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PATTERNS
OF PEACEMAKING

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PATTERNS OF PEACEMAKING

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“ It is becoming more and more clear that the peaceful order we hope to set up is not something that will spring quite suddenly out of a large conference. It will depend on the thought and work put into it before the war is over.

The meeting at Dumbarton Oaks should, therefore, be seen as part of a pattern of peace. The work was begun at Hot Springs and went on to Atlantic City and Bretton Woods. More meetings of the kind will be necessary as the pattern grows. But this is the right way to go to work.”

(*Lord Halifax*, broadcasting to the people of the United States,
on August 26, 1944.)

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PREFACE

This book began, at the end of 1943, as an attempt to make a systematic survey and analysis, as objective as possible, of the tendencies most likely to govern peacemaking. The authors intended to avoid making any specific recommendations of their own as to how the labours of peacemaking should be undertaken, and to confine themselves to a study of how they were likely to be undertaken in the light of past experience, contemporary proposals, and the present alignment of political powers in the world. But in the process of study, discussion and writing, all three authors arrived at certain more definite conclusions. At the same time, the course of events and the increasingly clear trend of official policies seemed to justify more positive assertions and more constructive suggestions than had at first been thought possible. The book, therefore, takes its present hybrid form : of systematic analysis carried forward to certain statements and even recommendations. It is hoped that it has gained and not lost thereby : and that no conclusions have been pressed further than both the analysis and events themselves justify. If these hopes be realized, the book may be more than a mere record of the movement of opinion during the closing phases of the Second World War.

It has been found convenient to use certain words which have acquired well-established usage in political and sociological writing : such as " patterns of settlement ", " climate of opinion ", " utopian ideas ", and the rest. The authors realize both the dangers and the temptations of such metaphors and jargon. But they have tried to give them precise and consistent meanings, and to avoid their abuse. Their justification is the difficulty of finding terms which more scientifically describe the conceptions involved.

There are very obvious difficulties and handicaps in the writing of such a book amid the tempo of modern affairs. To keep pace perfectly with events, and to avoid being out of date even before publication, is a superhuman labour worthy of Sisyphus. To devote equal attention to the background of peacemaking in Great Britain, the United States, Soviet Russia, and all the other members of the United Nations would lead to a book of intolerable bulk : therefore the spotlight has been focused more

on Great Britain than on any other. The authors dare not hope to have succeeded in every detail. But it is hoped that the approach has been broad enough, the method objective enough, to make the book not entirely worthless after that time-lag between writing and publication which is now inevitable for even the kindest and most efficient of publishers. A postscript does something to alleviate this difficulty.

PATTERNS OF PEACEMAKING

INTRODUCTION

GETTING WHAT WE WANT

The victory of the United Nations over the forces of tyranny in Europe and Asia brings to all believers in the ideas and ideals of democracy the opportunity and the duty of restating those ideals in terms most appropriate to our own times. There is everywhere the determination to give them new and more effective expression than after the last world war. Two tremendous questions loom ahead. What sort of New Order do we want? And how should we set about getting it?

Much has been said and written about the first of these questions. Less has been heard of the second. But behind public discussion of both there lies, in the heart of the ordinary citizen, the haunting, cynical suspicion that he heard once before about a "war to end war", the building of "homes fit for heroes", and the creation of a "brave new world". The high hopes of 1918 turned to ashes within twenty years, and from these ashes sprang the blazing, gesticulating Phoenix of the second world war. There lurks in the minds of our people the suspicion that the Phoenix is not such a *rara avis* after all: that from the rubble of London, Rotterdam and Warsaw, from the ashes of Stalingrad, Naples and Aachen, there may arise another Phoenix which is again not of their choosing. The disillusionment of the 1930's has not been forgotten. But if it be not dispelled, it may itself frustrate our present aspirations and paralyse our most strenuous efforts to make lasting peace.

This fear and suspicion find rational expression in the argument that one war leads to another. There is, indeed, a real sense in which the causes of wars are previous wars. There is a strand of direct cause and effect between Bismarck's wars which reached their climax in 1870 and the war of 1914: a strand which carries through to the war of 1939. The determination of Frenchmen to reverse the results of 1870 and to recover the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine was matched by the resolve of Bismarck and his successors to keep France isolated in Europe.

The interaction of these two policies produced the system of Great Alliances. The tensions and terrors induced by the Alliance system led to feverish competition in armaments, which bred still further fear and still more frantic friendships. The conviction that no nation could afford to lose its friends tied the more reluctant nations to the chariots of the more aggressive. When the edge of the precipice was reached in 1914, all were dragged down together into the first world war.

The victorious Powers imposed on Europe the pattern of peace calculated to be most favourable to themselves. Territorially it was a pattern in which a range of buffer-states was raised in the eastern marchlands of Europe against the new and mysterious menace of Bolshevism ; devised so as to serve the double purpose of encircling Germany, too, in the south-east, and linking up with France as the chief counter-weight to Germany in the west. This pattern was imposed with all the idealism generated by President Wilson's conception of the sacred national right of self-determination, and with all the realism derived from Clemenceau's resolve to guarantee France against resurgence of the Power from which he had just wrested Alsace and Lorraine. The mingled elements of idealism and realism were carried over into the policies of the various Powers towards the new-born League of Nations. To some it was the universal application of democratic principles : to others, a convenient means of preserving the fruits of victory : to others again, it was the symbol of national humiliation or neglected claims. From this medley of motives arose that broad division of Powers into " revisionist " and " anti-revisionist " States—called somewhat inaccurately the " Have-nots " and the " Haves ". From this division was born the present conflict.

These undeniable elements of continuity have led many to speak of this war as the continuation of the last. Field-Marshal Smuts has described the years since 1914 as a " Thirty Years' War ", and it has become common to speak of the inter-war years as the " twenty years' truce ". Yet it would be wrong to regard this chain of cause and effect as in any way inevitable. There are such strands in the rope of connection and causation, but they are not the only strands. There were points between the two wars, as there had been many points in 1919, when the links of cause and effect could have been broken, and the whole trend of events given a quite different twist. It is arguable that even as late as 1936, when Hitler laid the necessary basis for all

his later aggressions by occupying and remilitarizing the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the power of Nazism could have been broken if France and Britain had acted together with decision and vigour. Certainly before 1936 greater wisdom and clear-sightedness might at many moments have altered the whole course of history. Mr. Churchill owed his immense prestige in 1940 to popular recognition that he had consistently urged a wiser policy at many of these moments. American readiness to break one of the strongest conventions of their Constitution and to re-elect President Roosevelt for a third term came largely from realization that he, too, had foreseen the menace, and had laboured to forewarn and forearm his country against it. Even basic imperfections in the machinery of the League did not determine its failure. As Mr. Robert Dell, one of the severest critics of the League, has remarked :

If all the States members of the League, and in particular the Great Powers, had been willing to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant as it stands, the League would have been quite able to check aggression or stop it when it occurred.¹

Unless the possibilities of a different development are fully appreciated and generally understood by public opinion ; unless men recover belief in their chance to choose and faith in their capacity to guide their own destiny in these things ; unless all feelings of fatalism and helplessness are destroyed, there lies ahead nothing but drift into another series of wars, which even the most wise and equitable of peace-settlements can do little to prevent.

What has been shaken is not popular confidence in the possibility of brilliant statesmanship or skilful improvisation—there have been plenty of examples of both. Nor is it faith in the values and virtues of democratic forms of government, nor the vision of what is most to be desired from the return of peace. The ideals set forth in the Atlantic Charter and in the speeches of leading statesmen from all the United Nations have won a large measure of agreement. The choice of means by which these ends must be sought naturally remain more in dispute : though already, in instruments such as the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, the Lend-Lease arrangements, and the Moscow Agreements of November, 1943, there are signs of very substantial agreement even here. What has been shaken most fundamentally is the optimistic nineteenth-century assumption that the develop-

¹ Robert Dell : *The Geneva Racket, 1920-1939* (1941), p. 318.

ment of scientific knowledge—in the social no less than in the natural sciences—enables men by the light of their own reason and ingenuity to dictate to fate. We have learned, to our cost, that our ability to create a Frankenstein is vastly greater than our capacity to control it. The fatality of the last peace breeds fatalism about the next.

Although we of the twentieth century are adults in the art of producing wealth and of waging war, we are still as children in the art of utilizing wealth and of making peace. We have shown immense energy, resourcefulness and enterprise in developing the technique of production and warfare. By the use of advanced scientific research-methods, of subtle economic inventiveness, skilled administration and management, and new forms of social and political organization, we have evolved entirely new means for generating, accumulating and concentrating power. In warfare the forces of freedom and democracy have fortunately shown themselves superior to the forces of tyranny and dictatorship in the adoption and adaptation of these methods for the defence and promotion of their own ideals. The possibility of peace depends upon the triumph of these forces of freedom. But it depends, too, upon the capacity of democrats for showing the same resourcefulness, ingenuity and resolve in tackling the problems not only of warfare, but of welfare : not only of imposing our will on the enemy, but also of imposing our will on events.

Our most urgent need, in short, is to study the technique of peacemaking. Before that can even be started, we must examine with what justification there lurks the suspicion that it is almost impossible for us to “get what we want” out of a peace-settlement. If that remains in doubt, then all else is in vain. Nor can the doubt be easily dispelled. Recent experience casts too dark a shadow. Professor H. N. Fieldhouse has put the facts in a nutshell :

Our one agreed aim in 1914 was to break German militarism. It was no part of our original intention to break up the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, to create Czechoslovakia or resurrect Poland, to make a Russian revolution, to treble the size of Serbia and double that of Roumania, to create Iraq and Estonia and Lithuania and a Jewish National Home, or to give the keys of the Brenner and the Adriatic to Italy. Yet, in the outcome, all these things—and much else—sprang from the war . . . while the one thing which we promised ourselves, the destruction of German militarism, we failed to achieve.¹

¹ H. N. Fieldhouse : *Fortnightly*, June, 1940, pp. 580-1.

Decline of faith in the power of reason and resolve to mould the future takes diverse and even conflicting forms. The German crowds, bemused by the nightmare experience of dark, impersonal forces at work during the currency-crash of the 1920's and intoxicated by the hysteria of the Nazi mass-meeting, were enticed into surrendering control over their own lives into the hands of the medicine-men of dictatorship. They are one example of this tendency. The disciples of Lord Vansittart, panic-stricken with the fear of again "losing the peace" to German militarism, seek to exorcise their fears by driving out the whole German people as a scapegoat into the wilderness. They offer another example of the same tendency. For they simply invert the racial theories and superstitions of the Nazis, substituting Germans for Jews as the peculiarly perverted people who are to blame for everything. They, too, abandon hope in rational control and ignore the objective experience of earlier ages. There is nothing so much like a bump as a hollow : and both retard progress.

The nineteenth century is usually taken as the age of over-optimistic rationalism. But there is a curious time-lag between the advanced ideas of theorists and the immanent political assumptions of their own day. The idealist dialectic of Hegel and the materialist dialectic of Marx both tended to an argument of inevitability and fatalism. The writings of Darwin suggested an impersonal process at work which pre-conditioned man's life. The investigations of Freud and Jung explored the hitherto dark recesses of the subconscious and further depreciated rationality. The power of mass-suggestion and emotional propaganda made possible by inventions such as the cheap newspaper, the electrical amplifier and the radio, have let loose the irrational impulses of the mob and placed them at the disposal of the modern demagogues, who easily become demi-gods. But it has taken time for these changes to permeate habits of thought. The so-called optimistic rationalism of the nineteenth century derived in fact, by a process of delayed action, from the advanced thought of the eighteenth century. So has the pessimistic fatalism of the twentieth century derived from the advanced thought and the practical developments of the nineteenth century. Only during the last twenty-five years have the full effects of it become apparent in political behaviour. In 1918 the prevailing climate of opinion was still the doctrinaire, rationalistic liberalism of the mid-nineteenth century.

The change in the climate of opinion between 1918 and 1939 will inevitably affect the form and dynamic of a new world settlement. It is to be hoped that the most recent discoveries and methods in the natural sciences—especially in the realms of physical science and engineering—will modify the habits, methods and conceptions of the social sciences without this old, disastrous delayed action. This book starts with the belief that something at least can be done to achieve this result at the next peace settlement, and that more scientific control over men's social and political environment can be achieved.

The framework of this control can already be traced in the plans for scientific medical relief and food distribution at the end of the war. The theory of such control has already been developed by a variety of writers and thinkers who have cast overboard derelict mental apparatus and tried to think again on new lines.¹ By analysing the operative forces in society and the ideals men hold, and trying to assess their strength, they claim that "laws of social dynamics" can be stated: and that they can be stated accurately enough to give a real measure of control over transition. In short, we really can get what we want. We do not merely have to wait for "what is coming to us".

Getting what we want demands a fusion of power and purpose. It has been well said that if "purpose without power is a dream, power without purpose is a nightmare". In the building of Hitler's New Order the pursuit of power for its own sake has conditioned the social, economic, political and ideological structures of this alleged "New Order", moulding them and changing them to meet new situations. The quest for power culminated in the mastery of the continent by Nazi bands, and Hitler's world Utopia meant the wielding of power by an *élite*:

There will be a Herren-class . . . , there will be a great hierarchy of party members. There will be a new middle class. And there will be the great mass of the anonymous, the serving collective, the eternally disfranchised, no matter whether they are members of the old bourgeoisie, the big land-owning class, the working class or the artisans. . . . But beneath them there will still be the class of subject alien races. . . . In my *Ordensburg* a youth will grow up before which the world will shrink back. A violently active, dominating, intrepid, brutal youth.²

¹ See especially, R. Niebuhr: *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932); E. H. Carr: *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) and *Conditions of Peace* (1942); K. Mannheim: *Ideology and Utopia* (1936), *Man and Society* (1940). Cf. pp. 150 and 180, below, and Chapter V, *passim*.

² H. Rauschnig: *Hitler Speaks* (1939), pp. 50, 247, etc.

Such an "ideal" is the garish, tawdry nightmare of "power without purpose" in which the citizens of occupied Europe have lived and worked during the war. And though a British, or an American, or a Russian use of "pure power" would be different in form,¹ peace based on such barren premises would hold little promise for the future, and would be a betrayal of all the individual sacrifices war has entailed.

But similarly a sense of purpose alone has proved inadequate to meet the demands of successful peacemaking.

The idealists were inclined to believe that power is immoral in itself, and that in any case history was in the process of gradually eliminating all power from politics. We were to look forward to the day when social organization of every kind would be a purely rational achievement—a result of the meeting of mind with mind. We admitted that power still had to be used, under circumstances, but we regarded its use as a temporary expedient.²

The attack on "power politics" before 1914, the campaign against secret treaties, the hatred of the holocaust between 1914 and 1918, the high hopes of world peace, did not in themselves produce a world where, to quote Mr. Day Lewis,

. . . Humankind stands forth
A mightier presence,
Flooded by dawn's pale courage, rapt in eve's
Rich acquiescence.³

Instead they merely left power in the hands of the unscrupulous, and allowed purpose to wither and die in face of strong men armed.

The jungle code and the hypocrite gesture?
A poppy wreath for the slain
And a cut-throat world for the living.⁴

The difficult fusion of power and purpose will be one of the central problems of the next peace: creative vision must have ordered power as its basis, if it is to be transformed into effective achievement.

* * *

Such a fusion of power and purpose can be achieved only

¹ Bertrand Russell has analysed the various forms of power, which he regards as "the fundamental concept in social science, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics". See his *Power: A New Social Analysis* (1938).

² R. Niebuhr: *Power as the Instrument of Justice*: broadcast talk printed in *The Listener*, 24th June, 1943.

³ C. Day Lewis: *Word Over All* (1943). ⁴ *Ibid.*, "Will it be so again?"

against an historical setting. The pattern of peacemaking for the future must partly, at least, grow out of past patterns, if only because they have themselves done so much to mould present conditions and present conceptions. The most impressive feature of peacemaking in the past has been the enormous disparity between what the makers of peace settlements have set out to achieve and what in fact resulted from their work. The road to the present is strewn with unfulfilled intentions. But the authors have tried to show that it would be a fallacy to draw from this fact over-pessimistic conclusions about the fate of the next peace settlement. Any settlement must be the product of a particular set of historical circumstances, and the problem is how these circumstances can most perfectly be influenced and controlled so as to favour the establishment of a lasting order.

It must be constantly recognized that the final settlement which emerges from the present war will inevitably be the result of a give-and-take compromise between the most powerful forces involved—the product of several complex parallelograms of forces among which the power of governments, the pledged purpose of national leaders, the existing conditions of the world at the time of the settlement, the desires of peoples and the activities of organized pressure-groups whether religious, political or economic in character, will probably be the most decisive. Because this is recognized, the main purpose of this book is to analyse these forces, to estimate their relative strength and probable tendencies, and to suggest forms of preparation, organization and procedure which will enable these forces in combination to produce a settlement with a good chance of enduring.

The authors have been more concerned to analyse and to make suggestions than to pronounce final judgements. It is not their main purpose to trace yet another blue-print for a new world-order, nor to decide what should be the particular forms of territorial, political or economic organization to be adopted by the peacemakers. If that were already known or generally accepted, there would be little need for a peace-conference: certainly there would be no need for this book. But those existing blue-prints of most desirable patterns of peacemaking which have behind them the support of influential forces or groups will themselves be one important factor conditioning the final settlement. They therefore have to be taken into account. Accordingly, a special section of the book (Chapter V) has been devoted to analysis of the main proposals which have emerged from

contemporary discussion. It is, of course, quite unlikely that any one of these schemes will find practical expression in its entirety. But, as has been shown, they are not always incompatible with one another ; and the very existence of so many schemes suggests that the final issue may be a compound of ingredients from more than one of them.

In the final interaction between historical developments pointing to certain features in the next pattern of peace, and strongly backed remedies prescribed by contemporary theory, the decisive factor will normally be yet a third force—the concrete situation in the world at the time of the peace-settlement. The whole set of circumstances prevailing during the peace-making—involving material conditions such as food-supply and transport facilities, and spiritual factors such as war-weariness, hatreds and idealistic visions, no less than the balance of political power-blocs—will act, so to speak, as the selective and sifting mesh through which more long-range tendencies and war-time aspirations must pass before they play a decisive rôle in the new pattern. Therefore these, too, have been estimated and described with as much regard for probability as present knowledge allows : and Chapter VI has been devoted to this task. The “growing pattern” of peacemaking machinery which has been evolved step by step during war is the vital link between war and peace : it is described in Chapter VII. The four main typical patterns which seem most likely to emerge from this complex and only partially calculable process have been defined in Chapter VIII. Of the four, the pattern of a revised League of Nations has emerged during the last phases of the war as the most generally favoured solution, although it will no doubt be supplemented by various forms of functional machinery. It is evident, too, that the four patterns described are distinct only in logical content and not in practical application. Perhaps the most durable settlement would be compounded of a judicious selection of certain ingredients from all four.

Although the broad division is between the “technique” and the “substance” of peacemaking, it is a central thesis of the whole argument that ends and means are vitally interconnected. Technique and method of procedure are as important for peacemakers as a clear vision of probable and desirable ends : and most important of all is the relation between ends and means. On the one hand the substance of the settlement must be largely conditioned and determined by the method of arriving at the

settlement : ends must be adjusted to the available means and to prevailing conditions if they are to be attainable at all. On the other hand, there must be the greatest ingenuity in devising means adequate for the desired ends, if intentions are to be substantially fulfilled. To suggest some ways of harmonizing desirable ends and available means is the chief purpose of this book. If political theory be the study of the desirable, political science is the study of the possible : to marry political theory with political science is the underlying principle of what has been written. Therefore the first three chapters have been devoted to discussion of the technique of peacemaking and its proper adaptation to the patterns of settlement most likely to emerge from this war. They describe some of the problems of the whole transition from war to peace ; the legacy of war-time experience and promises ; the difficulties of material and psychological adjustment ; the problems involved in the holding of international conferences ; and the special question of how to treat the vanquished countries. Unless these preliminary problems are satisfactorily settled on a coherent plan which is in harmony with the pattern of final settlement, many intentions will certainly be again frustrated in the event. We cannot dictate the decisions of the peacemakers, but we can indicate certain conditions to which they must conform if they want to make their decisions effective in the post-war years.

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In this connection, there is one general principle so central to every stage of the argument that it can best be stated first in general terms. It is perhaps the most elementary, yet the most frequently neglected, of those general sociological principles which Mr. Russell calls "the laws of social dynamics". It may be called the principle of "polarity in politics", since it has some affinities with that law of magnetism that every charge induces an equal and opposite charge in adjacent objects. It is neglect of this law which is most frequently the explanation why political intentions get frustrated in their final results.

It has become a commonplace amongst historians that neither the Reformation nor the Counter-Reformation succeeded in its aims, but that both Calvin and Loyola were historically fighting the same losing battle. Each strove to build a theocratic order of society, a "Church-State", and each was the champion of a rigid orthodoxy. Yet the historical outcome of the clash

between Reformation and Counter-Reformation was the one result which both would have abhorred—the powerful tendency to establish a “State-Church”. If religious toleration and civil liberty grew up, it was precisely because both sides had resisted these ideas—because the long series of religious wars which sprang from their mutual intolerance led through exhaustion to the rise in most countries of a *politique* party, asserting that “the State must not perish for conscience’s sake”. The secular nation-state was the product of supra-national religious zeal.¹ Thus arose the *politique* monarchy of France with its cult of *étatisme*; the religious compromises of Augsburg and Westphalia in Germany; and that Elizabethan church-settlement in England which, though still thought of as a compromise between the desires of Catholics and Protestants, was in its Erastianism a third alternative unsought by either.

Most of the great social and political upheavals in history offer further illustration of a similar process. The clash between Cavaliers and Roundheads in seventeenth-century England produced a temporary triumph for each, but resulted in the eventual triumph of a compromise settlement—1688—which would not have satisfied either side in the Civil War. The conflict between the forces of the French Revolution and the forces of reaction led first to the despotism of Napoleon, which neither had wanted; and eventually, through the second cycle of experiments with Monarchy, Republic and Empire between 1815 and 1870, to the foundation of the Third Republic as a compromise “form of government which divides us least”. The plans for world revolution and proletarian dictatorship laid by Communist movements and the three “Internationals” did not result in the establishment of a communist order in any country outside the U.S.S.R. They only contributed to the growth of Fascist movements in one country after another. As Professor Brogan has picturesquely put it: “No gangsters could have invented better stooges than the Comintern has provided for Hitler and Mussolini.”² Indeed, all who cherish the ideals of democracy have good reason to be grateful to the working of the principle of polarity in politics. For the eventual clash between these rival forces has not only brought democrats a mighty ally in their opposition to fascism, but has already done much to change the

¹ For elaboration of this historical paradox see H. Butterfield: *The Whig Interpretation of History* (1931).

² D. W. Brogan: *Is Innocence Enough?* (1941), p. 10.

nature of communist rule more in the direction of democratic development, and of sympathy with democratic ideals.

Yet, despite the frequency with which this principle operates, there is always some element in history which can only be called chance. There is also the factor of human will. Not every revolution is frustrated or offset by a correspondingly powerful reaction. Prudence, timely compromise, political wisdom can play a great part in minimizing the friction of change. There have been phenomena such as "conservative revolutions", like the American Revolution which Mr. Peter Drucker has described as a "conservative counter-revolution".¹ There is never merely one broad dialectical process which can be defined in simple, clear-cut terms: but rather many interwoven and intersecting dialectical processes. The relevance of historical study for the political scientist is that he must analyse the strongest of these processes, examine their points of intersection and significant overlap, and gauge from his conclusions the probable total direction in which events are moving. Any attempted predictions or simple analysis of current trends not based upon such scientific analysis are of small value. Even conclusions drawn from such analysis must be tentative and liable to constant revision. But only on this basis can rational choice be exercised; and hope of controlling the future so as to "get what we want" can depend on nothing else.

Such are the main principles on which peacemakers must set about their task if they wish to make their decisions effective. These general principles of political action are not, it should be noted, dependent for their validity on whether or not men choose to regard them as true. They are given facts, governing the manner of procedure and the methods of operation upon which policy must proceed if it is to be effective. They do not, like so many political conceptions, cease to be important because men refuse to believe them. If ignored, they merely work so as to produce consequences different from men's intentions. But there are, in addition, further conditions which can be formulated as limiting men's choice of policies in substance no less than in technique. It is not possible, when so many imponderables are involved, to specify in detail courses which must or must not be followed. Yet it is possible to lay down a general framework of what might be called "the inevitable pre-requisites of a durable peace-settlement" in modern times. It is advisable to speak of

¹ Peter Drucker: *The Future of Industrial Man* (1943): Chapter 8.

minimum requirements rather than of maximum demands. It is simple, but Utopian, to prepare plans for all the desirable conditions of perpetual peace. It is less optimistic but more hopeful to limit the task of our peacemakers to that of providing peace for those generations at present alive. That liability is immense enough, and we are too prone to legislate for future generations whose will we cannot share and whose outlook and conditions we know nothing of. If we set a good example during our own time, future generations will learn quickly enough from that example to solve their own problems. So wherever, in the pages that follow, the authors speak of "durable peace", they do not refer to more than the duration of life of people at present alive.

What then, within these limits, are the definable pre-requisites of durable peace? It has become common to speak of "the peace-loving peoples" on the one hand and (as in Point 8 of the Atlantic Charter) of those "nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression". It is true that, at any given moment, nations may well fall into one or other of these categories, according to how well or ill they are satisfied with the existing *status quo*. But all nations will be simultaneously "peace-loving" only when there is nothing that any of them wants more than it wants peace. The membership of each group is not fixed but fluctuating, so that the aggressor of to-day may become "peace-loving" quite suddenly—either because it has satisfied all its desires, such as Great Britain and the U.S.A.; or because it abandons its ambitions, such as France after 1815; or because it is so exhausted that it cannot yet challenge the conditions it detests, such as Germany after 1918. Overwhelming defeat and exhaustion can serve as a permanent purgative of expansionist ambitions, as they affected Sweden after the reign of Charles XII. Unfortunately, formerly "peaceful peoples" can also become "aggressor-nations": as witness the southern German States under the guidance of Prussianism and Nazism, or the people of Italy under the lead of Fascism. Former allies become enemies, former enemies become allies. There is not merely a division into "Have-nots" and "Haves", revisionists and anti-revisionists: but also into ambitious and pacified, restive and acquiescent, potentially aggressive and potentially peace-loving. And there is no historical evidence for assuming that any nation is devoid of the capacity for becoming either one or the other.

From these facts two sets of conclusions may be drawn. First, that in order to make a durable peace-settlement some provision

should be made for compelling potential aggressors, wherever they may arise, to "keep the peace". It must be inferred, so long as there are some things which some nations will value more highly than keeping the peace, that durable peace must involve the power of coercion. The power of coercion depends partly upon the existence of an organization for applying coercion, and partly upon the readiness of the community to support and participate in coercive action : neither is likely to be for long effective without the other. The most desirable (because the most completely effective) conditions are that the organization for coercion should be permanently established, so that its action can be certain, immediate and decisive : and that communal approval and support for its action should be universal and automatic so that aggression may be deterred and prevented by the inevitability of its failure. The minimum pre-requisites are that organized coercion should be promptly improvised and applied : and that such action should be given an approval general enough and a support powerful enough to repel aggression. It is impossible to predict just how much more than the minimum and how near to the desirable maximum we can get at the next peace-settlement. The possibilities and probabilities are discussed later in Chapter VIII. We should be foolish to reject the minimum, as some Utopians would do, because we cannot get the maximum. But we must remember that nothing less than the minimum stated will be of any use at all. The remoteness of war will be measured by the extent to which we approximate towards the maximum.

The second set of conclusions which may be drawn is that a durable peace must depend upon minimizing the number and magnitude of those issues for which peoples are willing to "break the peace". A coercive organization must accept the disharmonies which exist, and merely secures that they do not take the form of widespread war. Repression, however necessary, does not remove the disharmonies themselves. It may well be, in a world of nationalist enthusiasms, that some disputes are insoluble and some grievances irremovable without creating equal grievances. But unless most soluble disputes are settled and most removable grievances removed, the balance between potential aggressors and potential peace-lovers will become so equal that attempted coercion either becomes ineffective or itself assumes the proportions of widespread war. To prevent this there must be, alongside the organization for coercion, an

organization of peaceful change : a machinery for conciliation, co-operation and mutual aid, to minimize that disharmony of interests and aspirations which produces wars. There must also be, alongside a general readiness to support the suppression of aggressors, a willingness to compromise where interests clash and to moderate nationalist claims. The maximum harmony would be a universal renunciation of war and an automatic submission to arbitration and conciliation, symbolized by general disarmament : the minimum requisite for preventing war would be the settlement of all disputes whose settlement is necessary to preserve the relative superiority of peace-keepers against war-makers.

In this way, the coercive and conciliatory aspects of peacemaking are functions one of the other. In minimum terms, the degree of international harmony and co-operation must not fall short of the degree to which aggrieved or aggressors can be suppressed : and deficiencies in the achievement of conciliation and co-operation must be adequately compensated by the coercive power available against peace-breakers. The less perfect is co-operation in the solving of disputes the more reliance must be placed on the use of force. Therefore, if we wish to minimize reliance on the domination of a power bloc, we must seek to maximize the extent of international co-operation and of national readiness to effect peaceful change. The failure of the League of Nations was due to the failure to close the gap between the greatest available coercion against aggressors and the greatest attainable reconciliation between conflicting interests and ambitions. So long as such a gap exists at all, war remains possible. The wider it is allowed to become, the more war becomes probable. The peacemakers can, in one sense, choose between the two possibilities and are free to choose how much they shall rely upon one rather than the other ; but they are free to reject one only in the proportion to which they accept the other.

But experience suggests that so long as the positive task of peacemaking is confined to the composition of rival claims between nations and between governments, it does not go deep enough. The claims of rival nationalisms are seldom completely reconcilable. The claim of Poland to have access to the Baltic and the claim of Germany to have a land-link with East Prussia cannot both be satisfied. During the present war the conviction has spread, and has been repeatedly expressed in the statements of all allied leaders, that peacemaking of the future must, if it

is to endure, think and plan in terms of individuals more than of nations.¹ In the past peacemaking has been—except for some few parts of the settlement of 1919—confined to the political plane and to national requirements. It has come to be recognized that the “world-wide” peacemaking of the future must be based on more satisfactory economic and social conditions for men and women everywhere. It must penetrate from the political plane far into the realms of social and economic conditions, by seeking freedom from fear and want for individuals. It must be concerned with the welfare of the individual inside his State at least as much as with the requirements of States and governments externally. In so far as a disharmony of interests between nations is a product of distress and discord inside nations, it is impossible to be concerned with the external disharmony alone, and to be indifferent to the internal affairs of each country.

It will later be discussed how far the principle of non-interference and of unlimited national sovereignty must be affected by the establishment of durable peace.² But meanwhile it must be noted that, since reliance upon coercion will be least when the harmonizing of interests is greatest, the price of peace without concerted international planning for social security and economic welfare would be reliance upon coercion as the main bulwark of peace: and coercion by an organization which, in so unco-operative a world, would probably have to be improvised with precarious support.

In short, the general pre-requisite of durable peacemaking is that we must regain faith in man's capacity for self-determination through rational control and scientific organization, without resuming the fallacy of a natural or automatic “harmony of interests” in international affairs.³ The condition of peace may be likened to the condition of health in the individual. It is, in essence, a harmonious relationship between the parts of the whole. And such a harmony or healthy co-ordination cannot exist internationally unless it exists nationally: nor nationally unless it exists internationally. If one part is sick, or diseased, or undernourished, then discord creeps in. We are indeed members one of another, even in an economic and political sense. Greed or starvation, indulgence or neglect, result in ill-health. When such ill-health reaches epidemic proportions as in the

¹ For fuller discussion of this, see Chapter IX, below.

² Chapter VIII, below.

³ For a critique of the applications and implications of the idea of a “natural harmony of interests”, see E. H. Carr: *The 'Twenty Years' Crisis*.

competition in armaments and the alliance-system of 1914, or the world economic crisis of 1931, or the world political crisis of 1939, then war is in sight. To those who would argue that war is the *Stahlbad der Nation*, the answer is that only a sick man seeks such treatment, and that iron may enter into the soul : to those who plead that " war is inherent in human nature ", the answer is that so also is every sort of mental, moral and physical disorder, which in no way deters us from making strenuous efforts to overcome such afflictions. Human nature should not be blamed for what is merely human behaviour. The most important characteristic of human nature is neither its inherent goodness nor its inherent wickedness, but its immense variety and variability. It is the task of the twin and interdependent sciences of psychology and sociology to study, and so to enable men to decide, which impulses and what sort of environment should interact to produce a particular kind of human behaviour. The harmony of interests which durable peace requires must be planned, organized and deliberately built up, with all the help that psychology and sociology and political science can give.

If this be the requisite approach to peacemaking, the substantial pre-requisites of a durable peace-settlement may be listed under four headings.

(1) On the level of physical force and coercive power, there must be a superiority of organized force and the will to apply it amongst those nations which want to keep the peace, as against those who cherish aims for which they are willing to break the peace. Such a force is most effective when planned and held permanently ready, and least effective when it has to be improvised after the challenge has been thrown down by the aggressor.

(2) On the level of material conditions and economic welfare, the clash of claims and interests which tend to produce war will be kept at a minimum when, in each nation, individuals and their families have a sense of social and economic security : that is, when none is afflicted with fear of want, unemployment, or sickness, and none feels that his national society or the international community is indifferent to his personal fate.

(3) On the level of political organization, a harmony among nations is best created and preserved not by a balance of power between blocs with conflicting interests, but by the concerted effort of all to effect peaceful change and to settle international disputes by conciliation. This condition, in turn, is best achieved when internal political arrangements, too, are based less on a

“balance of powers” or on the domination of one group, and more on the operation of responsible government backed by an educated public opinion.

(4) On the level of individual psychology and education, the interests of durable peace are best served by the restraint or sublimation of impulses of aggressive nationalism and racial superiority, and the encouragement of wider loyalties extending beyond the single nation-state. Such tendencies are necessary if men are to perceive and work for that systematic harmonizing of interests on which durable peace depends.¹

These four general pre-requisites are tabled here, somewhat dogmatically, for the convenience of the reader. It is not suggested that the perfect fulfilment of each or any of them is essential for durable peace, in the sense defined above. But they are *desiderata* to which the substance of peacemaking must approximate if it is to endure at all: and the durability of a peace settlement will be measured by that approximation. We may have peace for one generation—the peace of exhaustion—without any of them. We are not likely to get peace for two generations without a substantial approximation towards most of them.

¹ Amongst the extensive literature on the subject of the psychology of war and peace, the following works may be consulted: Mark May: *The Social Psychology of War and Peace* (1943); Edward Glover: *War, Sadism and Pacifism* (1933); M. J. Adler: *How to Think about War and Peace* (1943); John Dollard et al.: *Frustration and Aggression* (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, 1944); Q. Wright: *A Study of War* (2 Vols., 1942); W. A. Brend: *Foundations of Human Conflicts* (1944); A. M. Meerloo: *Total War and the Human Mind* (1944).

PART I

THE TECHNIQUE OF PEACEMAKING

CHAPTER I

THE CLIMATE OF PEACEMAKING

§ 1. *How different from last time?—nationalism in 1919 and now : an “ international civil war ” ? : public interest in problems of peacemaking : interest of the services : secret agreements of 1918 absent now ? : Lend-Lease.*

§ 2. *How similar to last time?—the widening scope and increasing intensity of “ total war ” : the growing share of public opinion in peacemaking : armistice hysteria and war-hatreds : economic and social dislocation : the maintenance of war-time controls : the more “ positive State ” growing from “ total war ”.*

§ 3. *Some lessons learnt : international co-operation to liquidate the results of war : national planning : demobilization last time and now : prisoners of war and deported workers : precautions against economic depression : deferred purchasing power : political dangers and “ Khaki elections : the rôle of Russia.*

§ 4. *Summary and conclusions : psychological conditions : social conditions : economic conditions : political conditions.*

§ 1. HOW DIFFERENT FROM LAST TIME ?

The general environment in which peacemaking will take place after this war will be in many ways different from last time. There was little attempt last time to secure that nationalism should be transcended or superseded by larger loyalties : little belief, except among a few outstanding individuals and small groups, that “ patriotism is not enough ”. It is true that pacifists were persecuted and gagged in many countries. But they believed that patriotism was too much. International Socialism—the Second International—broke down at the very start of war : and the murder of Jaurès in August, 1914, was symbolic of the breakdown of internationalism as both a movement and an ideal.¹ The war became more nationalistic as it went on, until the very basis of the peace settlement itself was that principle which had been proclaimed by President Wilson as “ an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril ” : national self-determination. The President’s “ Fourteen Points ”, contrary to popular belief, were concerned little with lofty ideals of humanitarianism but rather with quite specific undertakings that States should be made more perfect

¹ See also below, Chapter IX, § 4.

nation-States. And the League of Nations was based on acceptance of the sovereign, territorial nation-State as the unit of all modern diplomacy, politics and social life. The peace-settlement and the League were the apotheosis of the secular, sovereign national community as the basis of all international action.¹

This war began less as a war of nationalism than as a war of defence against fascism. During the decade of the 1930's, men had become accustomed to the idea of an "international civil war", involving a battle between the forces of liberalism, democracy, socialism on one side, and the reactionary forces of fascism and totalitarian dictatorship on the other. Experience of the Stavisky Riots and the *Cagouard* Plot in France, of the Spanish Civil War in which Axis intervention and the International Brigade played so great a part, of general strikes and fascist agitation in almost every country, all seemed to indicate the breaking up of the nation-State as the highest focus of men's loyalties. Writers had written as if the wars of nationalism were past, and all future wars would be civil wars between conflicting ideologies.² The notion that war and revolution are inseparable in modern times became widely accepted as a dogma.³ And when Nazi "fifth column" activities (a term significantly coined during the Spanish Civil War) spread throughout all Germany's neighbours and even across the Atlantic, these notions seemed to be abundantly borne out. The fall of France in 1940 was readily interpreted as due to fifth column and to the conviction, among the bulk of France's ruling classes, that they would be "better with Hitler than Blum". The Communists alone—and they somewhat hesitatingly and only until Soviet Russia was attacked—proclaimed this to be an "imperialist war" of the familiar kind.

The importance attached to propaganda as a weapon of war still further encouraged these beliefs. Political warfare means appealing above the heads of national governments to the people of the enemy State—appealing for revolution to end the war. It was not startling for "Scipio" to write, in 1940, a book about propaganda and the fifth column called *100,000,000 Allies*—

¹ Cf. Sir A. Zimmern : *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (1936), especially Part II ; and David Thomson in *Political Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, January, 1937.

² Cf. J. Langdon Davies : *Behind the Spanish Barricades* (1936). "There will never again be a united nation fighting against another nation. War from now on will involve civil war."

³ Cf. F. W. Fodor : *The Revolution Is On* (1941) ; E. H. Carr : *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, Chapter 14, and *Conditions of Peace*, Chapter I ; H. J. Laski : *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (1944), *passim*. Francis Williams : *War by Revolution* (1940).

if we choose. The exaggerated importance which all belligerents attached in the early years of the war to propaganda as a weapon was not justified in practice.¹ It under-estimated the cohesive force of national sentiment, the difference between propaganda carried on within a national community by its own government and propaganda which could be dubbed, from the first, the "voice of the enemy". The most powerful propaganda of the whole war proved to be the steady supply of reliable news and information provided by the B.B.C. for peoples of the German-occupied territories—that is, for people already fired with a spirit of national resistance to German oppression. Revolutions, when they came, were revolutions against the national oppressor: though in so far as they are also revolts against the classes and conditions which had helped to make national defeat possible, their truly revolutionary character may appear only during the period of peacemaking. The writers of the 1930's have not yet been proved wrong in identifying war with revolution: they may only have antedated the effects which they described.

The short-term effect of this war, however, has been to breed not revolution but a more fervent nationalism. In none of the defeated enemy States has it precipitated more than a political revolution by gradual stages, as in Italy: ² or a simple change of government, as in Bulgaria, Roumania and Finland. In Germany and Japan, the effect has been ever more strenuous—but largely successful—efforts to preserve and intensify national solidarity. In the occupied countries, national feelings have been stirred and canalized by resistance to German domination, just as the empire of Napoleon aroused a tide of nationalism which surged throughout Europe for the next generation. In the other allied countries, the total nature of war, the greater intimacy of the effects of war for every citizen, the experience of bombing and blockade have likewise brought closer and more self-conscious national unity.

Yet the nationalism so aroused is different in character from the nationalism of 1914-18. There is little belief that "patriot-

¹ Cf. Wickham Steed: *The Fifth Arm* (1940); Kingsley Martin: *Propaganda's Harvest* (1941); Bernard Causton: *The Moral Blitz* (1941), and many other pamphlets and articles of these years. For the development of propaganda in the war of 1914-18, see H. D. Lasswell: *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927); Sir Campbell-Stuart: *Secrets of Crewe House* (1920); Brigadier-General Sir George Cockerill: *What Fools We Were* (1944). There would seem to have been an unwitting conspiracy between Hitler and the former officials of Crewe House to exaggerate the rôle of British propaganda last time.

² See below, Chapter VI, § 2.

ism is enough". The twenty years' crisis and the twenty years' truce have together implanted the general belief that nationalism cannot be an end in itself: that peace cannot be found in isolation or in neutrality; and that war springs not from imperfections in national unity as men believed true in a territorial sense in 1919,¹ or in an ideological sense in 1939. It is widely believed, as will be shown below,² that international co-operation on the purely political and diplomatic level is not enough, either: but that internationalism must be concerned with social conditions, economic policies and cultural co-operation, and must transcend national loyalties and national organization, even while comprising and satisfying nationalist aspirations, for security and prosperity. In this way, the climate of opinion will be very different from the climate of opinion in 1919. Last time, the settlement was the culmination of nineteenth-century enthusiasm for "national unification". This time, it will be the culmination of twentieth-century enthusiasm for "national liberation"—liberation not only from fear but from want. That will be the most fundamental difference.

Other elements in the present situation will help to intensify this difference. People in all the United Nations have been made to think more—and to start thinking earlier and more systematically—about problems of peacemaking. The profound heart-searchings prompted by the tragedy of two world wars in one generation: the background experience of prolonged political and economic crisis in the years between these two wars: the early direction of men's thoughts towards social and economic reconstruction by declarations such as the Atlantic Charter and the great speeches of President Roosevelt and other American leaders: ³ the need to undertake extensive reforms even during war itself: ⁴ all have paved the way for a more interested and well-informed public opinion about peacemaking than existed in 1919.⁵ The existence of radio, whereby the voices of ally and

¹ It is clear, from his Fourteen Points, his "Four Principles" of February 11, 1918, and from his other speeches, that President Wilson pinned much of his hope for a permanent peace on tidying up national frontiers so as to identify "nation" and "State" and "territory" as perfectly as possible.

² Chapter VII.

³ See Appendix I, A, for full text of the Atlantic Charter. President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" were part of a vast wave of idealism which includes the ideas of Henry Wallace's *Century of the Common Man* and Sumner Welles' speeches.

⁴ E.g., such far-reaching reforms as, in Britain alone, the Social Security plan, Education Act, National Health Service, etc.

⁵ Despite much war-time discussion of peacemaking last time, victory came as a surprise in 1918.

enemy, no less than of national leaders, are brought into the home of the ordinary citizen (and whereby he can, through first-hand war reports, share by proxy in the very atmosphere of battle), constantly focuses public attention on the day-to-day events and the permanent issues of the war and of the peace. In Britain the fighting services themselves afforded new forms of political education, and new opportunities for political discussion through such organizations as the Army Bureau of Current Affairs and the Army Education Corps have been encouraged to give attention and thought to political, social and economic problems. Despite all shortcomings, the armies of Soviet Russia, the United States and the British Commonwealth are more completely citizen armies to-day than ever before : armies with the interests of civilians in full employment, social security and economic prosperity after the war.¹ This cannot but have a powerful influence on the making of peace.

In so far as these widespread popular interests and this new popular education open the door to individual thought, it makes for more rationality in peacemaking. But in so far as it merely gives facilities for propaganda, it perhaps makes nationalist doctrines and emotions easier to impart. One striking feature of the fourth and fifth years of war in Britain, at least, was popular concentration on "the German problem"—and the dissemination of semi-racial conceptions of Germany as the eternal "butcher-bird" of history. A little education is a dangerous thing, winning credulity for pseudo-scientific notions and plausible historical "interpretations". The very intensity of popular interest in—and demand for—greater social security and economic prosperity is a temptation to politicians to divert popular attention away from the complex and difficult problems of domestic reconstruction, towards other much simpler and more easily attainable objectives, such as the punishment of war criminals, the disabling of the enemy, reparations and retribution.

The actual effects of the above considerations on the character of the next settlement are thus difficult to predict. Last-moment

¹ Cf. G. M. Trevelyan : *English Social History* (1942), p. 586 : "The battle of Waterloo was won, not on the playing fields of Eton, but on the village greens of England. The men who fought in the ranks on June 18th, 1815, were little educated but they had the qualities of countrybred men. To-day we are urban and educated. The flyers of the R.A.F. are not and could not be the product of rural simplicity. If we win this war, it will have been won in the primary and secondary schools." The same is true of the Red Air Force, the U.S. Air Corps, and the *Luftwaffe*.

In the United States, Senators have the initiative in the appointment of recruits for West Point : thus ensuring the widest national distribution and selection of the officer corps in the American Army.

developments have the power to twist national sentiment and popular demand in one direction or another : and the situation remains malleable until the very last stages of peacemaking. This is further reason for the most thorough and careful investigation of the forces at work, if they are to be in any way consciously controlled for good, instead of being allowed to drift haphazard into evil.

Conscious control and direction of events is made easier by one further important difference between this time and last. There are no secret agreements or treaties this time amongst the allies, no hidden engagements to neutrals or former enemies.¹ Mr. Eden has given British assurance of this in the House of Commons. This is due not merely to respect for the principle which President Wilson placed first among his Fourteen Points—the desirability of “open covenants openly arrived at”. There has been little or no need in this war to bribe countries to enter the war by secret promises and concessions. No great countries, except Britain, her Dominions and France, have entered the war until they themselves were directly attacked or (like Brazil) felt themselves directly threatened. Where a smaller country—such as Turkey—has had pressure put on her to sever relations with the enemy, such pressure has normally taken the form of diplomatic protests or economic assistance, not of territorial promises. Last time, the Treaties of London with Italy in 1915, and of Bucarest with Roumania, proved an entanglement and handicap to the peacemakers of Paris. They led to immediate disputes between Italy and Yugoslavia about Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, and to prolonged dispute between Russia and Roumania about Bessarabia, settled only in 1944 by the Soviet defeat of Roumania. Secret British and French promises of Constantinople to Russia (in return for which Russia promised to support French claims to the Rhineland) were prevented from causing further trouble only by the collapse of Russia in 1917.² This time the only comparable promises or offers of territorial concession have not been secret, and have been made at a late stage when they were certain of fulfilment and could be agreed among the United Nations as parts of the eventual settlement.³ The next peacemakers will confer unshackled, at least, by an

¹ Though tacit agreements to-day might play the part of pre-war secret pacts.

² Cf. R. B. Mowat : *History of European Diplomacy* (1927), Chapter IV.

³ The two most important examples are the definite promise of Transylvania to Roumania in the armistice of 1944, and the offer of Silesia to Poland in return for the eastern territory wanted by Russia. Cf. Crimean Declaration, Appendix I, G, below.

embarrassing tangle of secret engagements undertaken during war, and they will be backed by national opinion taken less by surprise than in 1918 by "the outbreak of peace".

Finally, a force of international range totally absent last time but far-reaching in importance this time, is the mechanism of Lend-Lease. Before, war-debts between allies haunted the post-war years, causing both economic dislocation and political friction. The operation of Lend-Lease, inevitably carrying forward far into the after-war years, will keep the Allies in close contact instead of encouraging their separation.¹ The principles of Mutual Aid have, and are meant by the makers of the Mutual Aid Agreements to go on having, significance for peace as well as for war. The conception of "mutual benefits" cuts across the old conceptions of commercial rivalry and financial competition: and though they encounter powerful forces of opposition, they are a sign of hope quite absent in 1919.

§ 2. HOW SIMILAR TO LAST TIME ?

But when full allowance is made for these important differences—indicative as they are that some former mistakes have been avoided and some omens are more auspicious—there are still many significant similarities between the climate of peacemaking now and before. And most significant of all is the effect of modern war itself on psychological, social and economic conditions.

The frame of mind in which peoples and their leaders approach peacemaking is conditioned by the duration and the character of total warfare. Modern wars leave a havoc of exhaustion on both sides. While the main enemy countries may fight on until they reach the extreme limits of strain and fatigue, the victorious Powers—especially if they have, like France and Russia, been in the very front line of battle and have known enemy occupation—are scarcely better off. The effect of a long war on a community has been likened to "prolonged fatigue in an individual, which takes from him the power to resist germs long latent in his body".² This war has lasted longer than the last, it has

¹ Cf. E. R. Stettinius : *Lend-Lease* (1944) : the detailed story of the working of Lend-Lease (and of "Lend-Lease in reverse") in its first two years, by the United States Administrator of Lend-Lease. "We know already that the principle of mutual aid in mutual self-interest that is embodied in the Lend-Lease Act must live on. To-day there is more unity of purpose and of action among freedom-loving peoples than ever before" (p. 271). Also *13th Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations* (1944). Cf. Appendix I, B, for Article VII of "Master Agreement".

² H. Nickerson : *The Armed Horde, 1793-1939* (1940), p. 10.

affected more countries than the last, and China, Britain, Russia and the United States have had to sustain a war-effort both more prolonged and more intense than last time. Although the initial casualty-lists of Britain, France and the United States have been smaller than before, it may well be that final figures will be little different, and the proportion of the population affected by war-strain will be greater. Thus, so far as the aftermath of war itself is concerned, there is little reason to expect it to be inherently different from last time. There will be the same drop in population, the same human grief and suffering, the same mental strain and emotional tension, when people come to consider the making of peace and the "liquidating" of war's effects.

Compared with all previous occasions, the last peace and this will be distinctive in their assumption that public opinion should play its part in the framing of the settlement. By 1918 the character of warfare had so changed that a war of four years mobilized public opinion and gave it power over peacemaking more spectacularly than a war of twenty-one years had done a century earlier. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, diplomats and foreign ministers of great dynasties could, as usual, make their peace comparatively quietly, paying little heed to public opinion at home.¹ In England, chief of the victorious Powers, political leaders like Whitbread or Sir Francis Burdett, concentrating on general opposition to "Tyranny", did not desire or attempt to stir up violent popular feelings of hatred or revenge towards conquered France.² In 1919, national leaders had to make peace against a background of popular clamour and criticism—an atmosphere sultry with cries of "Hang the Kaiser" and "Make Germany pay", and tense with grim French resolve that "the Boche" should be kept down by every means possible.

Yet it was in these very conditions that President Wilson, cherishing the belief that public opinion had become "more and more unclouded" and "enlightened", sought to give it the fullest control over peacemaking.

National purposes have fallen more and more into the background; and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the

¹ The novels of Jane Austen give some hint of how unperturbed was English life by this last of "the gentlemen's wars".

² After the news of Napoleon's flight from Elba, seventy-two members still voted with Whitbread against a revival of the war.

counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of poker and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a people's war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken.¹

The "clarified common thought" was Wilson's greatest illusion. The reasons for its absence in 1919 have a lesson for us to-day.

The trench warfare and submarine warfare of the years 1914-18 had involved extremes of misery and violent death reminiscent more of the Thirty Years' War than of nineteenth-century wars; and these horrors had involved large sections of the civilian population in Russia, France and Belgium. Atrocities of a kind familiar only in the Balkans in the nineteenth century had been perpetrated (and exaggerated) in western Europe. In enflaming public feeling about these atrocities, and about the cruelties inherent in trench and submarine warfare, the sensational press bore a special responsibility. In Britain—especially in the last stages of the war and the early months of the peace—the Northcliffe group of newspapers tended to abdicate any sense of responsibility. Hysteria rang through their editorials and headlines. Headings like "Hun food snivel" and the daily-repeated slogan "The Junkers will cheat you yet" were only part of a whole campaign to whip up popular hysteria and hatred. It succeeded, at a time when emotions were already unstable and feelings already enflamed by German war-conduct. A personal campaign against Lloyd George—largely dictated by the personal grievances of their proprietor—jeopardized the work of the Peace Conference. In Paris, the work of Wilson met a similar barrage of invective and abuse from French newspapers and magazines. Public opinion, far from being "enlightened", was laid at the mercy of sustained propaganda of an irresponsible kind. Only newspapers with a strong liberal tradition and a sense of duty to the public and the truth, gave sound news and fair criticism, and these papers had a relatively small circulation.

The responsibility of the press was shared by the politicians: and politicians who played with fireworks of jingoism and revenge found they could harry and carry the public more effectively than those preaching moderation and reason. The British khaki election of December, 1918, encouraged politicians who were returned on the "coupon" of "war-winners, peace-makers", to appeal to the worst elements in the psychological mood of the electorate. It is impossible to blame all politicians elected in

¹ September 27th, 1918. Speech at the opening of the Fourth Liberty Loan Campaign in New York.

1918, and it is certainly impossible to blame Lloyd George, who said at the beginning of the campaign, "We must not allow any sense of revenge, any spirit of greed, any grasping desire to overrule the fundamental principles of righteousness".¹ He went no further in his demands for reparations and retribution during the campaign than did his opponents. But the kind of demand which won loud applause was the famous plea of Sir Eric Geddes at Cambridge—to "squeeze Germany until you can hear the pips squeak".

If this was the climate of opinion in 1919, there is little likelihood that a fundamentally different opinion will prevail next time. It is true that the mistakes of 1919 are remembered, and people are more aware of the dangers of giving way to the irresponsible mood of a "Mafeking Night" or an "Armistice Night" of November 11. But on the other hand, the causes which produced a mood of hatred and revenge in 1918 have been multiplied and reinforced in this war. The atrocities committed by the enemy have been on a more vast and terrible scale than before: bombing has made the civilian population direct participants in the horrors of war: the resort by the enemy, in the later stages of the war, to the shooting of prisoners and indiscriminate bombing by means of flying bombs and rockets; the longer duration of the war itself: all these facts have enflamed bitterness and strengthened the natural desire for revenge and retribution. In the occupied countries, the cynical methods of German and Japanese administration—the collective reprisals on villages or towns or families, the shooting of hostages, the employment of forced labour, the brutalities of the Gestapo and of the Japanese army have implanted a burning hatred which more than one generation will remember, and which will demand satisfaction when Germany and Japan become powerless. The "forces of evil" of which Mr. Neville Chamberlain spoke in 1939 have had free rein in Europe and the Pacific for some years: evil will again beget evil, and all men can do is to minimize it in the cause of a rational, wise and durable peace.

Apart from such psychological effects of modern war, there are the effects of destruction and dislocation in economic and social life. These, too, will determine the climate of peacemaking even more than in 1919.² "War," said Edmund Burke, "never

¹ Quoted in *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (1938), Vol. I, p. 162.

² For further discussion of social and economic conditions, and of psychological factors, see below, Chapter VI, § 4.

leaves where it found a nation." To-day, the big-scale totalitarian wars which engulf the world give an impetus to radical change. The extent of State control of economic life and of State organization in social life, which was rapidly widening before 1939 to cope with the long-range effects of the last war, has been in every country immeasurably increased to meet the needs of fighting this war. In the United States, the "New Deal", which was designed to tackle the great economic depression and unemployment of the early 1930's, has paved the way for government direction or control of all main means of production and supply, transport and trade.¹ In Great Britain, traditional methods of improvisation went by the board, and the Emergency Powers Defence Act of 1940 prepared to mobilize thoroughly all national resources in the war effort. "It is necessary," said the Labour Party leader, Mr. Attlee, "that the Government should be given complete control over persons and property: not just some persons of some particular class of the community, but all persons, rich and poor, employer and workman, man or woman, and all property."² The conscription of all labour—of men and women; the device of heavy income tax and Excess Profits Tax; the requisitioning of property for service use, billeting of evacuees, and civil defence; the control of news and information through the Ministry of Information, censorship and the B.B.C.; all have carried the degree of government control in Britain during war far beyond that found necessary or permissible in 1914-18. In Soviet Russia, the advantages of State control of all economic life seem to have been re-affirmed by the astounding speed and efficiency with which the Soviet Union has not only recovered from early defeats and devastations, but has also inflicted overwhelming reverses on her invader. In France, since her liberation, a programme of progressive State control of the main means of production and transport has been begun,³ and French national economy will be more highly organized and controlled than before as the direct consequence of the war. Similar tendencies will doubtless show themselves in other countries as the needs for post-war reconstruction are tackled in liberated lands. War-time collectivism breeds post-war socialism: and central direction becomes a reality readily accepted by nations

¹ Cf. Part II of the Report of the National Resources Planning Board (1943), on *Wartime Planning for War and Post-War*.

² The House of Commons, May 22, 1940.

³ Coal-mines and the great Renault works were the first to be nationalized.

already grown accustomed to the restrictions and regimentation inherent in total war.

One way in which this process worked last time—and in which it will work similarly but more completely this time—is by the maintenance of actual war-time controls and organizations. Here, again, there is a conflict of impulses rather than any simple carry-over. The increasing use of national conscription places a greater burden on the mass of the ordinary citizens, and when war ends there is a natural revulsion against this supreme State interference with individual freedom. Nothing is more popular than demobilization—and with it goes an instinctive reaction against interference. In Britain, many regulations of D.O.R.A. were preserved until they became an absurdity, and few will be found to justify such a procedure or time-lag again.

But it would seem that beyond a certain point, familiarity with restrictions begins to be a habit, and they are accepted more passively as they become a normal part of everyday life. American public desire for the removal of restrictions such as rationing and State-direction of industry will probably be more vocal and active than in Britain, where rationing and control have been much more severe and drastic.¹ In Britain—and even more, of course, in the Soviet Union—it seems to have become widely accepted that such restrictions must go on for some considerable time after hostilities cease, for purposes of international relief and rehabilitation no less than for some aspects of national reconstruction. In any case, the cutting down of unessential industries and the dislocation of international trade which both the last and this war have brought about, cannot be undone without the formulation of comprehensive national and international policies governing economic life. In war the State in every country makes itself responsible for the development of new industries, the re-direction of supplies, equipment and labour to other forms of production, the control of transport, finance and foreign trade, prices and wages. The whole national economy is scrambled into a completely new shape: and it cannot be unscrambled at all—it can only be directed into still another form, for which task the State must again make plans and exercise control.

¹ In September, 1944, the new Chairman of the War Production Board of the U.S.A. announced with gratification that some 350 out of 500 W.P.B. restrictions on American industry would be lifted as soon as Germany is defeated, and free enterprise would be encouraged again.

This was the lesson of the last war in Russia, where Lenin's "war-time communism" moulded the whole future development of State socialism in the Soviet Union ; in France, where industry assumed a new importance, unprovided for by the Third Republic constitution with its agrarian bias ; in Britain, where the dislocation and shrinkage of international trade forced upon her the devising of subsidies, preferences, marketing boards and Ottawa Agreements, and where the massive unemployment brought by the post-war slump gave new departments like the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Health and other "social service" machinery, a far-reaching and permanent place in her national life.¹

§ 3. SOME LESSONS LEARNT

This is a lesson learnt, and an experience repeated, in this war. State control in every country has increased enormously. Since the beginning of the war "the majestic, slow-moving force of the British Empire, which reaches its maximum momentum comparatively slowly",² has organized its resources to meet the needs of war—stimulated especially by the time when it stood alone against Germany. Apart from new Ministries created in London for the direction of practically every branch of national life,³ and such bodies as the Export Council set up in 1940 to regulate export trade, the machinery of Lend-Lease has linked up American economic strength and life with British, and indeed with that of every other allied nation, while the Combined Resources Boards have pooled British production with the products of other nations in a world-wide network of quota-controls and allocations. The "getting somewhat mixed up together" of which Mr. Churchill once spoke has gone on, with increasing momentum, as the war progressed. The operations of U.N.R.R.A., the Food and Agriculture Organization and

¹ Of the many writings on this subject, see especially : *Economic Organization for Total War* (International Labour Review, October, 1940) ; R. W. B. Clarke : *The Economic Effort of War* (1940) ; M. Nicholson : *How Britain's Resources are Mobilized* (1940). On the general problem, see further A. C. Pigou : *Political Economy of War* (1940) ; G. Crowther : *Ways and Means of War* (1940) ; G. Piatier : *L'Economie de Guerre* (1939) ; E. R. Walker : *Wartime Economics* (1939). On the experience of the last war, see especially Sir William Beveridge : *British Food Control* (1928) ; Sir J. A. Salter : *Allied Shipping Control* (1921).

² W. R. Scott : *Economic Problems of Peace after War* (1917), p. 15.

³ More particularly, the Ministries of Food, Supply, Information, Economic Warfare, Aircraft Production, Civil Aviation, Social Security.

similar bodies, will help to prolong this interdependence and regulation far into the post-war years.¹ The economic aftermath of this war will be not only greater in scope than before : there is also a more widespread demand that it should be more systematically tackled as a series of problems demanding from the first both national and international planning no less complete than the problems of winning the war.

This will be one supremely important respect in which the next peace, though tackling comparable problems, will differ from the last. By 1918 there were twenty inter-allied committees dealing with different commodities, all depending on the work of the pivotal Allied Maritime Transport Council which allocated shipping space, regulated the blockade, and acted as "the hub of the allied war machine".² But this international machine, as its Secretary, Sir Arthur Salter, described it, "was not an external organization based on delegated authority. It was the national organizations linked together for international work and themselves forming the instruments for that work".³ When this machinery was stopped at the end of the war, all that remained was the separate national economic policies of the various States.⁴ The economic committees of the League of Nations had to start again from scratch to build up international co-operation, and the war-time machinery was not carried over into them. Soon the spirit, too, had gone. Such a break is less likely to occur this time : and this will profoundly affect the whole climate of peacemaking.⁵

At the same time, it is more fully and widely recognized that the state of emergency does not end with hostilities : rather does a new kind of "state of emergency" begin, needing new adaptations of controls and national plans to meet fresh conditions of dislocation and disequilibrium in social and economic life. War has not decided fundamental social and economic issues which were pressing for solution before war began : it has only complicated them and increased their urgency. War has also, however, made conditions more malleable and men's minds more ready to consider a radical overhaul of their social and

¹ These organizations are dealt with fully below, Chapter VII.

² Sir A. Zimmern : *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (1939), p. 147.

³ Sir J. A. Salter : *Allied Shipping Control* (1921).

⁴ See H. B. Brodie and K. W. Kapp : *The Breakdown of Inter-Allied Economic Collaboration in 1919* (1941), and R. H. Tawney : *The Abolition of Economic Controls* (*Economic History Review*, No. XIII, 1943).

⁵ For the steps already taken to prevent such a break, see below, Chapters VI and VII.

economic system. It has renewed men's faith in what may be achieved by skilful organization and human resolve. War is not a solution for old problems, but only an instigation and an opportunity to tackle old problems, even in their new forms.

The cry so often heard in both Britain and America that controls should be lifted as quickly as possible after the war hides the claim to return to uncontrolled private enterprise and marks business fears of bureaucratic interference. The social conflict inside each nation remains unresolved, and may lead to a policy of "drift".¹ That the end (or even the approach of the end) of hostilities should bring the lifting of many petty restrictions such as black-out and civil-defence regulations, and the withdrawal of many emergency powers such as those given to the Home Secretary under Regulation 18B, is both natural and desirable in the interests of civil liberties.² That pressure for such relaxation should be confused with the demand for abolition of all national controls and all collective direction of economic life would be to risk a repetition of old mistakes. It is healthy that there should be constant and watchful criticism of all unessential and out-of-date restrictions. Bureaucracy has a tendency to maintain powers even while relaxing their use, and relics of unused emergency powers are always dangerous in a democracy. But it is vital to distinguish between out-of-date restrictions and reasonable controls.

Perhaps the greatest lesson learnt from the last time is the need for systematic and planned demobilization. This, too, is a problem created by total warfare, and little known or heeded before 1918. Adam Smith estimated that the civilized countries of his day could not support more than one per cent. of their populations as soldiers "without ruin by the country which employs them".³ In 1815, after the French wars, only thirty thousand English soldiers had to be reabsorbed into the country's economy. Before 1914 it was generally accepted that a large continental Power could mobilize up to ten per cent. of its population. But in both the last war and this, "the question

¹ Cf. the discussions in the *Sunday Times* "Post-War Forum" during August and September, 1944, and cf. below, Chapter V, § 3.

² Though even this kind of relaxation is opposed by some on strange social and political grounds, to judge by a letter in the *Northamptonshire Chronicle and Echo* of September, 1944: "A strong protest ought to be made against the abolition of fire-watching. We never asked to be put on fire-watching, and amends should have been made by asking us if we wished to be taken off. If a vote were taken 75 per cent. of the married men would vote in favour of continuing. I plead for its resumption on higher grounds—that it would be wonderful discipline for the working classes."

³ *Wealth of Nations* (ed. Cannan), Vol. II, p. 191.

of numbers became of greater importance in determining the balance of superiority between two nations approximately equal in spirit, education and material resources".¹ By 1917, between forty and fifty million men had been called up for naval and military service by the belligerent countries.² In this war, in most main belligerents, women as well as men have been subject to national call-up, and on the continent of Europe Germany has mobilized the labour of all occupied countries for war service either in German factories, or in national productive services directly subordinated to German war needs.³ Demobilization therefore assumes an importance in the climate of peacemaking much vaster, even, than in 1919.

Last time, in Great Britain, over three and a half million men were demobilized from the forces in the eighteen months after the armistice. The schemes of the Government to release key-men first was hardly successful.⁴ The universal desire to leave the forces as soon as the war was over, to get out of uniform and find civilian employment, triumphed over the plans of the Government. Demobilization was disorderly and unscientific, and the unregulated flood of labour into the market only further dislocated the already badly disorganized economic machine. It deepened the slump which followed the immediate post-war boom, and even in 1920 unemployment figures were rising among boot and shoe operatives, textile and clothing workers, and coal miners.⁵ Will "Civvy Street" after this war prove a more kindly and well-organized place than "Blighty" after the last?

In Britain, precautions have been taken from the first against chaotic demobilization. It was made compulsory for employers, wherever possible, to take back workers called up for national service. Employers were encouraged to make up to pre-war level the wages of employees who had entered the forces, thus giving the men a greater sense of security and employers a vested interest in taking them back after the war. This time the problem is made somewhat easier by the need to keep large numbers of men mobilized after German defeat, partly for pur-

¹ E. L. Woodward: *War and Peace in Europe* (1931), p. 23.

² W. R. Scott: *Economic Problems of Peace after War* (1917), p. 28.

³ See *Occupied Europe: German Exploitation and its Post-War Consequences* (R.I.I.A. Report, 1944); and below, Chapter VI, § 4.

⁴ See E. J. Howenstine, "Demobilization after the First World War" in *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (Vol. LVIII, 1943); J. H. Bellerby: *Economic Reconstruction* (1943).

⁵ Cf. A. L. Bowley: *Some Economic Consequences of the Great War* (1930), and E. Staley: *The Economic Aftermath of the War* (Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, New York, 1941).

poses of occupation and control of former enemy countries, and partly for the expected continuation of the war against Japan. This is one of the underlying assumptions of the British scheme for demobilization. In September, 1944, the British Minister of Labour and National Service issued a White Paper laying down the basis for partial demobilization "during any interim period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan".¹ Describing the problem of this period as "not one of demobilization but of re-allocation of man-power between the Forces and industry", the Minister laid down two main principles which should govern this re-allocation :

- (a) Military requirements must over-ride all other considerations.
- (b) The arrangements for the release of men from the Forces must be such as will be readily understood and accepted as fair by the Forces and must not be too complicated for practical application.

Men are demobilized either generally according to age and length of service² (Class A), or exceptionally, on account of their special qualifications for urgent reconstruction work (Class B). But powers of direction are fully preserved, and release is even accompanied by continued mobilization of "numbers of young men at present deferred, particularly in the munitions industries".

This principle of demobilization by stages—and by very moderate and gradual stages—may well be the underlying principle of all demobilization this time. It facilitates systematic reabsorption into industry, and gives the administration preliminary experience of the many human and economic problems involved. But when the Japanese war is won, a more elaborate and adequate arrangement will be needed to cope with the many millions of men and women released. The homing instinct will be very strong—and avoidance of delay after the final armistice will become more important than a perfect scheme for reabsorption. Demobilization is a psychological problem, as well as a social and economic problem : and how it is handled will do more to condition the climate of peacemaking than almost any other consideration. Gratuities and civilian clothing allowance are more generous this time in Britain : and there is clearer

¹ *Cmd. 6548*. It appeared after long discussion and under considerable popular pressure for a clear preliminary statement of policy.

² The equation was made that two months of service should be equivalent to one additional year of age. There is a more elaborate "points" scheme in U.S.A.

resolve to look after the welfare of "demobbed" men and women than in 1919.

The counterpart to the problem of demobilization in the occupied countries will be the return of the prisoners of war and the deported workers from Germany, and their reabsorption into national life. In addition to the similar economic and social problems involved, this will have far-reaching political consequences. As with the return of British, American and Russian prisoners of war, so the return of prisoners and workers to the occupied countries will bring news and impressions of the enemy into the very heart of each nation. National attitudes towards the vanquished countries will be strongly coloured by personal stories of good or ill treatment, and public opinion will crystallize around the attitudes of the enemy's former captives.¹ In the occupied countries, furthermore, political reconstruction will tend to be deferred until these citizens return: which will give longer tenure of power, as in France and Belgium, to provisional régimes.² Popular opinion will be further coloured by the demobilization of men who have been in the invading armies, who have dealt with the enemy population on its home soil, and who will bring back accounts stimulating sometimes sympathy for the enemy, sometimes hardened hatred, according to their personal experiences. This tangled interaction of forces will be important in determining the general climate of peacemaking during its early and formative phases: it is a lesson which the enemy should learn in good time.

Yet another lesson learnt from last time is that long-term preparations must be made to cope with the cycle of boom and slump which tends, in modern conditions, to become peculiarly acute after a war. Immensely increased productive capacity in most countries—belligerents and neutrals—means a new abundance of wealth. The first task after war is, therefore, the re-allocation of resources, both nationally and internationally, to serve peace-time needs. That is the first lesson to be learnt from last time: and re-allocation machinery is part of the war-

¹ Nowhere will this be more important than in Russia and France: in Russia, because German treatment of Russian prisoners, unprotected by the Geneva convention, has been notoriously bad; France, because German grip on some million and a half of the pick of French manhood ever since 1940 has loomed large in French anxieties, and Hitler's release of only the old and ill has led French people to fear the worst. Cf. also below, Chapter III.

² Thus it has been officially announced (September, 1944) that general elections to the National Assembly of France and to the Belgian Parliament must be put off until prisoners and workers return to vote.

time preparation already made to forestall a post-war slump¹ (which is intimately connected, too, with the problems of demobilization). The second general principle, also learnt from experience, is that purchasing power must be deferred and accumulated until production has been sufficiently reconverted to consumers' goods for real wealth to correspond to purchasing power and effective demand. Lord Keynes, in 1940, published his suggestion of "compulsory savings", designed to defer spending until a certain period after the war.² He proposed three general principles :

- (a) A suitable proportion of each man's earnings must take the form of deferred pay.
- (b) The bulk of new war-time taxation should fall on the income groups of £250 or more a year.
- (c) A system of family allowances for each child up to the age of fifteen should be prepared.

In 1941 the British Government instituted a system of "post-war credits" incorporating the principle of deferred pay in the form of rebate from income tax which would not be paid until an unspecified time after the war, to accrue from January 1, 1942.

In 1944 it was made known that a scheme of war gratuities would be paid to demobilized men and women, and would be paid through the Post Office Savings Bank in the same way as post-war credits. In addition, small savings during the war had accumulated at a vast rate and had reached enormous figures.³ In short, all the machinery was established before the end of the war for ensuring, by control and persuasion, that spending power should be more evenly distributed than before, and should be controllable in time, so as to alleviate a future period of slump. The comprehensive "Social Security" scheme introduced by the British Government in September, 1944,⁴ with its system of family allowances, universal insurance contributions and pension

¹ Cf. Chapter VII, below. The war-time increase in British productive potential this time is estimated to be 15 per cent.

² J. M. Keynes : *How to Pay for the War* (1940). The book was the sequel to three articles published by Lord Keynes in *The Times* early in the war (November, 1939). Cf. also the *Economic Journal*, December, 1939.

³ Cf. *Small Savings*, by a committee of the Fabian Society (1943), where the conservative effect of small savings is wisely pointed out. "The increase in the number of families with some small reserve of savings, be it ever so small, means those families have something to lose" (p. 17). Post-war credits may well have a similar effect : and the election of 1931 showed how a British electorate can be stampeded by a scare about the security of small savings. Nearly one British person in two has an account in the Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks (p. 3).

⁴ *Cmd. 6551*.

arrangements, clearly supplemented the machinery for deferring spending. Britain, at least, has reaped some wisdom from the bitter experience of last time. It should be noted, too, that such preparations make little sense apart from Government control of prices, and therefore to some extent of wages. A "climate of opinion" in which deferred spending was accepted but price-control rejected would produce both economic chaos and social disillusionment among the mass of small savers. There are many dangers here in the path of creating a suitable environment for rational peacemaking.

But in addition to such social and economic dangers as unregulated demobilization and unregulated spending, there are also political dangers which should, on the British experience of last time, be guarded against. The greatest of these is an ill-timed "Khaki election", of the kind of December, 1918, or of October, 1900, even before that: an attempt to "capitalize the emotions of victory in terms of votes for the Government".¹ The temptations to run such an election very soon after a war are great, and arguments in favour of a general election at the end of a long war are very cogent. The adoption of a coalition Government and a party-truce during total war, in a parliamentary democracy of the British type, is almost inevitable. But it means that real differences of policy are hidden away until victory, and victory itself (or even the approach of victory) brings them into the open again. In Britain, in 1918, the House of Commons had remained immune from a general election for nearly eight years, and the Prime Minister himself called Parliament "moribund . . . (without) the necessary authority from the people to deal with the great problems with which we are confronted".² The authority of the Government was, indeed, challenged both from the right, dominated by Lord Northcliffe, and from the left, which was seeking early demobilization and dissolution of Parliament. The Asquith group was in an anomalous position, and a General Election, whatever its dangers, became inevitable. The British Parliament this time was elected as early as 1935, on entirely different issues and in an entirely different setting. Members of all parties have been educated by events during the intervening years; and the coalition itself (and even the main parties of the coalition) hide strong divergent groups of opinion on immediate post-war issues.

¹ Cf. E. C. K. Ensor : *England, 1870-1914* (1936), pp. 267 ff.

² D. Lloyd George : *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (1938), Vol. I, pp. 158-9.

Against the obvious advantages of consulting the electorate on topical issues, and of renewing an already superannuated House, must be set the wisdom of preserving real national unity through the immediate tasks of peacemaking, so that all parties can claim and have a direct share in the settlement and guarantee its enforcement. It may be that the United States has devised one way of keeping the issues of peacemaking out of general elections. In 1944, in the face of forthcoming Presidential elections in which Mr. Roosevelt was to run for the fourth term as Democratic candidate, he was careful to take the Republican candidate, Mr. Dewey, into close consultation over post-war plans, and to elicit his agreement on the security organization being discussed at Dumbarton Oaks.¹ These precautions, prompted by the experience of 1919 when President Wilson found himself unsupported in foreign policy by the bulk of his opponents so that eventually even the treaty he had signed failed to get the necessary majority in the Senate, embody a conception of national leadership which distinguishes general national policy from domestic party issues, and reconciles certainty in foreign policy with the uncertainties of popular decisions in general domestic policy. It may be that Britain will regret having preferred the dangers of post-war elections to the disadvantages of war-time elections, for with strong national unity, these latter are perhaps less than they appear : and the United States may have chosen a way which better avoids the dilemma of democracy in the conduct of foreign policy.

Finally, one central factor in the whole climate of peace-making this time which is completely different from the situation last time, is the relation between the western democracies and Russia. Then, as has already been suggested,² much of the peace settlement was dictated by the desire to erect a *cordon sanitaire* against the menace of Bolshevism. The mutual aid between Russia and the Atlantic Powers during this war has forged strong bonds of sympathy and unity. British seamen carrying supplies by the northern route to Murmansk ; British soldiers linking up the Iranian route ; British and American airmen flying on shuttle-service to Russia : all have taken direct share in the great victories of the Red Armies which have stirred so much enthusiasm and admiration in the peoples of all the United Nations. Since Mr. Churchill's historic pledge of full alliance with the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941, and the Anglo-Soviet Treaty

¹ For further details, see Chapter VII, below.

² Introduction, p. 2.

of 1942,¹ the "Bolshevik bogey" of 1919 has been progressively laid low. The periodic visits of British and American leaders to Moscow, and the meetings at Teheran, have added political and personal bonds to the military and economic bonds forged by necessity. Mrs. Churchill's "Aid for Russia" Fund is some index of British popular appreciation of Russia's rôle in the war.

This close collaboration with the most highly collectivist State in the world is obviously one significant factor in the new "climate of peacemaking". Yet its concrete effects are still difficult to gauge. Though the Bolshevik bogey has been laid low, it has not therefore been killed. Early difficulties over the playing of the Soviet national anthem on the British wireless, and latter-day difficulties over the siege of Warsaw, the Soviet-Polish frontiers and the unanimity rule in the proposed Security Council, suggest that overmuch optimism would be unwise. That Russian importance in the making of peace will be of the first order, is undoubted: the form which that importance will take is not easy to define. The situation is full of contrary possibilities, which only wise statesmanship can utilize for good rather than ill. And where personality intrudes into politics, prediction must cease.

§ 4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

What, then, may be defined as the main factors determining the broad environment in which peace will have to be made? Although many important conditions cannot be predicted with certainty, and much will depend on last-minute events,² a few generalizations can be made.³

- (a) *Psychological conditions*: national sentiment is strong—stronger, in many countries, than before the war. National unity is also, in the early stages, more intense than ever. If national feeling be two-sided—a sense of belonging together and of being different from other peoples—both senses have been strengthened by the experiences of war. Quislings and collaborators, fascist sympathizers and supporters, are eliminated or at least submerged. Herd instincts have been stimulated

¹ Appendix I, C.

² The purely chance elements of the last moment can assume a temporary significance out of all proportion to their real importance in the general development of the war and the peace: e.g., prolonged guerilla resistance, as planned by Himmler and Goebbels, would exasperate opinion abroad and mean harsher terms for Germany, as well as bringing more devastation to Germany.

³ These tentative generalizations may be compared with the suggested "pre-requisites of a durable peace" above, Introduction, p. 17.

by the sense of collective danger and the experience of common oppression. At the same time, anxiety to exalt the position of each nation internationally have been increased, and national interests are jealously pressed for fear they be neglected in the new settlement (e.g. France).

Individually, despite the natural revulsion of civilians against regimentation, there is clearer realization than last time, in most countries, that peace has its problems as great as those of war, and that restraint, reason, planned procedure, are necessary to "win the peace as well as the war"—as the popular phrase significantly has it.¹

- (b) *Social conditions* : most important factors in the social conditions prevailing during peacemaking are on one hand the separate national plans for social security and reform, for systematic reabsorption of the armed forces, prisoners and deported workers into the national economy : and on the other, the development of international organizations for social welfare, such as U.N.R.R.A., the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the I.L.O.²
- (c) *Economic conditions* : there is, as last time, widespread economic dislocation both in national systems of production and distribution, and in international trade. But there is a greater desire to carry over the machinery of war-time organization and controls into the post-war years, and to develop means of forestalling economic depression both by national means and by international action (monetary control as envisaged in the Bretton Woods agreements, or the planning of shipping, as envisaged by the United Maritime Council).³
- (d) *Political conditions* : while many nations will be in process of political and constitutional reconstruction during peacemaking (e.g. France, Poland, Yugoslavia), other nations which have preserved their political régimes will be faced with the issue of how far collectivism should be continued and developed, how far it should be resisted or abandoned. Some (e.g. Belgium) will be faced with post-war general elections, which will introduce an element of political uncertainty into national policies of peacemaking. At the same time, there will be greater awareness than last time that international political co-operation must depend and be built on co-operation for social and economic purposes, and that the organization of world security against aggression (as planned at Dumbarton Oaks) must proceed in step with the development of functional organizations for promoting national and international "freedom from fear and want".⁴

¹ For further discussion, see below, Chapter VI, § 4.

² For these organizations and discussion of their place in peacemaking, see below, Chapters VII and VIII.

³ For further discussion of the economic aspects of peacemaking, see below, Chapters VI and VII.

⁴ For the security organization in its relations with functional organizations, see below, Chapters VII and VIII.

CHAPTER II

THE TIMING AND SETTING OF PEACEMAKING

§ 1. Preparations for the task of peacemaking : the phases of peacemaking : public opinion and peace.

§ 2. Armistices : arguments for and against an armistice : military terms : generals and politicians : the experience of 1918 : 1918 and 1944 : who shall sign ?

§ 3. From armistice to peace : first-aid measures : 1918 : food supplies part of a general economic problem : existing machinery. Increasing gravity of the problem : German looting and exploitation : population displacement. The political problem : maintenance of allied unity and power : enemy authorities.

§ 4. Peace settlements : four milestones : the background to the settlements : public opinion and the picturesque : the Big Four : 1919 and 1815 : great and small powers : committees : secretariat : personalities : place of meeting : language : drafting : peace and the covenant.

§ 5. Machinery for Preserving Peace : organizational core. The Congress System : the League of Nations : the permanent court of international justice : collective security : council and assembly : secretariat : a sense of community : power and peaceful change : structural improvements.

§ 6. Maintaining the Treaty : the supreme council : the conference of ambassadors : allied commissions : constitutions and functions : machinery for a wider peace settlement : place of meeting.

§ 1. PREPARATIONS FOR PEACEMAKING

Just as it requires much more than brilliant generalship and obedient support to win victory in modern war, so it requires much more than individual diplomatic skill and initiative and popular loyalty to accomplish the tasks of modern peacemaking.

An increased awareness of the importance of machinery to secure and to maintain peace has sprung from the failure of the institutions set up at the end of the last war. The naïve view that at the end of hostilities the world will return again to its true instincts by a process of healthy and automatic adjustment, and that it will be carried forward again on a great wave of enthusiasm to find peace, happiness and prosperity, has been replaced by a more pragmatic view of the need for rational control and co-ordinated preparation. Mr. John Winant has put the new point of view very succinctly : " We must be absolute about our principal ends (justice and equality of opportunity and freedom), relative and pragmatic about the mechanical means used to serve those ends." ¹ Mr. Churchill has talked of " stronger, more efficient, more rigorous world institutions " ; ²

¹ Leeds, October, 1942.

² Harvard University, 6th September, 1943.

General Smuts has stressed "the imperative necessity for new and more effective machinery to provide against the periodic recurrence of war".¹ Theorists and political scientists have backed up the declarations of statesmen.² It is realized that preparations should be worked out in time of war to cover the four stages of peacemaking: first the military armistice with the enemy, second the covering of the difficult interim period between the Armistice and the Peace, third the Peace Conference itself, and fourth the setting up of adequate machinery to further the process of continuous adjustment in years of peaceful change. These four categories are not separate, but each marks one phase in the realization of a single purpose.

It is not possible to divide the periods cleanly and absolutely in time. The period of convalescence, short term relief, "first-aid measures", material rehabilitation of essential needs and services cannot be distinguished sharply in time from the period of active reconstruction. The relative lengths of the processes will vary from place to place. In nature,

the needs of society will be the same at once after the war as later on. The only difference will be the practical one of a priority of needs, the kind of difference which might be brought about by any social disturbance—an epidemic or an earthquake or an economic crisis—and the urgency of taking action. For the rest, one action and period will merge into the other, according to circumstances.³

The Peace Conference itself can never be regarded as a final act, as a grand climax to a momentous war, but rather as opening up a new period in human affairs. To confound peace with peace treaties is almost as dangerous as the opposite error of forgetting that the treaties exist, or regarding them as scraps of paper. To find the proper machinery for adjustment of treaties, the fourth stage in the process, is one of the most difficult technical problems involved. A final Treaty immediately begs the whole problem of revision. Three days before the Treaty of Versailles was signed, the Annual Conference of the British Labour Party carried a resolution demanding the "immediate revision by the League of Nations of the harsh provisions of the treaty . . . as a first step towards the reconciliation of the peoples and the

¹ November, 1942.

² Especially David Mitrany: *A Working Peace System* (R.I.I.A., 1943); J. P. Wild: *Machinery of Collaboration between the United Nations* (1942); E. T. Williams: *Lasting Peace and a Better World* (1944) and *The United Nations and a World Organization* (1944).

³ Mitrany: *op. cit.*, pp. 23-4.

inauguration of a new era of international co-operation and good will".¹ Such a situation repeated again could only jeopardize the creation of international order, and play into the hands of dissatisfied and scheming individuals and groups in the ranks of the vanquished powers. Peacemaking is a long process, and the phases merge into each other. "To be successful, international co-operation needs to be organized, systematic and continuous."²

It helps the work of active preparation for peacemaking to divide the four categories. But while it is important to distinguish between an Armistice and on the one hand a mere suspension of arms,³ and on the other hand a peace settlement, it is none the less impossible to say that "a general works on one side of the barrier and the politicians and diplomats on the other".⁴ Statesmen at the end of the last war recognized the connection. Lloyd George proclaimed that "the terms of an armistice should contain as nearly as possible the terms of peace",⁵ Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, wrote to Marshal Foch :

I recognize the connection between the terms of an armistice and those of a peace which will follow it. It is incontestable that the former should in a large matter affect the latter and that the guarantees necessary to secure peace should find their base in the clauses of the Armistice.⁶

This view was proclaimed by Foch, and carried to a much further extreme. Haig accepted it, and the difference between Foch and Haig was a measure of the difference in their attitude to final peace terms rather than in their attitude to the Armistice as such.

Lack of preparation for peacemaking has been based not only on ignorance of the issues involved, but on the fear of raising controversial issues in war-time between allies, likely to upset the effective prosecution of the war.⁷ The plea of ignorance must fast fade with the extension of precedents, like those of 1815 or 1918, and with the existence of a comprehensive and scientific literature on the subject. The plea of policy is more

¹ Quoted W. M. Jordan : *Great Britain, France and the German Problem, 1918-39* (1943), p. 40.

² R. J. P. Mortished : *Problems of International Organization* (W.E.A. Outlines, no. 12, 1944), p. 7.

³ *International Congresses*, Sir Ernest Satow (Foreign Office Handbooks, 1920), p. 10.

⁴ Foch, quoted Liddell Hart : *Foch, Man of Orleans*, II, p. 413.

⁵ Wemyss : *Life and Letters*, p. 398. Quoted Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁶ Pichon to Foch, 21st October, 1918.

⁷ A. Tardieu : *La Paix* (1921).

difficult to answer, but preparation and co-ordination for the peace should spring from practical co-operation in war : not only the same unity of will and purpose should be carried over, but also many war-time institutions should serve their purpose as agents of peace endeavour. In this war a start has been made along these lines.¹ Such preparation should this time avoid the half-hearted measures of 1919, when the lack of any preliminary basis of policy explained the bungling at the Armistice, the vacillations at the beginning of the Peace Conference, the subsequent delays and set-backs, and the feverish compromises of the last months.

The prime causes of these mistakes were that the end came unexpectedly, that the extent of the defeat of the German armies was not realized, and that the discussions on the terms of Armistice had to be conducted in haste and in complicated conditions. The obvious lesson is, "Be Prepared".²

"The great fault," wrote Colonel House, "of the political leaders was their failure to draft a plan of procedure."³ Although the lessons of 1815 had been noted, the same mistake that Professor Webster had pointed out was repeated, "As to form and procedure, nothing had been fixed, and for three months, the very fundamental character of the Congress was the subject of heated debate."⁴ Just as at Vienna in 1815, the exact purpose of the full Congress was not clearly worked out, so at Versailles, but on a more serious scale, it was not clear whether German delegates would be allowed to attend the Conference, or whether the treaty to be drawn up should be preliminary or final, imposed or negotiated. In November, 1918, Colonel House allotted seats to the Germans at the forthcoming Conference. From this date onwards until March, 1919, it was taken for granted that the peace would be made by a Congress, on the model of the great Congresses of the nineteenth century. The misunderstanding on this point was one of the fundamental mishaps of 1919.⁵

This lack of preparation is much more than a lack of information, indeed the peacemakers of 1919 were well supplied with mixed information from a wide range of advisers, civil servants, historians, and special commissions.

¹ See above, Chapter I, and below, Chapter VII.

² Sir Frederick Maurice : *The Armistices of 1918* (1943), p. 56.

³ Quoted Harold Nicolson : *Peacemaking, 1919* (1933), p. 103.

⁴ C. K. Webster : *The Congress of Vienna* (1937).

⁵ H. Nicolson : *op. cit.*, pp. 96-7. Cf. the detailed study by F. S. Marston : *The Peace Conference of 1919* (1944).

Every demand and suggestion for change put forward by rival candidates was given the most careful examination. The Foreign Office dug deep into its archives for the long, varied and blood-stained history of fluctuating frontiers. The Treasury were prepared with their information and advice on all financial questions, the Board of Trade with theirs on all matters affecting trade, navigation and labour conditions. The Intelligence Organizations of the fighting services constituted a storehouse of information on the position of affairs in the vast areas covered by the war. The facts gathered by them during the War and in the period of occupation of conquered territories that followed, supplemented and checked the information in the possession of the Foreign Office on ethnical and economic questions and was invaluable when strategical considerations entered into the fixing of boundaries. The judicious selection and co-ordination of all this information involved prolonged and immense labour by every Department.¹

There may have been faults in the distribution of this information,² and certainly its bulk made it difficult to grasp, and difficult to determine duplication and distribution, but it was not so much information on substance as agreement on procedure that was lacking. On November 30, 1918, Clemenceau and Foch arrived in London, and while they and the British Ministers discussed the Rhine Frontier, the Trial of the Kaiser, the Conference at Paris and other matters, they got down to no technicalities of programme. The result was that when the Conference did meet, "progress was slow, and the discussions were inclined to be rambling and desultory . . . We were all feeling our way . . . The time was occupied in determining the numbers and allocation of the delegates at the Peace Conference and their classification".³ Miscellaneous information from the widest possible circles cannot take the place of co-ordinated, inter-allied preparation.

This preparation should concern itself not only with war aims but also with the best methods of securing the war aims. "It was reasonable too, as it always must be, not to go into Congress without some previous understanding with the Powers to be there assembled," wrote a nineteenth-century authority.⁴ Bismarck refused to summon the Congress of Berlin until he had ascertained that an agreement had been reached beforehand between the Russian Ambassador in London and Lord Salisbury

¹ D. Lloyd George : *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (1938), Vol. I, pp. 211-12. The Americans were even better prepared, Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, Chapter II, *passim*.

³ D. Lloyd George : *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 214.

⁴ Duke of Argyll : *The Eastern Question from 1856* (1879), Vol. II, pp. 97, 128.

about certain matters that would come up at the later stages. For a Peace Conference, where all issues are "far-reaching and comprehensive", such prior agreement is essential. Problems should be graded in their priority, priority of urgency being distinguished from priority of importance, and a definite schedule being drawn up. This would avoid the difficulties of the November Meeting in London, 1918, when Clemenceau, Orlando, and Lloyd George were only too willing to discuss the hanging of the Kaiser and the Reparations Question, and only too reluctant to face the more urgent and more important problems of the peace.

It would be unwise, too, by focusing all attention on government policy, to underestimate the importance of outside bodies and individuals in the preparation for peace. The development of an informed and lively public opinion would be a guarantee against an outburst of hysteria. In the last war, while many organizations examined the problems of peacemaking, a great number of people were unable and unwilling to consider the questions of demobilization, economic controls, diplomatic technique, reparations and the like, except in an excited atmosphere of propaganda, prejudice and passion.¹ Government statements about the problems of peacemaking, their boundaries and their possible solutions, can set the lead, and build round them all the literature and discussion consistent with an undiminished war-effort.

Only with this preparation on all levels can a durable peace be built.

It will not be a rapid discovery of Utopia, but an empirical affair, building patiently stone by stone from the bottom upwards. That means that it should extend over a considerable time, and not repeat the attempt to settle all the problems of a new Europe in six months, which was adopted on the last occasion. If a period of transition lasting several years had been allowed before the final settlement was made, and if in the meanwhile a series of international bodies had been steadily engaged in working out all its different phases, many mistakes would have been avoided. No doubt the demand

¹ For the war literature, see List at the end of this book. In this war there has been some attempt to prepare opinion (i) by detailed and comprehensive Government White Papers on a wide range of topics, (ii) by the development of Army Education, particularly through Army Bureau of Current Affairs lectures and discussions, (iii) by the extension of Workers' Education facilities, (iv) by the presence in this country of allied statesmen and writers who have been able to put forward their own points of view, broadening our own traditional insular outlook, (v) by Ministry of Information lectures and campaigns, (vi) by the work of the B.B.C., (vii) by the pamphlets and literature of voluntary bodies such as the National Peace Council and Fabian Society.

for quick decisions in order to avoid prolonged uncertainty will often be strong and sometimes irresistible, but the more time can be gained to allow passions to cool, nerves to be restored and careful thought to be taken before the final balance is struck, the more likely it is to be just, workable, and therefore lasting.¹

§ 2. ARMISTICES

Armistices may be of several kinds : they may be partial, suspending operations only in certain defined theatres of war, or they may be general, suspending the entire military, naval and air activities of the belligerents. In modern conditions of war, "the enemy is unlikely to ask for an armistice unless the military, economic, and psychological superiority of the Allies is already such that they could, by continuing their effort, impose their will upon him".² The organization of the entire state for war purposes, and the momentum induced, act as checks on premature demands for armistice. To-day "such a request is very different from proposals for a peace of accommodation. In total war, it is tantamount to surrender".³ It is an admission that any continuation of the struggle would be too costly and valueless. It is an acceptance of the superiority of enemy power. For this reason, some writers and military leaders have argued that it is unnecessary and unwise to accede to the enemy's demand for an armistice in conditions of total war.⁴ Victorious power should be pushed to its limit. The enemy must not only surrender unconditionally, but he must be made to realize how extensive and irreversible is his defeat. Triumphs on the battlefield must not be squandered in negotiation. This was essentially the view of Pershing in the last war. In a note to the Supreme War Council, he first surveyed the military and power potential of both sides, concluding that "the British, French, Belgian and American armies appear capable of continuing the offensive indefinitely. Their morale is high and the prospects of a certain victory should keep it so." By contrast, he went on, the morale of the German troops was low, and "an armistice would revivify their low spirits and enable the Army to reorganize and resist later on, and would deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory by failing to press their present advantage to its complete military end". From these military questions, Pershing went on to examine some of

¹ H. Butler : *The Lost Peace* (1941), p. 190.

² *Relief and Reconstruction in Europe* (R.I.I.A., 1942), p. 12.

³ F. Maurice : *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁴ Cf. the declaration of Lord Vansittart's "Win the Peace" movement,

the wider implications of the demand for an armistice. In the first place, he doubted German sincerity and motives. "The appeal for an armistice is undoubtedly to enable the withdrawal from a critical situation to one more advantageous." Secondly, the effect of an armistice on the Allies would be dangerous. "An armistice would lead the Allied armies to believe this the end of fighting and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to resume hostilities with our present advantage in morale in the event of failure to secure at a peace conference what we sought for." In order to dictate peace terms, the only terms that could be permanent and worth winning, final capitulation based on unconditional surrender was Pershing's suggestion.¹

The arguments against Pershing's viewpoint—those stated by Foch, for instance—were briefly that further pursuit of the enemy, after his defeat was certain, was expensive and pointless ; and that the exhaustion of modern warfare imposed its strain on victor as well as vanquished, the strain being proportionate to the length and intensity of the war ordeal of the powers concerned, that of France being considerably higher than that of the U.S.A.

The Government of the United States, whose army is steadily increasing, and therefore called to play a more and more important part in the war, and in its consequences, may well regard a refusal of the armistice with satisfaction. In the eyes of the British Government, whom the Armistice will make master of the German fleet, such a prospect seems less advantageous. As far as we are concerned, such a refusal would postpone without gain the immense advantages which we would be able either to acquire immediately or be certain of obtaining eventually by the terms of an armistice, and would keep us in a state of uncertainty.²

To Pershing himself, Foch stressed that the objects they had in mind were identical, that both wished to see the successful assertion of allied power. "Tell General Pershing that I am in agreement with his views, and he need not be anxious regarding this matter : what I am demanding from the Germans is the equivalent of what he wants, and when I have finished with them they will be quite powerless to do any further damage."³ Both agreed that an armistice approximated to capitulation.⁴ Haig was more guarded. Believing that "the German army is capable of retiring to its own frontier and holding that line if there

¹ J. J. Pershing : *My Experiences in the World War* (1931), pp. 673 *et seq.*

² Foch : *L'Armistice et la Paix*, p. 114.

³ J. B. Mott : *Twenty Years as a Military Attaché*, p. 267, quoted Jordan ; *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁴ Cf. M. Sibert ; *L'Armistice dans le Droit des Gens*, pp. 42-6.

should be any attempt to touch the honour of the German people and make them fight with the courage of despair", and that "the French and American Armies are not capable of making a serious offensive now," he recommended more lenient terms of armistice.

Why expend more British lives? And for what?¹—I therefore advise that we only ask in the armistice for what we intend to hold, and that we set our face against the French entering Germany to pay off old scores. In my opinion, under the supposed conditions, the British Army would not fight keenly for what is really not its own affair.²

Haig's estimate differed from the estimate of Foch not only in its military presuppositions, and in its analysis of power potential in the immediate future, but also in its underlying political desires, and in its peace hopes for the future. The question of the most satisfactory armistice terms inevitably overlaps the question of final peace terms.

Bliss, the American Military Representative to the Supreme War Council, realized this most clearly. In backing Pershing's demand for the implementation of "the full measure of victory", he challenged Foch's use of armistice terms to act as security for future French plans. Foch had wished to occupy the left bank of the Rhine "as security for reparations to be exacted for the destruction perpetrated in allied countries".³ Further even than this, he wished to bring the Rhineland under allied control prior to its political detachment from Germany.

If France intended to separate the Rhineland from Prussia, there was no time to be lost in shaping the Armistice accordingly.⁴—It is certain that the Armistice should give us full guarantees for obtaining, in the course of the peace negotiations, the terms that we wish to impose upon the enemy; and it is evident that only the advantages secured to us by the Armistice will remain to us; that only the sacrifices of territory agreed to by the enemy at the time of signing the Armistice will be final.⁵

Foch was so anxious to maintain this hold on territory that he was willing to allow some of the German military strength to remain in German hands. He was sceptical about total disarmament, and regarded some measure of German armament as a pretext for any further punitive action to be enforced in the

¹ Duff Cooper: *Haig* (1936), Vol. II, pp. 395 *et seq.* ² *Ibid.*, p. 397.

³ Foch: *Memoirs* (1931), p. 527.

⁴ Quoted B. H. Liddell Hart: *Foch, Man of Orleans* (1931), p. 414, ii.

⁵ Foch: *Memoirs*, p. 534.

future. Bliss criticized this willingness to retain intact the organization of Hindenburg's army, and went on to say—

I do not believe that, in this peculiar case, the question of conditions of so-called armistice should be left to the military men alone. . . . All of the military propositions for an armistice that I have seen plainly embody or point to the political conditions which will exist after the so-called armistice is agreed to. These political conditions, imposed in the armistice, will be doubtless demanded by the political people in the discussion of final terms. At the same time, these political conditions imposed by military men alone may be such as to keep the world in turmoil for many years to come.¹

The modern armistice then is more than a reflection of a power ratio : it does, by its substance and by its omissions, play a decisive part in the building of final peace. There are few precedents of any value before 1918. The Armistice leading to the Peace of Paris in 1814 was made between sovereign equals, and the text is full of the language of brotherly friendship. The allied powers wish to give back to a France "revenue à un gouvernement dont les principes offrent les garanties nécessaires pour le maintien de la paix", the benefits of peace, and the ties of friendship.² The military terms are drawn up with that end in view ; in no sense do they represent a capitulation. As late as 1899, the "Land War Regulations" of the Hague Peace Conference still interpret juristically the idea of the armistice as an agreement between two sides, who can both remake war if they desire it, and continue on the same terms.

L'Armistice suspend les opérations de guerre par un accord mutuel des parties belligérantes. Si la durée n'en est pas déterminée, les parties belligérantes peuvent reprendre en tout temps les opérations, pourvu toutefois que l'ennemi soit averti en temps convenu, conformément aux conditions de l'armistice.³

Such attitudes were impossible in 1918, and this explains some of the difficulties that arose. In the discussions between Foch, Pershing and Haig, a new situation was being explored. The elements of that situation have been carried still further during this war. The Nazi Party is dependent on military victory for its survival : military defeat means irrevocable doom. The same applies to the Japanese war-lords. The pre-requisites of an

¹ F. Palmer : *Bliss* (1934), p. 344. See further, Gen. T. H. Bliss : *The Armistices* (*American Journal of International Law*, XVI), 1922.

² Quoted Satow : pp. 122-5.

³ Article 36, "Règlements concernant les Lois et Coutumes de la Guerre sur Terre," 1899, renewed 1907.

armistice to-day are unconditional surrender on the part of the enemy, and this essential is proclaimed by the Allied Governments when they set themselves firmly against any German attempt to get an early peace in order to conserve German strength for the future. Seen as a problem of power, the armistice is meant to impose on the enemy, such conditions as will prevent a resumption of hostilities. The Allies mean to maintain the power to enforce their will during the interim period between the signing of the armistice and the making of peace. The means to be employed in the assertion of that power can hardly be only military—the disarmament of the enemy, and the occupation of his territory—but also psychological. The realization of the superiority of allied power and of the irreversibility of victory has to be made plain not only to the defeated armies but also to the vanquished peoples.

The modern tendency to demand a “total armistice” can be explained partly by purely mechanical reasons—by the nature of modern warfare itself. The machine of modern war, which depends on total national mobilization, accumulation of supplies and highly geared war-industry, cannot be readily started again once it has been slowed down or stopped. Before it can be halted, there must be certain defeat of the enemy: and likewise it is known that once the enemy has made an armistice, he will find it virtually impossible to restart his war-machine quickly. The demand for “unconditional surrender”, which first appeared as a slogan after the Casablanca Conference in 1943, has been made by the Allies as a safeguard against any repetition of the post-1918 thesis that Germany had never been defeated in battle, but had been “stabbed in the back” and betrayed by the home front. How far such precautions are necessary this time—and how far the demand for “unconditional surrender” can be satisfied—are questions relevant to armistice-making.¹

What happened in 1918?² With the deterioration in the German military position by the summer of 1918, Hindenburg and Ludendorff urged the German government to sue for a negotiated peace. Hertling resigned the Chancellorship, and was succeeded by the liberal Prince Max of Baden, with clear-cut orders from the Supreme Command to end the war without delay, and to strengthen the weak German position. Prince Max's doubts about the wisdom of a direct appeal to Wilson were

¹ See below, Chapter V, § 3.

² Cf. Lindley Fraser: *Germany Between Two Wars* (1944), Chapter I.

sharply brushed aside. "The Supreme Command considers it necessary ; and you have not been brought here to make difficulties for the Supreme Command."¹ In consequence, a note was dispatched to Wilson on the 3rd-4th of October, 1918, "accepting the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his Message to Congress of January 8th " and requesting "the President of the United States to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air".² The Note created difficulties from the start. It was an appeal to the leading allied statesman who appeared likely to offer the best terms. These terms—the famous Fourteen Points³—had been laid down in an Address to Congress but had not been officially communicated to the leaders of the other allied powers. And the German High Command were far from seeing the terms in the same light as Wilson, as "definitions of principle and purpose", "the programme of the world's peace."⁴ To the Supreme Command, they were "a mere collection of phrases which a skilful diplomacy would be able to interpret at the Conference Table in a sense favourable to Germany".⁵

The Allied leaders led by Lloyd George were suspicious of the binding restrictions of the Fourteen Points,⁶ and wished to add an additional note on Reparations. Wilson himself refused to negotiate while the enemy occupied allied soil, and while he could not be sure of the transformation in the character of the German Government.⁷

An exchange of Notes occupied most of the month of October. German acceptance of American principles on the 20th of October brought the whole issue to a head ; on the 4th of November, the Allied Governments, with reservations, accepted Wilson's Speeches as the basis of peace ; on November 11th, the military and naval terms were signed at Compiègne. Meanwhile Ludendorff, Prince Max and the Kaiser had all been swept away in turn. The Supreme Command had failed in its first aim to strengthen Germany's position, but it had not failed in

¹ Max of Baden : *Memoirs* (1928), II, p. 16.

² *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (1929), Vol. I, p. 448.

³ They are quoted in innumerable places, and in their 1918-20 setting are best read in *President Wilson's Policy* (Foreign Office Handbooks, No. 161), 1920.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 46-7.

⁵ Max of Baden : *op. cit.*, II, p. 24.

⁶ This simplifies the issue. "The only two clauses in the Fourteen Points upon which any question was raised were the Freedom of the Seas and Reparations" (Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, p. 77), but in general the points seemed somewhat vague and indecisive.

⁷ Note of October 8, 1918.

its further aims of maintaining intact the nucleus of German power.

The German troops marched home in good order, with their arms, with bands playing, and with colours flying, having been told by their leaders that they had not been defeated, but that peace was required by the home front. That created an impression of which the fullest political use was made, and was a substantial element in the military revival of Germany.¹

The dangers of a similar mistake being made at the end of this war are not so great. By insisting on a formula of unconditional surrender, the Allies have forestalled any attempt to play on the allied declarations of peace policy. By declaring that the Atlantic Charter did not bind us as a pledge given to Germany,² Mr. Churchill obviously feared a repetition of the use of the Fourteen Points. By prior discussions among the Allies on armistice policy, lack of preparation and open division and disagreement among the Powers such as last time characterized the first armistices between the Allies and Bulgaria and Turkey, can be avoided. By stressing the necessity of prolonged occupation, any belief inside the allied countries that demobilization and peace-time standards of living would come with the lights of London automatically and to stay, has at any rate been cold-shouldered by a wave of governmental scepticism.

There still remains the question of who shall sign the armistice. The question is closely bound up with the problem of authority and order in the vanquished countries.³ It would be surely unwise to saddle new governments with the responsibility of hard armistice terms. This has already been made plain by the difficulties of the Bonomi Government in Italy, which, while cutting itself adrift from the imperialist bases of Mussolini's foreign policy, was compelled to bear the expense and unpopularity of hard defeat. The Armistice should probably be signed by the Commander in the Field,⁴ who would seal enemy destinies by so doing, and prevent the spreading of propaganda in the difficult interim period between war and peace.⁵ In the event of a complete breakdown of all central military authority, local commanders and leaders should have this duty forced upon

¹ Sir F. M. Maurice : *op. cit.*, p. 56 ; L. Schwarzschild : *World in Trance*, Chapter I (1943).

² Cf. below, Chapter IX, § 5.

³ See *Relief and Reconstruction in Europe*, II, pp. 9-15.

⁴ See *News Chronicle*, September 7, 1944.

⁵ This and kindred problems are discussed with moderation and good sense in Wilson Harris's *Problems of the Peace* (1944), pp. 44 *et seq.*

them. In acknowledging their own defeat, they would at least be making one gesture towards the rehabilitation of their shattered countries under new régimes.

§ 3. FROM ARMISTICE TO PEACE

"The Armistice was signed this morning," declared President Wilson. "Everything for which America fought has now been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty to assist by sober and friendly counsel and by material aid in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world."¹ Neither the sober and friendly counsel nor the material aid was commensurate with the task. The difficult interim period between war and peace was a period of chaos and confusion, and the necessary economic directives by the allied powers were lacking.

Before the Armistice was signed in 1918, Colonel House pointed out to Wilson, "Probably the greatest problem which will be presented to us upon the cessation of hostilities is the furnishing of food and other essential supplies to the civilian population of Serbia, Austria, Bohemia, Belgium, Germany and Northern France".² The machinery for distributing that relief unfortunately was a matter of dispute. Existing war-time machinery, created out of the needs of war, by "a piecemeal empirical process of improvisation",³ offered one possible means of general control. The Allied Maritime Council, established early in 1918 with permanent staff to supervise the most effective use of shipping tonnage for the prosecution of the war, had worked in co-ordination with the Food Council, which in turn co-ordinated the International Committees on Wheat, Sugar, Meat and Fats, and Oil. These two bodies had fed the people of the liberated areas of France, but in 1918 had no power to finance the feeding of Europe. On October 18th, 1918, they passed a resolution urging that European supplies should be arranged through existing organizations, and that the Allied Maritime Commission should be enlarged in scope to become a General Economic Council. This resolution was never put into effect. American plans, favoured by Hoover, were to create a new

¹ R. S. Baker : *Wilson's Life and Letters* (1939), Vol. VIII, p. 580.

² *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (1928), Vol. IV, p. 240.

³ R. H. Tawney : "The Abolition of Economic Controls, 1918-21" (*Economic History Review*, XIII, 1943). On this general topic, see also A. Zimmern : *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (1936), Part II, Ch. II, and J. A. Salter : *Allied Shipping Control* (1921).

The machinery, too, should not be dependent on rivalry between the Powers. Jealousy between the American-sponsored Hoover Commission and other existing bodies led to inadequate staffing, and inadequate correlation of purpose.¹ During this war, there is a mass of existing machinery. In addition to those bodies created from the needs of the war effort, like the Combined Supply Boards, or the Middle East Supply Centre,² there are pre-war bodies, especially the Economic and Finance Departments of the League of Nations, the League Health Organization, and the International Labour Office at Montreal. There are also voluntary bodies like the Society of Friends and the Red Cross, whose rôle during the interim period between armistice and peace will be vital.

The financing of co-ordinated relief involves many pitfalls. In 1918, the French Finance Department took the hard line :

The Germans should be required to work in order to produce the raw material which should pay for the food supplies. Consequently, if at the end of a month or two it were found that the Germans were not producing any greater quantities of coal and other raw materials, the question as to whether the Allies should continue to feed people who refused to work would have to be reconsidered.³

The U.N.R.R.A. Conference settled the thorny financial problem early enough to prevent such difficulties, at least for non-enemy countries.⁴ A universal formula based on ability to pay was accepted.⁵

The general problem of relief is much more serious now than it was in 1918 because of the fact of prolonged German occupation and spoliation of other countries. In 1918, apart from Belgium, Luxemburg, and Northern France in the West, and the Baltic and Western provinces of Poland in the East, there were no occupied countries. No effort had been made to incorporate into a greater Germany countries like Austria and Bohemia, which by bloodless victories had been conquered before this war began. Nor had the whole of France, Poland, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway been absorbed into a "New Europe" for a number of years. On the dislocation so caused,

¹ Cf. Salter, *op. cit.*, p. 216, and section 5 of the Crimea Declaration, Appendix I, G.

² See J. Payson Wild : *Machinery of Collaboration between the United Nations* (For. Pol. Ass. Rep., July, 1942) ; "The Middle East Supply Centre" (Bulletin of International News, Vol. XXI, Nos. 16 and 18, 1944) ; *Building Peace out of War* (P.E.P., 1944).

³ Loucheur, quoted D. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

⁴ For U.N.R.R.A. in enemy countries, see below, Chapter VII.

⁵ "Helping the People to Help Themselves" (United Nations Information Organization, 1944), p. 17.

and on the conditions arising from blockade, bombing, and general privations of war, there has been superimposed the deliberate and ruthless policy of subjugation and enslavement. In face of such a situation, the forty-four United and Associated Nations determined

that the population of areas liberated by the armed forces of the United Nations shall receive aid and relief from their suffering, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and that preparations and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of urgently needed services.¹

This preamble to the Atlantic City Resolutions indicates the human as well as the economic problem in the interim period between war and peace. Normal economic and social life in the Occupied Countries cannot be restored as long as they suffer from the displacement of citizens from their homes, their enforced evacuation or transportation to other parts of Europe, their exile in distant lands. "When this ghastly war ends," said President Roosevelt, "there may not be one but ten million or twenty million men, women and children, of many races and many religions, living in many countries and possibly on several continents, who will enter the wide picture—the human refugee."² The Wandering Jew is but the prototype. Transfer of foreign labour to the Reich has systematized movements which began with persecution and developed into sustained economic exploitation. The absence of millions of citizens, still homeless exiles in foreign countries, would for various reasons retard a final peace settlement. It would have to be in the interim period after the armistice when most of these wandering folk return to their homes.³

But all this does not yet cover the whole field of indispensable economic and social action during the period between the signing of the armistice and the making of final peace. It is true that "the success or failure to deal with the social and economic problem will make the setting in which the solution of the political problem has to be attempted. In so far as that effort meets with

¹ See Appendix III, A.

² See I.L.O. Reports, Series O, "The Displacement of Populations in Europe," E. M. Kulischer (Montreal, 1943). "Persecution of the Jews" (Inter-Allied Information Reports, No. 6, 1943).

³ For existing arrangements, see below, Chapter VII.

success, a more favourable atmosphere will be created than that which surrounded the deliberations in Paris".¹ The political problem remains none the less important.

Just as for the making of the armistice, so for the period between armistice and peace, the essential political problem remains that of maintaining allied unity, and through allied unity, allied power. It is in the discussions over the Conference table—and even before—that divergencies of interest and of outlook emerge. No amount of preparation during the war itself can entirely obviate this. A good example of the difficulties involved in this direction is the armistice concluded with Austria-Hungary in 1918. Occupation of Austrian territory by allied troops gave some of the more directly interested powers like Italy a chance to stake their own claims. Italy and the newly formed state of Yugoslavia were soon involved in trouble over their respective spheres of interest. In this case, the Austrians could hardly profit from allied divisions, but the moral is plain.

The perpetuation of allied power is overwhelmingly important. A clamour for demobilization inevitably arises as enlisted citizen-soldiers see growing prospects of returning to their homes and their work, outside the range of war discipline.² The problem is to control the size and distribution of military resources so as to maintain a superiority of power over the beaten enemy. This superiority will mean in practice the ability to hold the enemy disarmed and to occupy his country. But long-term occupation of former enemy countries might present difficulties, in connection with the man-power required, which have not been fully contemplated by advocates of long-term occupation.

One determinant of the policy adopted during this period will be the character of the governments set up in former enemy countries. The measure of control necessary will depend on whether there has been military conquest, leaving no legitimate or provisional authorities in being with whom the Supreme Command can deal, or whether there is a government able and willing to exercise authority during the period of occupation. In the latter case, the kind of government is extremely important: a government of exiles returned to their own soil after years abroad; a military government set up by soldiers and maintaining strict loyalty and discipline by military rule; a government of civil servants, administrators, churchmen and politicians willing to co-operate; or a revolutionary government, springing from

¹ H. Butler: *op. cit.*, p. 201.

² See above, Chapter I.

below, from the ashes of defeat. To complicate any such governmental structure, there will be surviving representatives of discredited régimes. The lines of policy drawn will depend on a variety of changing factors,¹ but the difficulty of the political task is already clear.

§ 4. PEACE SETTLEMENTS

Modern European and world history can be charted in terms of four great milestones: the Peace Treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, and Versailles. These four treaties stand out among the mass of important and unimportant international agreements. They marked attempts not only to remould the structure of Europe after expensive and decisive wars, but also to give to the attempt the sanctity of universal agreement, and the guarantee of its perpetuation.² For instance, the Treaty of Paris of 1814,³ to which Great Britain, Austria, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and France, all the principal belligerents, were parties, had as one of its articles: "All the powers engaged on either side in the present war shall, within the space of two months, send Plenipotentiaries to Vienna for the purpose of regulating, in General Congress, the arrangements which are to complete the provisions of the present Treaty."⁴ The major decisions of policy were made by the Great Powers and the Congress was merely to be an instrument of ratification, but it is significant that at Vienna there assembled a crowd not only of what Gentz, the shrewd Secretary, called "the most illustrious personalities in Europe", but also of petty princes, with and without princedoms, of representatives of backstairs financial houses, "the moneychangers" as Wellington called them, of adventurers, title-seekers, propagandists, cranks with visionary utopias to offer, and sad and gay sponsors of causes already lost.

This background to the modern European settlement is the inevitable result of national and communal diversity. It is the inevitable background to any attempt to remodel international structures. And the picturesque nature of the background in 1815 has not entirely gone. At Versailles in 1919, the Emir Feisal was granted an interview with the Council of Ten.

¹ See below, Chapter VI and Postscript for an analysis of such factors.

² See Chapter IV, below.

³ May 30, 1814, text in G. F. von Marten's *Nouveau Recueil de Traités*, Vols. V, VII, and Supplement to Vol. V.

⁴ Article XXXII.

Lansing said that "his voice seemed to breathe the perfume of frankincense". At Paris also, two envoys arrived to represent the small principality of Montenegro, one nominated by King Nikita, the other by a National Assembly. At the end of this war, there will still be the fringe to the world settlement, and the guerilla bands of Europe will not go unrepresented.

At the end of this war, also, the background to settlement will be more than picturesque. The new force of public opinion moulds international developments.¹ Leonard Woolf wrote sweepingly of the change in the "political matrix" between 1789 and 1914:

The aristocratic Europe of Castlereagh, Metternich and the Tsar Alexander, strait-laced with treaties and Holy Alliances and principles of legitimacy, gave place to a politically fluid Europe in which Parliaments, votes, parties, Governments rising and falling on the swell of "public opinion", oust the kings and the emperors, and the aristocratic ministers of kings and emperors.²

Peacemaking by great conference inevitably changes in a world where the "common man" is acknowledged as a partner, even if in practice he is still at the mercy of his leaders.³

Behind these four great milestones of history, one can see the same shuffling to secure positions of directive authority. Particularly after 1815, the idea of the great powers holding a special place developed: "les quatre" of the struggle against Napoleon were to lead Europe in peace as they had led her against aggression and occupation in war. The purpose of the Treaty of Chaumont, the basis of the subsequent Quadruple Alliance, was to provide "not only a systematic body of persevering concert among the leading powers, but also a refuge under which all the minor states, especially those on the Rhine, may look forward to find their security upon the return of peace, relieved of the necessity of making a compromise with France".⁴ England, Austria, Russia and Prussia, were to direct the business of the Congress of all the powers to be held at Vienna. They were to be the inner ring. The original plan of the Allies was upset by the intrusion of French diplomacy under the skilful direction of Talleyrand. By mooting alternative plans, stressing the rôle of the Congress

¹ See below, Chapter VI.

² *After the Deluge* (1931), p. 132.

³ In some senses, the present war had largely been a war of leaders. After the triumph of the English and Russian peoples against German onslaughts, the stage was set for the dramatic conferences of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, and their travels from city to city.

⁴ Castlereagh to Liverpool, May 10th, 1814.

as a whole—great and small powers alike—and by suggesting an inner committee of eight ; by playing on the differences of opinion among the four victorious powers ; and by being sure of his own will when the wills of the other powers were open to influence and persuasion, Talleyrand had the effective bloc of four extended to become a Committee of Five. It was this Committee of Five which was, in Webster's words, " the real Congress of Vienna ".¹ There was a sham directing committee, and there were meetings of the Congress as a whole as well, but these occasions were not policy-making. Indeed von Humboldt, the Prussian delegate, wanted the Committee of Six merely to summon the other powers as it thought fit. Castlereagh objected to this in terms which are still pertinent : " it too broadly and ostensibly assumed the right to do what may be generally acquiesced in if not offensively announced, but which the secondary powers may protest against, if recorded to their humiliation in face of Europe ".² The result of this difference of viewpoint was that the small Powers became mere consultative agents. There never was any possibility that the Congress of Vienna would become a Constituent Assembly, legislating for Europe.

At Paris,³ too, there was the same kernel of real direction and power. Just as the Committee of Four at Vienna developed from the Chaumont Powers, allied to defeat Napoleon, so the Supreme Council of the Conference of Versailles developed from the Supreme War Council, set up to overthrow Imperial Germany. Lansing's book on the Peace Conference is called " The Big Four ". But in 1918 there was more tenderness towards the smaller powers. This was due to at least two factors. In the first place, from the Hague Convention onwards, the smaller states had begun to protest against their exclusion from the European Concert, and to demand a bigger share in any international forum.⁴ In the second place one of the declared planks of allied policy had been the defence of the helpless small nation

¹ C. K. Webster's work is essential to any detailed study of this period. In addition to *The Congress of Vienna* quoted above, p. 45, see his two volumes on *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, Vol. I, 1813-15 ; Vol. II, 1815-22 (1934).

² Quoted C. K. Webster : *The Congress of Vienna*, p. 64.

³ Some confusion arises on the question of the choice of label—" Paris " or " Versailles ". Paris and not Versailles was the seat of the Conference. Throughout this book " Paris " is used of the Conference, " Versailles " of the Treaty, which was signed in the Palace. The standard work on the Conference is H. W. V. Temperley : *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, 6 vols., 1920-4.

⁴ See D. Mitrany : *The Progress of International Government* (1933), Chapter II, " Realities in State Equality ", esp. pp. 61-2. He points out that in 1907 the small states blocked the creation of two International Courts which would have allowed the Great Powers a certain pre-eminence.

against large and aggressive neighbours. For these two reasons, the allied leaders wished to give a nominal share in the peace-making to the smaller powers. They were to be more than consultative ; " from the very outset, therefore, a method had to be devised such as would enable the delegates of the smaller powers to pretend that they were in effect playing some sort of part in the deliberations of the Supreme Council." ¹ They were to put in writing the concessions they desired from a general treaty of peace, and they were to have the opportunity of expounding orally the bases of their written claims. This lip-service to the idea of full co-operation between all the Powers, great and small, has been blamed by Harold Nicolson for much of the disorganization at the Conference. It meant a waste of time, and a misdirection of the Conference from its main task of concluding peace with Germany. An undue concentration on smaller issues, overlapping and misproportioned, blurred the organizational outlines necessary for speedy and smooth working.²

The real policy-making kernel of the elaborate machinery at Versailles was the secret " Council of Four ", at first an informal body without a Secretary or an Interpreter, but later acquiring Hankey and Mantoux to fill these two essential offices. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Wilson and Orlando, became the " big men " of the Conference, like their counterparts of 1815. In addition to this inner body, other organs were the Council of Ten, set up in January, 1919, and composed of two representatives of each of the five great powers—France, Great Britain, Italy, the U.S.A., and Japan ; and the Council of Five, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of these countries. The Council of Ten directed the conduct of the Conference during its initial stages, and was only replaced as directing body, when the Council of Four began to meet together in March. The relation of these bodies of the Great Powers to the smaller powers has been put authoritatively by Lloyd George :

It was agreed that the main duty of drafting the Treaty must be left to the Great Powers and submitted to the others for their approval. Had all the Allied nations been represented, the Congress would have been merely a debating society and for at least a year it could not have come to a definite decision on all, if any, of the vast and varied issues which had to be determined. The main burden of the War had fallen on the Great Powers and the victory was almost exclusively theirs.³

¹ Nicolson : *op. cit.*, p. 115.

² Nicolson, *loc. cit.*

³ D. Lloyd George : *op. cit.*, I., p. 215.

The representation of the smaller Powers on the Conference raised many difficult issues. The smaller Powers had played unequal parts in the struggle against Germany, and the extent of their contributions was not necessarily proportionate to their area, population, or power potential. The special position of the British Dominions, regarded as appendages of Britain by some of the continental powers, but very sure themselves of the extent of their effort and jealous of their rights, and the somewhat anomalous position of the South American States¹ required some measure of diplomatic skill. Finally, the two delegates from Canada, Australia, South Africa, and India were given the same rights as the two delegates from Serbia, Belgium, and the rest of the smaller countries. The final place of the small Powers in the newly-constituted Europe after the Peace Treaties and the Covenant had been signed was more advanced than the position they held in 1919. In the organised work of the League of Nations, the smaller states ostensibly at least had a greater degree of importance :

At the Paris Conference the small States were still treated as cavalierly as at any of the peace conferences and congresses of the nineteenth century. The real test, however, came with the League, for that was the first experiment in international government under modern conditions. . . . The small States are now in a majority on the Council and all are eligible to it ; the Assembly rests on absolute equality ; the small states have equal rights in the constitution of the Court of International Justice and of the League Secretariat. All members of the League have the same title to initiate discussions and measures. . . . The names found most frequently in the van of progressive opinion belong to representatives of small countries—like the late MM. Nansen and Branting, M. Motta, M. Hymans, M. Hambro, M. Loudon, M. Benes, M. de Madariaga. . . . The League Assembly has invested the small countries with means which at times enable them to exert a predominant influence. . . . The process of equalization is actively at work.²

So in the period after the Great War as in the period of peace between the climax of Bismarck's victories and the Great War, the small powers seemed once again to be climbing in importance.

¹ For instance, the case of Costa Rica, whose representation at the Conference was denied by Wilson, because of the character of its government. The Government of Costa Rica had declared war on Germany to try to get its position recognized by the U.S.A.

² David Mitrany : *The Progress of International Government* (1933). This long quotation from Professor Mitrany shows the attitude of a shrewd observer noting the League Constitution from the standpoint of the times. It should be compared with the same author's *A Working Peace System* (1943), esp. pp. 19-42. See also below, Chapters III, VIII.

The experience of this war, however, has revealed once again that decisions of major peace policy will continue to be taken by those Great Powers which have wielded the decisive power during the war. The special rôle of Great Britain, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China was stressed at the Conferences of Cairo and Teheran. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference marks the beginning of the active participation of the Big Four in the new peace settlement. The rôle of France as a fifth partner has been decided.¹

The modern Peace Conference demands not only the inner ring of policy-making powers and the other organs of general action. In addition to this pivotal machinery, the special place of Committees and Secretariat deserves attention. At Vienna, there were several committees. Of these, three were on territorial questions, the Committee for Switzerland, the Committee for Germany, and the Committee for Tuscany, Sardinia and Bouillon. Two were concerned with the statement of international customs and the laying down of rules of diplomatic conduct—the Commission on International Rivers and the Committee on Diplomatic Rights. The rest were concerned with the machinery of the Conference. The Statistical Commission and the Drafting Commission worked behind the scenes, while the Committee of Eight, to which all the other Committees reported (except the separate Committee on Germany), produced the declaration and machinery for the signature of the *Acte Finale*. It is interesting to see at Vienna the Committee System in its embryonic form. Although at subsequent conferences during the nineteenth century,² it was not found necessary to appoint any committees other than Drafting organs, at Paris, the eight of 1815 had swollen to fifty-eight. In both 1815 and 1919, there was some delay in their appointment. Many of the Committees of 1919 were territorial, such as the Committee on the Roumanian claims, or the Committee on Poland. Their number shows the emphasis on territorial demarcation at Versailles. In addition, there were committees set up to deal with War Guilt and War Criminals, Reparations, Labour Problems, the League of Nations, and a variety of other topics, all marking a considerable extension of the horizons of 1815, as well as parallel bodies like that on Ports or Waterways, laying down canons of international law. Representation on the Committees as in 1815 was shared by the

¹ See below, Chapter VIII and Postscript.

² Except the Hague Conferences, which fall into rather a different category. In 1899 at the First Conference there were three committees; at the Conference of 1907 there were four. These do not include the drafting organs.

delegates of all the powers concerned. In 1919, each country represented appointed two delegates, one of whom was considered to be a "technical expert".

The limitation of the work of Committees lies in the difficulties of adequate co-ordination. To correlate the activities of the different smaller committees, a "Co-ordination Committee" was appointed in 1919, but it came too late to remedy the isolation of separate decisions on the one side, and their needless overlapping on the other. The failure to co-ordinate was more serious at Paris than at Vienna, if only because the variety of problems to be tackled had so greatly increased.¹

A second difficulty lies in the definition of the scope of the Committees' powers. At Paris, they were not allowed to express any view on "principles" or "politics", and in any case, they were given no assurance that their work would be regarded as final. At Vienna, the Committee on the Slave Trade never secured its full status, owing to the opposition of Spain and Portugal. Its conferences were not binding in the same way that the conferences of the Committee on the Relative Rank of European powers were. Only by laying down carefully the scope of the various committees, while at the same time maintaining their flexibility, can the members of the committees produce unified memoranda.

Even if the committees of the Versailles model were to be replaced by special functional organizations, dealing with the different types of international activity from aviation to world security, from oil to broadcasting, co-ordination of their work with the peace conference would still remain a major problem. Indeed it might be said to become more important, for without it, decisions would be reached in different fields, which would pass over the heads not only of the governments but also of the peoples. For example, oil agreements could be made behind the scenes, which might contradict agreements on wages or on armaments. A series of such agreements could tighten a mesh around the ordinary citizen, and might deprive him of responsible partnership in government. Political co-ordination applied generally, not necessarily laid down formally in paper schemes, but operating continuously, would be essential.² Co-ordination inside the same group of functions (e.g. relief), that is co-ordina-

¹ Cf. F. S. Marston : *op. cit.*

² For rather a different view, see D. Mitrany's pamphlet, which examines this question very carefully, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-8.

tion on its lowest level, would have to be paralleled by co-ordination between different groups of functional activities (e.g. relief and supplies), and finally general co-ordination of all functional bodies.

The Conference would obviously need an active but unobtrusive Secretariat. Diplomatic practice suggests that the President of a Peace Conference chooses as Principal Secretary some member of his own diplomatic staff. In 1814, Metternich chose Gentz, brilliant and cynical publicist, who managed the technical details of the Conference almost to perfection, and left his brilliance stamped in all his work. In 1918, Clemenceau chose Dutasta, affable and tactful, but easily flurried and without a wide enough experience. Sir Maurice Hankey soon took a more important place. The secretarial work at an international Congress differs considerably from that required of an international body, working continuously in times of peace. In the first place, much of the work in the former case must be done nationally, and involves its own problems of liaison between different interests, military and diplomatic, political and technical. In the second place, what Harold Nicolson calls the "secretarial strategy" of the Conference¹ assumes more importance when time is limited, and decisions cannot be left suspended in mid-air for months of deliberation.

In all secretarial work, however, the kernel of activity is the same: (i) the preparation for meetings, either of the policy-making body or of the respective committees, involving the drawing up of agenda, the collection and dissemination of necessary information, and the guidance of delegates; (ii) negotiation, to smooth the frictions and contacts of different personalities.² At modern international committees, the burden of distributing information is a serious one, since the sources are so scattered and the material so vast. The particular place of the economic expert, with figures and charts at his elbow, or the geographical expert, with his maps and diagrams, has become greatly magnified since the setting up of the Statistical Conference in 1815. The contribution of expert opinion on these matters to the delegates and to the Conference in general is vital to the settlement. In

¹ H. Nicolson: *op. cit.*, p. 120. Because Nicolson's account is so direct and intimate, it acquires a lasting value in all books on peacemaking. Its uniqueness means that it must be quoted as a primary authority in preference to more official and less revealing sources.

² See *The International Secretariat of the Future* (R.I.I.A.), 1944. A full and authoritative survey of the whole field.

the case of both maps and data, national distortions can so vary the facts at issue, that some scientific appraisal is indispensable.

This general picture of the lay-out of an international Conference, proceeding through its different phases from the preliminaries of Peace down to the Acte Finale ¹ and the ratifications of the Settlement, or alternatively seen as proceeding from the Committees up to the policy-making organ at the centre, omits many of the less structural elements, which none the less leave a firm imprint on the resulting peace. In the first place, personality and the clash of personalities claim a wide share of attention, not only during the period of the negotiations, but also in years long afterwards in the narratives and analyses of historians. 1648 is remembered for Richelieu ; 1713 for Bolingbroke ; 1815 for Castlereagh and Metternich, Alexander and Talleyrand ; 1919 for Wilson "the prophet", Clemenceau "the Tiger", and Lloyd George "the Welshman". The future peace will be remembered for its protagonists also, whether they be Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek or de Gaulle. The outlook of these leaders, their education and upbringing, their political experience, their relationships among themselves, cannot be discounted. And among the smaller powers, men with dominant personalities can carve out for themselves parts of unusual importance, as did Venizelos at Paris. The attitude of the major powers towards Greece and political problems affecting Greece, was determined in large measure by their special attitude towards Venizelos personally. A figure like Marshal Tito has acquired a similar lustre during the present war.

The place of meeting is similarly of considerable importance. The decision to hold a Congress in a given city is largely dependent on circumstances, but the most important factor is the initiative possessed by the leading victorious powers. The choice of Vienna in 1815 was almost a matter of course : it was intended to pay tribute to Austrian determination and diplomacy.² The choice of Paris in 1856 was a tribute to Napoleon III's share in the Crimean War and his anxiety to appear as the Emperor of Peace.

¹ The order of signing the Acte Finale has some significance. Normal practice is to sign in French alphabetical order, not in any system of rank among the powers. At Vienna in 1815, a system of drawing lots was advocated. The alternative is for all powers to sign *pêle-mêle*, which only leads to confusion.

² Castlereagh had first intended that London should be the seat of the Conference, but the choice of Paris as the place for the Signature of the Peace with France and Vienna as the seat of the Conference soon followed. "Les souverains alliés avaient voulu donner un témoignage de gratitude à l'Empereur d'Autriche pour sa conduite." . . . d'Angeberg, *Le Congrès de Vienne*, p. xxxiv.

The choice of Berlin in 1878 was to ensure that all the European Powers would be present. In all these cases, the results were not unfortunate. In 1918, however, the choice of Paris was a mistake which should be obvious enough to prevent repetition. Castlereagh had confessed to Bathurst at the time of the Treaty of Paris that the city was "a bad place for business".¹ The statement remained true a hundred years later. Lloyd George claimed that while the atmosphere of Paris had seemed to the British Government likely to "be naturally excited and exasperated by the events of the past four and a half years" and not "conducive to that calm and detachment so essential to a durable settlement of highly controversial subjects", yet at the same time "I cannot point out that in the sequel the purely Parisian influence made any serious impression on the actual stipulations of the document finally agreed to, since I cannot discover a single particular in which it has departed from the terms of peace laid down by the Allies before the War came to an end".² This statement has been very severely criticized by many writers.³ "We were hampered by the atmosphere of Paris, where German guilt was assumed as a proved fact," wrote Dr. Seymour;⁴ "Paris was a nightmare and everyone there was morbid," recorded Keynes;⁵ "That sombre and authoritative capital appeared during those barbarian weeks to have lost her dignity," explained Nicolson.⁶ The violence of the Paris Press, its distrust and lampooning of Wilson, and the high emotional pitch of the people of the city did not make for a satisfactory peace. The release of hatred and vengeance in the Paris of 1919 contrasts oddly with the picture of Vienna dancing in 1815. In both cases, the choice of setting mirrored the character of the peace, even if it did not determine it.

This interplay of structural and personal factors in the making of a Peace Conference is not the only theme. At Vienna, the Preamble to the *Acte Finale* begins "Au nom de la très sainte et indivisible Trinité". The lip-service to the divine sanction for peace was still paid, even though the Papacy had been pushed right into the background. At Versailles, men put their trust in the Covenant. "The High Contracting Parties, in order to

¹ C. K. Webster : *The Congress of Vienna*, p. 40.

² D. Lloyd George : *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 148-9.

³ Especially by P. Birdsall : *Versailles Twenty Years After* (1941).

⁴ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*.

⁵ *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, p. 3. See the whole of the Introduction.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security . . . agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.”¹ The question of the language to be used in the transaction of peacemaking goes far beyond the choice of medium—English, German, or French—it involves the choice of words and expressions wherein the mood of a moment is crystallized for all time. The tendentious clauses of the Versailles Treaty mark the mood of moral superiority felt by allies who knew they had done the right thing.²

The linking of the League with the Treaty is an attempt to overcome the duality of letter and spirit. Wilson's fears for the future of his League of Nations made him willing to overcome his scruples on many of the issues of the Treaty.³ This willingness is written in its language. Also written there is imprecision and uncertainty, and at times evasiveness.⁴ Much of the improvisation was the inevitable result of a process of “give and take”, but the drafting⁵ left some of the clauses dealing with the perpetuation of the peace machinery very uncertain and insecure. The interpretation of Article Sixteen, main plank of the machinery of international co-operation, became open, and in effect the whole purpose of the provision was lost.⁶

¹ Traditionally, French has been the diplomatic language, and any declarations and the Acte Finale have been made in French. This applied also to non-Western countries. The Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan in 1905 was signed in duplicate in English and French, but it was laid down that, in case of doubt, the French text was to prevail. At Brest-Litovsk in 1917, a Babel of languages was used. Turkish, Bulgarian and Russian were used as well as French and German. In the League of Nations, the official languages were English and French, and delegates using other languages had to have their speeches or reports translated into one of these. After the fall of France in 1940, the claims of English as the language of peacemaking were put forward, and Article XI of the U.N.R.R.A. Rules of Procedure laid down “that English shall be the official language of the Council and its Committees”. Mr. Churchill's sponsoring of Basic English points in the same direction, but as the controversy on the languages question at Atlantic City shows, the position of French as a special international language has not been destroyed.

² The best example of this is Article 231 of the Treaty. “The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.” The second part of the article in italics is an extra and unnecessary attempt to give moral backing to the first part.

³ “Examine the ‘Treaty of Peace’: you will find everywhere throughout its manifold provisions that the framers felt obliged to turn to the League of Nations as the indispensable instrumentality for the maintenance of the new order it has been its purpose to set up in the world of civilized men.” (Speech of Wilson on his return to the U.S.A., July 10th, 1919.)

⁴ The best example of the evasiveness is Article 80, that dealing with Austria. See Professor Hazeltine's Summary of the German Notes to the Peace Conference, Vol. II, Temperley, *op. cit.*

⁵ See D. H. Miller: *The Drafting of the Covenant* (2 vols., 1928).

⁶ “Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members

It seems clear that past experience of international conferences will not suffice to cover the needs of peace-making at the end of the present war. Just as the formal armistice is a relic of the past, even though it can still be used as an instrument of international dealing,¹ so the final and definitive peace treaty belongs to the time when peacemaking could still be an occasion, an event, to be treated in years to come as an anniversary with fireworks and festivities. A longer process of peacemaking is now inevitable.² But it still seems essential for co-ordinated peacemaking to hold some form of international assembly, if only to be the first of a series, regularly meeting when the war is won. At such a meeting, the same problems outlined above would continue to arise, and it is only by a combination of wisdom based on experience and directive ingenuity based on the quick appraisal of new needs, that this peace conference can succeed. Lloyd George called the Treaty of Versailles "the most far-reaching and comprehensive settlement ever effected in any international dispute".³ There can be no disagreement about the magnitude of the new task.⁴

§ 5. MACHINERY FOR PRESERVING PEACE

It is in itself a chastening experience to compare the high hopes of 1919 with the grim despair of 1939. "The position to-day," wrote Sir Alexander Cadogan from the British Foreign

of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air-force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures . . . and in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League." The article was amended at the Second Assembly of the League of Nations. It was still a matter of dispute in 1935. See Viscount Cecil: *A Great Experiment* (1941), pp. 75-6, and 125 *et seq.*

¹ Note, for instance, the Allied Armistice with Rumania, September, 1944.

² Although the demand for certainty militates in favour of a speedy settlement (see above, Chapter I). One argument used in favour of delay is that the statesmen concerned will be tired and in need of rest before the conference begins (cf. Wilson Harris: *Problems of the Peace*, p. 9). But if it is desirable that war-leaders should be the peacemakers, age alone is a limiting factor.

³ D. Lloyd George: *op. cit.*, I, p. 17.

⁴ For the differences in the setting of the two tasks, see below, Chapter IV, § 3.

Office on the 7th of September, 1939, "shows clearly that the Covenant has, in the present instance, completely broken down in practice, that the whole machinery for the preservation of peace has collapsed."¹ The extent of the collapse was not then fully apparent, but the "lost peace" could already be docketed away for the purposes of the historian and the political scientist.

Many of the problems raised in the preceding section on the peace conference remain as problems in the years after the peace is signed, and are only slightly modified in character. The structural needs of a peace system are the same. Around a core of policy-making states, holding the peace together, there are grouped organizations dealing with the different aspects of international policy. Around the inner group is an Assembly of all the states, discussing matters together, and having varying degrees of power to implement decisions arrived at. As the servant of the Powers, there is the secretariat, an international staff with special qualifications. Together this series of bodies represents the organizational nexus of any international political system.

The importance of executive authority is plain. The most careful investigation and drafting of policy is of little use unless it is translated into practice. This truism was not always acknowledged at Geneva. Robert Dell has stated succinctly what was often thought: "International problems can never be solved by an international talking-shop. That is what the League has in fact been to too great an extent. There has always been too much talk at Geneva and too little action."² The executive problem is more simple at the end of hostilities when the first peace conference is in session. Then the concentration of power in the hands of the victorious Powers gives them at any rate the illusion of being able to manipulate the peace in the same way that they have won the war. The problem is more complicated in districts where the authority of the Allies is still challenged, or in doubt. The test comes when the initial stages of settlement have been accomplished. Precisely how the executive arm of any international organization will work is still uncertain,³ and a consideration of its failure after the Peace of Versailles is of direct relevance to-day.

The League of Nations was an attempt to give continuity to

¹ *Cmd. 3452*.

² *The Geneva Racket*, p. 319.

³ For interesting suggestions, see E. T. Williams: *op. cit.* Cf. also Dumbarton Oaks, Chapter VII and Postscript.

international collaboration. As such, it was the climax of years of striving. After Vienna in 1815, the continuity of the Congress System soon broke down. The Congress of Verona in 1822, the fifth after the initial conference, was the last of the series. The difficulties of travelling from one city of Europe to another, and of referring matters back to the governments concerned, was one of the chief technical factors in the failure of the scheme. The political factor was more important and more decisive, for as soon as one of the Great Powers broke away from the Concert of the Great Powers, the fabric collapsed. For a variety of reasons, England was the first country to leave the system. British trade and British distrust of interference in Europe moved together.

Things are getting back to a wholesome state again, every nation for itself and God for us all, [exclaimed Canning]. He (Canning) thinks that the system of periodical meetings of the four Great Powers, with a view to the general concerns of Europe, new, and of a very questionable policy. . . . It will necessarily involve us deeply in all the politics of the Continent. All other States must protest against such an attempt to place them under subjection. The meetings may become a scene of cabal and intrigue.¹

From this time onwards, apart from a steady and important international activity in non-political spheres, international political activity was not organized and moulded, but flashed intermittently and emotionally from sympathy with oppressed peoples. The collaboration of the Great Powers on various international topics, especially that of the Eastern Question, coming to a head at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, was not formal and sustained, but practical, unsystematic and at times arbitrary.²

By contrast, the League of Nations was an attempt to establish the Rule of Law in international relationships. It aimed first at preventing an outbreak of war, and secondly to provide means of settlement for nations engaged in disputes. Disputes were first to be dealt with by diplomatic negotiation ; if that failed by judicial settlement or arbitration. The former procedure was to be carried out by the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. The institution of such a court had been recom-

¹ Bathurst to Castlereagh, 20th October, 1818. Quoted H. W. V. Temperley : *Foreign Policy of Canning* (1925), p. 44.

² See A. Zimmern : *op. cit.*, Part I, Chapter VI.

mended at the Hague Conference of 1907, but it was not until 1922 that it was set up.¹ Working as a permanent body, the Court was open to all members of the League of Nations, or non-members agreeing to abide by given decisions. The Court was a body for states only and not for private persons. Jurisdiction was either voluntary, based on common consent of the parties to abide by the verdict of the Court, or compulsory, based on conventions, treaties, and agreements, accepted by the members. The judges were "independent, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character who possess the qualification required, in their respective countries, for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law".² No national judge could adjudge a case involving his own country, and decisions were given by majority vote.

The settlement of political disputes was more difficult. The framers of the Covenant drew a distinction between disputes touching law and disputes touching policy. The former only were matters for the Court; the latter brought into play the ambiguous collective security provisions of the Covenant.³ The League Council acted as a Conciliation Commission.⁴ Any sanctions decided upon were to be left to the individual members of the League to carry out. At crucial moments of history between the two wars, the governments making up the League failed to apply the standards of the Covenant, and bowed before the intimidation and force of militant aggression. The collective defence of peace-loving nations could not succeed unless there was a sense of common interest holding them together. The failure to apply sanctions was only the measure of the lack of the will on the part of the members to make the Covenant work. "It is not the sanction which makes the law; it is the existence of law which leads to the sanction. It is only when society is

¹ On the International Court, see M. O. Hudson: *The Permanent Court of International Justice* (1934); A. P. Fachiri: *The Permanent Court of International Justice* (1932); H. Lauterpacht: *The Permanent Court of International Justice* (1934), and the Annual Publications of the Court.

² Article 2, Statutes. See also below, Chapter VII, § 1.

³ Especially Article XVI, quoted above, footnote, p. 71. For a discussion of some of the difficulties of the Covenant, see R. Dell: *op cit.*, Part Two, Chapter I; Cecil: *op. cit.*, 329 *et seq.*

⁴ "The most evident fault of the League Council during these few days was its inability to act in a truly judicial capacity—a fault which was made painfully plain by the readiness of nearly all the delegates to take sides in the dispute under discussion."—*The Times*, December 12th, 1934, on the dispute between Hungary and Yugoslavia.

firmly established that it can protect the rules of its existence with adequate sanctions.”¹

As a long-range protector of the peace, the League failed. The nations failed to show what de Madariaga called a “sense of a higher collectivity”. Sectional interests undermined the conception of the indivisibility of peace. In an international body, some case can be made out for greater regional groupings to increase this sense of solidarity, but in order to prevent inter-regional rivalries, regional bodies should not be supreme. Whether in a smooth peace system there is any place for neutrality is doubtful. “The feeling has undoubtedly grown up that the intimate relations of the civilized world in modern times, with its corresponding interdependence of nations in intercourse with each other, and the more highly developed conscience of the world, demand a fresh edition of neutrality.”²

Alongside a greater community of purpose, there should develop power to exercise authority. During the last war the American League to enforce Peace suggested the organization of force to back up the decisions of any international body. Similar views had been put forward by William Ladd³ and later by President Taft.⁴ During the period between the two Wars, the New Commonwealth Society did much to popularize these views, and Lord Davies⁵ gave all his energies to propaganda for the movement. The idea of an International Police Force backing the decisions of an Equity Tribunal has been suggested as a further extension of the League of Nations.⁶

A third means of improvement in the long-range machinery of peacemaking is the framing of machinery to settle the problems of peaceful change, to overcome the frictions caused by obsolete international settlements.⁷ Such frictions induce the surface tension which ignites the spark of war. War is often regarded as the machinery of redistribution, of the present bursting forward from the shackles of the past.

¹ A. L. Goodhart : *Law, Equity and World Order* (Peace Aims Pamphlets, No. 17, 1943), p. 18.

² Mr. Justice Phillimore : “The Future Law of Neutrality,” quoted D. Mitrany : *The Progress of International Government*, p. 166. See further G. Schwarzenberger : *International Law and Totalitarian Lawlessness* (1943), esp. Chapter II.

³ G. Schwarzenberger : *William Ladd* (1936).

⁴ In 1911. This followed a Senate Resolution of 1910.

⁵ See Lord Davies : *Nearing the Abyss* (1936) ; *The Problem of the Twentieth Century* (1930).

⁶ See below, Chapter V.

⁷ See Sir John Fischer Williams : *International Change and International Peace* (1932) ; C. R. M. F. Cruttwell : *A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World* (1937) ; Paul de Auer : *The Revision of Treaties* (Transactions of the Grotius Society, 1933).

A method of referring such frictions to an international body has its legal basis in the rule "*conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus*", agreements cease to be binding when the circumstances in which they have been made have altered. The balancing of a due regard for treaties and their effective revision is one of the most important technical problems affecting the perpetuation of peace. Peace must not and cannot be rigidly contained for ever in the old bottles of existing settlements. Germany's desire to break the Settlement of 1919 led Europe through flame and destruction. The question is how far any system of peaceful change would have prevented this.

Against a picture of peaceful change through agreements and verdicts of courts of law should be set the normal pattern of peaceful change in the single national community. Peaceful change is brought about through a variety of different instruments (e.g. Parliament), and the development of common habits and interests. To carry this idea of peaceful change into the "community of nations" is the problem not for one single international body like the League, but for a series of bodies, giving colour and variegation to international co-operation. "That way alone lies the prospect of turning 'defence' into 'police', as in the national state; and especially of giving 'security' the sense of an undisturbed social life, to be preserved by common government, in lieu of the outdated sense of the security of a physical territory, to be protected by tanks and planes."¹ That the Europe of the years between the wars never approached such an ideal of "common government", and must still pass through many phases of economic and political development before it is ripe for such an ideal, is plain. The problem of peaceful change requires not only a more refined fabric of machinery and law, but also a change in conceptions of citizenship and society.

The failure of the long-term machinery covers most of the troubled history of the "Twenty Years' Truce". The short-range machinery was hardly more successful. Almost immediately at the end of hostilities, the rift between France and Britain and the defection of the U.S.A. paralysed united action to enforce the main provisions of the Treaties. The Treaty demanded years of united effort to ensure its success: it ordered changes of boundaries inside the European Continent, plebiscites to decide on national allegiances, commissions of control to keep a vigilant eye on German armament, reparation, and occupation.

¹ D. Mitrany: *A Working Peace System*, p. 27.

§ 6. MAINTAINING THE TREATY.

The machinery to secure these vital tasks was varied, diffuse and somewhat unco-ordinated. From 1920 to 1923, there was still officially a state of war in the Near East, and the conduct of the policy there shows the extent to which the war machinery had broken down, and the will to revive it had been broken. The instrument of high policy was the Supreme Council, direct descendant of the Supreme War Council, but lacking the subordinate technical organizations to cover the different phases of peace control. Political differences between Britain and France were heightened rather than diminished by public conflicts on this key body. Almost independent of this main body and more successful in preserving a façade of agreement was the Conference of Ambassadors, meeting in Paris, and carrying out the day-to-day decisions of policy, criticized strongly in both Britain and France, and accused of acting under the orders of the Quai d'Orsay largely because it demanded a fair measure of treaty enforcement.

The Conference of Ambassadors supervised the work of the Allied Commissions set up to supervise the military, naval, and air-force programmes inside Germany.¹ The useful work of these Commissions, where military unanimity was easier to secure than governmental agreement, diminished as an entirely new attitude to the beaten enemy arose. Instead of imposing controls to maintain the supremacy of allied powers, politicians were looking forward in an increasing degree to full collaboration with Germany, and to a series of Conferences with Germany, which would ultimately restore her place in the Council of the Great Powers. From the time of the Occupation of the Ruhr onwards, there was little effective control, and in 1927 Germany demanded the withdrawal of the Military Commission before signing the Locarno Pact. The entry of the Germany of Stresemann into the League of Nations on special terms brought these bodies to an end. The vanquished enemy had been admitted into the heart of long-range peace organization without having satisfied all the initial short-range demands, laid down categorically in the Treaty.

Two other Commissions saw their scope diminish in face of changing national policies among the Allies. They were the

¹ See below, Chapter III. The inspection machinery of the three Commissions was quite inadequate. The Air Commission could not control civil aviation or the building of aircraft. No sustained effort was made to inspect by surprise visits. See further Schwarzschild, *op. cit.*, esp. Part II, Chapter 4.

Reparation Commission and the Inter-Allied Commission for the Rhineland. Neither was a model of good organization. The Reparation Commission developed into a semi-political body, with the Chairman able to use a decisive casting vote, or at any rate to hold it out as a threat during preliminary discussions. The second body, the Rhineland Commission, handicapped from the start as all these bodies were by the unwillingness of the Americans to play any part other than that of observers, showed its complete lack of co-ordination at the time of the French Occupation of the Ruhr.

The open failure of this short-range machinery for maintaining the settlement and for implementing the French policy of seeking security against Germany by a series of checks and controls shows the "powerlessness of institutions to effect the co-ordination of policy when changes of political temper supervene among the peoples concerned".¹ The lesson of the need for allied unity and allied power is driven home again. The provisions of the peace settlement must inspire the same vigilant enforcement years afterwards as when the peace was signed ; and the long-range machinery of peacemaking must ensure that changes in the initial programme, brought about by changes in the world-situation, should not appear as retreats in the face of the beaten enemy. Co-operation of all nations in maintaining peace cannot be bought at the expense of yielding on the basic conditions.

Special bodies to deal with these pre-requisites for maintaining the peace are among the kinds of machinery most likely to be used after this war.² The realization that "government is a practical thing" has led to the demand for action rather than declarations of rights. From this standpoint, the Covenant of the League of Nations took too little account of the importance of the short-term *ad hoc* bodies regulating European life :

it continued nineteenth-century tradition. It was concerned above all with fixing in a definite way the formal relationship of the member states, and in a measure also of non-members, and only in a very secondary way with initiating positive common activities and action. . . . The incipient common functions, as well as many old connections, were disbanded in the international sphere at the very time

¹ See Jordan : *op. cit.*, p. 65. The whole of Chapter V is relevant. On Plebiscites, see S. Warnbaugh : *Plebiscites since the World War* (1933) and *The Saar Plebiscite* (1940) ; on the Conference of Ambassadors, *The Conference of Ambassadors* (Geneva Studies, Vol. XII, 1942), by G. P. Pink ; on the Allied Commissions of Control, see General J. H. Morgan, "The Disarmament of Germany," in *Quarterly Review*, October, 1924, pp. 415-57.

² See below for the "Functional Approach to Peace," Chapter VIII, pp. 319 f.

when a common constitution was being laid down for it. It was that divorce between life and form that doomed the League from the onset, and not any inadequacy in its written rules.¹

The protagonists of this standpoint explain in these terms the remarkable success of the I.L.O., the one piece of Versailles machinery² to retain its life and character. Behind it was the general realization that the social and economic problem was a world-wide one, and that countries would have to get together to settle it. For this reason, Germany became a member as early as 1919, the U.S.A. was a member also, and when Brazil left the League in 1927, she retained her membership of the I.L.O.

"The great defect of the Treaties of 1919 was that they were purely political treaties and ignored the economic and social aspects, which are really essential to any thorough peace settlement."³ Machinery to explore the various levels of a wider peace settlement is in the making now.⁴

Structural changes in the machinery of the League will raise other problems of revision as well.⁵ The same problems of place of meeting and clash of personalities that were important at the initial peace conference remain throughout the years of sustained activity. Geneva had its drawbacks—an essentially provincial town in a glorious setting with a population never very friendly to the crowd of international outsiders, it none the less avoided the struggle between Fascism and Democracy which swept across Europe in the thirties. Its lack of contact with the movements of real life has of late been criticized. It has been suggested that the League should not have met in some "Shangri-la",⁶ but in a large and important city "where the members of the staff would have a large and varied society outside the League to mix with and would not be obliged, so to speak, to take in one another's washing".⁷ From the point of view of many of the British Government leaders at any rate, "Geneva was a strange place in which a newly fangled machine existed in order to enable foreigners to influence or even control our international action".⁸ Thus although the League had its own quota of powerful and dominating personalities, it never won the assent of Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers to the extent that it might have done. This was apparent even at the time of Locarno, when

¹ Mitrany: *op. cit.*, p. 8.

² The I.L.O. was set up by Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. It was to be an autonomous organ of the League of Nations, open to members and non-members.

³ H. Butler: *op. cit.*, p. 198.

⁴ See below, Chapter VIII.

⁵ R. Dell: *op. cit.*, p. 337.

⁶ Cf. below, Chapter VII, § 1.

⁷ Letter to *The Times*, September, 1944.

⁸ Viscount Cecil: *op. cit.*, p. 146.

a Locarno Bloc of Great Powers grew up almost within the threshold of the Geneva Canton.

It seems unlikely that the international machinery of the future will be so closely associated with any one town. It is in the nature of functional organizations to operate in a more decentralized fashion dictated by immediate convenience, and more loose-jointed peacemaking will also tend to decentralization. The "General Assembly" and the "Security Council" foreshadowed by the Dumbarton Oaks proposals might well meet in each of the "Big Power's" capitals in turn. But the Secretariat by its nature requires greater permanence, as a sedentary body : and the "Security Council", if it is to "meet permanently", would most conveniently meet beside its Secretariat. The I.L.O., having its special building in Geneva, may well choose to move back there after the war : and Geneva has still certain advantages, both because of its central position and its convenient buildings inherited from the League.¹ It has been suggested that, with Russia playing so large a part in the new organization, a more eastern capital is to be preferred : and that Berlin has obvious advantages of a different kind, as regards keeping a watch on Germany. Although psychologically the choice of capital remains important, the development of speedy air transport removes many former difficulties. It is significant that whilst the main war conferences have been held in a wide variety of places from Moscow and Cairo to Casablanca and Quebec, the new organizations have been planned at conferences which have all been held in the United States. That the organization of them has been influenced by American habits is shown by the use of "steering committees" at an early stage at Bretton Woods.² The timing, setting and organization of international conferences are important factors in peacemaking and in the technique of reaching agreed policies. The increased attention given to these apparently trivial details is one sign of a more scientific approach to the whole subject this time.

¹ Mr. Wilson Harris favours Geneva for these reasons : *Problems of the Peace*, Chapter I. Cf. Robert de Traz : *The Spirit of Geneva* (1935).

² Cf. below, p. 275.

CHAPTER III

THE TREATMENT OF THE VANQUISHED COUNTRIES

§ 1. *The priority of the problem : the relativity of ideas of justice : prerequisites of a wise peace : lessons of 1918 : the importance of allied unity in the period after the peace : will and power.*

§ 2. *The military settlement : its phases : importance of the military terms : action to maintain disarmament : occupation : control and supervision : power structure : the will to enforce peace.*

§ 3. *Frontiers : territorial change in 1918 : the Rhine Frontier : Russian frontiers : new frontier demands : frontiers and new ideas of security : frontier problems of the next settlement : dismemberment of the Reich : allied views : the lessons of 1815.*

§ 4. *Economic aspects of the settlement : the history of indemnities : precedents before 1914 : reparations in 1918-19 : the Reparations Commission : Economic Plans : net effects of German reparations : feasible forms of reparation : reparations to poor countries : labour reparations : economic treatment of the Reich : the framework of world trade : the future of German heavy industry : internationalization : nationalization : trade in the East of Europe : a general economic settlement.*

§ 5. *Retribution : war-guilt and war-crimes : 1919 : Leipzig trials : improvements of technique : policy of the Allies : common principles : re-education.*

§ 6. *Settlement with the smaller defeated powers : difficulties of timing : guerillas of peace : lessons of 1918 : the case of Italy : other defeated powers : great and small.*

§ 7. *The problem of Japan : difficulties of discussion : the imponderables : Japanese militarism : divergence of remedies : the Emperor myth : occupation, reparation, retribution : the economic structure of Japan : expansionism : Japan in a new setting.*

§ 8. *Reconciliation of interests and policies : difficulties of co-ordination : dangers of easy ways out : making the settlement last.*

§ 1. THE PRIORITY OF THE PROBLEM

In all large-scale wars, when the fate not only of one particular country but of many has been in the balance, tremendous efforts and elaborate organization have been necessary before a coalition could defeat an aggressor. The violence and the tenacity of such a struggle lead to the demand for increased security and a more unchallengeable order. The treatment of the vanquished aggressor becomes naturally the first plank in the programme for creating a stable peace.

The treatment of the vanquished country or countries is, in a real sense, an index of the wisdom of the whole settlement. It takes priority in importance, and helps to create the necessary conditions and environment in which the other tasks of peace-making can be successfully carried out. The idea of the wisdom of a settlement has been explored far less than the more spectacular problem of the justice of a settlement. The cry of justice is

raised too often in international politics to be entirely convincing. It was in the name of justice that Hitler carried on his most successful campaign against the Treaty of Versailles, paying lip-service to Wilsonian principles at a time when the age of Wilson had gone for ever, but was still sufficiently recent to appeal to many sections of world-opinion.¹ The question of the justice of the Treaty led Hitler to discuss the abstract principles according to which nations should live—"For example, according to all common sense, logic, and all principles of a general human and of a higher justice, nay even according to the laws of a Divine Will, all nations ought to have an equal share in the goods of this world," he said in the Reichstag, on April 28th, 1939. His view of justice is very different from that upheld by those who talk of justice to the oppressed victims of Nazism, to the countries ravaged and destroyed, and who claim in the name of justice the destruction of Germany and the German people. And both views of justice diverge radically from the papal view of justice, put forward by Benedict XV, Pius XI, or Pius XII.² Señor de Madariaga sums up the relativity of justice very strikingly :

May I enter a caveat about "justice". I know that the alternative sounds worse, but justice is a word which I hope to hear some day from the lips of the Lord ; but from the lips of man I do not believe in it overmuch. The man who speaks of justice all the time usually means to air his own grievances. Expediency is an empirical method no better than Justice. But the true alternative is Wisdom.³

Wisdom, then, rather than justice, would seem to be the better guide in the treatment of vanquished countries. Wisdom demands first and foremost a long-range view. The enemies in one war, for instance, are not always the enemies of the next. Even the Allies of one war may become enemies in the next, as the examples of Japan and Italy show. These facts are often forgotten. Wisdom demands secondly a balanced view. A dissatisfied partner may well team up with the beaten enemy, as did Italy in the Axis Pacts with Germany and Japan. An isolated outcast may well ally with the beaten enemy in the ranks of the forsaken, as the U.S.S.R. and Germany did at Rapallo in 1922. Thirdly, wise treatment of the enemy can never imply a mere

¹ See G. Schwarzenberger : *International Law and Totalitarian Lawlessness* (1943).

² For similar statements by the different parties involved in the last war (Asquith, Wilson, Bethmann-Hollweg), see L. Woolf ; *After the Deluge*, Part I, Chapter I, p. 26 (first published 1931, 1937 Edition).

³ *The Future of International Government* (Peace Aims Pamphlets, No. 4). Cf. T. E. Jessop : *The Treaty of Versailles—Was it Just ?* (1942), especially Chapter VI.

diktat, narrow in scope, when states are as variegated and divided as they now are, and when new alliances emerge with new grievances and newly realized convergent interests. Wise treatment of the enemy may be difficult at a time when all power lies secure in the hands of the victors. Unwise use of this power would tend to obscure the changing power relations that emerge as years go by, and only a peace which can go on growing and is sufficiently flexible to absorb the change in power relations can remain respected and served beyond the day. The ideal settlement is long-range in vision, balanced in proportion, and comprehensive without being restrictive, even though made at a time when the short-range memories of war have seared themselves into men's hearts and stirred men's passions, when a balanced and tolerant view has been destroyed in the partisanship and comradeship of national struggle, and when the desire to settle things for good and all on the one hand, or merely to let things drift on the other hand, paralyses effective and thoughtful action. Here is a difficult task indeed. A wise peace is conditioned by all these factors : but a just peace, to go one step further, can only be made in Heaven.

If the treatment of the vanquished countries takes priority in importance, it also takes priority in time at the Conference, and in the preparations for it.¹ In the judgement of many critics of the Paris Conference this fundamental issue of general policy was unduly postponed and less urgent problems were tackled first. The whole problem of security which is so intimately connected with the treatment of the defeated aggressor, was obscured by grandiose schemes for rolling up old maps of the world and drawing new ones.

We thought less, [writes Harold Nicolson],² about our late enemies than about the new countries which had arisen from their tired loins. Our emotions centred far less around the old than around the new. I beg the young men who will be in attendance upon the British Commissioners to the Conference of Montreal in 1965 [*sic*] to believe me when I say that the concepts "Germany", "Austria", "Hungary", "Bulgaria" or "Turkey" were not in the forefront of our minds. It was the thought of the new Serbia, the new Greece, the new Bohemia, the new Poland, which made our hearts sing hymns at heaven's gate.

The diversity and presupposed righteousness of the new countries

¹ There is thus urgent need, in a democracy, for parties to agree on a single national policy : cf. the Liberal Party Committee : *Germany after the War* (1944), p. 3.

² *Peacemaking*, 1919, p. 32.

themselves seemed an adequate guarantee for security and the perpetuation of the settlement. In the meantime the question of the treatment of the vanquished was made the matter of dispute and compromise.

The treatment of the leading vanquished country inevitably takes precedence over the treatment of the smaller enemy satellite states. Many of these states fall to the allied onslaught before the leading enemy is defeated. The problems of how to treat them vary from case to case and from time to time : their treatment is conditioned by the war situation and its changing requirements.¹ Thus the treatment of Italy after the collapse of the Mussolini régime and the armistice with the Allies was largely an affair not of rigid and unconditional surrender nor of sermonizing on wisdom and justice, but of adaptation to the requirements of defeating the German armies as quickly and as decisively as possible. In this war as in the last, Germany has been considered as the chief enemy : though many sections of American opinion see the Japanese as the chief enemy. The settlement with Japan is felt to post-date in urgency the settlement inside Europe, if only because the war with Germany began earlier, and absorbed the full interests of Great Britain and her allies long before Pearl Harbour or Singapore. For this reason alone, the emphasis at this point will be placed on the German problem, and the question of the place of the smaller enemy Powers and of the Japanese Empire will be considered separately, although general principles of reparations and retribution policy and other aspects of policy apply to all, even to those who "work their passage home".

As regards Germany, two attitudes had developed in 1919, "the one looking forward towards reconciliation with a Germany purged of autocratic rule within the framework of an all-embracing League, the other seeking the assurance of peace in safeguards against the revival of German power".² British Liberalism had consistently maintained that the war was a crusade for the emancipation of the German people from the domination of the Prussian military caste. "We are not fighting the German people . . . the German people are as much under the heel of this Prussian military caste as any other nation in Europe. It will be a day of rejoicing for the German peasant and artisan, when the military caste is broken," said Lloyd George in the

¹ See below, § 6, and section 5 of the Crimea Declaration, Appendix I, G.

² W. M. Jordan : *Great Britain, France and the German Problem* (1918-39) (1943), p. 7.

second month of the war.¹ With a "new map of Europe", H. G. Wells's first war aim, justice would so reign between the nations that the motive for war would disappear.² The German people along with the British people and the French people would share the blessings of universal peace.

Such views about the German problem could not possibly be universal. In France the nearness of the enemy, his occupation of French soil, the damage caused, the precariousness of victory, produced the realization that German power might well revive.

A Republic built up on the same principles of militarism and the centralization of power, [said Foch], will be no less dangerous and will remain no less a menace to peace. More than that . . . republican Germany, unhampered by the difficulties which the existence of small principalities undoubtedly created for the Empire, is likely to derive increased strength from her unity and from the vitality and energy of a people henceforth in closer relationship to their government.³

Besides these two views of the German problem, Wilson raised the cry of cold impartial justice, "even-handed and dispassionate". In the subsequent confusion of ideas, no satisfactory and coherent solution to the German problem was reached. "The Peace which emerged from the Paris Conference was unjust enough to cause resentment, but not forceful enough to render such resentment impotent. Germany was neither conciliated nor suppressed. She was wounded, but not slain. It took her fourteen years and more to recover from her wounds."⁴

During these fourteen years, the differences in attitude to defeated Germany which had existed in 1919, developed and grew. The United States of America, by cutting itself off from European politics, helped to transform the problem of European security into a dialogue between Great Britain and France.

¹ W. M. Jordan : *Great Britain, France and the German Problem (1918-39)*, p. 3. See also I. C. Willis : *England's Holy War : A Study of English Liberalism during the Great War* (N.Y., 1928) ; F. Rechtenwald : *Kriegsziele und öffentliche Meinung Englands, 1916-18* ; J. B. Scott : *Official Statements of War Aims* (1921).

² Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 4, quotes Headlam : *The Peace Terms of the Allies*, where he says, "When once the soil of Europe has been divided between equal and free nationalities, it will be possible for every state in Europe to guarantee to all the others its possessions, and wars for European territory will in the nature of things cease, for the causes of them will have disappeared." This statement stands in direct line with the Grand Design, where the problem of peace is said to be "de faire poser entre les quinze dominations, desquelles devait être composée la chrétienté d'Europe, des bornes si bien ajustées entre celles qui sont limitrophes les unes des autres et de régler tout équitablement la diversité de leurs droits et prétentions qu'ils n'en puissent jamais plus entrer en dispute".

³ Quoted by Jordan : *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁴ Harold Nicolson : *Why Britain is at War* (1939), p. 147.

France, invaded four times across the Eastern frontier between 1790 and 1918, saw the German problem in much more intimate perspective than England, girdled by a protecting sea. France, unwilling and unable to act as the only policeman of Europe, hankered for the old bonds that had united the victorious allies, based on mutual assistance pacts with the smaller European states and a firm military alliance with Britain. Great Britain, however, tried "half unconsciously", to quote E. H. Carr, to revive the defunct policy of balance of power, balancing Germany on the one hand and France and her satellites on the other. This and a great fear and mistrust of France, particularly in her policy towards Germany, blocked agreement and darkened European politics. In addition to these geographical, military and diplomatic reasons for differences of policy, there was a striking rift in the economic policy of France and Britain towards Germany. "Great Britain sought to end the paralysis of European trade by promoting the financial and economic recovery of Germany. This preoccupation decided the British attitude on reparation . . . France, however, viewed the rehabilitation of Germany with marked apprehension." ¹

All these divergences were reflected and enhanced by the gap between public opinion in the two countries, the one still suspicious of Germany and fearing new challenge, the other trying to assess the peace in terms of brotherhood, renunciation of old war hate and open dealing. A transformed Germany was preferred to an unchanged France, by many sections of British opinion.

Appreciation of this cleavage is essential to judgement of future policy towards the vanquished countries. Not only is that policy of prior importance immediately at the end of hostilities, in the acts of peacemaking, but more important still it largely determines the political climate of post-war years. The apparatus of allied unity, difficult to preserve in time of war, becomes more difficult to preserve in the political flux of peace. Agreed policy towards the vanquished implies continued responsibility. The United States by abdicating that responsibility in 1919 had to suffer the penalty of a second war in 1941. As a shrewd French writer has said, "It must be hoped that the United States will finally understand that it is no longer possible to play the feudal knight fighting in tournament for the just cause and then

¹ Jordan : *op. cit.*, p. 47. Chapter IV of this work, "The Vicissitudes of Policy and Opinion" is invaluable. See also E. H. Carr : *Conditions of Peace*, Chapters 7, 8, 9.

returning triumphant to his tent ; law and liberty are won by daily solidarity and not by wars every twenty years.”¹ The will and the power to maintain a settlement are the real tests of its durability.

§ 2. THE MILITARY SETTLEMENT

The military terms imposed on the beaten enemy are of vital importance in determining the duration of the subsequent peace, and the vigour employed in their effective maintenance is an index of the general attitude taken up by the victorious powers. Genghiz Khan maintained his conquests for several generations by the simple military measure of cutting off the right hand of all males between the ages of twelve and thirty. The complicated military control system of Versailles hardly maintained the peace for twenty years despite the great military superiority of the victors. The victims of Genghiz Khan could hardly claim that they had not been vanquished in the trials of war, but Hitler gained much support by telling Germans that they had never been defeated in 1918.

The military terms fall into three stages :

- (1) The cease-fire stage, when the enemy realizes the extent of his defeat and the impossibility of any further general resistance.
- (2) The occupation and disarmament of the enemy, laid down simply and directly in armistice terms² or an agreement between commanders-in-chief, and enforced if necessary by action on the part of the victorious armies.
- (3) The maintenance of superior power after the settlement with the defeated enemy has been made, and the prevention of any attempts at rearmament.

The precondition of a cease-fire order in large-scale modern war is the realization that any attempt to prolong resistance would be futile. The Nazi Government has repeatedly warned Germans against the perils of a second 1918, propaganda has been focused on the successful resistance of the U.S.S.R. and of Great Britain to attacks on their homeland, and measures have been taken to train special personnel to continue guerilla warfare

¹ André Gros : *Les Problèmes Politiques de l'Europe*, “Réflexions sur la Paix Future” (1942), p. 54. Compare E. H. Carr : *Conditions of Peace*, p. 171. “The period between the two wars was an interregnum in international leadership, due to the inability of Great Britain to perform her old function and the unwillingness of the United States to assume it.” See also *seq.* pp. 207-9.

² See above, Chapter II, § 2.

if necessary in the hills and forests of Germany. A cease-fire order could only come with the complete breakdown of the military and party machine. The cease-fire order in the Russo-Finnish War was only given after the Finns had spent long months of negotiation with the Russians, and when it was clear to all parties inside Finland that no hopes of further military successes even on a local scale could be achieved. Finnish war-communicés continued to be issued while Finnish statesmen were deliberating in Moscow itself. German recalcitrance after all the satellites have yielded is dictated by the interest of the Nazis in holding on to their positions and their lives for as long as possible no matter what the cost to their country. Their unwillingness to tolerate attempts on the part of German Generals to hasten on the cease-fire order and their ruthless stamping out of any internal opposition show that same fanaticism inside the Reich which characterized the holding out of the German Fortress towns of Brest and Lorient long after the war had moved eastwards to the German borders.

The occupation of enemy territory and the disarmament of German forces are recognized as essential in all statements of allied war-aims. The willingness to allow the Germans to march back to Germany in battle formation in 1918 was a great weakness of the armistice conditions. Allied occupation of the Rhineland was not the prelude to settlement but a result of it. The allied armistices with the minor powers during the course of the present war have been modified by the continuation of hostilities against the main enemy, and the need of securing help in that aim from any quarter. Thus while the Allies have occupied defeated countries like Italy or Bulgaria or Roumania, they have used these territories as springboards for operations against the German army, and they have accepted the co-operation of former enemy nationals. Italian units have fought inside their own country ; in the case of Roumania and Bulgaria, a declaration of war on Germany by her former allies has been a condition of armistice. Thus in all these cases, occupation has not been coupled with disarmament. Former enemy armament, under the control and supervision of the Allies, has been used against the Germans.

In the case of Germany, total disarmament will be carried out. This was recognized as a plank of allied policy as early as the Atlantic Charter : " Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations

which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential." In order to secure the necessary measures of disarmament, strategic points inside Germany will have to be immediately occupied. Control of air bases will be an important element in enforcing these preliminary measures, but the rôle of the army cannot be dispensed with.

Such an occupation and disarmament is a condition not only of armistice with Germany but also of the effective "smashing of the swastika" inside Germany itself. German Overseas Radio Propaganda has made much of the possibilities of armed bands maintaining Nazi power no matter what the general political situation.¹ It pointed out that such bands would be in a very different position from the guerrillas of Marshall Tito or of the F.F.I. They would be supplied by a state arsenal that had been supplying regular forces in warfare throughout the whole of Europe for five years, and which had built up stocks and trained personnel to be ready for such an emergency. In face of this continued menace, and of the existence of large numbers of people with military training and experience, a rigid disarmament has to go further in its preliminary measures than was ever contemplated in 1918. And the policing power cannot be handed over lightly to German authorities.

Keeping the major enemy disarmed after the armistice and the peace is more complicated. In addition to the problem of technique, there is the vital problem of limiting and adjusting allied commitments to changing circumstances and changing wills. Unwillingness to bear the long-term cost of prolonged intervention laid down in armistice or treaty, and the rise of conflicting interests among the Allies, undermine the whole settlement. The imperative French demand for German disarmament at the end of the Great War was never shared to the same extent by Great Britain, and disarmament began to be conceived of in England in terms at least as mystical as those of the Holy Alliance. The feeling among many sections of the population that first France, then the British Government, were blocking general disarmament against the wishes and interests of the people, diverted popular and even governmental attention from the rearmament of Germany. This fundamental breach on the question of disarmament was exploited by Germany to the

¹ See *The Times*, October, 1944.

full. In March, 1935, she officially and openly repudiated the Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty. France protested, but could not take any coercive action. Great Britain even granted Germany sea as well as land rearmament. In June, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement marked the complete rehabilitation of Germany as a great power.

This failure of the Allies to maintain the mood of victory was paralleled by the failures of machinery and of control. In 1919, three Control Commissions were set up to keep Germany disarmed. The Air Commission lasted until 1922. It did little to secure any control of civil aviation or of means for converting different types of aircraft from civilian to military use. In 1929, at a trial before the Leipzig Supreme Court, the representative of the Reichswehr stated on oath that all civil aviation had been for some years under the supervision of the Reichswehr, and that the unauthorized publication of any information about any type of planes was military treason. This close integration of civil aviation served the Luftwaffe well in its early days of construction. Allied control at that stage was essential, but it would have meant some measure of control over civilian economic enterprise.

The Naval Commission was reduced to three officers at the beginning of 1923, and was withdrawn in 1924, although control of ship-building would have been comparatively easy, had Britain, the leading naval power, been ready to take action.

The Military Commission exerted little control after the end of the Occupation of the Ruhr. There were few surprise visits, and the correlation of industrial and military activity was never examined. Plant installations in large factories were adaptable for new ammunition schemes. Combines like I. G. Farben compassed many branches of heavy industry as well as chemicals. Their work in the industrial field was paralleled in the military field under the Weimar Republic by the training of a nuclear professional army of N.C.O.s under the direction of General von Seeckt, and the expansion of the Free Corps and private bands of soldiers, often financed by the barons of industry and commerce. By 1933, the basis of German rearmament had been laid.¹

In face of this rearmament, the allied politicians, taking their

¹ This was admitted in the years just before and since the beginning of this war. Cf. a Talk on Deutschlandsender, May 26th, 1941, quoted *The Problem of Germany* (R.I.I.A., 1943); see further T. H. Minshall: *Future Germany* (1943).

lead from the British Government, remained silent or even stubbornly acquiescent. When a country entered the League of Nations, it had to accept such conditions as "may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments", but in the case of Germany a note that the relevant provisions of the Treaty were being carried out was accepted in face of the knowledge exactly to the contrary of the military experts.

The maintenance of German disarmament at the end of this war demands threefold action: (1) allied occupation, covering not only the immediate period after the armistice, but a period of time long enough to secure a satisfactory degree of control. This occupation will be undertaken by the three great Allied Powers at least, and by representatives of the smaller Powers if difficulties involved in such a move are overcome. Reports of schemes to partition Germany into three zones of occupation, the British controlling the North-West, the Americans the South-West, and the Russians the East, have filtered into the press, along with reports of allied disagreement. Such differences of opinion would be fatal to the success of any occupation schemes. If the occupying powers fail to agree and do not adequately co-ordinate action, occupation seems perilously near to unilateral aggression, and can be exposed as selfish or reactionary or vindictive. This was the reaction in Britain to French unilateral action under the terms of Versailles. Without co-ordination, some forms of unilateral occupation could become as dangerous as the protracted Japanese occupation of parts of the U.S.S.R. after the Bolshevik risings.

Two other points should be noted in considering lessons of occupation. Military occupation does not mean political rule by foreign Powers. While pledging themselves to the defeat of Nazi organization, the Great Powers have repeatedly professed their openness on the issue of new forms of government. The Russian attitude to Roumania was an example of this. To impose political rule on Germans would be impossible for governments with such different bases as Great Britain, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. In the second place, occupation must be planned and not arbitrary. Large numbers of men should not be wasted on needless occupation. Public opinion in Great Britain and the U.S.A. would hardly stand for this.¹

(2) Control by allied experts, noting the allocation of key

¹ See Chapter I.

metals and the organization of pivotal industries, particularly the machine tool industry. The production of finished articles and of component parts should be controlled rigidly. The functions of the economic branch of the General Staff cannot be lightly discontinued at the end of hostilities. In this matter of control of industries and supplies, it was not so much the knowledge that was lacking after 1918. Indeed much information was presented gratis by the Germans in technical magazines. What was lacking was the will to take the necessary measures of control. Economic control of Germany is not inevitably a profitable business. Many British firms and private individuals made much out of the expansion of German rearmament after the last war, and the modernization of plant was largely financed by British and American money. The success of a policy of control this time depends upon learning these lessons and preventing the sinking of foreign capital in the rearmament industry of the defeated Powers. In the long run, Germans themselves would profit from the elimination of tremendous concentrations of economic power dominating their lives. Some groups of exile Germans recognize this very plainly.¹

(3) The elimination of individuals and organized groups, aiming at the revival of German power. The rise of the Free Corps of 1918-19 illustrates this danger. The proclaimed supporters of law and order were the chief dangers to the solidarity and peace of the new Europe. Without the elimination of groups like the Junker Group, traditional upholders of German militarism, seeing one war in terms of its successor and defeat merely as the necessary prelude to future victory, or the Finance-Heavy Industry Group of wealthy and powerful leaders, often working back stage, there can be no reorientation of Germany's attitude. It is here that military terms merge into the wider issues of redistributing power inside the social structure of Germany itself. Without that shift of power, occupation and disarmament will have to be more intense over a long period, and even then their reformatory effect on German behaviour would not be lasting.

§ 3. FRONTIERS

It was felt by some critics at the beginning of the war that the problem of frontiers had already become outmoded.

¹ See *The Next Germany* (1943), or *Germany's Road to Democracy* (n.d.).

The tradition which makes the drawing of frontiers the primary and most spectacular part of peacemaking has outlived its validity. The idea that peace can be established by shifting frontiers in conformity with some fixed principle or set of principles did duty at Versailles and has failed. To repeat the same process once more on the basis of the same or of other principles would be futile and hopeless.¹

It was argued that the frontiers of 1919 required little new adjustment. There was little cry in England that "what we are fighting for is a new map of Europe", H. G. Wells's proclamation in 1914.

This apparent lack of interest in frontiers was based essentially on reaction from 1919. The patchwork quilt of Central Europe had created far more economic problems than the ancient dynastic Hapsburg Empire. A grasp of the economic conditions of durable peace was felt to be far more important than tampering with distant boundaries. This view did not go unchallenged in England. Professor Goodhart, for example, urged that frontiers should be finally established and all aggressive wars henceforth be regarded as illegal. Outside England, an interest in frontier delimitation was greater. The smaller states of Central and Eastern Europe still felt strongly about the extent and nature of their boundaries. The problem of Transylvania was sufficient to disturb international relations inside the Axis itself, and Polish exiles in France and England looked longingly at their historical heritage.

Since the military position of the Allies improved and the whole of Eastern Europe was thrown into the melting pot by the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war, the interest in frontier problems has grown. Though the interest is mainly strategic—Russia's demand for "safe frontiers" or France's "bulwark on the Rhine"—some of the ideological fervour of nineteenth-century nationalism is maintained in Roumania and Hungary; and elsewhere the search for security cannot be divorced completely from the search for economic gain, as, for example, the cession of the Petsamo nickel mines of Finland to the U.S.S.R. by the Armistice Agreement of 1944; or the search for living space, as, for example, the desire of the Polish National Committee of Liberation to move westwards, even if the migration means the transplanting of settled colonies of people, and virtually moving a country for the sake of maintaining its size and resources.

Demands for revision of frontiers have come from at least

¹ E. H. Carr: *Conditions of Peace*, p. 241.

three sources. The suggestion has been made that Poland should get most of East Prussia and that her east and west frontiers be pushed further west, in order that Russia could secure a boundary further west, roughly coinciding with the Curzon Line. Such a revision would mean the Polish occupation of many miles of German territory, and control over German citizens. If populations could be transferred, a Polish line on the Oder and Neisse, suggested by the Chairman of the Polish National Committee of Liberation,¹ would compress into a greatly diminished Germany masses of exile workers and peasants. Such a change would be far more radical and far-reaching than the Polish occupation of East Prussia and the abolition of the Polish Corridor, which were the first suggestions made before the great Russian drives into the heart of Poland. They would imply a revolution in the political geography of the North-East of Europe, in which the incorporation of the 1919 Baltic Republics into the U.S.S.R. would be another phase.

A second demand for frontier revision has come from French sources demanding the Rhine as a frontier and control of the German Rhineland as a guarantee of peace. This frontier problem has been posed as one of security more than of tradition or history. The failure of the river barriers of the Somme and the Marne has emphasized the need for the Rhine as the only river likely to be in any way effective in securing France against new German aggression.

A third demand for frontier revision has come from the Yugoslav Government of Marshal Tito, which is apparently anxious to overturn the Versailles Settlement in the Adriatic, and to regain territories taken by the Italians in 1919. The exact implications of the demand are not clear, but Trieste would be the most important centre. A further suggestion has been made for the incorporation of Macedonia in a federal Yugoslav state.

These three proposals for frontier revision are the most important. The future of the Dodecanese or of Pantellaria or of Eastern Ruthenia is unimportant by comparison. As demands, they are dependent on an effort to find security by gaining more secure barriers. They mark a reversion to the idea of national security through the strong state well armed behind its own walls. They come at a time when this view of security has already become old-fashioned, and the importance of co-operation to

¹ *The Times*, August 30th, 1944 : confirmed by the Provisional Warsaw Government, January 1945.

maintain security is becoming increasingly plain. The demand for security on such terms is an effort to find reassurance against the breakdown of more ambitious schemes of peacemaking. The economic dangers of an emphasis on frontiers are clear. Breaking up the large empires of the nineteenth century did not satisfy national needs although it attempted to satisfy national aspirations. The problem of maintaining peace at the end of this war will depend on the ability of statesmen to bring about an economic settlement. This will be more important than undoing the political settlement of Versailles.

If these frontier revisions are made either wholly or in part, Germany will have shrunk far below her pre-1939 size. The restitution of pre-war occupied territories such as Austria by allied military action would begin a process of shrinking, unparalleled inside a compact community. Many would go even further than this, and basing their actions on the argument that Germans never fundamentally change or at any rate have not changed so far, would claim the dismemberment of the Reich itself. Such a scheme would seem to be incompatible with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Atlantic Charter. It would also seem to be futile. A Germany effectively disarmed does not have to be split up. A Germany split up but not effectively disarmed would eventually come together again. Dismemberment is either unnecessary or futile, as the answer to "the German problem". But the argument needs more detailed examination. Sixty million people situated in the heart of Europe must, it is argued, separate out into smaller units, avoiding the rigid and single loyalty to a powerful centralized state. Historical precedents show the great variety of German life in the past. The dominance of Prussia and its capital Berlin would disappear and enable the "old rococo Germany" of the eighteenth century to be revived. Geographical data are quoted to prove the same conclusion. Germany is said to be a "land without design", with no natural frontiers and no geographical homogeneity.¹ Politically, too, differences are drawn between the Prussian, accustomed to obey, hardened by his upbringing and his inherited attitudes, and the more genial Southern Germans, as different from the Prussians as are the Austrians, Catholic in culture and more cosmopolitan in outlook. All these arguments are adduced

¹ Eugene Diesel: *Germany and the Germans* (1931). See the excellent short work by R. E. Dickinson: *The German Lebensraum* (1943), and by the same author, *The Regions of Germany* (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction. 1944).

along with the more popular case for a complete shattering of Germany and all that it stands for in the interests of peace, so that the "butcher bird" may be finally impaled, and its victims avenged. The case against dismemberment has been stated ably and convincingly time and time again,¹ but more important than theoretical rebuffs is the complete unwillingness of any of the allied governments to sponsor such a solution. Stalin has stated simply and clearly :

We have no such aim as to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia ; but the Hitlerite State can and should be destroyed, and our first task is to destroy the Hitlerite State and its inspirers. . . . The experience of history shows that Hitlers come and go, whereas the German people and the German state remain.²

Viscount Simon stated categorically on behalf of the British Government in the House of Lords :

I now say in plain terms on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that we agree with Premier Stalin, first that the Hitlerite State should be destroyed, and secondly, that the whole German people is not (as Dr. Goebbels is trying to persuade them) thereby doomed to destruction. I put the two propositions with equal prominence and equal clearness and equal firmness.³

But the time is past when most of the allies would endorse an American opinion that :

The matter of boundaries is simpler still : they can be fixed precisely where they stood before the aggression began—that is to say, before Germany overran Austria. No new nationalistic groups within the pre-war German border are asking for separate statehood. The European states lately overrun by Germany are making no claims on her for territory—none, at least, that would have to be dealt with in the first brief treaty. Hitler is gambling for the richest stakes that man can imagine, the dominion of the world. But so far as the German state is concerned, he has risked next to nothing. Its possible winnings are the greatest, and its possible losings are the least, of any such gamble in history.⁴

¹ For example, in H. N. Brailsford : *Our Settlement with Germany* (1944), or earlier still in Harold Nicolson : *Why Britain is at War*.

² Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Soviet Union, November 6th, 1942.

³ House of Lords Debates, March 10th, 1943.

⁴ "Interests of the United States as a World Power," Whitney Hart Shepardson (*America Faces the War*, No. 17, 1942). Official American declarations have been rather guarded on this issue. Compare Wilson in the last war. "The people of Germany are being told by the men whom they now permit to deceive them, and to act as their masters, that they are fighting for the very life and existence of their Empire, a war of desperate self-defence against deliberate aggression. No one is threatening the existence or the independence or the peaceful enterprise of the German Empire." (Address to Congress, December 4th, 1917.)

This last American view goes a good deal further than the official references of the British and Russian governments, and it would minimize the problems of the Polish Corridor or Silesia or the Rhineland beyond the significance they are likely to acquire. In the latter phases of the war there has been an increased interest in territorial problems, although it remains true that mere territorial expropriation is no answer to the problem of European peace. This was recognized in 1815; "France restored to the dimensions which centuries of glory and prosperity under the rule of her kings have assured her, should share with Europe the blessings of liberty, national independence, and peace." It should still be recognized at the end of this war.

§ 4. ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Realization that the scope of peacemaking goes far beyond territorial changes has far-reaching consequences on the attitude of victorious powers towards their vanquished enemies. The heavy economic cost of war and the human suffering it entails have led to demands for comprehensive penalties to be imposed on guilty individuals and peoples. The problems of assessing guilt or of seeking compensation are so complicated that they hardly admit of one easy or automatic solution.

The minimum demand and the most urgent demand at the end of hostilities is for restoration.¹ During the war, the Germans have looted and pillaged wherever they have had the opportunity. The Board of Economic Warfare of the United States estimated that the Germans plundered Europe at the rate of ten billion dollars a year. It was not merely a matter of stealing art treasures from the palaces and museums of France and Italy: property confiscations of all kinds made up a "black record" of international robbery, planned systematically and successfully by the special economic units of the General Staff. Restoration of pillaged property that can be restored will be the first step in building up the shattered economy of Europe: of recoverable cattle, stores, agricultural equipment and industrial plant.

¹ This was recognized in the Crimea Declaration of February, 1945. See L. Nizer: *What to do with Germany* (1944), Chapter IV; E. S. Hediger: *Nazi Exploitation of Occupied Europe*, and the Report of the Board of Economic Warfare of the U.S.A. (1941).

After restoration comes replacement. Some articles cannot be restored. Military equipment pillaged from Czechoslovakia or oil acquired from France and Belgium cannot be restored. It can and should be replaced, even though it should be recognized that the cost of such replacement will keep Germany's standard of living below that of her former victims during the period of replacement. This reduction of Germany's standard of living will be inevitable even in face of the economic declarations of the Atlantic Charter: "They will endeavour, with due respect to their existing obligations to further the enjoyment by all states great and small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."¹

Restoration and replacement are the minimum requirements of the victorious powers from their beaten enemy. The further demand for reparations has not been discussed so frequently since the disastrous experience of the great depression after the last war, attributed in large measure to the burden of war debts and the chaotic effect of reparations on the structure of world economy. Reparations in 1919 were essentially financial, and the demand made by the victorious powers could only be met by Germany with foreign loans. Over the whole post-war period, Germany received more in loans and credits from her former enemies than the amount paid in reparations. The loans were largely used for the bolstering up and modernization of German industry: the astronomical demands of the allies at the end of the war recoiled on their own heads.²

In the atmosphere of victory, it was popular and profitable for politicians and press lords to demand the utmost in the way of reparations; it secured continued support from public opinion, and whipped it up to fever heat. "There is much suspicion of influences concerned to let the Germans off lightly," said *The Times*³. . . "It is the candidate (in the General Election) who deals with the issues of to-day, who adopts Mr. Barnes's phrase about 'hanging the Kaiser' and plumps for the repayment of the cost of the war by Germany, who rouses his audience

¹ The Atlantic Charter, Clause 4. See Appendix I, A.

² How much Germany paid is a matter of dispute. The Reparations Committee estimated that she had paid a sum equal to five times the amount paid by the French in 1871. The Washington Institute of Economics computed a larger figure, and the German estimate is, of course, still higher. Cf. G. Borsky: *The Greatest Swindle in the World* (1942); T. E. Jessop: *The Treaty of Versailles: Was it Just?* (1942), Chapter III; and Lindley Fraser: *op. cit.*, Chapter III.

³ December 18th, 1918.

and strikes the notes to which they are most responsive." Sir Eric Geddes proclaimed in a speech at Cambridge that has since become notorious, "We will get out of her all you can squeeze out of a lemon and a bit more. I will squeeze her until you can hear the pips squeak."¹ Mr. Lloyd George, while carefully avoiding extremes, later pleaded that "if the whole cost of the war, all the costs incurred by every country that has been forced into the war by the action of Germany, had been thrown upon Germany, it would have been in accord with every principle of civilized jurisprudence in the world".² The third plank in the Government's final December Election Programme was the "fullest indemnities from Germany", and this demand was not challenged by opposition leaders or responsible organs of the Press. The same cry arose in France, where J. M. Keynes' scepticism about reparations demands provoked a torrent of abuse, Tardieu calling him a "pro-German scribe from Cambridge, overstepping the limits of permissible tomfoolery . . . only making fun of Germany's victims".³

The Reparation Commission set up by the Treaty of Versailles was faced with a very different problem from that faced by the Powers demanding indemnities at the end of previous wars. In some of these earlier transactions, war had become almost a profit-making business. It not only opened up trade, but reparations or indemnities themselves became marketable assets. Thus by the Treaty of Miramar in 1864, Mexico promised to pay France not only for losses to French subjects, compensation for imperialist adventure, but also 270 million francs for the cost of the expedition. By the Treaty of Lhasa in 1904, Tibet promised to pay Great Britain for the costs of a British expedition occupying a Tibetan valley until Tibet opened her markets.⁴ Such colonial indemnities were completely different in kind from Reparations in 1919.

So also were the reparations of 1815, whereby a pecuniary indemnity of 700,000,000 francs was imposed on France. Bismarck's combination of economic advantage and political revenge in the Peace of Frankfurt in 1871 was much more the spirit of Versailles. He formally accepted the principle, however, that indemnities should be limited to actual war expenditure.

¹ Quoted J. M. Keynes : *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919), p. 131.

² House of Commons, July, 1919.

³ Quoted D. Lloyd George : *The Truth about Reparations and War Debts* (1932), p. 18.

⁴ See "Indemnities of War, Subsidies and Loans" (Foreign Office Handbooks, No. 158) (1920).

The reparations demand of 1919 was not a demand by a powerful commercial power to a small undeveloped country. It was a demand from one fully developed set of countries to another. In so far as Germany could have paid reparations by expanding her trade, particularly her export trade, this would bring her into fierce competition with her creditors in a world where high tariff walls and economic barriers were already dividing nations. In so far as Germany paid reparations by foreign loans, the only long-run effect was to give her a margin to develop and modernize her broken industries, particularly her heavy industries, and indirectly prepare her economy for a second world war. In the meantime, along with inter-allied debts, reparation wrecked the distribution of the world's gold supplies, leading to a fall in prices and the great depression.

The psychological effect of reparations was bad. Lloyd George, though one of the makers of the Versailles settlement, wrote in 1932 :

The process of extraction is for the world a process of distraction, taking the mind of statesmanship in Europe and America from other and more important matters. To sit still, waiting for windfalls from reparations and war-debts, instead of getting busy on the restoration of world trade and industry, is a form of conduct as reprehensible as that of a firm which wastes the whole time and energy of its staff in vain efforts to collect stale book debts, instead of devoting its thought and activities to transacting and expanding its business.¹

Such a view of the economic problem contrasts forcibly with declarations of many of the allied statesmen of this war who look forward to a world of greater productivity and of greater plenty.²

Reparations policy at the end of this war will have to fit into a very different setting. The emphasis will not be on impossible and ruinous payment, but first on reparation to poorer countries, stripped by German occupation and looting ; and secondly on labour reparation to help rebuild what German exploitation has destroyed. Proposals for labour reparation in 1919 met with both nationalist and humanitarian opposition. *Laissez-faire* economies cannot easily absorb a large influx of foreign labour without dislocation of home employment and trade. Planned economies on the model of the U.S.S.R. can absorb such labour

¹ Lloyd George : *op. cit.*, p. 140.

² See, for example, Henry Wallace : "What We Fight For," an address at Chicago, September, 1943 ; Mr. Cordell Hull : "The War and Human Freedom," Radio Address, July, 1942 ; Mr. Sumner Welles's Economic Memorandum of 1940 ; J. B. Condliffe : *Agenda for a Post-War World* (1941).

willingly and easily into their systems. Foreign labour has been absorbed by German industry during the war in massive proportions, and allocation of such labour by State authority is as easy as the problem of home labour. If, as seems likely, nationally planned economies are set up in France and in the Balkans, they too could use forced labour on a very large scale at least during the "practical restitution" of the immediate post-war years. But nationalist sentiment may again cut across such methods.

§ 5. RETRIBUTION

Associated with reparation, but distinct from it, one step farther along the pathway towards a reformatory policy to be applied to the defeated enemy, is retribution. The borderline between retributive justice and legitimate reparation was confused in 1919, and the tendency of British politicians to introduce into the idea of reparation a punitive and moral argument rather than the argument of compensation alone, obscured many economic realities. The problem of retribution is twofold ; first the problem of individual and collective responsibility for war-guilt, and second the problem of individual and collective responsibility for war-crimes, that is to say, atrocities committed in the course of war.

After the turmoils of the last war, the allied statesmen felt they had the right to assert Germany's guilt for the troubles through which Europe had passed. Austria, it was argued, had chosen war as the tribunal for judging her initial dispute with Serbia. The verdict of that tribunal had gone against her and her allies. The countries who withstood them were relatively unprepared and unequipped, like Belgium, and they had gone to war, like England, against their will. Germany's responsibility was considered evident. Assertion of Germany's war guilt was not laid down in the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. But it does appear in the Treaty of Versailles. By the famous "War Guilt" clause placed at the head of the Reparations Chapter, Germany was to "accept the responsibility of herself (Germany) and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies".¹ The article is most significantly placed. It introduced the formal part of the Reparations settlement, which went far beyond the demands

¹ Article 231.

made by Wilson at any time in his war speeches or by the "Fourteen Points". This enabled German propaganda after 1919, and in a new phase after 1933, to use the "War-Guilt Clause" as a lever at home and abroad.

This extended conception of war-guilt was in some respects a new departure. It was an attempt to answer the question of the common soldier and the citizen, "Why did this terrible catastrophe have to take place?" It was inevitable that a scapegoat answer should be given, but that inevitability does not necessarily refute the rightness of the reply. What is more important is the futility of the answer in the world of power politics and infinite complexity. The "scapegoat" answer, used as a justification for extorting huge indemnities, was only to provoke further chaos. The question was to recur, in each crisis of the 1930's, "Why did this terrible catastrophe have to take place?" The answer could seldom be a purely personal one, even in 1939.

Whatever the answer to the problem of "war-guilt", the crucial and more permanent problem remains, that of trustworthiness in peace. It is impossible to make peace while one Government rejects the principle that the rights of other States should be respected, and international compacts observed. As the British Prime Minister declared at the outbreak of war in 1939, "A situation in which no word given by Germany's ruler could be trusted, and no people or country could feel themselves safe", is intolerable. It has even been suggested that States so behaving be treated as outlaws¹: and certainly they put themselves beyond all law. Better, perhaps, than asserting Germany's "war-guilt" and drawing up an indictment against a whole people, however plausible and factually supported, is to bring home to the German people the underlying principle that Governments which deny human rights at home are liable to deny human rights everywhere. Lawless States deserve to be treated as outlaws: and just treatment is evoked best by just behaviour. These morals German policy has never fully appreciated. But they are the very basis of peacemaking.

The problem of war-crimes links up with the larger problem of war-guilt, but has a very different history. The link between the two is the attempt made in 1919 to charge the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties to consider as a "war-crime" "the responsi-

¹ G. Schwarzenberger: *International Law and Totalitarian Lawlessness*, especially Chapter IV on "Totalitarian States as Outlaws".

bility of the authors of the war".¹ The American and Japanese delegates argued that the declarations of war "however iniquitous and infamous and however terrible in their results were beyond the reach of judicial procedure, and subject only to moral sanctions", and this view was accepted. To have taken the alternative line would have been to equate war-guilt and war-crime. The illegality of war-making itself was admitted in 1928 in the Kellogg Pact, but no sanctions were proposed for the breach of the declarations, and the first test of the efficacy of the pact, when the Chinese claimed that Japan had violated it in 1937,² brought no satisfactory response. Though the point has been raised many times since then, there is no reason to believe that the position has fundamentally changed since 1919.

The recognition of war-crimes goes back long before 1914 and is a part of customary international law. They are limited to those crimes, contrary either to international criminal law or to local rules on the nature of criminal acts: they are acts which "are not covered by the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience".³ Such crimes are punishable by death, and any more lenient sentence is only made at the discretion of the prosecuting power. They are, however, specifically *war-crimes*, for the jurisdiction of the enemy country comes to an end with the end of hostilities. After that time, war-crimes are only prosecuted if they constitute ordinary crimes, unless there is a special agreement, modifying customary law, made by the respective parties concerned.

By the Treaty of Versailles, the German Government recognized the right of allied military courts to have brought before them persons accused of "having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war". The persons accused of such crimes were to be extradited, if necessary, by the German Government, who were not given the similar right of bringing charges against allied "war-criminals". The German Government had to provide all necessary information, and the accused could nominate their own counsel. On the list of such criminals prepared by the Allies, there were many outstanding German names, like those of the Crown Prince and Hindenburg. For the Emperor, a special procedure was to be adopted. He was to be

¹ The Report is published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oxford (1919).

² Statement to the League of Nations, August 30th, 1937.

³ Preamble, paragraph 5, Fourth Hague Convention, 1907.

tried by a court of five judges, representing the five allied powers, the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. The judges were to be guided by "the highest motives of international policy with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality", and were to "fix the punishment".¹

In practice, neither the much-boasted Trial of the Kaiser nor the prosecution by allied military courts of German war-criminals ever took place. The flight of the Kaiser to Holland and the refusal of the Dutch Government to extradite him was followed by a long wrangle between the Allied and the German Governments about the lesser war-criminals. A compromise was reached, whereby the German Supreme Court was to try twelve of the more flagrant offenders, with the Allies taking the rôle of prosecutors. These trials did not take place until 1921, they were held at Leipzig, and led to sentences being imposed which *The Times* described as "little better than a farce".² Only twelve cases out of some nine hundred were tried. On the whole the lessons of 1919 seem to suggest that unless the extradition of war-criminals can be ensured, and Courts not swayed by political motives or desires to pass mere token judgments can be instituted, the policy of bringing war-criminals to trial is as useless as the trial of the French politicians at Riom in 1942.

Various improvements have been suggested by lawyers and theorists. An International Criminal Court has been proposed by many writers :³ it was suggested in 1919 by the Committee of Jurists appointed by the League of Nations, and federalist writers in particular have taken it up with fervour. Others regard it as a utopian project, in a Europe not yet ready for it, more likely to create war-martyrs than outcasts, and to inflame national rivalries and passions rather than eliminate them.

To apply something like law as a test to Nazis might be merely to cover force and righteous vengeance with a more hallowed garment, and to provoke charges of hypocrisy, which would embitter international relations.

If the post-war world were willing to base its inter-State relations

¹ Article 227.

² *The Times*, June 2nd, 1922, and C. Mullins : *The Leipzig Trials* (1921).

³ See Lord Phillimore : "An International Criminal Court and the Resolutions of the Committee of Jurists" (*B.T.I.L.*, 1922-3, p. 135 ; M. O. Hudson : "The Proposed International Criminal Court" (*A.J.I.L.*, 1938, pp. 551), gives a full bibliography.

on the federal principle, a federal criminal court, meting out retributive justice impartially, but sternly might well have an integrating influence, apart from the deterrent effect which labour gangs of convicted war-criminals, engaged on the rebuilding of devastated areas, might have on potential Hitlers and Mussolinis.¹

Whatever be the technical means employed, the leaders of the Great Powers have made it plain that "the acts of desperate men who know in their hearts that they cannot win" ² will not go unpunished. Declarations of great importance by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill ³ were followed by a more definitive statement drawn up at Moscow by representatives of the three Great Powers, who laid it down that all accused men should return to the country where their crimes were committed to be "judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged . . . according to the laws of these liberated countries". This method has already been carried out in Russia, as for example, at the Kharkov Trials, and has been approved of as a suitable method by the French National Committee and Consultative Assembly.

The cry for punishment of war-criminals may well come this time from inside Germany as well. A Manifesto of a National Peace Movement operating inside Western Germany demanded as its third point "arrest and punishment of those responsible for the war and confiscation of their possessions",⁴ while the Free Germany Committee set up in Moscow demanded "a just and merciless trial of those guilty of the war, the inciters and their accomplices, all those who plunged Germany into the abyss and branded her with shame".⁵ Other Germans have demanded Revolutionary Tribunals to try prominent Nazis.⁶ In this way the allied attempts to brand war-criminals, the despoilers of the occupied territories and murderers of allied soldiers and airmen, would be paralleled by measures taken inside Germany by Germans themselves against the despoilers of German freedom and the torturers of German citizens.

It is only when retribution becomes a common task that its

¹ Schwarzenberger : *op. cit.*, p. 80.

² President Roosevelt, October 25th, 1941.

³ *Ibid.* On the same day a statement was made by Mr. Churchill also. See further the Declaration on War Crimes, adopted by the Inter-Allied Conference, January 13th, 1942 (Belgium, Czecho-Slovakia, Free France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugo-Slavia, Article 13 of the Armistice with Finland and the Crimea Declaration, Appendix I, G below.

⁴ *Germany's Road to Democracy*, p. 11.

⁵ "Appeal to the German Army and the German People," broadcast from Moscow, July 13th, 1943.

⁶ *The Next Germany*, p. 42 ff.

full value emerges. In the sectionalism of modern Europe, retribution can hardly be divorced from interest. The interest in retribution must be common. It was this realization that prompted the attempts to secure some sort of reciprocity between allies and enemies in treatment of war-criminals at the end of the last war and between the wars.¹ The principle that the victor as well as the vanquished should submit to trial his own "war-criminals" has been one suggestion made. But this plan is full of difficulties, as it is hardly likely that a victorious power could see its soldiers tried by the courts of former enemy countries soon after the end of hostilities. The opposition of professional soldiers and statesmen would be shared by the public. To acquire the due measure of common interest some other solution would be necessary, and this solution presupposes, as do most measures of peacemaking in the last resort, some common interest in peace-building between all parties concerned. Only then do re-education and retribution work together towards making a more harmonious society of nations.

Policies involving restoration, replacement, reparation, and retribution must be sharply distinguished from the policy of vendetta and vengeance which lies at the extreme of the scale. Restoration, replacement, reparation, and retribution all imply an ordered and coherent policy, and all demand rational procedures, based on processes of order and law. Vengeance at the far end of the scale may vary from a rigorous application of the principle of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" to indiscriminate and violent behaviour, as arbitrary as many of the theories and practices of the Nazis. Vengeance would imply a reversal of the terroristic activities of the Nazis, and could hardly provide the basis for an integrated peace.

But even vengeance is not without its method. Schemes have been put forward to sterilize large masses of Germans, to introduce compulsory out-breeding, to lynch and to massacre on a large scale. Such policies are, of course, incompatible with the allied war aims, and with the standards which the allied Powers have repeatedly set. But the chief futility of such drastic proposals is that they imply far closer interference and a more indefinite series of commitments than the Allies could profitably undertake. The inevitable result of vengeance immediately after the war would be appeasement later, and allied excesses would

¹ See E. C. Stowell : *International Law* (1931), p. 531, or Sir John Fischer Williams, *Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations* (1929), p. 249.

recoil on their own heads in orgies of sentimentality which would make it very easy for the Germans to "organize sympathy" in all the civilized countries of the world. For this reason alone it is important that allied policy towards Germany should work on rational principles and through regular channels, and so avoid the worst dangers of overmuch deference to popular clamour of the day.

There is popular clamour, too, for the "re-education of Germany": and though the problem is vast enough to deserve a book on its own, a word must be said about it here. It is doubtful that defeat for a second time in a generation will alone, as so many suppose, "re-educate" Germans. It is as easy to draw the moral that better-prepared aggression is needed, as that aggression never pays. (It has, in fact, paid large classes in Germany quite well for five years.) The chief grievance against the Nazis is less that they have been aggressive than that they have been unsuccessful. Yet ultimately the taming of Germany must depend on re-education, in the widest sense. As Sir Walter Layton has written :

It is probable that the first sentiment in Germany will be one of self-pity and resentment against a world that is actuated by jealousy of Germany's great achievements. But as fuller knowledge spreads of what crimes have been committed in their name and by their own folk—there may emerge a sense of shame which should be heightened by the indictment of Hitler promulgated by the United Nations.¹

Free influx of news will do much to sweep away the fog of Nazi propaganda and censorship. The glimmerings of re-education will come not in the first phase after defeat but in the second or third.

Re-education in the narrower sense, of reorganization of the German system of education, is a more calculable, technical task.² Its basis is the destruction of Nazi ideology in its simple forms, as taught to schoolboys :

The teacher pointed out the moral, which I noted : "This struggle is a natural struggle. Life could not go on without it. That is why the Fuehrer wants his boys to be strong, so they can be the aggressors and the victors, not the victims. Life and nature

¹ Sir Walter Layton : *How to Deal with Germany* (1944)—an admirable pamphlet, dealing with problems of peacemaking in a much more general sense than its title suggests.

² Unless, indeed, the suggestion be adopted that the school-leaving age in Germany should be raised to seventy-five.

respect only the strong and big. Germany will be strong. The Fuehrer will make it so strong that it can go out and attack any foe the wide world over." ¹

Or as taught to the people by Hitler himself :

Man is a fighting animal and the nation is therefore a fighting unit. Any living organism which ceases to fight in the struggle for existence is doomed to extinction. A country or race which ceases to fight is equally doomed. The fighting capacity of a race depends upon its purity. Only brute force can ensure the survival of the race. Hence the necessity for militarism . . . The German race had it been united in time, would now be master of the world to-day. Is it too late for her to realize that mystic function ? ²

Or as taught by the Professors in the Universities : " Nations must be either hammer or anvil." ³

The mere destruction of Nazi ideas and the institutional apparatus of the Nazi System is not enough : it must be supplemented by the fostering of new values, and of a new faith and purpose in lasting ideals, looking to the future and not grounded in cynicism and despair. The problem of finding such ideals is not only a German problem. The victorious powers feel the same pangs of pessimism in after-war periods as do the defeated powers, and in the case of both, the recovery of an integrated civilization is the most essential problem. This problem for Germany begins with the problem of a reassessment of national conduct, but it widens and deepens beyond that—beyond the problem of economic welfare—to a " harmony between the power and the spirit of our civilization ". ⁴ All of which means that Germany must re-educate herself : and so must we.

¹ Quoted G. Ziemer : *Education for Death* (1944), p. 62.

² *Mein Kampf*. This central theme is quoted in H. Nicolson : *Why Britain is at War*, p. 34.

³ Karl Haushofer. Cf. Erika Mann : *School for Barbarians* (1939). The author is the daughter of Thomas Mann, who points out in the introduction that Nazi education has sole reference " often enough with implication of violence, to the fixed idea of national pre-eminence and warlike preparedness " (p. ix).

⁴ The phrase is Christopher Dawson's in a pamphlet, *The Renewal of Civilization* (1944), and *The Judgement of the Nations* (1944). On the general problem, see K. Mannheim : *Diagnosis of Our Time* (1944), where many other sources are also quoted ; and Stead : *Education for a World Community* (1944) ; A. Woolf : *Higher Education in Nazi Germany* (1944). Ziemer's *Education for Death* is a telling popular account of the German educational system and the problems it raises. See also W. K. Pfeiler : *War and the German Mind* (1941). *The New Germany*, Chapter VII, is pertinent and interesting (1941), and should be compared with the Report of a Joint Commission of the London International Assembly and Council for Education and World Citizenship, *Education and the United Nations* (Gill, London, 1943). *Stepping-Stones to Peace* (1943), by Felix Langer, is an interesting discussion by a German-Jewish refugee of this and kindred problems.

§ 6. SETTLEMENT WITH THE SMALLER DEFEATED POWERS

By focussing attention on the treatment of the leading vanquished country, the mainspring of opposition in time of war, the position of the other defeated powers could go almost unnoticed. The main enemy steals most of the limelight, as Germany stole it in 1919, France in 1815 and in 1713, the Hapsburgs in 1648. Yet the smaller powers, clustered round the main enemy during his spell of triumph, symbolize the menacing cohesion of a "new order" in a temporary stability before defeat breaks the spell. Such was Europe at Tilsit, Brest Litovsk, or Compiègne, and Asia after the fall of the Dutch East Indies. The smaller powers are the first to crack—Rumania in 1917 or Italy in 1943—and if they survive the main enemy as did Turkey in 1919, they introduce new complications for the peacemakers.

The problem of these other defeated powers is a dynamic one: its existence ensures that peacemaking shall not be conceived of as a single act, brought to a head in a definitive treaty. For the smaller enemy countries might almost be said to play in the strategy of peacemaking what the guerilla bands play in the strategy of war. They introduce a time-scale into the scheming of the victors; they do not all conveniently give way together. They give way at embarrassing times, they exert pressure at awkward points, they test allied reserves and dispositions.

The surrender of Italy in 1943 provides an excellent example of the problems raised.¹ Any treaty with defeated Italy could not be final. As in the parallel case of Germany's agreement with France in 1940, the engagements entered into were strictly limited to urgent issues, mainly military, and were only to be made into a final settlement at the end of the war as a whole. It has been argued that Germany held out the bait of a final settlement to France as a means of exerting pressure on the Pétain Government, and certainly the presence of French prisoners of war in Germany could be used as a lever. The impermanence of the settlement had both its advantages and disadvantages for both sides.

In the case of Italy, a constitutional problem complicated matters from the start. The fall of Mussolini and the Fascist hierarchy raised the difficult question of responsible order and government, a problem which it was recognized was essentially

¹ See below, Chapter VI, § 2, for greater detail and further discussion.

an Italian issue, but which had repercussions on the life of the Allies as well, and which was of interest to public opinion outside as well as inside Italy. The constitutional problem was soon complicated by the military and psychological question as well. Badoglio, the new Head of the Royal Government, lost no opportunity of declaring war on Italy's former ally. A vanquished country now became a co-belligerent, and the change in status no doubt implied that Italy now felt she could, in the phrase of the English Prime Minister, help "work her passage home".

At the same time, the British Government has not committed itself at all on the questions of Italian territorial changes at the end of the war (except the restoration of Abyssinia, which had already been liberated by British, Dominion and "Patriot" Forces); or on general economic policy towards Italy, except first-aid relief. In the military sphere, the thorny question of the disposal of the Italian navy—said to be about to be divided up between Britain, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R.—provoked widespread comment, some alarm in Italian Government circles, and a fear for the future; but quite obviously the general question of Italian disarmament could not arise when Italian troops were fighting against Germans in the same cause. The question at the core of the allied attitude to Italy seems to be how far the renunciation of Fascism has changed the responsibility of Italy for the war, and for bearing the share in defeat. A settlement with Italy can only be finally brought about when Germany is defeated also, and measures for the reconstruction of Europe as a whole can be taken.¹

It is interesting to compare the attitude of the Allies to Italy in 1943 with the attitude of Germany to Russia in 1917. On Russia was imposed a victor's peace. An elaborate territorial cession by the Russians was imposed, so that she lost 34 per cent. of her population, 32 per cent. of her agricultural land, 54 per cent. of her industrial undertakings, and 89 per cent. of her working coalmines.² She had to renounce her sovereignty over large areas, and recognize the independence of Finland, the Ukraine and Georgia. She had to promise to pay reparations to the amount of 6,000,000,000 marks in goods, bonds and gold. The Peace of Bucharest with Rumania followed the same model,³ and in addition a German army was to be maintained in the

¹ See below, Chapter VI, p. 199 ff.

² See J. W. Wheeler-Bennett: *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace* (1938).

³ Rumania ceded the southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, the Carpathians to Austria, and her oil-wells to Germany for 99 years.

country, only to be evacuated "at times later to be agreed upon". These treaties were an attempt at the most favourable terms possible. For the German industrialists and military leaders they constituted a would-be final settlement. New vistas were opened up to them, a post-war world could be envisaged. There seemed little limitation in the attitude of victor to vanquished here. In fact, it might be said that for Ludendorff and the German Generals fighting on the Eastern Front, Russia was not a subsidiary but the main enemy, at any rate for the time being. Those who, like von Kühlmann, saw the war in a wider perspective sought a different type of Treaty—"no annexations, no indemnities, and the principle of self-determination". Such a treaty would be a model, would appear to offer a glimpse of justice and mercy, and would provide bargaining power in a final settlement.

In general, factors influencing the treatment of allies and satellites beaten before the main enemy are fourfold. First, there is the realization that the attitude taken up towards the defeated power will somehow constitute a model and example for the main enemy, whether an example of mercy or of severity. "A harsh peace," a German Staff Officer replied to a Rumanian diplomat; "you call it a harsh peace? Just wait till you see what we are preparing for France and England." Baron Burian called it "a model of the peace to be imposed on all our enemies". The same attitude was taken up by the Germans after the fall of Paris in 1940, or by the Russians in their Declaration to Rumania on the eve of invasion of the Balkans in 1944.

The second factor vying with this is the influence of the General and troops on the spot. Before the termination of all hostilities the Army has a considerably greater power, and this can be used, as events have shown in North Africa and in Italy during this war, to direct or modify political change.

The third factor springing from this is the realization that the negotiations with the defeated country must in no way act as a diversion of the conduct of the war, and as a check on action to be taken against the main enemy. In Italy also, the need for Italian support played a vital part in the determination of allied armament policy, and indirectly on the choice of a new Italian government: active help against Germany was a condition imposed in the armistice of 1944 with Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland.

Fourthly, apart from military considerations, there is a certain

unwillingness to compromise a final and general settlement by agreeing on clear-cut and final terms. Certain problems—mainly economic—can only be seen as a whole, and not in terms of separate compartments for each country.

All these factors operate in the treatment of the lesser vanquished countries, but the term "lesser" should not obscure the divergent categories grouped under it. In practice, there is a tendency to try to judge each case on its merits, with a show of impartiality. In addition to the main enemy, there are the enemy's allies, countries sufficiently powerful to have acted as positive partners in peace and in war, countries who have had a policy of their own, even if that policy brought the country directly under the influence of the more powerful main enemy. This rôle was played in the last war by Austria-Hungary and by Turkey, and in this war a little more dubiously by Mussolini's Italy. The position of Japan is more complicated. She is bound by alliance with Germany, but is essentially fighting her own cause. The war is the same war in the eyes of certain ideologues and from the point of view of the war aims of the United Nations, but the Japanese cause is essentially parallel to that of Germany and not one with it. Every war gives a chance to others to enter as allies winning their own victories, as Cavour realized in the Crimean War in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Alongside the Allies are the more obvious satellites, countries fully dependent on the main enemy for the maintenance of their régimes and authority. Most of the satellites are drawn willy-nilly into the full game of power politics, as Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania have been in this war, and the net result is that they get swallowed up inside the orbit of their more influential neighbours. A good example of a satellite in this war is Slovakia, where a puppet government works in close collaboration with the Nazis, and where this "independent" government has signed the anti-Comintern Pact, and admitted German troops as protectors. The position of Slovakia is hardly different from that of many of the Occupied countries.

After the satellites in the ranks of the enemy come the "quiescent" governments, or tolerated governments working alongside the enemy in occupied territory, like the Government of Neditch in Serbia, or of Laval in France. Such governments, while directing the resources of their countries to the best of their ability for the Germans, none the less cannot be held to be representative

of the will of the masses of the people. In most cases, they are faced with counter-organizations, often working underground, governments of resistance, like the Tito régime in Yugoslavia. The attitude to take up to these different ranks of the enemy must vary at the end of the war. The allies can be said to have had a real share of responsibility for the conduct of the war, subject to their redeeming themselves later on. The satellites by contributing to the enemy war effort diverted resources and added to the cost. A good example of a country half-way between an ally and a satellite is Finland. In some respects she could claim to be neither, but rather a linked belligerent. The moderate terms of the Soviet armistice with her acknowledge this position, and she has suffered little territorially.

The quisling governments are ultimately responsible to their own peoples, whose will to purge and destroy will be greater than that of the Allies as a whole.¹ Indeed, for their kinsmen accusers, these quislings will be, if not the main enemy, at any rate the enemy on the spot, accomplices in crime. The retributive aspects of policy will be among the strongest.

The attitude towards these enemy elements is still further complicated by the different relationships existing between them and the Allied Powers. The attitude of the U.S.S.R. towards Finland is fundamentally different from the attitude of the U.S.A. towards Finland. And the difference of attitude is reflected in the continued presence of American diplomatic representatives in Helsinki after 1941, and the sympathy Finland roused in many American circles. This sympathy, affecting even the Government, could mean nothing to the Russians, shelled in Leningrad by Finnish guns, and losing their own soldiers at Finnish hands, and trying to secure armistices all in vain with the Finnish Government of President Ryti and M. Linkomies.

On the whole, the problem of the smaller vanquished powers has been settled by a process of give and take more flexibly than are conditions with the beaten main enemy. He is still regarded as the scapegoat and the most likely source of future danger, whereas the lesser powers would have little momentum to make war on their own account. Sometimes the enemy by this process of "give and take" can retain his hold on some fragment of power as did Murat in the First Peace of Paris. If an enemy holds on long enough after the main enemy has been defeated, as

¹ French and Belgian treatment of collaborators after liberation was significant as an early indication of what may happen elsewhere.

did Turkey in 1919, terms may well have to be modified and even radically altered.

The Turkish case is worthy of further attention. A divided and weakened Ottoman Empire was next after Bulgaria to sign peace terms with the Allies in 1918 at Mudros. After trouble between Greece and Turkey had flared up, the Allies occupied Constantinople in 1920 and the dictated Peace of Sèvres—the logical next step after the armistice terms—stripped Turkey of all rights in the Arabian Peninsula, in Africa, in Armenia and Kurdistan, and demanded that the administration of Smyrna should be handed over to the Greeks for five years, its fate to be settled then by plebiscite. This dictated Treaty did not hold, and within three years it was replaced by the negotiated Treaty of Lausanne, between the Allies and a new Turkish Government led by Mustapha Kemal, and directed with energy and purpose. A vanquished enemy had radically transformed a settlement by holding out in face of considerable opposition. The reasons for the success of Turkey in securing a new Treaty were varied, but the chief of them was undoubtedly division among the Allies, between France and Italy on the one side, and Great Britain on the other. The further reasons are also important. Time itself brought war weariness, and unwillingness to stand firm. Demobilization and its problems, a desire to turn again to peace, made consistent firmness impossible. And the inevitable changes with time, like the fall of the Venizelos Government in Greece and its replacement by that of King Constantine (reputed to be pro-German during the war) hardly inspired the will to continue the struggle. Thus, if the time scale works to the advantage of the vanquished powers, they can expect to see a weakening of the will of the once all-powerful victors.

The problem of these States is then to secure a common policy, which will ensure an integrated settlement. The clash between accepted principles—the Fourteen Points or the Atlantic Charter—and the tendency to pick out and discriminate; the clash between sound long-term policy and expedencies based on war or immediate post-war needs, must both be resolved if wisdom is to prevail down to the details of peacemaking.

§ 7. THE PROBLEM OF JAPAN

Discussion of the appropriate or the probable treatment of Japan after her defeat has peculiar difficulties, and it is not proposed to deal in any detail here with this very complex

problem. The defeat of Japan is, at the time of writing, farther off than the defeat of any of the enemy countries of Europe. Much will depend on how and when Japan is defeated. Furthermore, expert opinion differs profoundly on the most hopeful treatment of her special problems, and it is a matter on which Chinese and United States, Australia and New Zealand opinion will carry greater weight than British. Soviet Russia, not being at war with Japan, has made no official pronouncements of policy: yet if she should share in the victory over Japan, her views also will clearly carry great weight.

In face of so many imponderables, only a few facts can be adduced with relevance and certainty. And the first is that the United Nations will continue to function as a battle-fellowship until the unconditional capitulation of Japan, and the military and naval defeat of her armed forces. The only clear and concerted allied policy is that pronounced at the Cairo Conference of November, 1943, in the joint communiqué of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Mr. Churchill.

The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.

They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China.

Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.¹

This programme of aims meant, when it was issued, the task of liberating Burma, Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, the Japanese-controlled Pacific Islands: Manchuria, Formosa, Korea and other parts of occupied China. It meant freeing some 200 million people from Japanese rule—double the number under German rule in Europe. This vast undertaking has since steadily progressed, and there is no doubt that it can eventually be achieved. Japan's record of having been the first to challenge the system of "collective security" in 1931: of her treacherous attacks on China, the United States, and other Pacific Powers:

¹ For full text, see Appendix I. Further, P. E. Corbett: *Post-War Worlds* (1942), Chapter VI.

of her cruelty and ruthless brutality in the conduct of the war : all militate against a treatment any more lenient than that meted out to Germany. Japanese militarism and prepared aggression, no less than German, are clearly recognized as a menace to any future world order. As such, the extirpation of militarism is a crucial problem of peacemaking.

But when we move from analysis to constructive policy, there is wide divergence of both opinion and probability. Are the Mikado, and the Emperor-worship associated with his name, inseparable from the power of the military and naval cliques ? In China, and to a lesser extent in the United States, it is held that the whole theocratic structure of Japan must be destroyed if militarism is to be uprooted : that the Emperor myth must be attacked and the Mikado forced to abdicate in favour of some kind of republican and more democratic régime. Some American writers, however, argue that the Emperor myth is in itself neutral, the mere focal point of Japanese national unity which became associated with aggression only after 1918, and that it could be converted into a useful focus of a more peace-loving Japan once aggressiveness was finally proved unprofitable and impossible.¹

The treatment of her military leaders and the semi-feudal clans which have been responsible for her aggressions, will in any case be comparable to the treatment of the Gestapo and the Nazi Party in Germany. Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Chinese Legislative Yuan, urges that all Generals be shot, all Colonels imprisoned for life, and all junior officers forced into labour service abroad. Reparation to China and other peoples victimized by Japanese invaders, would seem to be dictated by the same principles as govern reparation to the victims of German aggression.² Payment both in kind and in labour could be absorbed even more readily by China than by European countries, and could be exacted with equal moral justification.³ Certainly, the punishment of "war-criminals" must be no less rigorous than in Germany.

Whether or not total defeat will cause so great a revulsion of opinion and feeling in Japan that a social revolution will follow,

¹ For elaboration of the two points of view, see H. Vere Redman : "The Problem of Japan" in *International Affairs*, Vol. XX, No. 1, January, 1944. The former point of view is expressed forcefully by G. W. Keeton : *China, the Far East and the Future* (1943).

² See above, § 4.

³ But many Chinese reject the notion of exacting forced labour—replying that they "prefer to do their own rebuilding". Cf. *War and Peace in the Pacific* (1943), p. 90.

it seems unlikely that Japan can ever take her place among "peace-loving nations" until she has thoroughly overhauled not only her corrupt political régime but also her unbalanced social structure. A social and economic system wherein one or two family dynasties, such as the Mitsui and the Mitsubishi, own 95 per cent. of the coal, 98 per cent. of the cotton spinning, 90 per cent. of the artificial silk industry, 90 per cent. of the transport, 70 per cent. of the flour-mills, and about half the radio stations, is bound to be an unhealthy social system, incapable of fitting into a world of more democratically organized societies. Nor does the low standard of living and working conditions of the mass of the people appear due mainly to lack of facilities for emigration. Sweated-labour conditions were as bad in 1880 when Japan had only half her present population. There is no sign that the leaders of her expansionist movement are in the least concerned to improve these conditions. It would be truer to say that her bad economic conditions are the result of her expansionism than to say that they are the cause of it. Her expansionism has been due to a triple convergence of forces: the economic greed and lust for power of her ruling classes, the primitive and tribal nationalist and imperialist sentiments of her people, and hatred of the foreigner which takes the form of theories of Japanese being a "master-race". This convergence of forces has induced willing acceptance of deliberately depressed social conditions in the cause of immense armament-building and costly imperialist adventure. The pivot of peacemaking as regards Japan is the double task of liberating the Japanese people from the power of her reactionary cliques and also from the burden of her own recently-found tradition of racial arrogance and nationalist aggressiveness.

Total defeat, and expulsion from all territories gained since this expansion began, will do much towards this end. If it precipitates social revolution, it may do everything needed. But this does not mean—as is often suggested—that the Japanese should be "left to stew in their own juice". Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has himself indicated a more hopeful policy. On New Year's Day, 1944, he promised a helping hand after victory to "the innocent and harmless people of Japan", and added: "It is my opinion that all the Japanese militarists must be wiped out, and the Japanese military system must be purged of every vestige of aggressive elements. As to what form of government Japan should adopt—that question can best be left to the awakened and repentant Japanese people to decide for

themselves." Whether a post-defeat régime would be communist or liberal-parliamentarian is at present fruitless speculation. There are—despite rigorous repression—some 200,000 communists in Japan : but national hatred of Russia, the most intense and traditional of all hatreds, might militate against purely economic and social forces which, in defeat, would tend towards a communist régime. Impressed by the success of democratic régimes and adopting as usual the régime most in harmony with prevalent trends in the world outside, Japanese opinion might favour a parliamentary régime. Yet neither traditions nor national character nor political experience favours a successful parliamentary régime : and compulsory disarmament, combined with allied occupation, would make democratic institutions associated with national humiliation. In such matters, events rather than allied policy will prove the decisive factor. But the earliest possible participation by Japan in the benefits of international organizations whose function is to provide "freedom from want" would do much to diminish inflamed nationalism and promote a more constructive and peaceful spirit in Japan.¹

The problem of the treatment of Japan is part of a wider settlement of affairs in Asia and the Pacific as a whole. Just as the settlement of Paris transcended the German question, and involved the destinies of new nations and the birth of new institutions, so the settlement with Japan will involve the complex reorganization of South-East Asia and the Pacific zones and the great expansion of China, almost as large and as varied as the continent of Europe, and with traditions of culture and authority comparable to those of Europe. The treatment of Japan cannot be isolated from the fate of South-East Asia and of the Pacific as a whole.² The Eastern settlement will be no less far-reaching in its scope than the European.

§ 8. RECONCILIATION OF INTERESTS AND POLICIES

The difficulty of applying sound policies in the economic,

¹ The wide divergence of views, even among experts, on the future of Japan and the appropriate treatment of her after defeat is apparent in *War and Peace in the Pacific* (R.I.I.A., 1943)—a report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held in Quebec in December, 1942, and attended by delegates from Australia, Canada, China, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was suggested by a Chinese member that "We must make the Japanese hate war by beating them badly in the war, and love peace by treating them justly, if not kindly, in the peace" (p. 91).

² See K. M. Panniker : *The Future of South-East Asia* (1942) ; F. M. Keesing : *The South Seas in the Modern World* (1942) ; N. Peffer : *Prerequisites to Peace in the Far East* (1940).

political, military and territorial aspects of settlement is made much more serious by the further problems of linking up the different policies to form a coherent whole. Economic policy towards Germany, non-punitive and aiming at the rehabilitation of the German people into European life as soon as possible, may well clash with military policy, aimed at crushing Germany's power potential, or with territorial policy, squeezing Germans on top of each other until there is a real case for increased *Lebensraum*. The application of odd pieces of policy here and there, with some controls but not all controls, half measures and never full measures, compromises between different interests and hesitation to act, is the surest way to lead Europe into a third Great War. The need to have a unified policy evenly applied transcends all other considerations in the settlement.

Such a clear-cut policy is the only alternative to indiscriminate cries for long-range vengeance, sterilization of the German male population, compulsory migration, mass hysteria. The first trouble with such cries is their ephemeral duration. There can be no effective control of vanquished countries which is not based on forethought and reasoned application, and which goes beyond the cries of the crowd.

The second and equally serious trouble with such cries is their openness to outside influence, often of a most reactionary kind, and their diversion to ends far less simple and more subtle than they were ever intended. Just as the cry of freedom from restriction can lead to a victory of big business in the making of the peace, so a cry of vengeance can be turned by those who wish to control Germany for their own profit, and to thwart any possibilities of the development of a balanced and peaceful European society. Organized power can use irrational fears, pulsing slogans, and popular ignorance to consolidate its position. By focussing the attention of the public on indiscriminate and arbitrary policies, the problem of penetrating beneath the surface can never be solved.

Already in England, the tendency to isolate the German problem from its context and prescribe remedies for Germany based on the peculiar nature of the German people, its unique record as an aggressor, its deep-rooted philosophies of race and cultural superiority, and its destruction of settled life and order in many of the most peace-abiding states of Europe, has been used as a means of diverting attention from other equally pressing problems of peace. By concentrating on Germany's "Black

Record",¹ it is easy to forget that there have been many other black records and that there may be new black records of aggression in years to come, unless the problem of peacemaking is approached against a more varied background.² It is when Lord Vansittart's followers³ go beyond an analysis of German behaviour in the last seventy-five years to seek remote historical and literary justifications that they relapse into exaggeration and errors of proportion. The perspective becomes distorted. If Vansittartism is merely a statement of certain facts—that most of Germany is united under Hitler, that German behaviour before and during the rule of Hitler has been violent, destructive and dangerous—if it simply means that "seventy-five per cent. of Germans have for seventy-five years . . . been eager for any assault on their neighbours",⁴ then in isolation, the viewpoint is a valuable one, and a corrective to sentimentalism. Unfortunately, it has come to mean much more than that, and in the minds of many has been associated with a burst of righteous vengeance at the hour of victory.

Peace cannot be approached healthily in a spirit of revenge, and the reactions of the beaten enemy cannot be completely discounted. The character of a future German authority is of essential importance in the attitude taken up by the peacemakers. In 1815, the generous settlement with France was conditioned by the fact that she had a government that the victorious allies could trust. The restored French dynasty was sufficiently respected in Europe to allay fears. "The restoration of so many of the ancient and legitimate governments of the Continent affords the best prospect of the permanence of that Peace, which in conjunction with His Majesty's Allies, I have concluded."⁵ The correlation of trustworthy governments and secure frontiers should need no emphasis. The attack on the Settlement of 1919 has often been made that we did little to help the struggling Weimar Republic and thus encouraged its reactionary enemies. This has been well countered by the reply that in 1919, there was

¹ See Lord Vansittart : *Black Record* (1941) ; *Roots of the Trouble* (1942) ; *Lessons of My Life* (1943). There is no space here to go into the literature of "Vansittartism", which would be large enough to fill a whole bibliography.

² Lord Vansittart realizes this objection. See *Lessons of My Life*, p. 219-20. "Nothing but confusion can result from the notion that one must write *no* history unless one writes *all* history." But a study of this book shows the limitations of the background as defined by Lord Vansittart.

³ And at times Lord Vansittart himself. See *Black Record*, p. 16. "This bird of prey is no sudden apparition. It is a species . . . which from the dawn of history has been predatory and bellicose."

⁴ *Lessons of My Life*, p. 33.

⁵ Prince Regent, Speech to Parliament, July 30th, 1814.

not a sufficiently fundamental change on the part of Germany to justify an entirely new attitude.

A German Communist has written during this war "The best and indeed the only lasting guarantee of the renunciation of all foreign conquests is the establishment in Germany of a trustworthy democratic régime based on all the forces prepared to fight Hitlerism now and from within the country."¹

The treatment of vanquished countries not only in the immediate settlement but in the period after the settlement will depend on the trustworthiness of the governments, and their willingness and ability to co-operate in the international field. This applies to the governments of Germany and of Japan, for neither country can be blotted out and partitioned between neighbours without turmoil for years afterwards and new wars to come. The trustworthiness of the governments will tend to be measured, at first at least, by their amenability to correspond to the wishes of the Allies. But in the long run, the governments of the vanquished countries will only help to preserve peace if they develop peaceful behaviour, and behind the behaviour a genuine will to co-operate in common tasks. The regeneration of German and Japanese life will depend on a complete transformation of values. "The Germans will have to learn that *Der Tag* is everybody's day, that the warmth of the sun, the wheat from the field, and joy of family and comradeship belong to us all. In sharing them, they are preserved for each of us."² The governments of the defeated countries will not be the only ones that will need to learn that lesson, but for them such ideas must spread among the people through education and example, until a common sense of responsibility restrains their aggressions at least, and prevents the "German Problem" or the "Japanese Problem" from overshadowing all other problems of international society.³

¹ Wilhelm Koenen in *Germany's Road to Democracy* (1943).

² L. Nizer, *What to Do with Germany*, p. 143.

³ The policy of the major Powers towards Germany has been defined in the Crimea Declaration of February, 1945: it includes allied occupation and control, total disarmament, maximum compensation for damage done, and punishment of war criminals. See Appendix I, G.

PART II

THE FRAMEWORK OF PEACEMAKING

CHAPTER IV

HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF PEACEMAKING

§ 1. *Patterns of order : four main historical patterns of order.*

- (a) *The Medieval "ordo" of united Christendom.*
- (b) *The Balance of Power at the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).*
- (c) *The Concert of Europe at the Treaty of Vienna (1815).*
- (d) *The League of Nations at the Treaty of Versailles (1919).*

Lessons which can be drawn for the "new order" to-day.

§ 2. *Community-units of peacemaking : contrasting historical units.*

- (a) *The hierarchical and stratified unity of medieval Christendom.*
- (b) *The territorial, dynastic State of the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries.*
- (c) *The territorial, sovereign State of the nineteenth century.*
- (d) *The territorial, national, sovereign State of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries.*

The basic community-units of modern peacemaking.

- (i) *The force of fear : (a) of barbarian and infidel invasion : (b) of disruption through religious and dynastic wars : (c) of Jacobinism and revolutionary upheaval : (d) of "power-politics" and of war itself.*
- (ii) *The force of a temporary coincidence of interests : the common interests of victorious Powers in keeping a favourable status quo : the cement of force and how this cement deteriorates.*
- (iii) *The cement of prevailing ideologies : (a) of religion and doctrine : (b) of an international code of behaviour and etiquette : (c) of doctrines of conservatism and anti-revolutionary beliefs : (d) of humanitarianism.*

The groping for a modern ideology of internationalism.

§ 1. PATTERNS OF ORDER

The making of peace must be seen in historical perspective : not only because peace at any time is conditioned by discernible forces of historical development, but because there have been, historically, enough attempts at making durable peace settlements for certain consistent factors to be perceived at work during these attempts.

Efforts to make a stable order have taxed the will and the skill of statesmen and thinkers throughout medieval and modern history. The story of these efforts is not just the tale of one long ascent from amateur groping to intelligent achievement. The facile theories of progress which characterized F. S. Marvin's

Century of Hope or most of the " Whig historians " of the nineteenth century, hardly stand up to modern experience. The history of peace is rather a sequence of interconnected patterns, purely temporary in scope and substance, yet linked together by a common thread of human purpose and social change. Each rests on its own basis, and was created out of the political and social conditions at the time.

For the purpose of the present argument, four main historical patterns may be distinguished : though such distinctions imply an over-simplification which may be forgiven to the sociologist more than to the pure historian.

(a) The first in time—the medieval pattern of a united Christendom—was itself based partly on the memory of the old *Pax Romana*, the unity of the Mediterranean world created by the military and legal genius of ancient Rome. To this memory—and it was more than a memory, since the substance of Roman law and political organization survived as the basis of the Byzantine Empire in the east, the papal organization in the west, and even the territorial organization of many of the new barbarian kingdoms—was added the Christian conception of a universal " *ordo* ", governed by divine law and justice operating through the canon law and ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Catholic Church. Because it excluded the Eastern Empire and the infidel just as the Roman Empire had excluded the barbarian, it remained only potential in its universality ; though the great expeditions of the Crusades were a serious attempt to make its universality real. Because the Church had to resist constantly the threat of schism and heresy and the opposition of kings and nobles to ecclesiastical control, its unity seldom went unchallenged. Yet with all its shortcomings, the effort to make and keep a united Christendom is a tremendously important historical pattern of peace.

(b) The second great pattern of peace, which emerged from the abandonment of the unity of Christendom even as an ideal during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, was clearly defined at the Congress of Westphalia in 1648. The Thirty Years' War had been the climax of the political repercussions of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Viewed from a modern standpoint the settlement of Westphalia which ended it marks an intermediate stage between the medieval and the modern. The idea of religious unity remained as the basis of order, but was now transferred to the territorial unit of the

State, on the principle of *cuius regio eius religio*. The territorial State became the real unit of politics and economics, no less than of religion. In France, England and Sweden, it had previously been sanctified ; but now in Germany as well, the States were given the right to conclude treaties and alliances with foreign princes, on the condition (difficult to enforce) that they would not ally together against the Holy Roman Emperor. In religion, a compromise was struck between Protestantism which triumphed in the northern States and Catholicism which still prevailed in the southern States.

Such a change of the old pattern of unity meant that peace would in future depend on a balance of power between territorial States. The operative principle of peacemaking and peace-keeping was no longer a co-ordination and synthesis, as in the Middle Ages, but a compromise and balance between rival forces : a compromise in religion and a balance in politics. But both the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire remained, claiming—now against heavier odds—to be the symbols of a transcendent unity in Christendom.

(c) The third pattern of peace, which was drawn a century and a half later at Vienna, was in broad principles an effort to overcome the dangers and difficulties of this precarious balance of power, which had meanwhile been destroyed and discredited by the dynamic forces released by the French Revolution and the prolonged and strenuous international exertions needed to resist the aggressions of Napoleon. The balance of power between a multitude of small territorial States had shown itself futile before the highly organized military might of a single great nation, infused with crusading zeal and led by a ruthless military dictator. The idea of a self-adjusting and automatic balance of power was—for a time—replaced by the idea of a deliberate and controlled “Concert of Europe”. This concert was to be managed by a congress of the greatest Powers, meeting periodically to settle international disputes and preserve order and peace in Europe. If this meant intervention in the internal affairs of troublesome States—then intervention there would have to be. But peace could not be left to chance, or to the blind working of an automatic balance of power. A preponderance of power would have to be put behind the forces preserving the *status quo*.

But the willingness of nation-States to work in concert and to submit to concerted intervention was not great enough to

maintain such a system in the nineteenth century. Within a generation, international relations were again governed essentially by the principles of balance of power between States. Bismarck, having done so much by the unification of Germany to destroy the old balance, devised an ingenious system of "grand alliances" whereby the balance of power in Europe was for a time kept so even that it almost became self-adjusting. Less aggressive States would hold back and check their more aggressive partners, while the delicacy of the balance and the equality of sides deterred each State from over-straining the friendship of its allies. This system worked by skilful manipulation but it bred fear : and it broke down disastrously, when two almost equally powerful armed camps came to grips in 1914.

(d) The result was the fourth, and most elaborate, pattern of peace, devised by the Conference of Paris in 1919. In the violence of its reaction against the discredited "balance-of-power" basis of peace, the Covenant of the new League caught up again the idea of a universal order and of a concert of Powers, and combined the two into the conception of a universal and permanent concert, conducted from one centre by an Assembly representative of all nations, seeking peace primarily through the organization of "collective security".

In the principles of the Covenant, certain lessons were drawn from all the great previous experiments in peacemaking : but, guided by the academic and idealistic mind of President Wilson, it overlooked the realities of power politics in a world by then divided into some sixty sovereign territorial States. Whether or not a preponderance of power would be put behind the organization of "collective security" would inevitably be determined by each separate State, since each retained control of its military power and armed forces. Order would only be preserved without war if there was already a fundamental harmony and agreement among at least the largest Powers. Given disharmony, the concert could work no better than the concert of 1815. As soon as the world split clearly into revisionist and anti-revisionist States without any effective machinery for peaceful change, the League was doomed, and with it the peace which it had been formed to create and preserve.

From this broad outline of historical developments, two general conclusions relevant to the next peace may be drawn. On the one hand the idea of concert—of machinery for systematic

conciliation and agreement between States—has not itself been discredited. It has been the central idea of two great attempts at peacemaking : and each time it has been not the idea but the means of achieving it which have been at fault. The quest for peace has moved forward from the notion of one single Congress, at Westphalia, to settle the new order, to a more regular but periodic series of congresses, as in 1815, and thence to the conception of a permanent assembly, meeting regularly to achieve general agreement about international problems. The peace-machinery of the future certainly cannot afford to be less systematic and regular than any of its predecessors.

On the other hand, both the last great experiments in peace settlement have been vitiated by excessive reaction against the forces and ideas which had just been previously discredited. Here is one clear danger, which historical experience warns should be guarded against in peacemaking after a great war. Just as the men of Vienna reacted so strongly against jacobinism and nationalism that they built an order too negative and reactionary to last, and made demands of intervention which few were willing to fulfil or tolerate : and just as the men of Paris reacted so strongly against the old “ balance of power ” and dynastic imperialism that they built an order too neglectful of the realities of power, and assumed too optimistically that the coming of democracy would make all peoples peace-loving and all governments willing to fulfil international obligations : so now, there is danger that the next peacemakers will over-emphasize the rôle of power in peacemaking, and assume that the powerful are necessarily the most righteous or peaceloving. The principle of “ polarity in politics ” has been already mentioned.¹ Here is its point of most urgent application. There is every temptation—and already there are signs that it has not been consistently resisted—to assume that success in providing political and military security will naturally or even inevitably lead to successful peacemaking in the social and economic spheres. It is a central thesis of this book that the very crux of peacemaking this time is success in *reconciling* the more negative tasks of keeping order and preventing aggression with the more positive tasks of achieving social security and economic well-being. Because most previous patterns of peace have been drawn in political terms and only very inadequately, if at all, in social and economic terms, this problem of reconciliation is new. But much may be learnt

¹ Above, Introduction, p. 10.

about the nature of this problem from a closer examination of the kinds of community-unit on which the old and new peace settlements are based : and of the different forces of cohesion which can hold these units together.

§ 2. COMMUNITY-UNITS OF PEACEMAKING

The extent to which each great peace settlement grew out of the political and social conditions of the time is most vividly shown by inquiry into the kind of social community on which each "new order" was based.

(a) The medieval order was thought of as a reflection of the divine "ordo", depending on the application of justice and tempered by love. St. Augustine expressed the conception in noble words.

Peace is the tranquillity of order. The peace of the body consists in the duly proportioned arrangement of its parts. The peace of body and soul is in the well-ordered and harmonious life and health of the living creature. . . . Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord. . . . Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal each to its own place.¹

Such a conception of peaceful order could be developed only in a society which was held together by a strong religious bond. Just as common citizenship had given social cement to the *Pax Romana*, so Christian love—"mutual love beyond the obligations of justice"—was conceived as the ultimate cement of Christendom.

The medieval pattern of peace was based, however, on more concrete realities as well : on a stratified and hierarchical society, with the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor at the apex of the pyramid, and under them kings and nobles, bishops and abbots, wandering scholars and merchants, townsmen and labourers. Each social class had its appointed place in the ordering of society. Kingship had certain religious sanctions : but no king, however powerful, could defy the power of Pope or Emperor without incurring the material risks involved in excommunication, the release of his feudal vassals from allegiance, and of his subjects from paying taxation. The "balance of power" between king and nobles was wielded by the Pope : the "concert of power" was conducted from Rome. Definite rules of conduct were laid down and broadly enforced through canon law defining just war and just peace—just only when made by a recognized legitimate sovereign with a righteous intention, and in conformity with the

¹ Augustine : *City of God*, Book XIX, Chapter 13.

rules of true Christian behaviour. In political disputes, the Papacy itself would arbitrate : there were a hundred cases of Papal arbitration in Italy alone in the thirteenth century.

With such central organization, a universal canon law and jurisdiction, a general horizontal stratification and hierarchy of social classes, a common culture and even a *lingua franca*, the medieval order kept the peace in Christendom better than any other system could have done in conditions of very primitive economic life, transport and communications, and imminent threat of external invasion should order break down. Only in times of Papal weakness or on the fringes of Christendom did war assume an international character. Normally, war and violence were mainly local in character—strife between lord and peasant, master and journeyman, noble and monarch : or, as in the crusades, a war of united Christendom against the infidel, though such enterprises proved easier to launch than to control. War, like the social order itself, was either intensely local or universal in purpose. Peace depended on the absence of strong and large territorial units such as the nation-State : and as such units began to emerge, the medieval order and peace were increasingly threatened.

(b) The social communities with which the peacemakers of Westphalia had to deal were utterly different from the social communities of the Middle Ages. Perhaps there had been many more, and more varied, social communities in the Middle Ages : but they were local communities, broadly similar in each part of Europe, and of a kind which could be comprised within an all-embracing system of order. By 1648, they were essentially territorial units, separated not only by local customs and traditions and jurisdictions, but by divergent loyalties to separate governments or to conflicting religious beliefs. They were units not only of social life but of power—the kingdoms of France, the Republic of Venice or the Sublime Porte. The far-reaching social and economic changes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—the assertion of royal over feudal power in England and France, of royal over imperial power in Germany and Italy, of royal over Papal power in every Protestant State, had completely changed the whole basis of social life and political organization on which peace had to be made. “The new Messiah was the King.”¹

The prototype of the new Europe had been the little world

¹ Cf. the historical analysis in F. L. Schuman : *International Politics* (1941 edn.).

of city States in fifteenth-century Italy, of which Machiavelli wrote with so much insight in *The Prince*. "To know the intentions of one's neighbour, to detect his hostile designs, to form alliances with his enemies, to steal away his friends, and to prevent his union with others—became matters of the highest public interest."¹ There was no political power superior to the State. How, then, could a peaceful order be built on such conditions?

The answer of Westphalia was to establish a stable balance between conflicting claims and interests—between rival religions, rival dynasties, rival nations. Peace was conceived as a *modus vivendi* between competing political units, each theoretically equal and sovereign in rights—and each indeed equal in the single sense that each had to depend on its own resources of power and diplomacy both for security and for expansion. Order could be established on such a basis, the unit of the self-contained and self-assertive State, only by the setting up of some such equilibrium. The inherent weakness of this arrangement was not only that peace so based was precarious, ever at the mercy of a combination of strong States: but also that each of the greater Powers conceived the "balance of power" in a sense only advantageous to itself. France was eager to keep a balance between Catholic and Protestant States in Germany because it weakened her chief rival, the Habsburg Empire, and gave her opportunities for intervention in Germany. England conceived the "balance of power" as an automatic check to any Power which sought to dominate the continent. To preserve the balance, it had to be redressed by taking the weaker side in any crisis; and when an over-mighty State arose, it had to be counter-balanced by a "Grand Alliance" of menaced States. This principle of redress operated against Philip II of Spain in the sixteenth century, Louis XIV in the seventeenth, and Napoleon at the end of the eighteenth: but only at the cost of long and exhausting wars.

Yet, despite the costliness of the balance of power as a pattern of peace, it was a pattern inherent in conditions, and inseparable from the whole structure of monarchical States. At the core of each community-unit was the monarch, ruling by "divine right", the royal family and the court. The State was the family estate of the king. To the court ambassadors presented their credentials with a procedure and etiquette which have remained and developed to the present day.² From the courtiers the king

¹ D. J. Hill: *History of European Diplomacy* (1921), Vol. I, p. 359.

² Cf. Ernest Satow: *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (3 Vols., 1917).

drew his ministers : men dependent on him alone, but in turn sharing the lustre of the throne. The art of statecraft was born in the court, and was still far removed from the counting-house, government department or debating chamber. The essential aim of statecraft was to ensure the security of the kingdom, to increase its wealth and wherever possible its territory ; for a monarch, like an Old Testament patriarch, was judged by the amount and fatness of his possessions.

Diplomacy, originating in the atmosphere of the court, was a matter of marriage alliances, family bargains, doweries, treaties and coalitions with other monarchs. The dynastic policies and rivalries of ruling families dominated international affairs : and since *Hausmacht* was the unit of power, peace could only depend on a balance between different *Hausmachten*. It did not involve consideration of the will of subjects. " They cut and pare states and kingdoms," declared Alberoni at the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, " as if they were Dutch cheeses " : and Alberoni's Spanish Queen had as her only aim family aggrandisement among the petty States of Italy. Because dynastic ambitions were by their very nature insatiable, peacemaking came to be a business of fixing definite limits of expansion, or frontiers. Territorial boundaries began to assume something of their modern importance even before they were thought of as the " natural frontiers " of national communities : which reflects the coming of the territorial State as the normal unit of international relations.

(c) Here lies the basic difference between the Peace of 1815 and the Peace of 1648. The unit of peacemaking was still, in form, the large dynastic State—the imperial dynasties of Russia, Prussia, Spain, France, Britain. But they were dynasties with a difference. Family compacts, inheritances, intrigues and ambitions had sunk into the background. The forces dominating international relations were less fears of princely appetite for power than fears of jacobinism threatening the power of all princes : less fears of bogus legitimist claims than fears of upstart, popular military dictators of Napoleonic power. The dynastic pattern of politics was crumbling and on the defensive before the sinister new forces of democracy and nationalism. The crowned heads of Europe hastened to put their heads together, lest they should fall separately beneath the guillotine. The result was the Holy Alliance : and the concert of Europe began as a royal command performance.

Napoleon's exploits of aggression not only shook faith in the balance of power as a guarantee against aggression and the hegemony of one Power, but also shook faith in the political merits of legitimacy and "divine right" monarchy itself. They did this partly by spreading the revolutionary doctrines into every part of Europe and arousing, by reaction, a new spirit of nationalism; and partly by burlesquing the normal antics of dynasts. The spectacle of the upstart Corsican moving monarchs like chess-men and marrying his relatives at will into the old established dynasties of Europe tore the veil of mystery from the old monarchies. Napoleon completed the work of the Revolution better than he knew. The realities of power poked through the mystery more crudely than ever before. If patriotism was still too much, the old balance of power between dynasties was no longer enough. Preponderant power would have to be put behind even the old order if it was to survive. And so Metternich organized the Congress System, whereby the great Powers, conferring periodically, were to unite in resisting all new and dangerous forces of change.

Just as with the "balance of power", each State interpreted the purpose of the new "concert of Europe" in the sense most advantageous to its own interests. Austria meant to use it against the spirit of nationalism which would, as Metternich well knew, disrupt the patchwork Habsburg Empire with its many national groups. Russian policy, as guided by the Tsar Alexander, saw in the Congress System the means of enforcing international conformity with the precepts of his own conception of the Christian religion. This meant, in practical terms, a conspiracy of absolutism to resist all anticlerical or democratic forces wherever they might arise. The justification for this policy was the realization that the causes of war now went deeper than dynastic or State rivalries, and that the roots of war lay in internal jacobinism, revolution, anarchy and dictatorship as much as in foreign invasion and aggression. The recent -victories of the Russian armies, combined with the enigmatic and disturbing personality of the Tsar, stirred up new fears of Russia, and offset any tendency to regard France as "the eternal aggressor", the only likely enemy of peace. Fear of new aggressions by former allies as well as by former enemies prompted the setting up of a general system of prevention. Superficially, "intimate union established among the monarchs" offered to Europe "the most sacred pledge of its future tranquil-

lity".¹ It was not illogical or surprising, now that France too had a legitimist monarch in the restored Bourbon, Louis XVIII, to admit her almost at once to the European concert. Peace demanded a grand alliance of Governments to stabilize order. And legitimist monarchy provided comforting credentials and guarantees of respectability. Peacemaking was based on governmental policies and interests, not on national feelings or aspirations.

So far as frontiers were concerned—they were fixed on considerations of geography and the needs of military defence, and designed to give security to existing States rather than to satisfy the demands of any national community. The State meant only the territorial State: and though countries were no longer "cut and pared like Dutch cheeses", they were combined as Holland and Belgium were combined, as a matter of international convenience. The Vienna settlement reflected quite accurately the prevailing interest of Europe's greatest States.² It was conservative and practical. Metternich saw it as a change from the dynamic to the static, from the anarchism of the Revolution to the defence of existing order. The supreme interest of Europe's dynasties lay in stability and order. But he realized that this kind of peacemaking was not easy, and needed the mobilizing of all energies and power behind the settlement if it were to last for long. "If someone should ask me," he said, "whether the Revolution will overflow all Europe, I would not wager to the contrary. Yet I am firmly resolved to fight against it till my last breath."³ By 1815, peacemaking had become not only the reconciling of competing community-units, but also the triumph of one ideology over another. The world was to be made safe from democracy: at least—for statesmen were practical folk—for "as long as possible".

(d) Between 1815 and 1919, there were many revolutions and wars for national liberation and unification. In the Great War, the crumbling of the old, dynastic Empires of Russia, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and Prussia completed this nineteenth-century process. The community-units with which the peace-

¹ Hertslet: *Map of Europe by Treaty*, Vol. I, pp. 573-4: Declaration of Aachen, 15th November, 1818.

² Cf. Count Ludwig von Cobenzl, who believed that "interest ought to outweigh every other consideration, regardless of justice". See Alison Philips: *The Confederation of Europe* (1920), p. 4.

³ On Metternich and this outlook, see E. L. Woodward: *Three Studies in European Conservatism* (1929) and *War and Peace in Europe* (1931); Algernon Cecil: *Metternich* (1933).

makers of Paris had to deal were no longer dynastic empires or the governments of semi-national or multi-national States. They were highly self-conscious and self-assertive nation-States. The spread of national feeling among most peoples of the earth created a completely new *milieu* for peacemaking.¹ A diversity of national units in which subjects as well as rulers felt a direct interest and an emotional loyalty, made the tasks of peacemaking more complex and more difficult. To early nationalist thinkers, such as Mazzini, it had seemed that each nation had its own distinctive mission to fulfil, its own individual contribution to make to world civilization and human progress. Provided each nation were free and democratic, so that popular will could find direct expression, it was optimistically believed that all would be peace-loving and willing to co-operate freely and fully in the building of a peaceful order. Once perfect national self-determination were achieved, peace would grow from the automatic and natural harmony of interests between free peoples. This belief, nurtured by nationalists and patriots in the nineteenth century, bore full fruit in 1919.

President Wilson stated the theory concisely in 1918.

We cannot have general peace for the asking, or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful states. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it. . . . This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life.²

The peacemakers of 1919, therefore, busied themselves with tidying up national frontiers as far as possible : with recognizing the independence of small national groups which demanded it : with providing for the just treatment of minority groups unhappily left under foreign rule.³ The assumption was that peace was disturbed not by too much nationalism but by too little : not by the ambitions of individual nations outside their borders so much as by the determination of national groups to throw off foreign

¹ The literature of nationalism and national development is immense. But see especially *Nationalism* (R.I.I.A. Report, 1939) ; F. Herz : *Nationality in History and Politics* (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, 1944) ; W. Friedmann : *The Crisis of the National State* (1943). Ernest Renan's *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation ?* (1882) is a classical exposition : see other documents in Sir A. Zimmern : *Modern Political Doctrines* (1939).

² Speech of February 11th, 1918.

³ See C. A. Macartney : *National States and National Minorities* (1934).

control. Liberation would make nations liberal, and universal liberalism would produce peace. "Liberty is the only sure guarantee of peace," urged Lloyd George. "Free nations are not eager to make war."¹

The problems of power were not, of course, forgotten. But they were underestimated, often deliberately, on the grounds that planned international disarmament would alleviate tension and fear, and that free discussion and conciliation through an international parliament would smooth out the causes of friction between nations. It is true, as already stated, that given the good will of nations, the Covenant would have worked adequately to preserve order.² The defects of the Covenant were imposed upon it by the claims of national sovereignty: the refusal to institute any super-national force, or to accept obligations for concerted action against an aggressor. By the terms of the agreement, it was possible for the League to deter or to punish aggression, but not to prevent it. President Wilson admitted the need for covenants to "be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost."³ The French, as their official Memorandum at Paris showed, went further and wanted an international General Staff and a Permanent Commission to keep a watch on armament programmes.⁴ But the compromise eventually reached in the Covenant was in effect a surrender to national sovereignties. No State was willing to accept substantial limitations in 1919: and there was more than a reaction against 1815 in the undertaking to "preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members". Order was to be kept on the purely political international plane, with every check against intervention in the affairs or policies of individual States. There could be no international government within such terms of reference: only machinery for compromising and reconciling divergent national policies. Once again, the "new order" reflected faithfully and accurately the prevailing conceptions of the sanctity of national sovereignty, the rights of national communities to absolute "self-determination", and the assumption of a "natural harmony of interests" between peace-loving, democratic nations which would be automatically achieved by each pursuing its real will as expressed

¹ Quoted in *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, Vol. I, p. 62.

² Above, Introduction, p. 3.

³ Speech of February 11th, 1918.

⁴ Cf. Sir A. Zimmermann: *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (1936), pp. 247 ff.

in free and enlightened public discussion.¹ All the deep-rooted beliefs and the familiar optimistic assumptions of the nineteenth century came home to roost in Geneva.

Yet public opinion had become more "enlightened" in the century between Vienna and Paris. Popular education and a popular press had spread in every great European country. Public opinion had won freedom of expression in most countries of the civilized world—all nations assumed some form of more democratic and popularly representative government after 1919.² However excessive the optimism about the peaceful value of these developments, there were some grounds for optimism. The Peace was built on the normal kind of social unit existing at the time: the optimism existed chiefly in the belief that this would remain the norm. Within a few years, democratic régimes tottered and fell in one country after another. The peacemakers went wrong less in what they positively believed and attempted than in what they did not foresee.

They overlooked certain lessons suggested by the more recent experience of Europe, before 1914. They believed that only the "old diplomacy" and the old "international anarchy" needed redress by international action, once nation, territory and State had been made as far as possible to coincide. They underestimated the capacity of modern national governments to accumulate immense political and economic power. The growth of the "social-service State",³ of vast economic organizations, of methods of propaganda and social control, was destined to take power more out of the hands of the people of each nation than had seemed possible, even in democratic constitutions. Nations, inspired with a common purpose and willing to make immense sacrifices in a cause other than peace, were to be a much more dangerous force in international affairs than the old dynastic State. A stronger, more cohesive framework of order was needed than the peacemakers of 1919 constructed.

And this time—what are the community-units of peace-making? Again they will be, for the most part, strong national States. But now a few great world Powers, multi-national in character, loom above all the rest.⁴ There is the problem first of keeping peace between these four or five "Leviathans". There is also the problem of establishing peaceful relations

¹ Cf. E. H. Carr: *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, especially Chapters 3-4.

² Cf. J. Headlam-Morley: *The New Democratic Constitutions of Europe* (1928).

³ See below, Chapter IX, for amplification of this development.

⁴ For development of the implications, see below, Chapter VI.

between these great Powers and the smaller nations and States, themselves of every size from Brazil and Italy to Luxemburg and Nicaragua. Clearly, co-operation and organization linking units so diverse in character and size and power cannot be achieved on a purely political level. It becomes necessary to re-state the interests which are common to all in social and economic terms, and to seek co-operation between them within a more complex order which is flexible and adjustable enough to comprise such diversities : and to do so with a sense of " the oneness of the world ".

There are elements of all previous historical patterns of order in the " new order " now required. In the inter-linked modern world, this order must aim at universality as much as did the medieval, in its own more limited conditions. It must find a working compromise between great and small territorial States, and between rival ideologies such as democracy and communism, as did the order of 1648. It must place preponderant power behind the settlement, as men tried to do in 1815, so that the only change shall be peaceful change. It must pay homage to national rights and seek peace by international agreement and conciliation, as did the Covenant of the League. It must aim at all these things—and yet more. Most peoples to-day are demanding social benefits even more vigorously than political rights : the benefits of social security, full employment, improved living standards and working conditions, and the whole programme of social reforms comprised in the aims of " freedom from fear and want ". Though much of these benefits can be provided by national organization, they cannot be fully achieved by purely national action. It becomes increasingly clear that no international order is likely to elicit the loyalties required for its maintenance, or the sacrifices needed to guarantee security against aggression, unless people feel that it is itself a " social-service " order, firmly rooted in the kind of community-life which they most desire. Post-war national spirit will doubtless be prepared to defend national sovereignty from frontal attack : but it may welcome such agreed restrictions of national sovereignty as are clearly part of an international plan to consolidate, extend and reinforce social security at home.

§ 3. THE FORCES OF COHESION IN HISTORICAL PATTERNS

Understanding of the nature of historical patterns of peace has to be sought not only in the kind of community units on

which order was based, but also in the forces of cohesion which held such units together, and made them participants in the experiment of peacemaking.

Since all great peace settlements have followed great wars or long periods of disturbance, one force of cohesion is obvious enough. It is fear. Fear of the recurrence of anarchy or war with their attendant miseries has been one of the sharpest spurs to concerted action. Fear of invasion acted as strong and binding cement in both the ancient Roman Empire and the world of medieval Christendom. Fear of the barbarian was followed by fear of the infidel, and these external dangers were a steady and incontrovertible argument for supporting strong central control or direction, and avoiding the dangers of internal strife. It was the common experience in the Middle Ages that as soon as a kingdom was weak, or schism appeared between authorities, this outside pressure began to make headway. With memories of the barbarian invasions of the fifth century and the infidel invasions of the eighth, European peoples were ready to accept both Papal and Imperial authority which could keep the infidel at bay. Likewise, with experience of feudal anarchy and local chaos, men became ready to support strong national monarchs who could draw the teeth of feudalism. The reasons for the decline of feudal power were in essence the same as the reasons for its original appearance: the desire for some stability, law and order, and some "freedom from fear".

So, too, fear played its part in encouraging the creation of a balance of power at Westphalia. Most vivid memories now were memories of the wars of religion in France, the Netherlands, and above all in Germany. Men knew how the State might perish for conscience's sake: and the urgent problem for statesmen who had now found a settlement of Europe favourable to their own dynasties was to prevent war from still further dissolving this favourable pattern. The ultimate justification for statecraft guided purely by *raisons d'état* was the desperate need to be free to do anything in order to preserve the State. With the State, as Thomas Hobbes in England was pointing out at the time, would perish all law, order and civilized life.¹ The worst tyranny was, in the end, preferable to anarchy. So, too, in international politics, the duty of States to help preserve a balance

¹ *The Leviathan* (1651): e.g. "The first and fundamental law of nature is to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the Right of Nature is: By all means we can to defend ourselves."

of power was dictated by the dangers of another Thirty Years' War.

Again in 1815, as already shown, one main inspiration of the Holy Alliance (and its more realistic counterpart, the Quadruple Alliance) was the fear of jacobinism, revolution and nationalism. The dreaded memory was of a cycle of events—revolution leading to despotism : despotism leading to universal war : universal war leading to the collapse of old régimes and imminent anarchy. These fears of Metternich, magnified in Austrian policy by the peculiar structure of her Empire, were shared by most European statesmen. The concert system of 1815 was designed against a whole panorama of fears. Once it was established, "the little kings came out into the sun again", though many were to be blown back into exile by the later gusts of nationalistic feeling. The whole history of nineteenth-century Europe is a commentary not only on how inadequate had been the machinery which the peacemakers of Vienna devised for keeping at bay the new movements of nationalism and liberalism, but also of how justified had been their fears in 1815.

How much the Paris settlement, too, was moulded by fear is seen in the concentration of the Paris peacemakers on abolishing the conditions which, on their analysis, had been to blame for the coming of the Great War : the "old diplomacy", secret agreements, national competition in armaments, and "the international anarchy". Apart from territorial readjustments to allow national self-determination, little else needed changing. But war—whose horrors and scientific destruction were still such vivid realities—must somehow be "outlawed". The Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 expressed, in its language,¹ the revulsion against war as such : so did pacifist and "no more war" movements in every country during the war and post-war years. The fear was not so much of German militarism (except in France), nor of new forms of aggressive dictatorship which might head for war. It was fear of war in itself, as something deadly to all civilized life.²

The territorial settlement itself was coloured on another fear—the fear of the sinister new force of Bolshevism, which had triumphed in Russia just over a year before, and which called for a *cordon sanitaire* in eastern Europe against its influx into

¹ E.g. Article I, whereby the Parties "condemn recourse to war . . . and renounce it as an instrument of national policy . . ."

² Cf. below, Chapter V, § 1.

Europe.¹ Again, as in earlier ages, the external pressure of a hostile force, felt to be alien to European civilization, acted as a spur to speedy settlement and early consolidation. The ready agreement to restore a Polish State, which Wilson had first supported on grounds of national self-determination, was not unconnected with this organization of "frontier marches" against the red menace. French diplomatic friendship and support for Poland during the following years, and western kindness towards Turkey, were not unconnected with it either. France above all continued to see Germany as Public Enemy Number One, and was ready to make alliance with Soviet Russia—or with any other eastern Power—which might help to counterbalance German strength in Europe. The territorial defences of Europe erected in 1919 were, like the Maginot Line defences after Germany's break-through, pointed in the wrong direction. Germany, approaching them from the rear in the late 1930's, was able to demolish them piecemeal, as she occupied Austria, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

A question highly relevant to peacemaking this time, therefore, is what will be the priority of prevailing fears among the chief peacemakers? For most of the occupied countries, the most urgent fear will again be of Germany. They will fear invasion, occupation, exploitation, and they will therefore fear the resurgence of Germany as a great Power. For the unoccupied countries, the main fear will be a recurrence of war, the breakdown of international security arrangements, a quarrel between the great Powers. The smaller nations will fear encroachments on their national independence: none more so than the neutrals. From this nexus of fears, some willingness to support an international system which contrives to reconcile cultural independence and political security with social and economic benefits can be mobilized: and that willingness must be fostered, nourished, developed by positive achievements. Other fears will cut across this willingness—fears between Catholics and Communists, capitalist States and more collectivist States, rival colonial Powers, and so on. But such fears can be undermined by positive results and the provision of concrete benefits. "Freedom from fear" would, indeed, remove one of the great cohesive forces of history: but it is unlikely to be achieved until the cohesive force of fear is more than abundantly replaced by other stronger cements of

¹ See above, Introduction, p. 2.

international order. Only when such other cements exist will real "freedom from fear" exist at all.

A second force of cohesion, which held together most realized historical patterns of peace, was a temporary coincidence of interests between certain community-units. In the Middle Ages secular and spiritual power alike had a common interest in resisting the barbarian and the infidel : Pope and King alike had an interest in an ordered society and a stable loyalty. In seventeenth-century Europe, wars of exhaustion and devastation bred a stalemate peace, wherein rival dynasties and religions had a common interest in reaching a working compromise and a reasonable balance of power. After the great French wars, all the victorious Powers had an immediate common interest in raising stout barriers against further upheaval : and Tsar Alexander, at least, believed in a fundamental harmony behind this coincidence of interests. The Holy Alliance had as its objects "to favour the internal prosperity of each State, and the general welfare of all, which ought to be the outcome of the friendship between sovereigns, made all the more indissoluble by the fact that it is independent of accidental causes".¹ The fact that in 1919 it was the great western, maritime, democratic Powers of France, Belgium, Britain, the United States which had won the war "to make the world safe for democracy", and the old dynastic empires of Russia, Austria, Turkey and Prussia which had gone down to defeat, made the temporary coincidence of interests even more vivid. The peace was to consolidate this great victory of (and for) democracy—the League was based on the principles of liberalism no less than of nationalism. "Descartes, Burke and Jefferson," says Sir Alfred Zimmern, "were not members of the committee that drafted the Covenant of the League of Nations ; but their ghosts were an active influence throughout its proceedings."²

But this cohesion of common interests, being temporary and a coincidence, in each instance soon deteriorated in strength. The alliance between spiritual and temporal power weakened as the threat of the infidel receded, and as temporal kings became more powerful than temporal Emperors : or even, eventually, than the spiritual power of the Church. Dynastic feuds revived with recovered strength, and with the ascendancy of a more ambitious monarch, a Louis XIV of France or a Frederick the Great of

¹ Alison Philips : *op. cit.*, p. 143.

² Sir A. Zimmern : *op. cit.*, p. 6.

Prussia. The concert of Emperors broke down when the Tsar evolved a sentimental devotion to liberalism and Britain rebelled against intervention in national affairs. The League wilted when America withdrew into isolation and France and Britain fell out of step in foreign policy. A settlement which does not look beyond, and in its very organization transcend, the temporary circumstances of its creation will not endure. It is noteworthy that as the settlements get more universal in scope, so the interval of peace gets shorter and the consequent wars more world-wide. The tempo of transition from peace to war speeds up in modern times : while the tempo of transition from war to peace lengthens, until war becomes the retribution for an unwise peace, and peace the painful profit extracted from a fear-inspiring war.

The historical lesson would seem to be that peacemaking should become an *ad hoc*, pragmatic process, exquisitely adapted to ever-changing circumstances : not a spectacular occasion to end a war, but a business-like enterprise to forestall another. To be such it should extend beyond political arrangements into many-sided efforts to create new common interests, and produce ever wider coincidence of interests through social and economic co-operation.

Each peace-pattern lasted only as long as the coincidence of interests which had produced it led to sufficient pooling of power to back the existing settlement with force. The Pope could force obedience on recalcitrant Emperors only so long as princes and vassals would pay heed to his anathemas. Metternich could enforce his system on Europe only so long as his Carlsbad Decrees were not viewed by everyone as "the absurd pretension of absolute power" ; and the Holy Alliance, once Britain felt it to be "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense", was doomed. The League worked reasonably well so long as Germany was too weak to challenge it, and so long as French and British power were likely to be used to enforce its decisions. But because force was ultimately controlled by each of the community-units and not by a superior authority independent of them, the end of the coincidence of interests between the victors meant the loss of preponderant power to maintain the settlement.

The historical lesson for peacemaking now would seem to be that the pooling of power should be as complete, and prompt action against aggression as automatic, as can be agreed upon by the great Powers. As suggested elsewhere, the interlocking of military, naval and air power in the present "Grand Alliance"

has become more intricate than in any previous alliance.¹ The nucleus of a genuinely "international force" is already in existence, and could usefully be prolonged into the peace. What remains more doubtful is the certainty that such force will be promptly used, and backed by all effort and sacrifice necessary for success, by the great Powers concerned and by other States. Many plans have been suggested for securing concerted and effective action which shall prevent, and not merely punish, aggression.² It is unnecessary to consider them again here. But historical experience emphasizes the need for such precautions and provisions, to preserve any settlement and afford that sense of security which alone allows for peaceful change.³ There is no historical warrant for supposing that force becomes unnecessary at any known stage of the process of peacemaking.

A third force of cohesion, binding together existing communities into a general system of order, has been a predominant and widely accepted ideology: a theory of politics and international relations, a code of behaviour, a common set of ideas and ideals. This, like the pattern of peace itself, has always been deeply rooted in the nature of the communities concerned. And, although the ideology wanes with the break-up of the pattern of settlement, its waning still further speeds the material disintegration.

The medieval order rested on the philosophy of the schoolmen and the doctrines of the Christian fathers, the principles inherent in the Canon Law and the hierarchical system of the Church.⁴ The territorial State of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries found its theorists in Machiavelli, Bodin and Grotius: and the connection between the theory of the State and the theory of international law is most clearly seen in the writings of Grotius, the father of modern international law. The ideology of internationalism significantly begins in the seventeenth century: its origins are of significance to-day.

Grandiose schemes for building world peace began in the sixteenth century.⁵ They sprang from a deep realization of the

¹ See below, Chapter VI, § 5.

² See below, Chapter V.

³ Cf. the fruitless discussion between France and Britain during the inter-war years on whether security arrangements should precede disarmament, or disarmament should precede security arrangements. W. M. Jordan: *Great Britain, France and the German Problem* (1943), especially Chapters X, XV, XVI.

⁴ Cf. J. Eppstein: *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations* (1935).

⁵ E.g. Erasmus, Colet, Postel. See G. G. Butler: *Studies in Statecraft* (1920), and an excellent synopsis in Sir J. A. R. Marriott: *Commonwealth or Anarchy* (1940), and *Federalism and the Problem of the Small State* (1943), Chapter III.

bloodiness and anarchy of religious and political strife, for it was a century of great wars. But they commanded little support from contemporaries: certainly little at all from contemporary statesmen. The first scheme of real importance was the famous "Grand Design" of Henry IV—an attempt to examine and eliminate the causes of sixteenth-century wars, through a federal organization of States, a common defence force, a Senate on the model of the Amphictyonic Council of ancient Greece, and regional Grand Committees.¹ As a scheme it reflects the social structure of the times—the dominance of "the Prince", the growing secularization of society whereby religion is seen as a dividing force and no longer as a unifying force in European life, the emphasis on dynastic interests. Some commentators saw in it nothing more than a Bourbon attempt to break Habsburg control of Europe and transform the balance of power in Europe: and, partly at least, at the heart of the first great modern theory of peacemaking, a political rivalry lay hidden.

Grotius, however, in his *De jure belli ac pacis*, "inaugurated the law of peace" in terms of contractual obligation, arbitration in disputes, a rule of law binding upon all States.² William Penn, seeing war as a "smart and a penance", saw peacemaking in terms of the recovery of "the reputation of Christianity in the sight of the infidels", and justice as "the means of peace" which is "the fruit of government".³ Behind both trends of theory was the vivid experience and memory of war, Hobbes's state of nature "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short". Behind both were the social and political presuppositions which underlay the Grand Design. But each starts a main current in modern theories of peacemaking. The legal approach of Grotius inspired a long chain of theorists who saw peacemaking as lawmaking: emphasizing the place of arbitration of disputes, juridical procedure and judicial process, the elaboration of rules of international conduct. This chain led, in time, to the setting up of chairs of International Law at Universities, Conventions like the Hague and Geneva

¹ The origins of the Grand Design are still doubtful. Cf. edition of the Grand Design in the Grotius Society publications (1921), and C. H. Hayes in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Its influence is undoubted. Perefex wrote a popular history of Henry IV in 1661 summarizing the Grand Design. The Abbé de St. Pierre based on it his own *Projet de Paix Perpétuelle* (1713)—again after a great war. Rousseau said that "Europe was not good enough for the Grand Design". It appeared in an authoritative edition in 1745, edited by the Abbé de l'Écluse de Logues, and went through five editions by 1770. It was by general consent elevated to what David Ogg calls "the dignity of a philosophical system".

² Its date is 1625.

³ William Penn: *Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe* (1694).

Conventions, and bodies like the Permanent Court of International Justice.¹ The modern climax is the attention paid to the punishment of war criminals.² The humanitarian approach of the Quaker Penn inspired the long chain of pacifist thinkers, producing prophets rather than law-givers, leading to the Peace Societies of 1815, the humanitarian movements of the nineteenth century, and bodies in our own days like the Society of Friends, the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Peace Pledge Union. It is a chain whose links include Richard Cobden and John Bright, Dunant whose followers founded the International Red Cross Society at Geneva in 1864, and socialist pacifists like George Lansbury.³

These two currents of thought mingled during the nineteenth century. Scientific, technical and administrative conferences extended in scope and became more frequent. The tide of liberal humanitarianism swelled as public opinion, influenced by press and propaganda, and conscious of new responsibilities, demanded a more humane approach to the miseries of war. Between 1794 and 1900 there were 177 cases of arbitration. But always, sovereign States committed themselves cautiously to agreements not clearly of absolutely universal interest (such as Postal Conventions), and none agreed to more than purely *ad hoc* submission to the International Court. But the nature of peacemaking changed fundamentally between 1815 and 1919, as the tide of humanitarian opinion overwhelmed public opinion about peacemaking. Humanitarianism mattered in 1815—as witness the activities of Wilberforce and the attacks on the slave trade. It mattered supremely in 1919, when the universalist belief in the inherent love of peace in free peoples dominated the whole ideology of peacemaking. “What we seek,” said Woodrow Wilson, “is the reign of law based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.”⁴ The two currents of peace opinion completely intermingled in the ideology of Wilsonism and the Covenant: they remained, as mingled but sometimes unhappy bed-fellows, throughout the inter-war years, often causing confusion of thought by obscuring

¹ See below, p. 239, and A. Pearce Higgins: *The Hague Peace Conferences* (1909); A. P. Fachiri: *The Permanent Court of International Justice* (1925).

² See above, Chapter III, § 5, and below, pp. 196 ff.

³ See especially: A. C. F. Beales: *The History of Peace* (1931); M. E. Curti: *The American Peace Crusade* (1929); E. L. Whitney: *The Peace Society* (1928); E. L. Woodward: *War and Peace in Europe*; H. D. Bosanquet: *Free Trade and Peace in the Nineteenth Century* (1921); J. A. Hobson: *Richard Cobden, the International Man* (1919).

⁴ July 4th, 1918. Speech at Washington's Tomb.

the need to enforce law and to tackle in many countries the problem of a growing opinion which was far from peace-loving or pacifist.¹

This nexus of beliefs and ideas has carried over into discussion of peacemaking during this war. It remains important, for from such discussion, interacting with concrete developments, will emerge the ideology prevailing during the next peace. That it should be consistent and realistic is the moral of historical experience. And the next stage in the argument is to examine, in more detail, the main contemporary proposals for a new order which have been made during recent years.

This time the problem is doubly complicated. The modern pattern of peace involves a basic contrast between high hopes, generated in the ordeal and sacrifice of modern war, and the grim realities of super-power politics, imperialism, vested interests, and national commercial and political rivalry. The last peace showed this contrast plainly enough. Hopes of a "parliament of man, a federation of the world", were reduced in practice to the reality of what the British Government White Paper called "a solemn agreement between sovereign (and independent) States, which consent to limit their complete freedom of action on certain points for the greater good of themselves and the world at large".² World peace hinged from the first entirely on the good will of nation-States: and the League came to mean different things for different States. For France, it was primarily a security organization on the political plane: for Britain, or rather some parties in Britain, it meant a machinery for conciliation and negotiation: for Italy and Japan, it was a sounding-board for the grievances and aspirations of the so-called "Have-not" nations: for Germany, after she entered the League, it was a diplomatic instrument for smoothing the return of Germany as a great European Power: for the United States, it was a dangerous entanglement in European affairs which a large section of American opinion was unwilling to incur. Only the smaller States had a broadly similar conception of what the League was for: it was for the wider protection of national independence. The technique of open conference only aired these divergences of opinion, without ensuring regular reconciliation between them.

¹ Cf. p. 150, and R. B. McCallum: *Public Opinion and the Last Peace* (1944).

² *Misc. No. 1*, "A Draft Agreement" (1919): No. 3, "The Covenant . . . with a Commentary thereon" (1919).

This old problem still remains : how best to reconcile divergent national policies, and it is the basic problem of peace-making. To it is added another in the modern world : the problem of building a peace settlement on the shifting sand of social conditions and economic interests. Power is ever shifting inside each country. The extension of social services and of a more highly integrated, collectivist State in many countries : the growing economic and social importance of the technician and the manager : ¹ the still uncertain place of " business as a system of power " : ² the internal changes induced by changes in world production, trade, transport, communications : the fluctuating and variable condition of public opinion : ³ all such factors demand flexibility in international organization, a pragmatic rather than a dogmatic approach. With this proviso, it is relevant to weigh against one another the various schemes and proposals made—ranging from the more dogmatic " Utopian " plans based on certain clear-cut ideologies, through less Utopian and less *a priori* projects to the other extremes of " drift " and " realism ".

¹ Cf. James Burnham's much-discussed book, *The Managerial Revolution* (1942), and below, Chapter IX, § 3.

² Cf. R. A. Brady : *Business as a System of Power* (1944), and for an historical approach to the same problems, Bertrand Russell : *Freedom and Organization* (1934).

³ A useful comprehensive survey of the forces at work may be found in W. Albigh : *Public Opinion* (1939), or an historical analysis of public opinion in foreign policy in O. V. Hale : *Publicity and Diplomacy, 1890-1914* (1940).

CHAPTER V

CONTEMPORARY PROPOSALS

§ 1. *The Utopians : pacifists and federalists—the two strands in nineteenth-century thought about peace : confusion between them during inter-war years : distinctions between religious, emotional or humanitarian, ethical and utilitarian pacifism : some examples of the 1930's : economic and scientific internationalism : the "rights of man" doctrine : universal federalism : the basis of Utopianism.*

§ 2. *The Semi-Utopians : borderlines between semi-utopianism and (a) Utopianism ; (b) realism : federal schemes based on unity of geographical conditions—of cultural or historical traditions : regionalist proposals : schemes based on "Economic Union".*

§ 3. *The Drifters : three senses of "drift" in this connection : (a) muddling through : (b) wait and see ; (c) deadlock : some examples since 1919 : statements of peace-aims and the Atlantic Charter : United Nations Conferences : the slogan of "all peace-loving nations" and the formula of "unconditional surrender".*

§ 4. *The Realists : the realist school of thought : political realists : the realism of "the growing pattern".*

It has just been seen that the patterns on which international relations were established in the four periods of history when men deliberately tried to remodel these relations, and to build a "New Order", were each associated with a particular ideology. Institutions and organizations were backed by a definable set of ideas and ideals. Each ideology of this kind, which crystallized around the "New Order", was a synthesis of previous and prevalent notions expounded by political theorists, sponsored by diplomatists and politicians responsible for making the peace settlement, and at least partially embodied in the arrangements made at the settlement. In conjunction and interaction with realistic conceptions of the most desirable balance of power, these ideological conceptions did much to mould some provisions of the settlement. They had, indeed, an impetus and an implication beyond their immediate consequences, and certainly beyond the intentions of those who tried hardest to apply them during the formative periods of peacemaking. Burke provided a philosophical vindication of conservatism which, when applied by Metternich and the Holy Alliance in Europe, and by Wellington and Sidmouth in Britain, provided justification for extreme repression and stagnant reaction ; reaction which consorted ill with the liberal-minded Whiggery of the champion of American and Irish freedom, the trenchant critic of George III and Warren Hastings. Woodrow Wilson's sacred principle of national self-

determination provided fuel for the engineers of German resurgence and rearmament, no less than for the newly created national States of Europe. Ideals, once bruited abroad, have a habit of serving contrary and conflicting ends.

In this chapter it is proposed to survey the wide variety of projects which have emerged from contemporary discussion concerning the next "New Order". They have been classified on the division which seems most relevant to the theme of our argument: which is also the division inherent in the whole nature of the proposals. The main differences between them arise partly from a psychological and partly from a sociological difference of approach to the problem of peacemaking.

On the one hand, they start from different views of the capacity of human nature to adapt itself to organized society, whether on the national or international level. Assumptions about how much or how little men can achieve by deliberate and rational effort to control themselves and their social organization may be either optimistic or pessimistic. If optimistic, the gist and tone of the argument tends to become a sustained effort to persuade all men to accept one set of beliefs: and the assumption is that if only enough people can be converted to these beliefs, the problem will be solved. If sceptical, the argument becomes a demonstration of the consequences which are likely to follow from actual developments, at most a warning rather than an exhortation. It becomes an analysis of prevailing and probable conditions, and a calculation of the likely trend of events. Thus the two extremes amongst theorists are "Utopians" and "Realists". Contemporary proposals have been classified according to whether one or other of these assumptions predominates. But writers, speakers and thinkers (not, alas, always synonymous) seldom take their stand exclusively and completely on one or other of these extremes. Therefore, those proposals in which Utopianism and optimism predominate, but which are considerably qualified in detail and application, have been grouped as the theories of "the Semi-Utopians".

But contemporary proposals differ, too, in their sociological no less than in their psychological assumptions. It is not only a question of what men can achieve, but also of what they should try to achieve. Theories differ not only in their conception of human nature, but also in the horizon of their vision of what is desirable in social, economic and political organization. And the two divisions tend usually to coincide. At one extreme

writers propound a long-range vision of what is desirable, with their eyes on the farthest horizon and their minds fixed on ends rather than means : at the other, there is insistence that only the most short-range vision of what is attainable in the given circumstances has any practical importance, and that the power of idealism is circumscribed by immediate material conditions. As explained above,¹ it is the contention of the authors that neither of these attitudes is satisfactory : that while desirable ends demand the search for certain pre-requisite conditions and appropriate means, so too are attainable ends defined by the selection of means. It is true, as Browning wrote, "A man's reach should exceed his grasp", but he will be doomed to unending disillusionment (and to being very grasping) if he constantly over-reaches himself.

§ 1. THE UTOPIANS

The nature of the "utopian" approach to politics has already been widely discussed by several prominent writers.² It will suffice for our purpose to examine the two main specimens of this approach which have been popular in recent years. These are on the one hand the various kinds of pacifist thought, and on the other the various proposals for the creation of world federation within a short space of time. They are the modern counterparts to those two strands of peace propaganda which grew up and developed during the nineteenth century. Mr. A. C. F. Beales has described them in his *History of Peace*.³

Pacifism, which is an extremist philosophy and rules out *all* organized war, has several bases. It believes in the fundamental unity of mankind as taught by the Scriptures ; homicide is criminal, war nothing but collective homicide. . . . Again, pacifism is utilitarian ; it emphasizes the misery and waste involved in war. . . . Thirdly, pacifism is ethical, denouncing war on the same grounds as the duel, namely, that force is no test of justice. Finally, pacifism is logical ; it realizes that war is worse than useless as a means of settling quarrels and removing grievances . . .

Internationalism is definitely a theory of the State, which it conceives as an organic nation-unit existing inside a community of nations—which community is not an aspiration but a sociological *fact*. And

¹ Introduction, p. 9.

² Most notably Karl Mannheim, Bertrand Russell, E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Georg Schwarzenberger. The nature of their own proposals is considered below, § 4, and cf. above, page 6.

³ *A History of Peace* (1931), especially Chapters I and II.

this conception does not rule out war altogether. . . . Internationalism, in short, is federative and not unitary.

Historically non-violent pacifism is the most primitive, instinctive and apparently spontaneous reaction against prolonged war. The old Hebraic prophets Micah and Isaiah spoke in terms of converting swords into ploughshares, and most of the medieval heretical movements—Albigenses, Lollards, Manicheans, Waldenses—denounced all war and thought in terms of universal brotherhood. So did their rebel successors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—the Anabaptists, Socinians, Moravians, Brownists, Quakers. The Society of Friends formed the main bridge between these early theories and the organized pacifist movements of modern times. These modern movements were born in the last stages of the Napoleonic Wars, brought to birth by the protracted experience of dreary and devastating warfare. They sprang up simultaneously, mainly out of the Quaker tradition so strong in America and Britain, and were concerned chiefly with pacifist propaganda. Thence they spread to France and Switzerland, and eventually to most other European countries in the course of the nineteenth century. Common to them all was absolute denunciation of war on religious or humanitarian grounds, and a drastic, emotional urgency which came from revulsion against the experience of modern war. It was, therefore, natural that pacifism should receive fresh stimulus from experience of 1914-18.

During the war itself, peace societies of many kinds grew up, usually in neutral countries, inspired by revulsion against the new horrors of world war. In belligerent countries conscientious objectors suffered for their faith. Among left-wing movements, split by war, a pacifist section often appeared, opposing the war as an imperialist war and a betrayal or denial of working-class solidarity. But they were inevitably small minorities, little influencing general thought, but storing up—as it later transpired—a reserve of popular credit which brought them honour and prestige during the disillusionment of the post-war years.

In the years after 1919 pacifism spread in almost every country of the world : most, perhaps, in France, Britain and the United States, and other States with the greatest interest in there being no more war. But many of the new adherents were pacifist more by emotion than by either religious conviction or clear-cut ethical principle. Apart from pacifist organizations of the traditional type, such as the No More War Movement and the Peace

Pledge Union, the religious pacifist thought of the Society of Friends, and the humanitarian pacifism of many left-wing movements, pacifist assumptions and arguments found a wider and vaguer public in the general tide of reaction against the horrors of war. In public opinion these trends mingled with the many movements which looked to the League of Nations as the most hopeful basis of organized world peace. The chief feature of Utopian thought in the inter-war years was a confusion of the two kinds of peace-movement which, in the nineteenth century, had remained comparatively distinct and separate. The Dean of St. Paul's gives an illuminating example of the confusion.

There were not a few who combined membership of the League of Nations Union with absolute pacifism and could not see any contradiction. An experience of my own is perhaps not irrelevant. During the "Peace Ballot". . . . I was at great pains to distinguish between three possible views : (a) Isolationism, which would cut loose from the League and all concern with Europe ; (b) Pacifism, which would not in any circumstances resist aggression by force ; (c) the full League policy, which implied the obligation to come to the help of any nation subjected to aggression. . . . With chagrin, I listened to an amiable gentleman who stood up at the end of the speech and said that he heartily agreed in supporting the League, since for his part he had always believed that we should look after our own business and not concern ourselves with the troubles of Europe, and, moreover, was convinced that war in any circumstances was wicked. My confusion was complete when this well-intentioned mixture of contradictory principles was received by the audience with rapturous applause.¹

A public wider than those religious sects which had always been pacifist was reached by the writings of certain literary men who took their stand on a philosophical and ethical pacifism. Aldous Huxley, A. A. Milne, Beverley Nichols, C. E. M. Joad were widely read in Great Britain,² and exercised considerable influence on the younger generation : all have since renounced their extreme pacifism in face of the hard facts of Nazi aggression, but theories such as they expounded with such vigour in the 1930's had an influence upon British opinion, and therefore upon British policy, an influence which in the event enervated

¹ Dr. W. R. Matthews : *The Foundations of Peace* (1942), p. 41. See also *ibid.*, pp. 9-25, for a criticism of Utopianism in Christian belief.

² See particularly Aldous Huxley : *Encyclopædia of Pacifism* (1937) and *Ends and Means* (1938) ; A. A. Milne : *Peace with Honour* (1934) ; Beverley Nichols : *Cry Havoc !* (1933) ; C. E. M. Joad : *Why War ?* (1939). The list could be immensely extended : e.g. John Middleton Murry.

clear thought and decisive action in connection with the League of Nations whose Covenant included Article XVI.¹ One or two brief quotations from these writings will show the tenor of the argument.²

I think that war is the ultimate expression of man's wickedness and man's silliness. There are times when I think that its childish silliness is even more heartbreaking than its wickedness. . . . If everybody in Europe thought as I do, there would be no more war in Europe.

So Mr. Milne : and so, too, Mr. Nichols :

I believe, with every fibre of my being, that the hour has struck in the world's history when every man who wishes to serve his country must realize that Patriotism is the worst service he can offer to it. The time has come when it must be definitely admitted that Patriotism is an Evil, in every country . . .

These expressions of an emotional revulsion against what Mr. Milne called "the war convention", with its accompaniments of patriotic and nationalistic conceptions, were rationalized by writers like Joad into a justification of passive non-resistance as a political method. And here religious, emotional and ethical pacifism merged into a purely humanitarian, or even utilitarian, pacifism.

Even in the world as it is, I believe that the adoption of non-violent measures by nations threatened with aggression would entail less suffering in the end than the resort to force in so-called self-defence. If the Belgian Government had cared for the happiness and prosperity of the Belgian people, it would have let the Germans through in 1914 without resisting them . . ."³

Aldous Huxley elaborated the arguments for non-violence in politics, and fitted them into a larger philosophy of human behaviour. He quite logically pointed out that, on his own thesis—

¹ It may be that recantation can be recanted : cf. C. E. M. Joad in *New Statesman and Nation*, August 19th, 1944. "A succession of accidental encounters has driven me to remove their war-time dust-sheets from a number of principles in the faith of which I lived during the inter-war years."

² No summary is attempted of the more regular Christian-pacifist arguments put forward in recent times, because they follow the orthodox and familiar lines. Amongst the most effective expositions of these views are the two booklets of Leyton Richards, *The Christian's Alternative to War* (1929) and *The Christian's Contribution to Peace* (1935). He concludes that "the Christian who is persuaded of the essential iniquity of war cannot himself enlist in an International Police Force, equipped for military operations", but that he may consistently recognize such a force as a step towards a more Christian world-order.

³ C. E. M. Joad : *Why War ?*, p. 144.

Morality and practical common sense are at one in demanding that efforts to create an "International Police Force" shall be strenuously resisted and that Article XVI shall be removed from the Covenant.¹

The League was to be limited to tasks of international conciliation and the promotion of arbitration: nations should unilaterally disarm; aggression should be met by non-resistance. Joad put the practical programme concisely:

. . . of all the courses which it is open to statesmen to follow, that course which is a declaration of war involves, under modern conditions, more suffering, and involves more suffering for more people, than any other course which could have been taken. It is for this reason that, in the present situation, I advocate disarmament for this country and non-resistance to the threat of war.²

The purely pragmatic, unemotional, utilitarian case for pacifism was expounded most vigorously—and almost alone—by Bertrand Russell. He had argued in similar lines during the Great War, and his dispassionate estimate of the probable consequences of German invasion of a non-resisting England, written during the Great War, was frequently quoted again in the 1930's.³ In *Which Way to Peace?* (1936) he wrote:

I am not a believer in the doctrine of non-resistance; I do not desire the abolition of the police; I do not hold that war is always and everywhere a crime. If an international government existed, and were possessed of the only legally permitted armed forces, I should be prepared to support it. . . . The evil of war is quantitative, and a small war for a great end may do more good than harm. My belief in absolute pacifism is limited to the present time, and depends upon the destructiveness of air warfare. In other times and other circumstances I should be prepared to consider gains and losses, and to concede that war *might* be worth while. . . . What I assert is that wars between civilized States, at the present time, are sure to do more harm than would be done by the peaceful submission of one side, and, further, that the actual harm which a nation would suffer through unilateral disarmament is very much less than most people suppose.

It is important to distinguish between the religious pacifism of Friends or the semi-religious, humanitarian pacifism of a Milne and a Huxley, and the empirical pacifism of a Bertrand Russell or a Joad. The former could merge with internationalist

¹ Aldous Huxley: *Ends and Means*, p. 114. See also Richard Gregg: *The Power of Non-Violence* (1935).

² *Op. cit.*, p. 149.

³ *Justice in Wartime*, quoted by Joad: *Why War?*, pp. 146 f., and in *In Pursuit of Peace* (1933), edited by G. P. Gooch,

movements in support of the League of Nations (such as the League of Nations Union) only at the cost of mental confusion, or at the cost of demanding the emasculation of the sanctions provisions of the Covenant and unilateral national disarmament. The latter could quite consistently support projects for collective security or an international police force. One could support British action in the present war only by renouncing its pacifist beliefs, the other could do so merely by revising the terms of its pleasure-pain (or good-evil) calculus. Both have been submerged in the present war, save for the minimum core of conscientious objectors who hold a fervent faith in the total wickedness of all war. But both may again have considerable influence in the years after the present war, when conditions will again exist which favour a popular revulsion of opinion and feeling against war as something in itself inherently wicked or (if disillusionment be reborn) inevitably futile. But, as in 1918, it is unlikely that non-violent pacifism as such will have great influence on the peace-settlement. It is noteworthy that all the pacifist writings mentioned above belong to the 1930's and not to the 1920's : that is, to the period when fear of war was again great, rather than to the immediate post-war years when war-clouds were not yet apparent on the horizon.

The extent to which utopian pacifism was the product of fear lest war should recur can be measured by the prevalence and popularity of the argument that another war would be incalculably more horrible than the last, and that it would mean the end of western civilization. The unknown power of aerial bombardment exerted fascination over the minds of many writers, whilst great prominence was given to the machinations of sinister economic interests (especially armaments-manufacturers) in producing international tensions and wars. Titles such as *Challenge to Death*, *What would be the Character of another War?* and *Merchants of Death* filled the bookshops. The cumulative effect of these writings was a widespread conviction that another war would be so horrible and so devastating that "peace at any price" was the only alternative. In this way assumptions which were essentially pacifist in character and effect came to be very widely accepted. They extended to a circle which was far wider and vaguer than the relatively small number of convinced pacifists who denounced war on theological or philosophical principles.

Most influential of the contemporary descendants of the older nineteenth-century "internationalist" tradition were the two

schools of thought associated on the one hand with the non-pacifist utilitarian arguments of Sir Norman Angell, and on the other with the cosmopolitan, "rights of man" teachings of H. G. Wells. Both were pre-1914 in origin and activity, and both wielded some sway over opinion about international affairs in Britain and U.S.A. during the inter-war years. They merge, theoretically, into the utilitarian conceptions of Bertrand Russell, but reject the notion that non-resistance to aggression would be effective.

Whilst Russell argued against national resort to war mainly on political grounds, Sir Norman Angell argued mainly on economic and Wells mainly on scientific grounds. Angell's classical exposition of *The Great Illusion* (1908) had gone through several editions and had been translated into many languages before 1914. It was reprinted and revised in 1933. Meanwhile, in *The Unseen Assassins* (1932), *Preface to Peace* (1935) and *Peace with the Dictators?* (1938), he reiterated and elaborated with persuasive eloquence the thesis that the economic life of modern national societies is so interdependent and "international" in character that war and the results of war must always be economically disastrous. He was always careful to draw a distinction between the assumptions of pacifism and the implications of internationalism, and shifted the emphasis from emotional revulsion against the horrors of war to an intellectual and rational quest to eliminate the mental habits and conceptions which bring war in their train. These were the "unseen assassins" of men's peaceful intentions.

War assuredly is vile, but men do not engage in it because they are altogether blind to its vileness. . . . When it becomes in men's minds a question of defending their rights, the horrors of war become irrelevant; indeed, the horrors make the act of war the more noble.¹ He was a perpetual critic of the non-violent pacifist position, insisting that the only practical choice before pacifists, since there was no hope of every nation becoming pacifist, was a choice between "armed anarchy or collective security".² Sir Norman was, indeed, one of the ablest and most consistent exponents of the theory of collective security as enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations.³

The general approach of H. G. Wells and other exponents of the more doctrinaire, cosmopolitan "rights of man" school

¹ *The Unseen Assassins*, p. 271.

² *Peace with the Dictators?*, Part II.

³ Among other economic interpretations of the last war, H. N. Brailsford: *The War of Steel and Gold* (1914) is among the most brilliant and influential.

overlaps considerably in substance the orthodox "League" theories of Angell. They, too, argue the interdependence of economic and social life in the modern world: the need for an "international" and even "supra-national" outlook: the urgency of a system of collective security. Starting with insistence that developments in modern science and technology have made the ideal of exclusive and narrow nationalism out of date, they aim at building a world-wide "commonwealth of man" as the only adequate political unit. Since the aim is to make the individual conscious that he is citizen of a community wider than the nation or the nation-state, emphasis is laid on the eighteenth-century individualistic theories of the "indefeasible rights of man": and the barrier of national citizenship is undermined both from without and within. In *The New World Order* (1940), *The Rights of Man* (1940) and *Phoenix* (1942), Wells has during this war restated in contemporary terms the doctrines which he was already preaching before 1919.¹ In 1941 a group of liberal thinkers, under the chairmanship of Lord Sankey, formulated a modern Declaration of the Rights of Man intended, in Wells's words, to be "no less than a common fundamental law for the whole world, overriding any other law that it contradicts".²

The two most important practical expressions of the Wellsian school of thought in this war have been the "Declaration of Rights of Man" published by the Poles in 1942, foreshadowing a sovereign world community and a super-State, declaring that a nation which makes laws contrary to the Declaration "shall be deemed to be an aggressor"³: and—immensely more important—the Philadelphia Charter of 1944.⁴ The latter, though not drafted formally as a declaration of "Rights of Man", includes general principles closely akin to the Wellsian theories. It is universalist in character—speaking consistently of "all peoples"; and it lists specific human rights which the International Labour Organization is "obliged to further". These include general affirmations that "all human beings, irrespective of race, creed, or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and

¹ E.g. *In the Fourth Year: Anticipations of a World Peace* (1918). The "Rights of Man" type of proposal is discussed in G. Schwarzenberger: *Power Politics*, Chapter 28; W. Friedmann: *The Crisis of the National State*, pp. 134-5.

² Printed in Appendix to H. G. Wells: *Phoenix*.

³ Printed in the *New Polish Monthly*, May, 1942.

⁴ See Appendix II, B, and Chapter VII, below.

equal opportunity". Universalist humanitarianism has won at least this victory during the war.

In the early years of the war many supporters of all these various idealistic schemes—ranging from non-violent pacifists through internationalists to cosmopolitan humanitarians—were enlisted in the ranks of a new movement for world federation, called Federal Union. During the late 1930's, when the breakdown of the League of Nations became apparent and the principle of "collective security" fell under a cloud, voices were raised urging a union of like-minded states as the tighter form of international organization dictated by experience.¹ The principle of national sovereignty was diagnosed as the canker of the League: it must therefore be shattered by a frontal attack. Various trends of thought were brought together in a well-timed, persuasive book by the American journalist, Clarence K. Streit: *Union Now* (1939). An association was founded, both in America and Britain, for propagandist purposes. The concrete proposal of Streit was the formation of a close federation of the fifteen largest democracies, led by the U.S.A., Britain, and the British Dominions, and including most countries of western Europe and Scandinavia. This nucleus was to become, in time, the core of a world federation: but its formation was to be immediate. The close affinity of this movement with the "Rights of Man" doctrines is clear from Streit's proposed draft constitution for such a federation: it begins with a statement of the Rights of Man. Many former enthusiasts (on both sides of the Atlantic) for pacifism, the League of Nations, and every other kind of internationalism found, during 1939 and 1940, a new panacea for world ills and perhaps also a psychological escape from the war in the federal principle. After 1940 it declined both in numerical support and in propagandist activity. It was perhaps, historically, the climax of all the inter-war utopian movements².

¹ E.g. H. N. Brailsford: *Towards a New League* (1936): "We who confess a common social faith shall attempt the first decisive steps towards a federal system of peace."

² Of the vast mass of writing produced in support of federalism at this time, the following are the most coherent and persuasive examples: Clarence K. Streit: *Union Now* (1939) and *Union Now with Britain* (1941); W. B. Curry: *The Case for Federal Union* (1940); W. Ivor Jennings: *A Federation for Western Europe* (1940); R. W. G. Mackay: *Peace Aims and the New Order* (1941); M. Channing-Pearce: *Federal Union: A Symposium* (1940); D. and E. Wilson: *Federation and World Order* (1939). For a criticism of such proposals, see Denis Pritt: *Federal Illusion?* (1940); John Strachey: *Federalism or Socialism* (1940); and Viscount Cecil: *A Great Experiment* (1941), Chapter V. The first issue of the Federal Union association's weekly news-sheet appeared on the significant date, 5th September, 1939: two days after war began.

In the fifth year of war Mr. Ely Culbertson, famous in the world of contract bridge, published a blue-print for world federation,¹ and an association known as The World Federation, Inc., was founded in New York. Attacking equally the League of Nations for its basis in the principle of national sovereignty (so that the League "fast became a Babelian assembly of ambassadorial puppets") and the proposals of Clarence Streit and Federal Union for putting nations at the mercy of world-politicians, Mr. Culbertson urged the organization of the world into eleven regions, each with a regional federal organization wielding strictly limited powers. Recognizing that power has to be put behind any organization for keeping the peace, he devised an ingenious basis for a world police force in the "quota-force" principle. Each powerful nation was to maintain a certain agreed quota of military, naval and air force, and a strong mobile corps was to be composed of contingents from the smaller States, owing allegiance directly to the world federation. While national contingents were to be carefully balanced so as to be adequate for immediate self-defence, the international mobile corps was to act as the fly-wheel in the balance of world power. The merits of the plan are that it recognizes the strength of nationalism and the necessity for power as a basis of peace.² But it merits being classed with utopian theories in that its basic regional grouping underestimates the obstacles. Thus France is expected to enter into a regional federation with Italy and Spain, Greece and Yugoslavia with Hungary and Bulgaria, all Latin America with the U.S.A.

The basic feature common to all these contemporary proposals, ranging from individual non-violent pacifism through internationalism to cosmopolitanism and universal federalism, is the feature which also justifies the epithet "utopian". It is the primary assumption that a consensus of opinion must be reached through rational persuasion and universal propaganda, in order that permanent peace may be secured: and, linked with it, the optimistic assumption that enough people *can* be so persuaded. The Christian pacifist is committed either merely to saving his own soul or to embarking upon efforts to persuade Moslems, Hindus, Buddhists and every other non-Christian that Christian pacifism is the right attitude to political affairs.

¹ *Summary of the World Federation Plan* (1944).

² There is even some hint of the "quota-force" principle in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of October, 1944. See below Chapter VIII, § 3.

Mr. A. A. Milne put the utopian approach in a phrase when he wrote, "If everybody in Europe thought as I do, there would be no more war in Europe."¹ So might Hitler point out that if everyone in Europe had thought as he did in 1939—that the German people, as a pure Nordic race, had the right to dominate the world—then there would have been no war in Europe. It is true that if everyone were to think alike on fundamental international disputes, there would be no more war in Europe: indeed, there would be no disputes. But theories based on such truisms can do little to bring permanent peace nearer.

It would be untrue, as well as unkind, to suggest that such writings are but verbose elaborations of the truism that wars happen because people disagree, and if people agreed there would be no wars. But of specific proposals for how peacemaking must be tackled, any proposal whose success depends ultimately upon the expected conversion of masses of people to the opinions of the author merits classification as "utopian".

The utopian [writes Professor E. H. Carr], treats purpose as if it were the only relevant fact, and constantly couches optative propositions in the indicative mood. The American Declaration of Independence maintains that "all men are created equal", Mr. Litvinov that "peace is indivisible", and Sir Norman Angell that "the biological division of mankind into independent warring states" is a "scientific ineptitude". Yet it is a common observation that all men are not born equal even in the United States, and that the Soviet Union can remain at peace while its neighbours are at war; and we should probably think little of a zoologist who described a man-eating tiger as a "scientific ineptitude". These propositions are items in a political programme disguised as statements of fact.²

Thus the utopian naturally spends much energy on maintaining that wars are due less to the wickedness of men than to their stupidity; and must of necessity contend that men need only to have the truth demonstrated forcibly and frequently enough, for them to perceive their common interest in peace rather than war. Utopian proposals tend to flourish in the period which follows an armistice, and such proposals have special relevance for our theme.

¹ Lest this be thought too sweeping a generalization, remarks of similar effect will be found in *Cry Havoc* I, p. 239; *Why War?*, pp. 231 and 247; *Ends and Means*, p. 128; *The Unseen Assassins*, p. 41; *Which Way to Peace?* Chapter 12; *Phoenix*, pp. 183 f.; *The Case for Federal Union*, pp. 211 f.; *World Federation Plan*, p. 78. The whole manner of writing of many of these and similar books is, of course, frankly persuasive and propagandist, and the assumptions mentioned are implicit on every page. Cf. Walter Lippmann: *Some Notes on War and Peace* (1940), for some pungent comments on this "utopian" thesis.

² *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, pp. 17 f.

Immediately after war, there is in victorious countries a mood of optimism and a confidence in freedom to determine the future, in defeated countries a war-weariness and disillusionment. In both, a climate of opinion is created favourable to the spread of utopianism.¹ The new forces released by war are often idealistic in purpose, resolved to seek a "brave new world" in the peace that has been so hard-won. Yet within a few years that temporary climate changes. Amongst the victorious nations, some may lapse into disillusionment and lament that "war does not pay", whilst others know, from their own improved condition, that war may indeed bring new opportunities. To the vanquished, pleas from the victors that "wars do not pay" seem hypocritical; whilst the benefits even of peace become tarnished by the aftermath of unsuccessful war. Circumstances are created which favour a new alignment of forces. By the time that successful but perplexed warriors are lamenting the unprofitableness of war, their defeated and resentful enemies become convinced of the unprofitableness of peace. A time may even come when the peace-settlement is preserved less by the efforts of its beneficiaries to maintain it than by the inability of the dissatisfied powers to challenge it. When that happens, another war already looms on the horizon. And then utopian theories of pacifism, internationalism and world brotherhood tend to mask and obscure the real issues more than they conduce to peace. For their assumption that all nations have a natural "interest" in peace is no longer operative, and the actual buttress of existing peace is merely the time-lag before adequate power can be accumulated by the dissatisfied States. It is, for example, meaningless to assert that "all nations want peace" or even that all nations have "a common interest in peace", unless we go on to ask "peace—with what?"² Some may want peace with security; others peace with honour; others peace with prosperity; others peace with justice. "Peace" comes to mean "the Peace"; simply a particular kind of peace-settlement—a form of international order which favours, or at least substantially satisfies, the national interests and aspirations of certain States. An international disharmony of interests and policies is masked behind the formula that "every nation wants peace"; a phrase implying the existence of an international harmony of

¹ For the earlier phase in the "climate of peacemaking", see Chapter I, above.

² This is the underlying fallacy in the current phrase "all peace-loving nations", used in several official pronouncements. See below, p. 178.

interests, which, the Utopians hold, needs only to be widely enough accepted to remove the danger of war.

Yet it would be wrong to neglect the possible services of utopian proposals to a durable peace-settlement. They are the rational expression of an idealistic enthusiasm and a noble devotion which can contribute much to the pre-requisites of permanent peace. They promote and enlist a spirit which is anxious to transcend the impulses of nationalism and to sublimate them into a wider loyalty. Such an outlook and spirit is, as we have seen,¹ one of the psychological conditions most desirable for successful peacemaking. It can be enlisted for peacemaking, and not condemned out of hand.

§ 2. THE SEMI-UTOPIANS

The definition of what is "Utopian" was based upon psychological and sociological criteria.² The assumptions of utopian theorists both about what men can achieve and about what they should try to achieve, are the roots of their utopianism. To distinguish the contemporary proposals here classified as "Semi-Utopian" from both Utopians and Realist proposals, a different type of definition, more fit for concrete application, is required.

Semi-Utopian proposals are here taken to be those proposals which try to keep in tune with existing conditions—political, social, economic and psychological—by setting themselves targets more closely related to the real world. But there is a relativity in realism. To-morrow, these targets might be attainable, in changed circumstances, and therefore the proposals would become realistic. But for the present, under close analysis of the pre-conditions required for their achievement and the actual conditions available, they would seem to be beyond reach. Hence their classification as "semi-utopian."

The most striking example of proposals on this borderline is the writings of Mr. Leonard Woolf. His study of *International Government*, written in 1916 for the Fabian Research Department, was a pioneer work on the problems of building international government and administration. Taking as its motto the bitter couplet of Swift :

Now Europe balanced, neither side prevails,
For nothing's left in either of the scales—

the book was a brilliant examination of the technique of peace-

¹ Introduction, p. 18.

² Above, § 1, p. 149.

making, and of how rational order and the rule of law might replace the disastrous "balance of power" sought by pre-war diplomacy. It was a prophetic book, called utopian at the time, yet making proposals of the very kind which were attempted in 1919. Again in 1940, after the failure of the League and the breakdown of all international government, Mr. Woolf re-stated his thesis in modern terms.¹ He adhered to the basic principles of the League of Nations (or rather of *a* League of Nations), as distinct from the cult of federalism then prevailing, and at the same time he counter-attacked the "Realists" who regarded the conceptions of the League as dead and discredited. Again, with the shift of prevalent opinion away from federalism towards the notion of a "revised League",² Mr. Woolf has had the sad satisfaction of seeing his "utopian" proposals reaching their target a few years later.

Among proposals which may still be classified as semi-utopian in character, are all schemes for federations, whether limited to a number of States alleged to be naturally united by geographical neighbourhood or to States which have certain common cultural and historical traditions. Among the former are proposals for European federation, either continental or regional in scope: among the latter, proposals for Anglo-Saxon union or extension of the British Commonwealth of Nations to other (non-British) States. A brief survey of the main proposals of this kind may reveal their character, and the nature of their possible influence on peacemaking.

In 1923 a movement for Pan-European Union was founded, which won support from M. Herriot while Prime Minister of France, and from Dr. Stresemann.³ By 1929, M. Briand, too, came out with proposals in the League of Nations Assembly for what he called "European Union". "I think that among the peoples constituting geographical groups, like the peoples of Europe, there should be some kind of federal bond. . . . That is the link I want to forge."

And thus the first important proposal for so-called federation

¹ Especially in *The War for Peace* (1940); but also in *Barbarians at the Gate* (1939), § 1.

² Cf. below, Chapters VI and VIII, § 3. Mr. Woolf makes the shrewd criticism of the "realists" that they too often label a proposal "utopian" merely because it has failed: and write as if failure proves that the League was utopian. The distinctions here made between "utopian" and "semi-utopian" proposals have, the authors hope, avoided any such confusion. Cf. *The War for Peace*, pp. 60, 114-83.

³ Count R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi: *Pan-Europa* (1923) and *Europe Must Unite* (1939).

of Europe was M. Briand's Memorandum of 1930 on a "United States of Europe".¹ But the confusion of thought which marked so much of the later discussion of federalism was unhappily fully present in 1930. The proposal was based on primarily geographical arguments. It proposed "a bond of solidarity enabling the nations of Europe to realize at last the geographical unity of Europe, and to bring about, within the framework of the League, one of the regional understandings which the pact has formally recommended". It was also based on arguments of cultural and historical affinities. "There are, in fact, certain questions of special interest to Europe for which, in the interests of peace itself, the European States may feel the need of special, more immediate and more direct action, and with which they are, moreover, specially competent to deal, because of their racial affinities and their common ideals of civilization." Underlying both arguments, was the constant realistic French quest for security: which became apparent in the proposal that the union should be "elastic enough to respect the independence and national sovereignty of each State, while guaranteeing to all the benefits of collective solidarity in the settlement of the political questions of common interest to the States of Europe". Union was not to "affect in any way any of the sovereign rights of the States which are members of such an association", and the whole proposal was kept "on the plane of absolute sovereignty and of entire political independence". It was thus not federalism at all. Even a European customs union was rejected as incompatible with League principles. Of the twenty-six governments which replied to the French Memorandum, only the Dutch pointed out the inconsistency of proposing federalism and the preservation of absolute national sovereignty at the same time. The proposal was, in short, merely a scheme for setting up a regional League within the world League: comparable to the regionalism indicated by the Dumbarton Oaks proposal of October, 1944.²

The two main proposals for a United States of Europe in more recent years come from the Socialists and the Federal Unionists. While one argues on economic and social grounds, the other argues on political and constitutional grounds, in favour of continental union. Both schemes may be classed as "semi-utopian" in the sense that though both, on present show-

¹ Cf. first part of Briand Memorandum in A. B. Keith: *Speeches and Documents* . . . , Vol. I, pp. 198 ff.; R. W. G. Mackay: *Peace Aims and the New Order* (1941), pp. 104 ff.; Sir Arthur Salter: *The United States of Europe* (1933).

² Cf. below, Chapter VIII, § 3.

ing, are beyond the reach of immediate post-war politics, yet neither can be permanently excluded as impossible, given changed circumstances. Mr. Walter Padley, of the British Independent Labour Party, has given one of the best full-dress expositions of the Socialist case for European Federation : ¹ while Mr. R. W. G. Mackay, formerly chairman of the *Federal Union* movement, has made the case on political and constitutional grounds.²

Mr. Padley sees "the essential pre-requisites of any serious attempt to organize Europe on a Socialist basis" as :

(1) The socialization of land, banking, transport, power and the basic industries in each of its component parts.

(2) The establishment of supra-national authority, which, at a minimum, would have to own and control banking, heavy industry, a socialized system of transport and communication, power supply and, so long as necessary, armaments and military forces. Also it would have to establish a firm control of foreign trade.

(3) A central planning commission responsible to the International Authority, not merely to co-ordinate national plans, but thinking and planning in European terms to direct production, distribution and investment in accordance with European resources and needs.³

Here, too, he suggests, lies the answer to the problem of Germany. "If the West wants a peaceful Germany, it must assist in the creation of a Socialist Germany as an integral part of a Socialist United States of Europe."⁴

Mr. Mackay believes that "the first step towards any European Federation would be to secure a common government for Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany", on the grounds that "if they can agree upon a common policy, reconcile their conflicting ambitions, and satisfy the demands of all their peoples, peace should be secured in Europe".⁵ This idea of a sort of Stresa Front as the nucleus of Europe, from which Soviet Russia is excluded, reveals the date of the proposal : 1940-1. It bears no real relation to the trend of world forces in 1944-5.

The ground common to both proposals is optimistic judgement of the degree of agreement and homogeneity which it is

¹ Especially in *The Economic Problem of the Peace* (1944).

² Especially in *Peace Aims and the New Order* (1941)—a revised edition of *Federal Europe* (1940), "outlining the case for European Federation together with a draft constitution of a United States of Europe". The first (1940) phase of Federal Union was transatlantic or universal; the second either continental or merely Anglo-American (1941-2).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

possible to get between the nations of Europe : and the belief that to unify Europe—and other great regions—into separate federal groups will not lead to large-scale friction and even war between these large groups. There appears plausibility in the notion of working up towards larger units, as the basis of world peace. But the spirit and working of these groups will be no better than the spirit of their component members. Nationalism and economic exclusiveness projected on to a larger screen become no more attractive or less dangerous. If the outlook of neighbours, in the past so often filled with bitter hatreds, can become enlightened enough to constitute a real regional federation, it is difficult to see why they should not also be capable of making the less exacting exertion of seeking world federation. If continental federation comes, it is more likely to come as the sub-structure of a world organization already in existence, than as the early step towards such a world organization. But here again, circumstances might change : and a powerful external menace such as united medieval Christendom and helped to cement its unity,¹ might produce a result closely comparable to these regional federal proposals.

A narrower variant of these proposals deserves brief mention : the various proposals for still smaller regional grouping—a western European federation or a central European federation. The two leading proposals of this kind have come from Dr. Ivor Jennings² and Dr. Milan Hodža.³ The stature of both these writers, and of Sir William Beveridge who has made similar proposals,⁴ requires that some attention be paid to the suggestions.

Dr. Jennings drafted a federal constitution to cover, in the first instance, all European States stretching from Finland to Iceland in the north, and from Germany and Switzerland to Ireland in the south, but excluding Poland, Soviet Russia, the Balkans, Italy and Spain. It was to be left open to membership by the Dominions and other European States. Sir William Beveridge visualized a federal grouping of only the western sea-board States, excluding Switzerland, Italy and Spain, but including Germany and the British Dominions. Whilst the political and economic advantages of such grouping are obvious enough, the practicability of getting Germany's neighbours to join in close federal union with her within any short period after the war seems now more remote than when the proposals were first

¹ Cf. above, Chapter IV.

² *A Federation for Western Europe* (1940).

³ *Federation in Central Europe* (1942).

⁴ *Peace by Federation?* (1940).

made. And the objections, no less than the obstacles, to partial regional groupings are identical with the objections to continental regional federations, already suggested.

The practical triumph of western federalism was dramatic but short-lived. In June, 1940, when France was on the verge of military defeat, Mr. Churchill made his famous offer to the French Government: an offer of close federal union between Britain and France.

The constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies. Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every citizen of Great Britain will become a citizen of France. . . . During the war there shall be a single war Cabinet, and all the forces of Britain and France, whether on land, sea or in the air, will be placed under its directions. . . . The two Parliaments will be formally associated.¹

The world gasped at the sweeping idealism of the gesture. It was openly and confessedly made "in the hope of encouraging the French Government to continue their resistance". And it seems never to have been seriously considered by the French Government, which was already in political crisis when the offer was received.² But the fact that a great realistic statesman should consider complete federal union between two western democracies feasible, was itself a victory for federal ideas. The failure of the offer correspondingly produced a slump in the growing popular faith in federalism as a practical solution to the problems of western Europe.

Perhaps a dim and remote shadow of the idea can be traced in the development, in very different circumstances, of monetary and customs agreements between Britain and Belgium, and the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg, in 1943-4. In October, 1943, the last three countries reached a monetary agreement, to which they added, in September, 1944, a customs agreement, lowering tariffs against one another.³ The following month, another monetary agreement was made between the United Kingdom and Belgium, after Belgian liberation.⁴ This fixed the rate of exchange between the Belgian franc and the pound sterling, which was not to be varied without mutual agreement. It brought Belgium and Luxemburg and the Belgian Congo

¹ *The Times*, June 18th, 1940.

² The full text of the offer, and a French journalist's account of the circumstances, may be found in Élie J. Bois: *Truth on the Tragedy of France* (1941), Chapter XXXI.

³ See also below, Chapter VI, p. 190.

⁴ *Cmd.* 6557.

within "the sterling area"—and by implication, the Netherlands which was now linked with Belgium in monetary matters. Such agreements do not, of course, amount to real federalism. But they have frequently been the preliminaries or accompaniment of movements towards closer union: and they are here a sign that the economic future of the western seaboard countries is regarded, at least in these ways, as being a common future.

"Central European Federation" as used by Dr. Hodža is perhaps a misleading phrase. What is really meant is "*Eastern European Federation*", that is, a federation of the smaller eastern European States, which owing to the adjacent position of most prospective member States, might be still more aptly called "*Danubian Federation*".

During a certain phase of the war, proposals for such a federation were very much in the foreground. The idea was equally favoured by the Polish, Czech, Yugoslav and Greek Governments in London, and steps were taken towards establishment of at least a nucleus of an Eastern European Federation. On January 15th, 1942, an agreement between the Greek and Yugoslav Governments concerning the constitution of a Balkan Union was signed in London. According to Chapter 1 of the agreement, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both countries were to form the "Political Organ"; two competent members of each Government the "Economic and Financial Organ"; and the Chiefs of Staff of each Government the "Military Organ", of the "Union". Parallel with these Union Organs was to be a Permanent Bureau with the same tripartite division into political, economic and military sections. The Prime Ministers of the two contracting States were to meet "whenever circumstances require in order to discuss questions of a general order of interest to the Union". "Regular meetings between Parliamentary Delegations of the States of the Union" were to be "facilitated". Chapter 2 of the Agreement described the tasks of the Union in the following way: firstly, to "co-ordinate the foreign policy" of the members. In connection therewith, two special commissions were to be created, one for the establishment of "intellectual co-operation" inside the Union, and the second for the creation of a "reciprocal rapprochement of the public opinion in the States members of the Union". The second—economic—task of the Union was to be co-ordination of the "policies of exterior commerce", elaboration of a "common economic plan for all members of the Union", "amelioration of

communications", "tourist development" and before all the preparation of a "Balkan monetary Union". The third—military—task was to consist of the "adoption of a common plan of defence and of a common type of armament". Chapter 3 envisaged the entry of other Balkan states "ruled by governments freely and legally constituted" into the agreement, and made the Union valid from the date of ratification of the agreement.

On January 23rd, 1942, a similar agreement was signed between the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments in London. The agreement established a "confederation" with not quite the same amount of merged powers as the Greek-Yugoslav agreement had transferred to the "Balkan Union",¹ but still with sufficient pooled authority as to justify the title of "federation". Again the federation was thrown open to "other States of the European area". The coming into force of the agreement, in this case, was not made dependent on ratification: so the final reality is not clear.

The climate under which both agreements had been signed had not yet changed when Dr. Milan Hodža, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia from 1935 until 1938, wrote his book on *Federation in Central Europe*. He advocated the grouping of the eight smaller national States of south-eastern Europe, which had proved too weak to defend their independence in isolation, into one Federation.

The freedom and security of individuals are to be guaranteed by the State. The freedom and security of small nations can only be guaranteed by their federation. . . . So it may be said that a voluntary agreement of putting sovereignties together and of making them a comparatively strong unit, means definitely more to a small nation than the permanent danger of losing its sovereignty with no compensation at all.²

So Hodža wrote, and he added:

Some of their neighbours may be less enthusiastic about their federation schemes. Still, one day, they will have to realize that the small and middle-sized nations of "Central Europe" mean about one hundred million people in the aggregate. It certainly would be a futile undertaking to attempt to extinguish the national life of one hundred million people, or to drive them away from their homes. As for Soviet Russia, one day she may be interested in an independent and strong bloc established between herself and Germany.³

¹ For instance, autonomous national banks of issue and separate currencies were maintained, and only in the event of war was a unified supreme command to be appointed.

² Hodža, *loc. cit.*, p. 171.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

This forecast of Hodža was not to come true. The Soviet Government did not conceive the future of Central Europe in these terms.

Progress was made not on the lines of Hodža's proposals, nor even on the lines of the federal agreements already signed. The Soviet-Czech Treaty, of December 12th, 1943, confirmed different alignments between eastern European Powers. The preceding Moscow and Teheran declarations had made no mention of Central European Federation. And proposals which, under different circumstances, might well have proved realistic, had fallen into the category of "Semi-Utopianism" through their inherent incompatibility with the concrete situation.

All the proposals described above were for regional federation on a primarily geographical basis. Kindred proposals for regionalism are based on the thesis that common cultural and historical traditions make stronger cement than geography: and the unity of the British Commonwealth itself is the best argument in favour of this thesis. Some federal unionists—notably George Catlin,¹ and Clarence K. Streit in his second book²—have argued for union between the United States and Britain (with the British Dominions attached) as the most hopeful basis for world federation. The notion of "Anglo-Saxony", of a union between the English-speaking democracies which have so much in common in political traditions and ideals, had a strong appeal in 1941, after the passing of Lend-Lease and the many signs that the United States was resolved to become "the arsenal of the democracies". It was an idea which grew as America became herself a belligerent, and as Anglo-American co-operation intensified. The idea is aptly expressed in one passage of Catlin's book:

"Men are held together in communities by common civilization, by their common values, perspectives in life, homogeneous assumptions about ways of living and political axioms. . . . Here is the only common basis for intimate and lasting federation, involving common citizenship."³ * The proposal assumed temporary practical importance in the suggestions made by the late Wendell Willkie, in 1941, for just such an arrangement:

(1) An economic and social union of the United States and the British Empire, which in effect will constitute a bond of brotherhood linking the English-speaking peoples of the world.

(2) The abolition of all immigration barriers between coun-

¹ *One Anglo-American Nation* (1941).

² *Union Now with Britain* (1941).

³ Catlin: *op. cit.*, p. 47.

tries comprising the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States, giving to holders of American passports in any part of the British Empire and of British passports in the United States the full value of citizenship.¹

But, paradoxically, it sank into the background as the war widened and Anglo-American pooling of resources increased.

The story of all these semi-utopian proposals and of their temporary effect in practical affairs suggests one or two significant generalizations. Schemes and offers for close union between any two countries, or among regional groups of countries, tend to be put forward in times of acute crisis, when partners in a common enterprise become anxious to hug one another closer in face of a common danger. Such were the circumstances of proposals for eastern, western or general European federation : and for Anglo-French and Anglo-American union. They are the product not of complete unity of purpose but of anxiety for more complete unity. Their importance and influence rest on circumstances. When circumstances change—as after the fall of France, or after the emergence of clear Russian policy in eastern Europe, or after the entry of the United States into full partnership in the war—then the proposals fall into the background. They are likely to revive only if events should re-create a mood and a situation similar to those in which they first appeared.

Of more lasting importance, since it is based on the spectacle of actual working arrangements, is the proposal to extend the British Commonwealth of Nations to include other, non-British, communities. Writers like Mr. Lionel Curtis, deeply impressed by experience of the Union of South Africa, urge the relations between Britain and the Dominions as a model and a moral for wider international relations.² “We British should apply to ourselves what Bacon meant when he wrote : ‘It was not Rome that spread upon the world, but the world which spread upon Rome—and that way greatness lies.’” The proposal is linked with the argument that the British Commonwealth should strengthen its own federal bonds, and plan a common foreign policy and a common system of defence.³ Mr. Walter Lipp-

¹ Quoted : *ibid.*, p. 42.

² The theory dates from the days of Lord Milner's “Round Table” group. Cf. Lionel Curtis : *The Way to Peace* (1944) ; as also *Decision* (1941) ; *Action* (1942) ; *Faith and Works* (1943) ; and *Civitas Dei* (1937).

³ *The Way to Peace*, Chapter II ; Sir Edward Grigg : *The British Commonwealth* (1943) and *British Foreign Policy* (1944).

mann's conception of "the Atlantic Community" has affinities here too:¹ and the realities of the post-war world may yet demand some such organization. Here Semi-Utopian proposals again merge into practical realities: and the future alone will determine whether or not the proposals are relegated to limbo.

Yet another variant of semi-utopian theory may be found in proposals for world union not through primarily political or constitutional means but through the setting up of common economic institutions. The two best examples of this approach—universal in scope but technical and limited in choice of method—are both from the other side of the Atlantic: from Dr. Hans Heymann² and Mr. Otto Tod Mallery.³ Dr. Heymann's proposal is more comprehensive than Mr. Tod Mallery's, in that he visualizes a Bank of Nations for the direction of economic life, a reformed International Labour Organization for tackling social problems, and a Federal World Authority for political union. Mr. Mallery pins more faith on "Economic Union" alone, operating through a World Bank and a World Trade Board. But both seek a much higher integration of world economy and world organization, and both regard economic causes as the roots of modern war. Again, neither can be classed as "Utopian", in view of the Bretton Woods Agreements of July, 1944. And the spread of such ideas, particularly in the United States, has done much to pave the way for the development of the International Bank and Monetary Fund mooted at Bretton Woods. The difficulties and criticisms aroused by the Bretton Woods agreements are themselves a comment on these proposals, and are dealt with below.⁴

§ 3. THE DRIFTERS

There is a sense in which "drifters" should not be included amongst the sponsors of "contemporary proposals". For if proposals are put forward and logical arguments of policy and behaviour are elaborated, then the proposers cannot strictly be called "drifters". But this is the narrowest sense only—the sense of psychological inability to prepare for action, and of conviction that "muddling through" is the best practical way of

¹ *U.S. Foreign Policy* (1943) and its sequel, *U.S. War Aims* (1944).

² Hans Heymann: *Plan for Permanent Peace* (1942).

³ Otto Tod Mallery: *Economic Union and Durable Peace* (1943).

⁴ See below, Chapter VII, and Appendix III, C.

progressing : the sense in which Ethelred the Unready was a "drifter".

There are two more profound ways in which political action and peacemaking can be said to be the result of a "policy of drift". On one hand, there is often persuasive power in the argument of "wait and see" and wisdom in the advice not to cross bridges before they are reached. Sir Robert Walpole believed in "letting sleeping dogs lie", and he has a distinguished ancestry and an equally distinguished succession among English politicians. To take the line of least resistance—to let political opportunities go by default—to believe in "safety first" as a slogan and improvisation as a political method—to deal with events by hand-to-mouth measures and to shun schematic thinking : these familiar habits of many political leaders, in many countries other than England, offer a perplexing mixture of wisdom and folly, prudence and vacillation, statecraft and bankruptcy of leadership, which no student of peacemaking can afford to neglect as an operative factor in national and international affairs.

On the other hand, there is also the danger of drift arising not from a "policy of drift", but from the failure to reconcile conflicting policies. This is a danger which particularly besets peacemaking, and indeed the conduct of all international conferences. There are temptations to reach immediate compromise on grounds of expediency at the sacrifice of consistent principles : to yield on matters of principle before the clamour of pressure-groups outside the conference, as when some national leaders went against their better judgement in 1919 because of popular clamour at home. Above all, if deadlock arises between States, there may develop an unresolved conflict which is shelved or circumvented, but which starts a drift to further friction immediately afterwards. Again the proposal involved is just "to wait and see".

Drifting, in both these important senses, played an intolerably large part in international relations between the two wars. The failure of the makers of the Covenant to force prime responsibility for action on a specific organ of the League, and their agreement to the unanimity rule for all Assembly decisions of importance, encouraged a policy of drift. It became the favourite jibe against the system of "collective security" that it meant only collective irresponsibility, and what was everybody's business became nobody's business. But the same tendency was apparent in

economic affairs. M. Maisky complained, in his closing speech at the World Economic Conference in 1933, "The Conference has been deeply permeated with one fundamental aspiration—adjournment." Mr. Van Zeeland's report of 1938 on economic planning was received in a way which he later described in these words :

I could not but note that when once the first and eminently favourable stage had been passed, the attitude almost everywhere became qualified by a very marked reserve. It seemed that nobody wanted to commit themselves in advance in any direction, before being certain that the path had been taken, or that at any rate it had been mapped out by others.

When great Powers with liberal institutions and democratic backing refused to direct foreign politics, dictators with policies but no principles could plan freely in their own terms of self-aggrandisement and conquest.

Fascist aggressions inspired a philosophy of appeasement which was at bottom a policy of drift. "Where two ideals are in conflict," said Lord Halifax, "that of devotion, unflinching and unpractical, to some high purpose, and that of a practical victory for peace, I cannot doubt that the stronger claim is that for peace." "Hoping for the best"—without always preparing for the worst—was the main characteristic of the confirmed appeasers. Mr. Arthur Bryant became an apostle of appeasement.

The rods and axes by which our ancient laws are administered and our peace preserved, are a walking stick and an umbrella, our Statue of Liberty the Parish Pump. . . . There seems to be something more important for Englishmen to do at this time of the year (August, 1936) than to fuss about politics.—The only champion of peace whose professions are worth anything is the man who is ready to tolerate and try to understand his neighbour even when he is shocked and dismayed by his standards and ways of life. This applies as much to the relationships of nations as of individuals.¹

Similar arguments can be found not only among other English writers, but among the writers of the late 1930's in most other nations apart from Germany, Italy and Japan. It involved a whole attitude of mind, bordering on pacifism, but appealing most to cultivated, gentlemanly folk, averting their eyes from the looming storm and seeking solace in a St. Martin's summer of semi-isolationism.

¹ Cf. Arthur Bryant : *Humanity in Politics* (1937), for these and many similar sentiments.

But this mood has been dispelled, these ways of thought submerged, by the events since 1939. And our chief concern is with the influence of drift on the actual process of peacemaking.

Something has already been said of how far drifting played its part in the last peacemaking, at Paris in 1919.¹ Harold Nicolson later pointed out that "until the very last moment, the plenipotentiaries were unaware whether the peace they were negotiating was to be preliminary or final, imposed or negotiated," and Colonel House noted that "the great fault of the political leaders was their failure to draw up a plan of procedure". Against this background of uncertainty and confusion, peacemaking became a process of bargaining, a higgling of the market between, for example, French demands for water-tight security and Wilsonian demands for universal justice and national self-determination. "Not so much a duel as a general mêlée," Colonel House called it, "in which the representatives of every nation struggled to secure endorsement for their particular methods of ensuring peace."² "A rough and tumble affair," said Balfour. How far will such a process be repeated this time?

There is an element of bargaining and compromise about all international negotiation and conference. Realizing this—and realizing, too, the dynamic power of clearly formulated policy—many people in the belligerent countries began, in 1939 and 1940, to demand a governmental statement of war aims and peace aims. The demand was rejected during the "phoney war" period prior to the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain. It was left to Hitler, in October, 1939, to propose a peace settlement after his conquest of Poland. Official refusals to make official declarations of this kind were probably justified. Any such statement would have appeared both foolish and futile in the light of the disasters of 1940, and of subsequent events. But the popular demand for definition of "what we are fighting for" grew, and swelled into a general debate in 1941. The answer to the demand was the Atlantic Charter.³

The circumstances in which the Atlantic Charter put an end to the first period of "drift" in national policy are in themselves important. The years of appeasement had left behind a legacy of distrust—of fears that the war would only be fought half-heartedly or as a purely "imperialist war". It was argued that total war needs total effort, and that people cannot be inspired to

¹ Above, Chapter II, § 1.

² *Paper of Colonel House* (Seymour), Vol. IV.

³ Appendix I, A.

total sacrifice without a clear picture of what they are fighting for. None could pretend that the pre-war years of mass unemployment and recurrent crisis had been years of bliss : but what "new order" could and should take their place? After Hitler had overrun most of Europe, including France, these nations needed fresh and clear hope held out to them : and at the same time the effectiveness of Wilson's "Fourteen Points" as propaganda to the enemy argued in favour of erecting a sharp antithesis to Hitler's "New Order" of racial domination. Against these arguments, the "drifters" raised a medley of pleas : that the main job was to win the war first ; that any statement or discussion of post-war plans would divide opinion rather than unite it in common war-effort ; that the dangers of war-time commitments which would have to be fulfilled in unknown circumstances outweighed any advantages such commitments might bring.

By August, 1941, the situation was felt by both the British Government and President Roosevelt to be ripe for a general statement of purpose. Italy and Russia were now in the war and the war had become more clearly a struggle between fascist dictatorships (the Berlin-Rome Axis) on one side, and the democratic and socialist States on the other. President Roosevelt had been returned for a third term, and the mechanism of Lend-Lease was creating a new sense of solidarity between the United Kingdom and the United States, although America was not yet at war. The President, in his efforts to make American public opinion fully aware of the Axis menace, had made several historic speeches, in which he had spoken of the "Four Freedoms".¹ Being still officially a neutral, America took more readily to statements of general principles, and none could answer "Let us win the war first". Amid growing anxieties about the intentions of Japan, a joint Anglo-American manifesto might serve to "warn off" Japan in the Pacific.

From the interplay of these various considerations and circumstances, the Atlantic Charter was born.² Its philosophical basis was the President's formulation of the "Four Freedoms" : of which two are implied and two specifically mentioned in the Charter. It was drafted, it would seem, to place equally before the belligerent allies, the occupied countries, and the enemy, an outline sketch of peace aims. It was used not only for this

¹ See page 337 f.

² There is a useful analysis of the Charter in W. Arnold-Foster : *Charters of the Peace* (1944).

purpose, but as a cement between the United Nations, as their number increased. It was signed on August 14th, 1941. Six weeks later the main allied governments announced their general adherence to the Charter. Signed first by one ally and one neutral, it became the common peace aims of all allies, and the core of United Nations unity.

If the Charter, despite all criticisms of inconsistency and vagueness levied against it, has helped to clarify purpose, it was made possible by the increasing clarification of political and international issues, and could hardly have been issued before 1941. If it ended one period of drift, it ushered in a second period of drift, of a different character. New unresolved conflicts became important : particularly the conflict, inside each nation, over the degree of central direction which should be given in future to economic and social life : and the conflict, between nations, over the degree to which international co-operation should involve a surrender of infringement of "national sovereignty". This twofold issue has, as will later be shown,¹ arisen in each of the United Nations Conferences to establish agencies of co-operation for the post-war years : at Atlantic City, Hot Springs, Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks. When the general aims of the Atlantic Charter came to be reduced to concrete and practical arrangements, this double conflict between social policies and between nationalist doctrines assumed immediate and urgent importance. And once again, in the face of unresolved conflicts, a policy of drift appeared. U.N.R.R.A., despite its urgency and short expectation of life, was confined (under business and nationalist pressure) to pure relief and rehabilitation rather than reconstruction, and its operation was made completely dependent on national governmental agreement. The Food and Agriculture Organization, though purely advisory, was long delayed in its creation. The International Fund and Bank proposed by Bretton Woods were hedged in with nationalist provisos, were discussed only at the expert level, and aroused considerable opposition in each country concerned.² At Dumbarton Oaks, the deadlock between the "Big Four" over the question of unanimity rule in the Security Council led to shelving of the issue—in the hope of later agreement or spontaneous solution. Throughout, there has been a clear tendency either to give way to powerful forces of resistance, such as business interest or

¹ Below, Chapter VII.

² E.g. anxieties about the sterling area, as expressed by Mr. Boothby in the House of Commons (*The Times*, October 11th, 1944).

national feeling, or to shelve the difficulty and "wait and see". There may be both prudence and short-range wisdom in taking such a course; but peacemaking will be neither coherent nor scientific if it is based on the line of least resistance, and on piecemeal surrender to the most vocal and active interests exerting pressure on its machinery.

Perhaps one central sign of drift is the recurrent use, in United Nations declarations, of the phrase "all peace-loving nations".¹ This unscientific conception, that certain nations are inherently and consistently peace-loving and others not, has been used as a mask for the real problem of defining what kinds of political and economic and social structure qualify States for international trust, and promote the smoothest international co-operation. When the Dumbarton Oaks proposal made the phrase the formal criterion of membership of "The United Nations", it reached final absurdity. Incapable of definition—permitting exclusion of any State at the will of the General Assembly—deliberately ignoring the whole nexus of forces which in interaction make States at one time more or less willing to put peace high in their priority of values—the phrase merely marks general agreement to shelve the whole problem of what shall be the minimum homogeneity required of partners in an international enterprise.

Of similar significance, perhaps, is the slogan of "unconditional surrender", in explaining the meaning of which so much energy has been spent by national leaders. Adopted as a preventive of any subsequent pretence by enemy countries that they surrendered on promises or understandings, the slogan became peculiarly inappropriate when the armistice terms actually made with Italy, Roumania, Finland and Bulgaria were so full of specific conditions as to be more akin to peace treaties than to normal armistices.² Again the slogan became a device for shelving

¹ The phrase appears in Point 8 of the Atlantic Charter, in the Moscow Declaration and the Dumbarton Oaks draft proposal. It is significant that the Philadelphia Charter (see Appendix II, B) speaks more universally of "all peoples".

² In the Finnish Armistice, published in full on September 20th, 1944, there are not only 23 Articles specifying "conditions" for the cessation of hostilities, but also 8 long Annexes, laying down in great detail the exact meaning, date, boundary-lines, etc., of the various terms: and these terms include redrawing of frontiers, the amount of reparation, and the conditions of disarmament, normally hitherto determined in peace-treaties. The Bulgarian and Roumanian armistices likewise fix indemnities: and the Italian armistice involved so little "unconditional surrender" that prolonged political difficulties were caused by the "recognition" accorded to the King, Marshal Badoglio, and the former fascist-ridden Army. As for the last of the satellites, Hungary, the press was printing, by October 15th, 1944, "reports that Hungary was considering preliminary armistice terms"! The Crimea Declaration of February, 1945, speaks of "unconditional surrender terms": and see Postscript for Mr. Churchill's re-definition of the formula.

difficulties, and obscuring the underlying problems of concerting allied agreement: a mere contrivance for gaining time and enabling the peacemakers to "wait and see". Yet time and any ultimate benefits derived from it have been bought at a cost—the cost of hardening and prolonging "unconditional resistance", whether in isolated garrisons or inside Germany itself.

The fundamental obstacle to all schemes for close union between States is the same in all the above instances: it is fear of each State that it is the smaller or weaker, and will therefore be absorbed too much by its stronger partner. The obstacle to French or American union with the British Commonwealth is that it would appear to mean "becoming a British Dominion". From the other side, so scattered and loosely jointed are the component parts of the British Commonwealth, the obstacle to union with America is British fear of American economic domination of some, at least, of the component parts. In moments of emergency and urgent need, these fears are sufficiently overcome to make union feasible. The emergency once past, the old fears reassert themselves. The pre-requisite for any semi-utopian proposal becoming realistic is to find some fear or some occasion which overwhelms separatist national feelings. Proposals which the crises of war have prompted may again revive in corresponding crises of the post-war years. That is the justification for their brief analysis here.

§ 4. THE REALISTS

Distinct from all the proposals mentioned above—whether Utopian, Semi-Utopian, or Drifters—are the proposals of a large and influential group of writers who have come to be conventionally called "the realists". It is they who have explored the contrasts between Utopianism and Realism, and have developed theories about the method of approach to the study of international relations.

They include theologians, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, V. A. Demant and Alec Vidler, who have laid bare the ultimate theological beliefs underlying much modern thought.¹ "Most moderns," says Niebuhr, "are utopians. Imagining themselves highly sophisticated in their emancipation from religion, they give themselves to the most absurd hopes about the possibilities

¹ Reinhold Niebuhr: *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932); V. A. Demant: *God, Man and Society* (1933); A. Vidler: *God's Judgement on Europe* (1940).

of man's natural history." Vidler suggests that the error of utopian thought is that it assumes that man is by nature good and reasonable and forgets the "intractable datum" of original sin; that it fosters the illusion that the goal of history can be achieved in time; that it holds that man alone, by reason and will, can achieve utopias for himself; that it distorts the whole picture of the universe by omitting God as the ruler of all change.

They include, also, sociologists and political theorists, such as T. E. Hulme, Karl Mannheim, Bertrand Russell and E. H. Carr,¹ who have developed the contrast between Utopianism and Realism, the one appealing to the imagination and relying on conscience and rational persuasion rather than coercion, the other pragmatic and empirical. These writers emphasize the rôle of power motives and material conditions in determining the destiny of man, and examine the behaviour and outlook which men must adopt if they are—even partially—to guide their own destinies. All are acute critics of the liberal assumptions which dominated nineteenth-century thought and the Peace of 1919, and all have been deeply impressed by the failure of idealism to prevent another war. On Mannheim's analysis of Utopianism and Russell's analysis of the power bases of society, E. H. Carr has evolved a detailed analysis of "the twenty years' crisis", and drawn from it lessons for peacemaking this time. All, and particularly Carr, have profoundly influenced war-time thought about peacemaking, and since their theories have substantially carried the day, and have been expounded throughout the pages which follow, little more need be said about them here.² More popular and less subtle writers have applied their principles to many other aspects of recent history, and forceful journalists such as Mr. Walter Lippmann have driven the lessons deep into popular consciousness.³

¹ T. E. Hulme: *Speculations* (1936); Bertrand Russell: *Freedom and Organization* (1934) and *Power: A New Social Analysis* (1938); E. H. Carr: *op. cit.*; Karl Mannheim: *op. cit.*

² See also David Thomson: "Political Thought in Time of War", in *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1943, and D. Routh: "The Twentieth Century Revolution", in *Horizon* (Sept., 1942). For a critique of these realist writers, see Leonard Woolf: *The War for Peace* (1940), and L. Susan Stebbing: *Ideals and Illusions* (1941). Professor Stebbing draws some valuable distinctions, and holds that the "realist-idealist" classification confuses rather than clarifies political thinking. "To have ideals is not the same as to have impracticable ideals, however often it may be the case that our ideals are impracticable."

³ E.g. Leopold Schwarzschild: *The World in Trance* (1943), and James Burnham: *The Machiavellians* (1943): both are super-realists, applying realist theories in a cruder and more extreme fashion than the writers already mentioned. On the war-time influence of Mr. Walter Lippmann—much evolved in the direction of realist

Realist thought, too, has its roots deep in circumstance. It was inevitable that the disillusionment of the 1930's and the spectacle of idealism helpless and frustrated in the face of power accumulated and used with violence and lack of scruple, should produce in the late 1930's and early 1940's a reaction : a swing towards " theories of power ", and study of the hiatus between human intention and human achievement. The failings of the realists are a tendency to cynicism and to under-estimation of religious, ethical and idealistic beliefs as social forces. But chiming so well with conditions and events of the times, their influence has been great.

Perhaps the greatest realists of our times are to be found, however, not among theologians and political theorists, but among national leaders : and the most influential of all realists are Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. The most far-reaching of all contemporary proposals lie not in any of the writings mentioned, but in the constitutions of U.N.R.R.A., the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Bretton Woods proposals and the many other technical organizations which have been created during war. Above all, the realist outlook is embodied in the first draft proposals of Dumbarton Oaks for a new security Organization after the war. These are the work of the leaders mentioned, or of their colleagues : and they must be given fullest attention.¹

But first it is necessary to answer the question, " Who are the Peacemakers ? " It is consonant with the realist approach to consider the peacemakers not merely as a group of individuals meeting in conference, as in 1815 or 1919 : nor even as a group of victorious nations imposing their will on defeated nations and world conditions alike. The real peacemakers will be the dominant forces in the whole nexus of men, peoples, ideas, and organizations which prevail during the formative period after the war ends. To disentangle and explore this nexus is the task of the following chapter.

thought from the Lippmann who wrote *The Good Society* in 1937, see below, Chapter IX, § 3. The approach of David Mitrany is an offshoot of such theories. See also below, Chapter VIII.

¹ See below, Chapter VII—" The Growing Pattern ".

CHAPTER VI

WHO ARE THE PEACEMAKERS?

§ 1. *The changing scene : how historical tendencies and prevailing views change with circumstances : the importance of the concrete situation at the start of peace-making : the peacemakers are governments and their peoples, but all work within given conditions and through existing agencies.*

§ 2. *Governments and their policies : the "Big Four" : the other "United Nations" : neutral States : enemy States : how the policies of these four groups will interact in moulding peace : the importance of (a) disarming the enemy, (b) punishing war-criminals, in United Nations policy : the treatment of Italy and the satellite States : the rôle of German and Japanese post-war governments in peacemaking.*

§ 3. *The peoples and their organizations : how public opinion influences peace-making : (a) Political parties : (b) churches and religious associations : (c) employers' associations and business groups : (d) workers' organizations : (e) other propagandist and pressure-groups.*

§ 4. *The material and psychological conditions of peacemaking : conditions in (a) occupied countries, (b) neutrals, (c) the unoccupied allies : how these differences will influence national policies in peacemaking.*

§ 5. *The organization of the United Nations : (a) bi-lateral treaties and agreements : (b) general statements of policy : (c) the machinery of war-waging : military and economic : (d) machinery for relief and reconstruction—U.N.R.R.A., the plans of Hot Springs and Bretton Woods. The rôle of these organizations as "peacemakers".*

§ 1. THE CHANGING SCENE

We have so far examined two of the main roots of the next peace-settlement : the lessons of historical experience (discussed in Chapter IV) and the main varieties of contemporary proposals (discussed in Chapter V). These two factors, since they provide the most general terms of reference within which peacemakers must work, may be called "the framework of peacemaking". But these long-range tendencies and aspirations must, as already suggested,¹ pass through the sieve of immediate, concrete conditions before they decisively influence the new pattern of peace-making. What appear to be logical historical tendencies may be twisted, diverted or transformed by immediate necessities ; and the loftiest aspirations or the most concrete blue-prints may be frustrated by the hard facts of a new and unforeseen situation. In a real sense, there can be no certainty until after the event.

Moreover, all who kept abreast of current argument during the war-years must have been conscious of a subtle but steady change in prevalent and effective opinion as to the general nature

¹ Introduction, p. 9.

of the coming peace-settlement. Throughout the first three years, arguments for federalism were widely canvassed. It was contended that the logic of history was that just as 1815 ended in a "concert of Europe" and a system of alliances, and 1918 had ended in a more permanent and regularized League of Nations, so now the logical step was closer federation, at least among the "democratic" or "peace-loving" nations. Federal Union was vocally active, revulsion against the League of Nations and all its works was strong, and many argued that only a frontal attack on the principles of national sovereignty could save the world.

But during 1943 and 1944, opinion veered away from federalism and swung round towards a more favourable view of the revival of a League of Nations. This happened partly under very powerful official guidance and leadership. On March 21st, 1943, Mr. Churchill in a broadcast talk paid warm tribute to "all the immense work which was accomplished by the creation of the League of Nations", expressed the hope that it would not be lightly cast aside, and pleaded for the attempt "to make the Council of Europe, or whatever it may be called, into a really effective League . . . with armed forces, national or international or both, held ready to enforce decisions, and prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars". The declaration issued in the name of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China after the Moscow Conference of October, 1943, looked forward to "a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving nations, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security". This could only mean, in principle, a new or revised League of Nations. Mr. Cordell Hull underlined this fact in his report on the Moscow Conference to Congress on November 18th, 1943, emphasizing that "the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, irrespective of size and strength, as partners in a future system of general security will be the foundation stone upon which the future international organization will be constructed". He added that "the adoption of this principle was particularly welcome to us". Almost at the same time the influential American "Commission to Study the Organization of Peace" under Dr. James T. Shotwell issued its report, recommending that "the international organization should build upon the foundations already laid in the League of Nations and its allied institutions making use of whatever may be found serviceable in their

experience and organization".¹ General Smuts, in his address "Thoughts on the New World" of November 25th, 1943, reiterated his faith in the League of Nations. He suggested that apart from paying insufficient attention to leadership and power amongst nations, and to economic conditions, "there was nothing much amiss with the League of Nations in other respects". In short, criticism of the League as it existed between the two wars shifted from one of principle to one of detail. The effective prospects for survival or revival of the League amongst contemporary proposals correspondingly increased.²

It is clear from this that the ever-changing situation, even during war, fundamentally affects and even determines the general principles which are in the ascendant at any one time. It does so by a process of selection from amongst the prevalent contemporary proposals: and it does so under the inspiration of national policies. Though it is impossible to prove from published statements, it is a more than probable guess that insistence on the principle of national sovereignty and equality came from the side of the two leading "Anglo-Saxon" nations, with their traditions of self-determination and their concern for a certain balance of power in Europe. Their own national security is not directly threatened by the danger of small neighbours becoming the puppets of a powerful aggressor, as Soviet security in Europe has been threatened in the past. And it is noteworthy that the Moscow declaration was considerably offset by the Teheran declaration a month later, which spoke more clearly in terms of the leadership of the "Big Four" and not at all of national sovereignty. "We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and upon all the United Nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world. . . . We will welcome them as they may choose to come into the world family of democratic nations."

The elements in the concrete international situation which exists at the time of the settlement will thus be decisive factors in the making of the settlement. The contemporary will not be merely temporary. It is impossible to predict in detail what will be the relative importance of each factor, but three main kinds of factor can be discerned. There will be first—and on short range the most important of all—the attitudes of the various

¹ *International Conciliation*, No. 396, for January, 1944, p. 28.

² See also below, Chapter VIII, p. 308 f.

governments and their representatives taking part in making the settlement. The settlement will be the result of an interplay of national governmental policies, amongst which the most powerful of the victorious Powers will obviously play the largest part. But behind these policies, will be the attitude of the peoples of the world, as expressed through their various organizations other than the State. Since most of the leading States will be in some measure democratic or responsive to public opinion at home, governmental policies will be trimmed to accommodate such opinions : and through the various functional organizations—such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (U.N.R.R.A.) and the International Labour Office (I.L.O.) already in existence—public opinion will have some chance of direct expression. In the moulding of such opinion the attitudes of political parties, of churches, of labour organizations such as trade unions, of economic vested interests and other pressure-groups will have a large share. This whole tangled nexus of forces will, in short, be “ the peacemakers ”, and not merely the group of individuals who come together to sign any necessary armistices or treaties.

There will be, secondly, certain general forces or tendencies, temporary in character but potent in effect, which overshadow both governmental policies and national opinions. Neither policies nor opinions will be atomized and separate, but common to whole groups of them will be the pressure of immediate material and psychological conditions resulting from the war and from the cessation of hostilities. Some of these have already been considered (Chapters I and II above). War-time experiences and immediate necessities will loom large in the minds both of governments and peoples, and will inevitably colour the whole character of the settlement which they make. These, in short, are the somewhat intractable material out of which the peacemakers must somehow fashion peace.

There will be, thirdly, certain preliminaries and preparations for the settlement already existing, and which, by being carried forward into the settlement, will help to cast it in a certain mould. Some of these will be the by-products of war—such as the Mutual Aid arrangements between the United Nations and the piecemeal pledges to restore the independence and integrity of overrun peoples. Some will be consciously and deliberately planned as parts of the eventual settlement—such as the organization of U.N.R.R.A. and the European and Far Eastern Advisory

Councils created by the Moscow Conference. All such previous commitments and institutions will, in short, be the straw which the peacemakers must mix with the clay of immediate conditions, in order to fashion the bricks for the building of peace. Each of these three elements in the situation during peacemaking must now be separately considered.

§ 2. GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR POLICIES

At the time of peacemaking there will be four wide groups of governments concerned: the "Big Four" amongst the United Nations; the rest of the United Nations, many of whose governments have spent most of the war in exile from their countries, or which—like the French Provisional Government—have been constituted during war;¹ governments of States which have remained neutral throughout the war; and the acting governments of defeated enemy States. But these groups will not be in every case sharply defined. The "Big Four" have acted in close contact with all their allies through general "United Nations" organizations, and all are intricately inter-connected through the operation of Lend-Lease. Eire, though a neutral, is technically a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations; Argentina is associated with the United States through Pan-American organizations; and Turkey has treaty-engagements with Britain. Likewise Italy, though ranking amongst defeated enemy States, has since October, 1943, established her status as a "Co-belligerent", and her government is technically at war with Germany; Bulgaria, like Japan, was, until September, 1944, at war with the United States and Great Britain but not with Russia.

Yet, despite these many blurrings of the borderlines, the participants in peacemaking fall ultimately into these four groups. What will be the outstanding features of the relations between these groups, when they approach the tasks of drafting a durable settlement?

¹ The complex development of the French Provisional Government is an example of how incalculable and fluctuating are national politics in modern "total" war. The Free French movement, founded in June, 1940, became the French National Committee in September, 1941: this merged with the organization of General Giraud in North Africa to form the French Committee of National Liberation in June, 1943. After Giraud and his followers were ousted, the Committee was proclaimed the "Provisional Government of the French Republic" in June, 1944, its members becoming "Ministers" when this government was moved from Algiers to Paris after the liberation of the capital. It was given *de facto* recognition by Britain and the United States after prolonged hesitation in August, 1944.

Most important of all in determining the settlement, by every available basis of calculation, will be the "Big Four"—the United States, the British Commonwealth, Soviet Russia and China. As the war proceeded, these four Powers more and more took the lead and concerted their action, for only they could muster the necessary "belligerent power" to overcome Germany. In this they conformed to the normal historical pattern of the greatest European and world wars (already described in Chapters I and V above). Britain and the United States joined in drafting the Atlantic Charter even before America was at war, and their co-operation was sealed by a long series of measures ranging from the Lend-Lease Bill of February, 1941 and the Mutual Aid Agreement a year later, to the Moscow, Cairo and Teheran joint declarations of 1943. The working battle-fellowship of Britain and Soviet Russia, founded by Hitler's aggression of June, 1941, and by Mr. Churchill's immediate pledge of support, was consummated in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May, 1942, and the Moscow and Teheran conferences. The solidarity of these four amongst themselves and between themselves and their smaller allies was affirmed by the United Nations Pact, signed in Washington on January 1st, 1942, and by the Cairo Conferences of 1943.¹ Lend-Lease facilities came to operate amongst them, in every case working all ways on. The necessities of concerted strategy and economic planning, no less than political unity and solidarity against a common enemy, converted co-operation from a convenience into a habit.

There is no question, then, but that the peace-settlement will be primarily prepared and made by a concert of this "Big Four", and that the overwhelming preponderance of economic and military power which this concert can command will enable them, so long as they choose and agree to make their power effective, to impose their agreed pattern on the world. Nor will the record of rapid disintegration which has historically befallen such war-time coalitions necessarily be repeated. Prolonged concerting and gearing of their economic life in total war has integrated this "Big Four" more firmly and intimately than any of their predecessors. The meaning and devastation of war has been brought home more forcibly than ever to their populations,

¹ For more detailed discussion of these arrangements and commitments, see below, § 5, and for texts, see Appendix I. As the war neared its end, the tendency appeared to be to think in terms rather of the "Big Three", with China and France ranking as a sort of second stratum—cf. Mr. Churchill's reference (May 24th, 1944) to France deserving "the fourth place in the Grand Alliance".

and resolve to make peace durable has been correspondingly stiffened.

The wide diversity of character amongst them is, however, a warning against overmuch optimism. The British Commonwealth, richest in population with its 500 millions, and in economic resources with its vast agricultural and industrial capacities, is yet weakest strategically. The heart of it, the United Kingdom, is on the doorstep of Europe, and its component parts are scattered over all oceans and continents, depending for defence and communications on British sea and air power. China, next greatest in man-power with her 420 millions, is a compact land-mass with strong natural defensive frontiers, but economically ill-developed and split by the division between communist and non-communist provinces and parties. The U.S.A., rich in men and materials, compact and remote from attack, is dependent for her high standard of living on an ever-expanding export trade and the demands of world markets. She is beset with profound internal social and economic cleavages, and a gulf between rich and poor which will require far-reaching measures of social reform to narrow it. The U.S.S.R., with a population 25 millions greater than the United States and a planned economy more resilient to war's upheavals than any of her partners, looks with more confidence to the future than any of them. With immense undeveloped resources, a rapidly growing population, and the enormous international prestige won by her astounding achievements against Nazism, her greatest desire is for a durable peace settlement which will leave her free to achieve this future. If her geographical position leaves her more vulnerable than America, her military might more than compensates. Estimates made for the League of Nations and the Office of Population Study in Princeton predict that by 1970 she will have a militarily effective population (males between 20 and 40) more than double that of the U.S.A.

Moreover, none of these leading Powers is entirely or even mainly a European Power. China and the United States lie entirely outside Europe, whilst Russia and Britain are only semi-European, and have wide territories and interests elsewhere. There is a constant risk that any settlement made by these Four may be a non-European peace. The European continent has deep-rooted and fervently held national traditions and culture which, though partially shared, do not predominate elsewhere. Neglect or under-estimation of these traditions would invalidate any settlement in Europe. The passion for national independ-

ence, integrity and cohesion will not have been abated by the experience of invasion, occupation and prolonged exploitation by the Germans: nor by Nazi tactics of sowing dissension between subject peoples, such as the Croats and the Slovaks, the Danes and Norwegians, on the principle of "divide and rule". As far as international organization is concerned, anxieties may have been largely allayed by the various pronouncements already cited above.¹ But concern may still be felt for the form of the territorial settlement and the fixing of frontiers, despite the general assurances given in the Atlantic Charter and elsewhere.

To these differences of character and geography are added differences of ideology and political structure: though differences of ideology have seldom obstructed active co-operation where this was really desired. The abolition of the Comintern in Russia and the steady growth of national spirit in that country: recognition in Britain and the United States that co-operation with Soviet Russia in peace would be the basis of peacemaking as it had already been of victory: diminishing distrust in Russia of the capitalist democracies: all have combined to rank considerations of security and international organization higher than differences of régime or ideology. Mr. Churchill even ventured the view, on August 2nd, 1944, that "as the war enters its final phase it is becoming, and will become, increasingly less ideological", and "more and more the means by which high ideals and solid benefits may be achieved by the broad masses of the people in many lands and ultimately in all".² Nevertheless, Soviet Russia remains in structure a single-party State, while Britain and her Dominions remain parliamentary democracies and the United States a presidential democracy. China, fundamentally different from all in political structure, is unlikely to clash in ideology with Britain or America: but is divided on the ideology of communism.

These difficulties of understanding and sensitiveness, especially between the "Big Four" and smaller European States, are increased by the fact that of the three Powers most concerned with Europe, only one—the U.S.S.R.—has known in her own flesh the thorns of occupation which have tortured the nations of Europe for five years or more. The mentality of peoples who have known occupation, persecution, and the risks of resistance will determine their judgement and acceptance of the settlement: and to appreciate this mentality requires a supreme effort of

¹ § 1.

² *The Times*, August 3rd, 1944.

imaginative sympathy on the part of the more fortunate citizens of the United States and the British Commonwealth. These factors are discussed elsewhere : ¹ so suffice to note their relevance here, as a conditioning factor in the relations between the first two groups of the peacemakers, and in particular as regards treatment of the enemy.

The position of the rest of the United Nations, apart from the "Big Four", will be even more complex and variegated. Some will have specific treaties with one or other of the Big Four. On December 12th, 1943, the Czechoslovak government signed a treaty with the U.S.S.R. Like the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, this pledged the two countries to full co-operation against Germany during war and in the event of any future German aggression ; to all possible mutual economic assistance after the war ; and to the perpetuation of these arrangements for at least twenty years.² Some will have treaties with one another. On January 23rd, 1942, there was signed in London an agreement for a Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation, also—like the Czech-Soviet Treaty—left open for the future adhesion of other interested States. A week before, the Greek and Yugoslav governments likewise signed an agreement, never ratified, for the constitution of a "Balkan Union."³ All the United Nations will have signed the United Nations Pact of January 1st, 1942, whereby they accepted the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter : and all will be active partners in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and other similar organizations. Indeed, the years 1942 and 1944 saw the weaving of a whole network of agreements designed to carry forward the co-operativeness of war-time far into the years of peacemaking. And the peacemakers have already committed themselves to certain measures and partnerships which are themselves of the very substance of peacemaking.⁴

¹ Below, § 3. See also M. Straight : *Make this the Last War* (1943) ; A. J. Peaslee : *Make the United Nations Permanent* (1942) ; and H. Callender : *A Preface to Peace* (1944).

² See the official documents published by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs : Dr. H. Ripka : *The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty* (1943), and Dr. E. Benes : *Czechoslovak Policy for Victory and Peace* (1944).

³ Approaches by the Soviet Government in 1942 and by the Yugoslav Government in October, 1943, for the signing of a Soviet-Yugoslav agreement similar to the Soviet-Czech, proved abortive. Cf. above, Chapter V, § 2.

⁴ See below, § 3, and Chapter VII. In September, 1944, the governments of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed a customs agreement for the period of reconstruction, but also in the hope of its further development. This, added to their monetary agreement of October, 1943, is one sign of possible developments in western Europe, as suggested above, pp. 167-8.

But the governments of all the occupied countries of Europe are in a certain predicament. They are exiles, and most of them have found difficulty in keeping in close touch with their peoples. They have offered guidance and inspiration through the radio and the underground press ; they have mostly tried to keep close links with the promoters of organized resistance to the Germans inside their territories ; and many of them have undoubtedly kept and even enhanced their authority in the eyes of the nations for whom they act as emergency trustees. Yet, professing loyalty to democratic principles and the rights of popular national sovereignty, they can only commit themselves for the future, subject to later ratification of such measures by the peoples themselves. The exiled governments cannot, in the nature of things, be sure that they will retain power during the peace-making : and they have been forced to grope and to work partly in the dark. They, too, are separated by the human gulf which personal experience of day-to-day occupation creates. In Yugoslavia and Greece, the strains of war, of old social tensions and of German disruptive tactics, resulted in this issue raising its head long before peace. How much more likely is it to arise during the painful process of settlement, when the pressure of enemy persecution is removed ?

That the submerged people have their own views on post-war planning is already plain. While their chief preoccupations have been with immediate needs—food, livelihood and resistance to the Axis—they have been spurred by hope of a better future, and these hopes have grown and become more articulate with the advance of the liberating armies. There are many points of difference not only between, but inside, the respective countries : but there are significant points of agreement. A strong sense of national feeling characterizes most of the resistance movements.¹ East of Germany, peasant-communist coalitions have challenged the bases of pre-war social and political alignments. West of Germany, in Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, underground spokesmen have planned, for the most part, to proceed within their long-established constitutional framework—in France, with some modifications. Everywhere hatred of the

¹ E.g. *Le Franc-tireur* (March 20th, 1943) : " We proclaim that France will be remade only by the French. We do not need to borrow any ideology from foreigners. We need only to seek in our own traditions and in our own strength for the reasons and means of our reconstruction." And " Walka ", *The Fight*, May 12th, 1943 : " Poland is a rightful heir to the old Slavic tribes on the Baltic, not only because of her numerical and territorial superiority, but also because the old Slavic tribes and nations once settled on the Baltic were akin to us racially and historically."

oppressor and experience of treachery have forced life back to a more intense level and hardened the desire for radical change.¹

These emergent political movements, born of the ordeal of resistance underground, have some affinities with the liberal movements that swept across Europe between 1815 and 1848, after an earlier experiment in peacemaking. They involve some division inside each nation, though they will doubtless win complete triumph over all "collaborationist" sections after liberation. They have, since the liberation of western Europe, won a place in the reconstruction governments of their countries. But they are often divided among themselves, and bring an element of uncertainty into the political life of post-war Europe.

Paradoxically, the State which was more completely splintered and obliterated than most others—the French Republic—has given a lead in these developments, as she did after 1815. The French Committee of National Liberation, having to reconstitute political authority from scratch with small pretence at legal continuity or constitutional legitimacy, had perforce to base its authority directly on the support of the organized resistance movements. While still in Algiers, it included representatives of the National Council of Resistance. It included—after March, 1944—two spokesmen of the Communist Party which had never before in French history wielded governmental power. It set up the Consultative Assembly in Algiers, with a majority of resistance delegates, and after its first meeting in November, 1943, this Assembly steadily increased both its authority and its powers of control over the Provisional Government. It proceeded to devise and elaborate detailed plans of "the Fourth Republic". When, in September, 1944, the Provisional Government moved to Paris, the whole balance of it had to be changed to include members of resistance movements who had never left France—among them M. Georges Bidault, President of the National Council of Resistance.

On no issue are all French parties and movements more perfectly in agreement than on the full participation of France among the peacemakers. Despite the chronic fluidity of French politics even after liberation, it is clear that France, with her vast liberated overseas empire and her strategic position in Europe *vis-à-vis* Germany, can claim a leading place among the Powers

¹ See "Post-War Programmes of Europe's Underground", by Winifred Hadsel, in *Foreign Policy Association* (Vol. XIX, No. 17, Nov., 1943).

which determine the peace settlement, both in its initial design and in its subsequent working.

Neutral States, too, should certainly have a special place among the peacemakers. But their chief function in peacemaking needs some consideration. They are unlikely to play any decisive rôle in the framing of the territorial settlement, partly because they are relatively few and relatively small in this war, and partly because they will be inevitably overshadowed by the "Big Four". Nor will the benefits of their participation lie in their alleged cool-headed impartiality amidst the fevers of war. Except possibly as regards the wise treatment of the enemy, there is no reason to suppose the governments of neutral countries more impartial or less self-interested than those of belligerents. It has clearly been as much a matter of the chances of war as of deliberate policy whether or not the smaller States of the world have been able to remain neutral throughout the war. Some—such as Turkey and Sweden—have come within an ace of German attack, such as was suffered by equally fervent neutrals like Belgium and Denmark. There is less of choice than of geographical and political luck in successful neutrality. And apart from governmental policies, few neutrals have concealed their inherent sympathies for one side or the other in the world struggle that has raged around their borders.

The need for neutrals' participation is twofold. It is a matter of justice and it is a matter of wisdom. It is a matter of barest justice, because neutrals have suffered as much as many belligerents in the war. Their economic and social life has been profoundly shaken by the dislocation of world trade. Their normal supplies of foodstuffs, fuel or essential materials have been cut off and many of their markets closed. Because of the skill and persistence of Nazi agents, most of them were subjected to severe allied pressure in the later stages of the war : Sweden because of her exchanging iron-ore for coal with Germany ; Turkey because of her shipment of chrome and Spain and Portugal because of their shipment of wolfram to Germany ; Spain, Eire and Argentina because of espionage carried out by the enemy on their territory. Moreover many—notably Sweden and Switzerland—have rendered invaluable human services to the Red Cross organizations, refugees and prisoners of war of all belligerents. The mere neutrality of Turkey and Sweden during critical periods of the war was itself of economic and strategic advantage to the United Nations. Portugal's agreement to lease the Azores to

Britain strengthened the Atlantic defence-system at a crucial stage. The neutrals have more than established the moral claim that their views and interests should not be neglected in the making of the peace.

But it is also a matter of wisdom. The tasks of reconstruction and settlement are so vast that no available human energy or talents can be spared. We cannot afford not to have them in the organizations of reconstruction, any more than they can afford to be absent. Their interests in a better and more orderly world are as much at stake as those of the belligerents. Peacemaking is global, and neutrals' interests will be neglected (or will be felt to be neglected) if their representatives are absent. Their shipping and other commercial services can do valuable work in the vast undertakings of reconstruction, as can their technicians and administrative and medical experts. Because of their war-time welfare work they are peculiarly well equipped for the tasks of convalescence and relief in Europe. Their readiness to take part is hardly in doubt. The first obvious step is to include them at the earliest possible moment in U.N.R.R.A.—they are already participants in the I.L.O. Though excluded from U.N.R.R.A. during war because of its limitation to the “United Nations” which is a belligerent alliance, they should be admitted as soon as they feel entitled to come in. Under the terms of the agreement signed on November 9, 1943, by the 44 nations constituting U.N.R.R.A., the Council of the Administration can admit any new members as they apply. Neutral countries, with their chief exports frozen at home and their chief imports cut off, both need and can give the supplies and relief handled by the Administration. They can bring very concrete contributions and services, for the advantage of all nations concerned and therefore for the advantage of peacemaking.

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When we approach the question of the position and possible policies of enemy States and their governments in the making of peace, we venture deeper into the unknown and the speculative. Such States fall into four main categories: Italy, since 1943 a “co-belligerent” of the United Nations; the smaller German satellite States, including Finland, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, all of whom similarly became “co-belligerents” before the final defeat of Germany; Germany herself; and Japan. Our chief concern is with such general factors as will almost certainly

govern the position of all of them in the period of initial settlement and peacemaking.

First, all will have submitted to an armistice on terms of "unconditional surrender". The United Nations are committed to continue the war together until such surrender is attained.¹ This means that the position of enemy States before the conclusion of final peace with them will be dictated by the victorious Powers. The terms imposed will undoubtedly include the disbandment and surrender of all armed forces capable of resisting allied control, and the allied supervision of internal administration. Whatever form of provisional government may appear during collapse will therefore be compelled to enforce a policy laid down by the United Nations.

Secondly, these governments will be confronted with conditions of exhaustion, disorder, economic dislocation and distress at home. In so far as the facilities of U.N.R.R.A. or other more voluntary relief-organizations are extended to enemy countries after hostilities cease, the governments will perforce have to co-operate closely with these organizations in their own territories. As these will work under the direction of Allied Military Governments in enemy territories, the questions of compliance and relief will be not unconnected, even if they be kept formally separate. In the last resort, the price of help will be general compliance.

Thirdly, these provisional governments will be composed at least partly of men who have been in opposition to the defeated régime. As all the old régimes have been fascist or semi-fascist in character, their successors will be democratic, socialist or communist, in some cases perhaps in conjunction with militarist elements of the "Badoglio" brand: though as all opposition in Germany and Japan has been so ruthlessly crushed, these alternative forces may be long and halting in making their appearance and in finding some solidarity. The avowed policy of these governments will necessarily be one of "fulfilment" of the armistice terms. It will equally inevitably be to get the best conditions possible for the reconstruction of their countries. The future of the political forces they represent will depend partly on their speed and success in fulfilling the armistice-terms, partly on the political status and economic conditions they are able to gain for their nations in the settlement. Many reputations will be for ever made or lost in the crucial years between armistice

¹ Cf. the declarations of the Moscow and Cairo Conferences.

and peace. The future will be alive and kicking within the womb of the present : and all wise men will bate their breath.

Unconditional surrender does not necessarily involve a dictated peace. A dictated armistice need not lead to an imposed peace : it may even be the preliminary to a peace that can be all the more freely negotiated because the victors' minimum conditions have been already ensured. Internal revolutions may completely change the political scene meanwhile, and many argue that the interval between armistice and definitive peace should be long.¹

Whatever may be decided about such things—and it should be deliberately decided and planned, and not allowed to develop by mere drift or default as in 1918—certain of the conditions of peace have already been laid down and it must be presumed that they will be exacted. The first of these is the continued disarmament into the peace years of the States who have been chiefly responsible for aggression. Point 8 of the Atlantic Charter specifies this condition, and the demand for security from all their neighbours will have this condition as its first and minimum requirement. This condition will entail considerable foreign intervention in the control of the foreign trade and heavy industries of enemy countries : it will entail keeping commissions of control or supervision long after the first era of provisional government, regardless of what form of régime may emerge : and it will therefore entail close international co-operation amongst the United Nations for this purpose alone. Dissensions and withdrawals will bring insecurity and the collapse of the very basis of the peace settlement. The second condition of peace already laid down—which will also be insisted upon in the armistice demands—will be the punishment of war criminals. On January 13th, 1942, the representatives of nine occupied countries² signed at St. James's Palace an inter-allied declaration on punishment for war crimes. They avowed "among their principal war aims the punishment, through the channels of organized justice, of those guilty or responsible for these crimes, whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them or participated in them" : and their "resolve to see to it in a spirit of international solidarity that (a) those guilty or responsible, whatever their nationality, are

¹ See above, Chapters II, III and IV.

² The nine governments concerned were the Belgian, Czechoslovak, the Free French National Committee, the Greek, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish and Yugoslav. Cf. Document published by the Inter-Allied Information Committee in July, 1942, on *Punishment for War Crimes*.

sought out, handed over to justice and judged, (b) that the sentences pronounced are carried out."

This policy has been at every stage endorsed and approved by the "Big Four". On October 25th, 1941, President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill issued simultaneous statements, deploring the Nazi methods of shooting innocent hostages. Mr. Churchill then declared that "Retribution for these crimes must henceforward take its place among the major purposes of the war". Chinese representatives who attended the signing of the inter-allied declaration in January, 1942, recorded the Chinese government's approval of its principles, and "its intention to apply the same principles to the Japanese occupying authorities in China when the time comes". In November, 1941, and again in January and April, 1942, M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, issued three notes to all allied governments, listing German atrocities against Soviet soldiers and civilians. The third note asserted that "Hitler's government and its accomplices will not escape severe responsibility and deserved punishment for all their unparalleled crimes perpetrated against the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and against all freedom-loving peoples".¹

All these pledges were re-affirmed and finally endorsed at the Moscow Conference in October, 1943, after which Britain, U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. issued a joint statement on atrocities. They spoke "in the interests of the thirty-three United Nations", and defined their joint policy in these terms :

At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries. . . .

They added an impressive warning—for the immediate purpose of the declaration was to deter German atrocities in the interests of their helpless victims.

Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly

¹ Cf. the two white-papers issued on behalf of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in London in 1942, known as "The Molotov Notes on German Atrocities" and "The Third Molotov Note on German Atrocities".

the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals whose offences have no particular geographical localisation and who will be punished by joint decision of the governments of the Allies.¹

The Soviet Government, in December, 1943, opened trials at Karkhov of three German military officers who were convicted of atrocities before the German retreat.

In view of these repeated pledges, and the methods of trial indicated in the Moscow declaration, punishment of war crimes will undoubtedly loom large amongst the factors governing the relations between the United Nations and enemy countries. It will also affect relations between the United Nations, by giving them another common aim demanding concerted action after hostilities cease: and relations between them and neutral States—to which many of the accused criminals will no doubt try to flee and seek refuge. It is a factor absent in 1918, except for the solitary case of the Kaiser himself, and the rather different war-guilt trials which were eventually held at Leipzig by the German Government.²

Beyond these two main issues of compulsory disarmament and punishment of war crimes, certain general principles for the more long-range treatment of the vanquished have been laid down. But they are too general and qualified to serve as concrete indications of actual policy. The fourth point of the Atlantic Charter states that the United Nations “will *endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations*, to further enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are *needed* for their economic prosperity”. That such access will be allowed only on terms made by the United Nations and not by the possession of colonies is suggested by the undertaking given at the Cairo Conference of November, 1943, to strip Japan of all her possessions overseas.³

The conduct and content of the armistice made with Italy in September, 1943, can hardly be taken as a pattern likely to be followed in dealing with Germany and Japan. It was made in

¹ For full text, see Appendix I.

² See above, Chapter III, § 5. By October, 1944, Argentina, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey had all given assurances that they would not give refuge to war criminals.

³ See above, Chapter III, § 7.

peculiar conditions, with the war going on and with every prospect of its going on for a long time to come. The prime consideration was, therefore, military expediency and necessity. Since it will certainly condition the position and policy of the provisional government of Italy during the peacemaking, it is worthy of some attention.

The sequence of events is important. On July 25th, 1943, the dictatorship of Mussolini was overthrown by the action of the Fascist Grand Council itself. The Duce was deposed because of the spectre of popular revolt raised by disasters in war. He was not deposed directly by the United Nations, but by the Court, the military hierarchy, and conservative forces in industry and church which most feared popular revolt and a relapse into anarchy. The first stage of the Italian revolution of 1943 was like the first stage of the Fascist revolution of 1922—a revolt from above, a palace revolution, intended to forestall more widespread rebellion. The Fascist Grand Council had not met since December, 1939—before Italy entered the war. It now met and proposed that the King should take supreme control of all armed forces: and Mussolini was simply dismissed and put under arrest. A military dictatorship under Marshal Badoglio took the place of the Fascist régime. The war went on.

But the still forbidden movements of resistance began to show their heads. They demanded further change and immediate peace. They were chiefly the centre "Party of Action", the Parties of Christian Democracy and of Liberal Reconstruction, of Socialism and Communism. There were popular demonstrations in Milan, Turin, Rome, and most other big towns. Marshal Badoglio proclaimed martial law and took other severe steps "to prevent disorders". The cadres and personnel of Fascist administration remained unchanged, and the first outburst of free speech and free press was damped down. All political parties—not only the Fascist—were forbidden for the duration of the war. General Eisenhower offered an honourable peace to the Italian people, and feelers for an armistice were put out through Madrid and Lisbon. But Germany sent more troops into northern Italy. And the war went on.

Factory Councils were set up by the workers in most factories, and there were epidemics of strikes. The government decided to come to terms with the workers, restored the eight-hour day and released numbers of political prisoners. But the issue of peace or war could no longer be postponed—despite certain

popular rallying to the Badoglio government in face of the Allies' "unconditional surrender" terms. At the end of August Badoglio agreed to all the proposed terms. He signed the armistice on September 3rd, though it was not made known until September 8th. That the delay had allowed the Germans to strengthen their grip on northern Italy and so frustrate the hope that Italy might be saved from becoming a further battlefield was shown both by immediate German reaction to allied landings, and by the toughness of the subsequent fighting in Italy. On October 13th, 1943, Marshal Badoglio declared war against Germany, and the next day Italy was accepted as a "co-belligerent" of the United Nations during the war. Still the war went on: and that is the crucial fact in the whole position of Italy amongst other nations. She has had to "work her passage home" in the hardest conditions of all; fighting on each side in turn, and becoming a battlefield in the process.

The broad effects of these events on the place of Italy in peace-making would seem to be two. On the one hand, she may establish a claim to more tender treatment than Germany in the final settlement of accounts between victors and vanquished. It is recognized by the United Nations that the Italian people have already incurred heavy sacrifices in their efforts to detach themselves from the German grip, and that the Fascist régime which has been peculiarly responsible for Italian aggressions has become in practice detachable from the Italian people as a whole. The interim régime of Badoglio, after many hesitations, has in practice had to give way to more democratic forces: and when declaring war on Germany, Badoglio gave the pledge that "the present arrangement will in no way impair the untrammelled right of the people of Italy to choose their own form of democratic Government when peace is restored". The King undertook to abdicate if required, and the United Nations always made clear that their negotiating with Badoglio and the King should not be allowed to obstruct the free choice of the Italian people, in conformity with the third point of the Atlantic Charter. The King abdicated when the Allies entered Rome on June 5th, 1944, and Signor Bonomi formed a liberal government pledged to summon a freely elected constitutional assembly after complete liberation. In this way, Italy made an early start on the road to conversion.

On the other hand, Italy's record before and during the war leaves even her people much to atone for. Though she may be

more readily forgiven by public opinion in Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. against the forces of which she won no success, she will be less readily forgiven by her neighbours and victims for her brutal conquest of Abyssinia, her treacherous attack on Albania, and her behaviour towards France, Greece and Yugoslavia. There is little chance that the prospect of prolonged compulsory disarmament and the measures of control which that entails will be brightened : nor that any of her important war criminals will escape punishment. It will be borne in upon her far into the post-war years that she is not only an ex-enemy nation but also a defeated nation : and that will have great repercussions on her status and general behaviour during the years of settlement and reconstruction. However democratic or co-operative may be her government, it will have to contend with the legacy of national hatreds and fears bequeathed by Fascism.¹

The rôle of governments of the satellite States—Finland, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary—will be broadly similar to that of Italy : as, indeed, their foreign policies during the war have often taken their cue from Italy. The armistice terms made with Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary, and eventually with Finland after prolonged hesitations, reveal something of the part these governments will play in peacemaking. It is a very passive rôle, though their treatment varies somewhat in proportion to their readiness in contributing to the defeat of the principal enemy, Germany. Thus Roumania was forced, in the armistice signed with the U.S.S.R., Britain and the United States, to pay reparations of £75,000,000 over a period of six years, in oil, corn, timber, vessels, machinery to the Soviet Union, as partial compensation for Soviet losses.² She also had to pay for damages suffered by the other allies or their citizens in Roumania, restore all Soviet treasures, and hand over all enemy supplies captured as trophies of war. But further reparations were expressly waived on account of her participation in the war against Germany, and although she lost Bessarabia to Russia, she was promised the restoration of Transylvania from Hungary. The underlying principle appeared to be that satellites would be treated according to their record in promptly and successfully “working their passage home” : and their active rôle in peacemaking will doubtless vary in the same proportion.

¹ For accounts of the fall of Fascism and the armistice, see especially T. L. Gardini : *Towards the New Italy* (1943) ; M. H. H. Macartney : *One Man Alone* (1944).

² *The Times*, September 14th, 1944. The terms were slightly relaxed in January, 1945, as regards delivery of rolling-stock.

The rôle played in peacemaking by the new governments of Germany and Japan after their defeat—if such should clearly emerge from the chaos—will be necessarily more negative than that of the Bonomi government or its successor, or its counterparts among the satellites. Their functions, so far as the United Nations are concerned, will first be to facilitate the fulfilment of the armistice terms. These, as already suggested, will include compulsory disarmament and the surrender of all war criminals. They will also include, in the early stages, the fulfilment of whatever restitution and reparation are decided. That restitution will include the return of all possible art-treasures, farm stock and industrial plant looted from occupied countries is certain. That reparation will include the provision of labour-gangs for rapid reconstruction in some of the devastated areas outside Germany is probable.¹ On January 11th, 1944, Moscow radio, broadcasting to Germany, said that Germans in Russia after the war would be treated as ordinary paid workers, and that Russia would retain only the minimum of German labour. The most devastated areas of Poland will doubtless need German labour to restore them to a condition fit for habitation. However much such demands may be increased or modified in the event, during the early stages of peacemaking governments in Germany and Japan will be essentially administrative agencies for allied control and little else.

Their share in peacemaking will become more positive only at a later stage, when more long-range economic reconstruction is planned. The fourth point of the Atlantic Charter, promising endeavours to “further enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world”, is qualified both by the previous phrase, “with due respect for their existing obligations”, and by the subsequent phrase, “which are needed for their economic prosperity”. It has been frequently pointed out that armament-making is not needed for Germany’s “economic prosperity”, and that the treatment of post-war German governments can combine both concern for their disarmament and concern for Germany’s economic welfare. On February 22nd, 1944, Mr. Churchill emphasized that there would be no question of the Atlantic Charter applying to Germany as a matter of right.

¹ After 1918, the French, however, showed no desire to benefit from German forced labour in France. They wanted Germans to be completely removed from French soil, paying reparation in money or kind. In the less devastated countries of Europe, this same feeling may again be strong. Cf. above, Chapter III, p. 117,

"Unconditional surrender means that the victors have a free hand. . . . If we are bound, we are bound by our own consciences to civilization. We are not bound to the Germans as the result of a bargain struck."¹ Yet in long-range, far-sighted peacemaking, collaboration between German and other governments is obviously essential in the sphere of social and economic organization. It is political wisdom, no less than economic wisdom, that "Germany must not be treated worse than other nations as regards economic, finance, and 'welfare' matters".²

It would be too optimistic to imagine that, however prudent allied statesmen or however co-operative post-war German governments, a policy of allied disarming and control of Germany could be in practice carried out without some dislocation of economic life, or some delay in recovery which would be regarded as "unnecessary". Nationalistic bitterness will be too great, vindictiveness on one side and humiliation on the other will be too deep, for smooth co-operation to develop until many years after the war. If annexation of parts of Germany on the scale envisaged by certain Russian and Polish proposals be carried out, this, too, will rankle in Germany for generations. Prospects become too unpredictable to be usefully discussed here. But one guiding principle seems worth emphasizing: that the larger the proportion of the peace settlement which comes to be thought inequitable by any considerable section of opinion in the victorious Powers, the less stable is the settlement likely to be. The conditions of treatment of Germany should be "such that public opinion in the victorious countries will be ready to resort to force should Germany attempt to violate them".³ This clear principle involves no judgement on the degree of repression which may be appropriate for post-war Germany in actual circumstances: it is simply an automatic principle, which will apply whatever the terms. To forget it in the settlement with either Germany or Japan will weaken the stability and durability of the whole settlement.

§ 3. THE PEOPLES AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS

Governments and their representatives will make peace only in partnership with their peoples. The terms of reference within

¹ *The Times*, February 23rd, 1944.

² *Germany after the War* (Liberal Party Committee, 1944), p. 6. For more detailed discussion of this point, see *The Problem of Germany* (R.I.I.A., 1943).

³ *Germany after the War*, p. 4. Cf. above, p. 15.

which they have to draft the settlement, deal with enemy countries, carry out relief and reconstruction, and seek to build a durable international organization for keeping the peace, will be laid down not only by their own policies and by existing material conditions, but also by the desires and opinions of the mass of their peoples. This will be so not only because Britain and her Commonwealth, the United States and most of the European allies, are democratic in structure, but also because the State in each country will not be the only medium of action. Religious organizations such as churches and pacifist societies, industrial bodies such as trade unions and industrial combines, financial groups of bankers and business men, pressure-groups of every kind and purpose, will operate in moulding public opinion about peacemaking, and in bringing public opinion to bear upon what is done about peacemaking. Through radio, newspapers, pamphlets, books and public meetings opinion will be swayed in each country at a time when opinion will be heated and malleable. These pressure-groups will influence government policies directly through the political parties. This may well be particularly the case in Britain and the United States, where political parties are the regular vehicles of such pressure. But they will also take some direct part in deciding international issues, and in working or hindering the many functional organs of relief and reconstruction which have grown up to deal with post-war conditions throughout the world.

Just as the Vatican played a large part in the formation of the Badoglio government and the making of the Italian armistice¹; just as the trade unions have been in many lands the core of organized resistance, especially to German labour demands²; just as industrialists and bankers have been the partners of governments in making war—whether in German-controlled Europe and Japanese-controlled Asia or amongst the United Nations: so these forces will have to be partners with governments in making peace. The crucial question is by what means their aims and interests can be reconciled and comprehended within the general framework of a *planned* settlement. There would seem to be two possible ways of doing this.

The first would be to confine their share in peacemaking to the influencing of public opinion, political parties, and so

¹ For details see T. L. Gardini: *Towards the New Italy* (1943), Chapters 6, 8 and 10.

² E.g. *The Times*, September 8th, 1942: L. de Jong: *Holland Fights the Nazis* (1942), p. 47 f.; R. Motz: *Belgium Unvanquished* (1942), p. 62 f.

ultimately of governmental policies. The settlement would be decided by governments, but only after they had deferred to the strongest pressure-groups at home and to the general demands of popular opinion. It would then be the tasks of their spokesmen to negotiate amongst themselves an agreed plan for each aspect of the settlement. This has been in essence the course taken in previous experiments in peacemaking. Perhaps it is a course which cannot be completely avoided. But experience suggests that it should be tempered, if not replaced, by the alternative procedure.

This second alternative course would be to systematize the direct share of groups in the process of peacemaking, and to make them partners and participants along with governments. Their relative share and the sort of functions which they undertook would still have to be planned by governments. But within this agreed framework of functions, they would operate independently in the various international functional organizations. Already, in the International Labour Office, representatives of trade unions and of industrial employers work side by side with government representatives. In the sphere of international finance, banking and currency, they must clearly be taken into the closest partnership with governments in any international currency system.¹ If kindred organizations were set up for intellectual and cultural co-operation, representatives of universities, churches and academies of arts would have their rightful place. Similarly scientific workers and technicians and medical experts of each nation would work together on problems of agriculture, industry, health, nutrition, and so on. With the current tendency to distinguish between advisory and executive functions,² the agreed decisions of such functional bodies would have to take the form of recommendations to the international political authorities—for the authority and finance of governments would be necessary to put such recommendations into operation and harmonize them with other conditions and policies. But if such technical recommendations were given full publicity they would—with the concerted authority of experts behind them—gain effective hearing in each country. They would be, in short, the ingredients of a real international public opinion, which is the chief pre-requisite for effective international action and com-

¹ See the British and American proposals for currency-planning, and the discussions at Bretton Woods in July, 1944, discussed below, Chapter VIII.

² Cf. pp. 265, 289.

munity-feeling.¹ As such, they could not be ignored by national governments. And, as Professor E. H. Carr has said : " International slogans only become real and concrete when they are translated into terms of national policy. Power over opinion cannot be dissociated from military and economic power." ²

It will later be discussed how these two methods of reconciling popular demands with the planning of a durable settlement can be applied in practical measures.³ Meanwhile, it is important to discover what are the general characteristics of these demands as they have already been formulated during the war. They have already been collected together and analysed (up to 1943) by Dr. Lewis L. Lorwin in his survey of *Post-war Plans of the United Nations*.⁴ His general conclusions are as follows :

Practically all the countries aim to improve the economic and social conditions of the mass of the people. In the advanced industrial countries, especially in the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations and western Europe . . . emphasis is on " full employment " and " social security ". The U.S.S.R. and the industrially less developed countries, e.g. Latin America, India and China, stress the idea of " higher living standards ", through more production and greater productivity. The concrete objectives, however, are alike—an increase in the material goods of life, better nutrition, housing, health and education, as a means for a larger spiritual and cultural life of all people. Most plans also imply that bettering the condition of the people will bring about a greater economic and social equality among all groups and classes.

These characteristics are mostly common not only to governmental proposals and plans for post-war reconstruction, but also to the schemes put forward by political parties, economic groups, and by churches and other interested associations. Some of these last are revealing, if correlated for each type of group and not merely—as Dr. Lorwin has compiled them—for each country.

The following general features then appear :—

(a) *Political Parties*

The general views of the political parties in power in the " Big Four " countries must be presumed from the governmental policies and declarations already outlined : though as regards

¹ The general arguments for functional organization as prior to political on the international scale have been briefly summarized by Dr. David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System : An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (1943).

² *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 179.

³ Below, Chapters VII and VIII.

⁴ Published by *The Twentieth Century Fund*, New York (1943).

Great Britain and the United States, at least, these policies perhaps more accurately represent the highest common measure of attainable agreement between parties, since the British Government is a coalition of all main political parties, and President Roosevelt has at every stage tried to carry the Republican Party along with the Democratic in foreign policy.¹ But in both countries parties not predominating in government have issued statements of peace policy which deserve attention.

From the Liberal Party in Britain has come *Liberal Plan for Peace*,² which propounds an official peace-programme that may be briefly summarized as follows :

The establishment of a "Grand Council" of the United Nations, with an International Executive responsible for immediate action against a breaker of the peace. For this purpose an International Police Force will be needed, to meet violence with force. This force should be composed of national units under a Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The establishment of an "Economic Branch" of the United Nations organization, to deal with economic collaboration. This might consist of several linked institutions, and its functions would be the collection and diffusion of economic information, the harmonizing of national economic policies, and its own operations of buying and selling, lending and borrowing.

The acceptance of a common "commercial code", limiting restrictive policies in trade, and with an "open door" policy as regards colonies.

The acceptance of a common "political code", preserving and protecting personal freedoms and promoting educational standards and opportunities.

Throughout, a distinction is drawn between "those tasks which are indispensable to peace and order, and those which will promote prosperity and progress". The former the Party regards "as mandatory, the latter as optional", and the former should therefore be defined and embodied "in the peace treaty itself". It is proposed that international collaboration should come mainly "not by the transference of functions from national governments to an international authority, but by the assignment to an international authority of functions which have never been

¹ E.g. the consultations referred to on p. 308, and those between representatives of President Roosevelt and the new Republican presidential candidate, Mr. Dewey, during the Dumbarton Oaks meetings of August, 1944.

² With an introduction by Lord Crewe, 1944. See also *Germany after the War* (1944), proposals of a Liberal Party Committee under the chairmanship of the Earl of Perth, formerly Secretary-General to the League of Nations : and the reports of the Liberal Party Conference of February, 1945.

and in the nature of things can never be undertaken by the national governments". Thus the general and confessed aim is to seek a *via media* between impotent international organization and coercive international authority which would involve "unacceptable inroads upon national sovereignties".¹

Common Wealth, the new party of Sir Richard Acland, given much support by the illustrated weekly *Picture Post*, makes similar proposals with much greater encroachments on national sovereignty, and with more optimistic belief in the chances of a European federation.² Of "making the peace", the party says "political reconstruction must follow, not precede, the immediate reconstruction of physical life. Once the fighting is over, continents will have to be treated, for this purpose, as single economic units." Common Wealth summarizes its whole programme in the words: "It is no use tinkering with the past. It is no use compromising between past and future. We must reject the past, and begin now to build a new social order." In harmony with this sweeping programme, it speaks of a World Council, a World Economic Council and "a democratic federation of Europe", rejecting the "provisions of the Atlantic Charter which guarantee the restoration of sovereignty to the States of Europe". In domestic affairs, it demands a system of "common ownership" of land, credit and investment institutions, fuel and power, transport, most heavy industries, and "all substantial undertakings producing standard articles in common use". The picture, then, is one of vastly increased State power internally, and of radically weaker State power externally: a redistribution of the functions and powers of the nation-State between both smaller and larger organizations.

The British Labour Party has published an official statement of post-war aims, which was approved by the Annual Conference of the Party in May, 1942.³ Internationally, it looks for an improved League of Nations, planned disarmament, and continued co-operation between Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. It makes no specific claim that organized labour should participate directly in peacemaking, save through established institutions such as the International Labour Organization. A later draft statement on Labour Policy for the Post-War settlement was severely criticized by some sections of the Party, and

¹ For the basic ideas of the plan, see *op. cit.*, pp. 88-91.

² *Common Wealth Manifesto* (Fourth edition, June, 1944).

³ *The Old World and the New Society* (1942).

Labour policy was in 1944 less clear-cut and positive than Liberal or Conservative.¹

The Independent Labour Party, small both in membership and in parliamentary representation, has been active in propounding its views on the peace settlement: and—as might be expected—it puts considerable emphasis on the social and economic aspects of peacemaking.² Contending that “the present war is a result of the economic antagonisms generated by a system resting on private property and private profit”, it argues that “to prevent war, it is necessary to end the acquisitive society in which capital, in the absence of effective demand at home, seeks investment abroad, and in which terroristic dictatorship is the politics of frustrated imperialism”. In Europe, “the compelling logic of economic facts dictates a supra-national authority, embracing Britain, France and Germany, and the peasant countries. A supra-national authority and an economic plan are needed for Europe as a whole. The Socialist United States of Europe is the only way forward.”³ The party attacks United Nations plans for control of Germany: “The principal aim of the whole scheme is the prevention of widespread civil unrest in Germany”, whereas the real solution to “the German problem” is the encouragement of a socialist Germany as an integral part of a socialist Europe.⁴

(b) Churches and Religious Associations

The war has evoked from most Churches and religious movements—particularly from the Papacy and the churches of Britain and the United States—a widespread interest and several notable statements concerning peacemaking and social order. The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the Methodist Commission on World Peace, the Catholic Association for International Peace, the Central Conference of American Rabbis

¹ Cf. the criticisms of the Parliamentary Peace Aims Group, as set out in *Labour and the Post-War Settlement*, by R. R. Stokes, and *Towards a Total Peace* (1944). The National Executive's statement is charged with abandoning the true international character of socialism: “Peace will only last so long as it brings benefit to all nations. British Labour should want German Labour in partnership, and not as a defeated, disgruntled body of men.”

² Cf. the Party's weekly paper, *New Leader*, edited by Fenner Brockway, and Walter Padley: *The Economic Problem of the Peace* (1944): “a plea for world socialist union”.

³ These quotations are from Walter Padley: *op. cit.*, pp. 51, 113.

⁴ *New Leader*, September 9th, 1944, and Walter Padley: *op. cit.*, p. 123.

and the Quaker American Friends' Service Committee have all published proposals dealing with international policy and organization.¹

In England there have been two leading official statements by the Churches. One is the "Malvern Report" issued after the Archbishop of York's Conference at Malvern in January, 1941: and to this has been added a supplement by economists, industrialists and labour representatives, considering the more detailed and technical economic applications of the Malvern Report.² The other is the wider joint statement of all British Protestant Churches, *Social Justice and Economic Reconstruction*, issued at the same time, by the Commission of the Churches for International Friendship and Social Responsibility. Individual churchmen—especially Dr. William Temple, the late Archbishop of Canterbury—have made problems of post-war reconstruction their constant concern.³

On Christmas Eve, 1939—the first Christmas of war—Pope Pius XII proclaimed his Five Peace Points. A year later they were publicly endorsed, in a joint letter to *The Times*, by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Cardinal Hinsley of Westminster and the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council. The writers declared their confidence that the principles "would be accepted by rulers and statesmen throughout the British Commonwealth of Nations, and would be regarded as the true basis on which a lasting peace could be established".⁴ The principles thus endorsed represent the fullest Christian agreement yet formulated, and are therefore given in full.

1. The assurance to all nations of their right to life and independence. The will of one nation to live must never mean the sentence of death passed upon another. When this equality of rights has been destroyed, attacked or threatened, order demands that reparation shall be made, and the measure and extent of that reparation is determined, not by the sword nor by

¹ They are summarized in Liston Pope: *Religious Proposals for World Order* (1941). 34 such statements are collated: though all date from before 1941.

² See *The Life of the Church and the Order of Society* (The Industrial Christian Fellowship, 1941, and *Malvern and After* (1942)).

³ See especially: William Temple: *Christianity and Social Order* (1942); *The Church Looks Forward* (1944); Bishop of Chichester: *Christianity and World Order* (1940); A. C. F. Beales: *The Catholic Church and International Order* (1941); E. Quinn: *Fundamentals of Peace* (1940); C. Dawson: *The Judgement of the Nations* (1943).

It will be noticed that the word "order" recurs as a constant theme in such modern Christian thought and argument. Cf. above, Chapter IV, pp. 124 and 128.

⁴ Cf. *The Times*, December 21st, 1940. The letter is reprinted in A. C. F. Beales, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-2.

the arbitrary decision of self-interest, but by the rules of justice and reciprocal equity.

2. This requires that the nations be delivered from the slavery imposed upon them by the race for armaments and from the danger that material force, instead of serving to protect the right, may become an overbearing and tyrannical master. The order thus established requires a mutually agreed organic progressive disarmament, spiritual as well as material, and security for the effective implementing of such an agreement.

3. Some juridical institution which shall guarantee the loyal and faithful fulfilment of conditions agreed upon and which shall in case of recognized need revise and correct them.

4. The real needs and just demands of nations and populations and racial minorities to be adjusted as occasion may require, even where no strictly legal right can be established, and a foundation of mutual confidence to be thus laid, whereby many incentives to violent action will be removed.

5. The development among peoples and their rulers of that sense of deep and keen responsibility which weighs human statutes according to the sacred and inviolable standards of the laws of God. They must hunger and thirst after justice and be guided by that universal love which is the compendium and most general expression of the Christian ideal.

The essentials of peacemaking emphasized by the Churches are thus the preservation of national independence and equality of rights : the exaction of just reparations for the violation of these rights ; progressive disarmament ; juridical machinery for peaceful change and the enforcement of treaty obligations ; respect for minority rights ; a general moral devotion to the principles of national and international justice. The statements of the various bodies enumerated above in substance accept these principles, and apply them further to the social and economic aspects of peacemaking. Thus, the Federal Council of Churches in America has a special " Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace ", which held a conference at Ohio in 1942. Its report is based on the belief that " moral law, no less than physical law, undergirds our world " : and the need for co-operation among nations is part of this moral law. It regards economic security as no less necessary than political security, and international machinery as necessary to ensure both. To show the interconnection between economic and social security for the individual within the State and lasting peace internationally

has, indeed, been the general aim and result of practically all Christian social teaching during the war. Proposals may differ as to the amount of social planning and governmental controls thought desirable, and they preserve an appearance of agreement on international problems only by avoiding detailed suggestions as to the form which international settlement and organization must take : but the measure of real agreement on aims and general principles of action is impressive.

(c) *Employers' Associations and Business Groups*

Most powerful of all the pressure-groups influencing both government policies and public opinion are those which represent employers and big-business interests. Such groups are the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce in the United States : the National Union of Manufacturers and the Federation of British Industries in Great Britain : and their counterparts in all the British Dominions and India. All these bodies have during the war issued statements on post-war problems : most of which are primarily concerned with internal economic life, and only incidentally with the problems of peacemaking as such. Here, too, there is substantial agreement on the general principles which these groups want to see prevail in the post-war world, and on the plans which have to be laid for the immediate problems of the post-war years.

For the most part, these groups are naturally the enemies of extensive economic planning and governmental controls. They press, like the Committee on Economic Policy of the American Chamber of Commerce,¹ that governments should keep out of every field of business which can be run by private enterprise : that the profit motive be preserved as " a powerful incentive to productive effort " : that government restrictions should give way to " a healthy and vigorous business competition ". But most of them accept planning as desirable in two main fields : amongst national business-firms so as to meet the special demands for consumer-goods after the war, and to a limited extent in international economic relations. In the United States a Committee for Economic Development has been set up by a group of firms in order to help industry and commerce " to gear themselves for the post-war effort ", and to facilitate their separate plans. So, too, the National Association of Manufacturers encourages separate planning. Its " Post-War Problems " Committee has

¹ This Committee was set up in 1942.

published a report which suggests that "some framework should be established through which the political and economic relationships between nations of the world can be developed and maintained on an orderly basis".¹ It proclaims the need for the United States to co-operate internationally to get world peace, and so to promote economic progress.

The United States Chamber of Commerce has a special committee on International Post-War Problems, and in April, 1944, this group presented seven declarations of policy to the Chamber.² These were all concerned with international political and juridical organizations, and placed very little emphasis on social and economic organizations in the international sphere. It significantly endorsed the clauses of the Moscow Declaration foreshadowing a political body "based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security".

British employers' groups go further than the American in accepting continuance of governmental planning, direction and control. While defending private initiative and enterprise, and attacking "bureaucratic influence", they agree that maximum production and high consumption will need help and stimulation by the government. They foresee that the conditions of international trade after the war will demand that exporters be organized to carry on British trade co-operatively, and this will demand the guidance and aid of the government.³ A group of 120 industrialists, including representatives of Unilever, Vickers, Imperial Chemical Industries and other big business, has formulated "A National Policy for Industry" which goes still further in the direction of industrial and commercial planning, in order to avoid "wasteful and uneconomic competition". This policy recommends the organization of British industries on a corporative basis, under a central council of industry to negotiate with the T.U.C. on one hand and with the government on the other.⁴

¹ *Jobs, Freedom, Opportunity in the Post-War Years* (1943).

² Printed in *International Conciliation*, May, 1944.

³ The views of the main groups were elicited in 1942 by the Board of Trade, and reports were presented by the Federation of British Industries, the Association of Chambers of Commerce, the London Chamber of Commerce and the National Union of Manufacturers. These reports are printed in the *Bulletin of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace* (December, 1942). The report of the Federation of British Industries is published under the title *Reconstruction* (1942).

⁴ The statement on "A National Policy for Industry" was also printed in the *Bulletin of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace* (December, 1942). This Commission was set up in 1939 under the chairmanship of Dr. James T. Shotwell, and published valuable reports in 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944, all of which were published in *International Conciliation* for those years.

The World Trade Alliance Association, under the leadership of Sir Edgar R. Jones, presses for a World Trade Alliance Council to be set up by Governments to regulate international trade.¹ It proposes economic organizations at four levels: Product Committees for each main product, representing exporting countries and consuming interests; a central World Clearing Bureau, to assist these various Product Committees and to get each country to balance its exports and imports as far as possible; a central World Development Commission to deal with projects of relief and development in distressed countries; and a Debt and Money Commission. Many of the functions thus described would be, in practice, dealt with by U.N.R.R.A. and the organizations proposed by the Bretton Woods Conference.²

Individual industrialists and business men have put forward their own views on the future of industry, especially in relation to government controls. The Individualist Society of Sir Ernest Benn propagates the extreme individualistic viewpoint on this question³: while others, such as Samuel Courtauld, approach the question more tentatively and less dogmatically.⁴ All clearly realize that relations between private industry and public policy will come under scrutiny and overhaul in the post-war world.

From these and from the similar statements of corresponding industrial and commercial groups in other countries, it is clear that the power and influence of big business and industry will be exerted in a nationalistic direction. There is a tendency for the groups in each country to combine and consolidate as against their rivals in other countries, whilst continuing to compete amongst themselves for the home markets. They will tend to look—as so often in the past—to governments for help as against foreign rivals. In return for such help, they are willing to promote greater social security amongst their workers at home, and to submit to a greater measure than before of governmental direction and even regulation. But with the return of peace, and of facilities for the forming of international cartels, they will no doubt tend still to build up international organizations of

¹ See *World Trade Alliance*, by Sir Edgar R. Jones, K.B.E. (1943), and an explanatory pamphlet of the same name by T. Lloyd-Williams.

² See below, p. 267 f.

³ See the many pamphlets of the Society of Individualists, especially *Murmurings of an Individualist* and *More Murmurings*, and the series on *Post-War Questions*.

⁴ *Government and Industry: Their Future Relations*, by Samuel Courtauld (Macmillan, 1942). "The English genius for social evolution and for compromise can find a middle way, between pure individualism and pure socialism, which will bring the greatest attainable good to the nation." See also Harold Macmillan: *The Middle Way* (1938).

their own, transcending national boundaries and seeking similar aid and facilities from foreign governments. In relation to international planning they stand in an ambiguous position, claiming to behave either nationally or internationally as best suits their search for raw materials and profitable markets.

(d) *Workers' Organizations*

During war the workers' organizations in each country have shown a growing interest in those problems of peacemaking and reconstruction which are connected particularly with social and economic security : and on the whole workers in Great Britain and the Dominions have been more active than the workers of the United States. American labour suffers from its division into the American Federation of Labour (some 6 million members), the Congress of Industrial Organizations (some 5 million), and other separate unions such as the Railway Brotherhoods and the United Mine Workers. And as Dr. Lorwin has said :

Broadly speaking, organized labour in the United States favours the maintenance of what is called the free enterprise system. . . . The dominant economic outlook of American trade unionism, in contrast to that of Great Britain, Australia and many other countries, is definitely that of a free capitalist system modified by collective bargaining and government controls. . . . American labour regards the present war largely as a struggle, not to revolutionize the economic system, but to preserve the essential features of free initiative, free unions, and voluntary collective bargaining.¹

The A.F. of L. has, in such post-war plans as it has adumbrated, merely continued the programme of moderate social reforms which it was urging before the war : such as the 40-hour week, legal safeguards for the unions, public housing projects. But it has set up a Commission on International Relations, demanding that labour should be represented at the peace conference and should take part in peacemaking, and it actively supports the existing International Labour Organization. The C.I.O. has not gone so far, and remains chiefly concerned with the prevention of unemployment in the United States after the war, and the extension of social services at home. Both bodies regard greater economic security as the aim of all post-war reconstruction : and should international action become obviously necessary for this end, they can doubtless be induced to support

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

such action. But preservation of the high standard of living in the United States is regarded with jealous anxiety by the mass of American labour, and it must be expected to remain essentially nationalistic in its approach to peacemaking.

Yet the nationalistic approach of American labour differs from that of American employers in putting greater emphasis on the social and economic aspects of peacemaking. This difference was forcibly demonstrated in the declarations on "The Bases of Lasting Peace" adopted by the Executive of the A.F. of L. in April, 1944,¹ at almost the same time as the Chamber of Commerce resolutions already mentioned. Proclaiming that "lasting peace must rest on social justice and include all peoples", it formulated a principle which, as contended in this book,² is perhaps the basic principle of modern peacemaking. "In order to maintain international peace, political and military programmes must be associated with a far-reaching economic programme which will be designed, not to advantage certain nations at the expense of others, but to organize and utilize the new productive powers of industry and agriculture for the advancement of the standards of living of all peoples. World-wide economic health is essential to security." This great American Labour body has clearly grasped the needs of twentieth-century peacemaking, and the new pattern, as well as the empirical approach, demanded by present conditions. Declaring that "the basic test of freedom is the welfare of the common man", and that "the frontiers of the world of labour are those of economic as well as political geography", they believe that "a certain number of international functional agencies will be necessary to insure the consistent development of sound economic policies". Even so, they cling to "the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, irrespective of size and strength".

In Great Britain the Trades Union Congress—representing some 8 million workers—and the Co-operative Societies, which have some 9 million members, have given intermittent attention to post-war plans. The T.U.C. is primarily concerned with industrial problems and economic policies, the Co-operatives with social security and betterment, especially in the sphere of insurance and education. Both have shown that they realize how much the attaining of these ends depends on raising the standard of living in other countries, and on wider international

¹ Printed in *International Conciliation*, May, 1944.

² Below, p. 337 f.

action through the I.L.O. The T.U.C. and the A.F. of L. have steadily supported the International Federation of Trade Unions, representing the main central labour unions of each country which, after 1939, fixed its headquarters in London.

The Labour Party, the parliamentary voice of the T.U.C., urges that the old competitive society be replaced by a "planned democracy", in which production will be planned less for private profit than for community use, and workers will be given the opportunity to "share in the making of the rules under which they work". Unlike American labour, it welcomes and demands that the chief war-time controls in industry and agriculture be maintained after the war, as part of this general planning for democracy.¹

(e) *Other Propagandist and Pressure Groups*

In addition to the main blocs of opinion reflected in these various statements by political parties and religious and economic organizations, there are innumerable cross-currents of opinion embodied in lesser propagandist and pressure groups. The various "utopian" and "semi-utopian" proposals discussed in Chapter V above have groups of followers, and often organized associations, whose confessed purpose is to exert pressure on the peacemakers. There are groups such as "Never Again", "Fight for Freedom", and the followers of Lord Vansittart, concerned with moulding the peace settlement in conformity with definite sets of beliefs. In 1943 the "Win the Peace" movement, under the presidency of Lord Vansittart, issued a twelve-point declaration defining the terms it wanted to see imposed on Germany, including not merely the disarmament and occupation of Germany, but also control of her aviation, and radio, and of the curriculum of school and university studies. The National Peace Council has done valuable work during the war in publicizing official documents and statements concerning the peace settlement, and in encouraging the popular study and discussion of the problems of peacemaking. The League of Nations Union has proposed revision of the old League.² Religious groups such as the Roman Catholic "Sword of the Spirit", the World Council of Churches, the Christian Industrial

¹ *The Old World and the New Society*. It is noteworthy that the F.B.I. Report (*Reconstruction*), p. 20, treats such controls as possibly justifiable during the immediate post-war years, but is very emphatic on the dangers of "bureaucratic influence" and on the need for controls to be agreed with industry when they are found essential.

² See below, p. 310.

Fellowship and countless others have helped to mould public opinion about peacemaking. Suffice to mention these groups and to leave unmentioned by name countless others. Their influence on peacemaking, though real, is too indirect and incalculable to be considered here.

Nor can much permanent significance be attached to the frequent surveys of public opinion produced by Gallup Polls, Mass observation, and the other modern methods of sampling current trends in public opinion, so popular in Britain and the United States. However valuable and reliable as an index of temporary opinions, they do not purport to show more than the temporary prevailing currents, and there is no predictable certainty that these currents will prevail during the process of peacemaking, nor that they will decisively affect the shape of peacemaking even if they then exist. There is even danger in attaching too much significance to them.¹ Of somewhat greater value, perhaps, is the combination of opinion-survey and systematic discussion achieved by the American Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems, which began its activities at the end of 1942. It presents a systematic analysis of peacemaking problems, together with the most important proposed solutions and the arguments for and against each of them, and collects and collates the views of about 100 organized discussion-groups on these problems in American Universities and Institutes. To such questions as war-time formulation of peace-aims, the best methods and stages of reaching a final peace settlement, the treatment of defeated countries, and the form of an international organization for general security, considerable unanimity of intelligent and progressive opinion is revealed. It is reported, for example, that "no 'final' settlement in the traditional sense should be attempted. Peacemaking in the style of Vienna and Versailles is viewed as obsolete. What is required is a continuing and progressive attack on post-war problems."²

From this brief survey of the main statements already made by the most influential political, religious and economic groups in Britain and America, a few tentative conclusions can be drawn. Most obvious is the immense emphasis placed by nearly all on the primacy of economic over political issues. It is almost

¹ E.g., "Daily Express" Poll of September, 1944, which favoured "Big Four" dominance rather than a League of Nations.

² The Report for 1943 is printed in full in *International Conciliation*, June and November, 1944.

universally agreed that peacemaking must be economic peacemaking : and almost equally unanimously agreed that economic peacemaking involves some degree—lesser or greater according to group-interests—of governmental regulation, control and general planning. It is further held, at least by the Churches and by labour organizations, and by many employers outside the United States, that such planning must reach an international level before it can be completely effective. Nevertheless, separate and different national outlooks and distinct habits of nationalistic behaviour, remain both strong and conspicuous. It must be expected that peacemaking will be powerfully influenced by these habits of thought and methods of approach. The effect of social groups on peacemaking cannot be judged simply from what these groups say they want. Account—and very serious account—must also be taken of how far they will be likely to behave in such a way as to promote the ends they acclaim as desirable. There is as much to fear as to hope, in this connection, from the statements of such groups reviewed above. National aims are clearer, national organizations more solid and numerous, than international aims and organizations. As Professor John Macmurray has remarked :

The inertia of habit is very great, and to change the direction of behaviour which it dictates is always difficult, and not infrequently impossible. . . . In social life the inertia of tradition—which is the pattern of social habits—is overwhelming. . . . All our plans for “reconstruction” presuppose, if they are to be successful, that the judgement which they embody of what would be a “good society” and the actions which they propose to achieve it, are compatible with the traditional patterns of behaviour in the people and societies with which they are concerned, and with the unplanned and unplannable forces of development which these contain.¹

What, then, are these “patterns of behaviour” and these “unplanned and unplannable forces” which will operate in peacemaking?

They are, on the one hand, the forces of economic change, among which the changes of war-time such as fresh industrialization, mobilization, food shortage and lack of social security will loom biggest : on the other, psychological forces engendered by war-time experience. Each of these must next be considered in their relation to peacemaking.

¹ *Through Chaos to Community?* (1944). Cf. P. A. Sorokin : *Man and Society in Calamity* (1942).

§ 4. THE MATERIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF PEACEMAKING

Behaviour [writes Mark May] always depends on two sets of factors—the outer and the inner. The inner corresponds roughly to the state of the organism at the moment ; the outer to the conditions in its immediate environment. Explanations of conduct, particularly of group behaviour, tend to stress one or the other of these two sets of factors.¹

The contrast between what may be called the sociological and the psychological methods of approach to the problems of peacemaking has already been suggested,² and it is the thesis of this book that both approaches must be made, and the results of both kinds of study correlated, if we are to “get what we want” during the process of peacemaking. How people live and what people think cannot be entirely stated or explained in terms of one another : and what people do will be determined by both. The same is true of groups no less than of individuals, even when these groups are States.

The movements of economic and social change occasioned by the making of war, and the upheaval of emotions and ideas simultaneously occasioned by war, will together, in interaction, condition the making of peace. Some of the ways in which they have done so in the past have been already considered.³ The prevalent material conditions which will confront peacemakers this time can here be only briefly outlined.

First, and clearest to predict in its main lines, will be the condition of the occupied countries of Europe. This has already been made the subject of two special studies by the Royal Institute of International Affairs,⁴ as well as of reports by the allied governments.⁵ The facts are simple but crucial. For some five years the economic life, man-power, industry, finance, agriculture, transport and commerce of the occupied countries (and to only a slightly lesser degree of the satellite countries, Hungary,

¹ *The Social Psychology of War and Peace*, p. 220.

² Chapter V, above, § 1.

³ Chapter I, above.

⁴ *Relief and Reconstruction in Europe : The First Steps* (R.I.I.A., 1943). *Occupied Europe : German Exploitation and its Post-War Consequences* (R.I.I.A., 1944).

⁵ *Europe in Bondage : Reports of the London International Assembly*, edited by John Armitage. Lindsay Drummond, 1943.

See also on this subject : *The Penetration of German Capital into Europe* : a report by the Inter-Allied Information Committee (1942) ; Frank Munk : *The Legacy of Nazism* (1943) ; J. Kuczynski and M. Witt : *The Economics of Barbarism* ; and two articles by J. Kuczynski in *The Left News*, July and August, 1944 ; D. Warriner : *Eastern Europe after Hitler* (Fabian Research Series, No. 50).

Bulgaria, Roumania and Finland) have been steadily and progressively deprived of their independent existence, and made subordinate to the war-time needs of the German Reich. Whilst military and political liberation of these countries will be complete and may be sudden and rapid, their economic liberation will be a matter for elaborate organization and perhaps prolonged disentanglement. Not only have factories been closed, moved or diverted from normal production ; reserves and stocks depleted and destroyed ; man-power removed and reorientated ; trade dislocated, finance penetrated by German banks, and currency depreciated ; but also the population as a whole has been undernourished, redistributed and depleted, as well as terrorized and internally disrupted by the tyranny of quislings and collaborators. Similar conditions will prevail in the occupied parts of allied countries, such as China and the U.S.S.R., although here reconstruction will be directly conducted by the countries concerned.¹ The period of initial peacemaking and territorial settlement (such as the definition of frontiers) will therefore coincide with a period of urgent and widespread organization of relief and rehabilitation in all such territories. That is the first relevant and crucial fact.

Secondly, the neutral countries of Europe and of South America will have had their economic existence profoundly affected by the course of the war which has raged around their borders. Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Argentina, have lived through five years of exceptional economic conditions, when their foreign trade has been radically changed both in bulk, nature and direction : when their social and economic life has been affected by the influx of refugees or internees, and by the internal disputes which rival sympathies usually bring ; when the rival systems of blockade have exerted a steady pressure on their sources of raw materials, markets and general standard of living. Here, though material distress will be less, and often non-existent, the period of peacemaking will also coincide with a time of adjustment and reorientation, and of new, urgent demands for participation in the general tasks of relief and rehabilitation.

Thirdly, the unoccupied allied countries will have undergone a radical transformation in the process of fighting and winning the war. The demands of war have meant immense industrial-

¹ More than one-third of the budget of the Soviet Union for 1944-5 has been devoted to reconstruction work in the liberated areas. On China, see P. S. Buck : *Dragon Seed* (1943).

zation in regions which before the war were mainly agricultural or pastoral. British Dominions such as Australia and South Africa, French territories such as North Africa, have become war-time industrial areas which it will be neither possible nor desirable to de-industrialize after the war. Colonial lands, such as British and French West Africa, have become vital links in the world system of air communications and transport, and the new opportunities for education, technical training, sanitation and economic prosperity which this has brought will have lasting effects after the war.¹ Soviet Russia and China have developed vast hinterlands, and created great new industrial areas, which will be a source of immense wealth when former industrial areas are again restored.² The far-reaching network of Lend-Lease has forged new links between the economic systems of all the United Nations, which will survive into the post-war years. Everywhere the process of total mobilization for war, followed by progressive demobilization after the war, will entail a measure of governmental control and planning of national economic and social life such as will inevitably affect the organization of agriculture, industry and trade in each country, however variable may be the methods adopted. The tasks of participating in relief and rehabilitation of the occupied countries, for which provision is made and commitments already taken through the Food and Agriculture Organization planned at Hot Springs in 1943, through U.N.R.R.A. and through the many refugee organizations which grew up before and during the war,³ will reinforce the links of Lend-Lease.

In a word, the "traditional patterns of behaviour" in every country, whether enemy, neutral or allied, occupied or unoccupied, will be shattered. The familiar landscape, with industry here, agriculture there, undeveloped areas overseas, will be strangely different. Even if there were any general desire to revert to pre-war conditions—and there is less desire than in 1919, when years of pre-war prosperity and security could more plausibly be looked back upon as the "good old days"—mere reversion would not be materially possible. The old order is in

¹ See the report on British West Africa presented by Lord Swinton, *The Times*, August 5th, 1944, and *The Listener*, August 17th, 1944.

² See V. Conolly: *Soviet Asia* (Oxford Pamphlet No. 62, 1943), and J. Scott: *Behind the Urals* (1942).

³ See the Report of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, presented by Sir Herbert Emerson on the work of co-ordination and co-operation performed during the first year of this committee's work after its war-time reorganization: *The Times*, August 16th, 1944, and below, p. 246 f.

the melting-pot. What comes out of it will not be, indeed, a matter of free and untrammelled choice. The new pattern has already hardened out, and it will set with immense rapidity under the universal desire for order, stability, security, after long years of uncertainty and chaos. It will be a pattern of greater governmental control, a more highly socialized economic system, a more conspicuously interwoven world community. But the purposes for which this new material order is used, the spirit which infuses its intricate economic and political mechanism, the speed and smoothness with which it is made to serve the welfare of men and women rather than the power of sovereign States or the ambitions of national rulers, can be determined by the desires and the will of men.

It can be assumed, with certain qualifications, that the underlying psychological force in the world during the process of peacemaking will be fear of the recurrence of war. It will not necessarily be the overriding force, in face of a completely beaten Germany and Japan. At first, the prospect of another world war may well seem as remote as it has ever been. But recent experience of invasion, occupation and exploitation, and present experience of the disastrous aftermath of war, will make desire for a durable peace stronger and more universal than any other single desire. Closely allied with this fear and desire will be emotions of anger and hatred against the enemy. The mass emotions most easily aroused and most violent in their manifestations are fear, anger and hatred. The crucial question will be whether anger and hatred against the enemy will predominate over fear of war and its aftermath. If they do—and if fear of even the beaten enemy is not offset by greater fears—the result may well be an overwhelming passion for retribution and punishment. If they do not—and if the then powerless enemy is feared less than the possibilities of domination by a bigger Power, or than the dangers of prolonged chaos and economic distress—then the result may be an overwhelming anxiety that peacemaking should be constructive and comprehensive. The violent forces generated by war and defeat, and pent-up by oppression and distress, may find an outlet in either destructive or constructive directions. Their bias will be determined, in general, by three factors.

First, the particular aspects of recent experience which loom largest in the minds of both governments and peoples will vary considerably from place to place. In the occupied countries,

the experience of enemy-occupation and persecution has included also the experience of allied blockade, bombing and counter-invasion. It has included the experience of forced labour for many millions, deported from their homeland to German or German-controlled factories : of organized resistance, ranging from isolated defiance and sabotage to large-scale, highly organized guerilla warfare, conducted in the hardest and most desperate conditions : of revolutionary action, not only against the common enemy, but—in Greece, Yugoslavia and Poland—against the former legitimate government of the country itself. Several years' training in the technique and outlook of revolutionary action and systematic sabotage may itself either encourage habits of violence and disrespect for the law, or may by reaction stimulate a yearning for law and order and security, which will evoke disciplined obedience to whatever authority contrives to provide these conditions after the war. Where a quisling government has held power, as in France, Holland and Norway, and wherever collaborators with the enemy have flaunted their gains and abused their power, there tends to be at first a period of virtual civil war, which keeps conditions malleable and fluid almost as long as conditions in directly enemy-occupied lands, such as Greece and Poland. In the unoccupied countries overseas, the balance of psychological forces will be radically different. Invasion, defeat, occupation, exploitation, persecution, terror, will be unknown : and, being unknown, will be less instinctively feared and detested. Material conditions will be in equally vivid contrast, and real distress, of the Greek or Polish quality, will be entirely absent. Likewise organized resistance and the habits of conspiracy will be unknown, and their subtle mental and spiritual effects unimagined. Partially occupied countries, such as China and the U.S.S.R., will be more closely akin in outlook to the occupied than to the unoccupied countries.

At every point, the consequences of these differences will be incalculable and unpredictable : nowhere more so than in the consequent attitude to the vanquished countries. On the one hand, hatred of quislings and even potential quislings may be more instinctively felt even by the unoccupied nations than might be expected. The profound and widespread popular reaction in Britain to the release of Sir Oswald Mosley from prison in 1943 is a straw in the wind. On the other hand, the ability even of persecuted peoples to preserve some distinction between the willing agents of Nazi terror and the German people

as a whole is apt to be greater than might be expected. Stalin has consistently made the distinction in his official statements, and Russian propaganda has echoed the sentiment even amidst the most brutal German oppressions in Russia, and the bitterest fighting on the eastern front. In the French resistance movements, it is possible to trace the same outlook.¹ And popular moods very suddenly change with circumstances. At the very time when the liberation of the first regions of northern France was revealing a popular mood which set a higher value on a rapid return to more normal and orderly material conditions than on wholesale reprisals against collaborators, the mildness of British feelings towards Germany was being violently changed—in southern England at least—by the bitter experience of flying-bombs clearly aimed less at military results than at the terrorization of the civilian population. Last-moment swings of public feeling in either direction, powerful enough to mould government policy towards the vanquished, cannot be left out of account.

Thus the second factor in determining the direction of opinion and feeling during peacemaking will be the effectiveness of concerted measures for the selective and discriminating punishment of those proved to be personally responsible for war crimes. If popular passions of anger and hatred can be concentrated against individual members of the vanquished country, and the inevitable desire for retributive justice satisfied by the completeness and certainty with which they are brought to book, the chances of a more rational and constructive peace will be greatly enhanced. Repeated pledges that this will be done have been given by the governments of all the United Nations.² Knowledge that no proved offender will escape punishment, and that no suspect will be beyond reach or jurisdiction, will do much to canalize popular passion, and give it a bias away from blind vengeance towards plans for more constructive and durable peacemaking.

Thirdly, psychological forces can be directed and harnessed by prepared machinery for international co-operation, if this be already in existence and available for the constructive energies which the end of war will certainly release. Here lies the most hopeful of all omens for positive peacemaking: for during the war the machinery for co-operation among the United Nations

¹ *Combat*, March, 1944: "To-morrow we do not wish the life of every German to be made into a martyrdom. . . . A federated socialist Europe will include a socialist Germany." Splitting up Germany is specifically rejected.

² See above, p. 197, for details of these pledges and the proposed procedure.

has steadily grown and expanded, until most of the essential agencies for "first-line" relief and reconstruction are standing ready for immediate action. These have been constantly referred to throughout the previous pages. It is time to review these existing preparations as a whole, and to assess, as far as possible, their general significance in the complex process of peacemaking.

§ 5. THE ORGANIZATION OF "THE UNITED NATIONS"

It is important to analyse in concrete terms the concept of "the United Nations". In what sense, and for what purposes, are they united? How far can nations be termed "united", when they are so immensely different in size of territory and population, in industrial and military power, in traditions and form of government, as Soviet Russia, Canada, Brazil, Norway and Greece? There is real political danger in over-frequent use of the phrase "the United Nations", if it is used as an anodyne for thought. Its limitations are as important as its capacities—its liabilities as significant as its assets—as the supreme organization for peacemaking. It excludes the three chief enemy States—all of them large in territory and population. It excludes the satellite States—Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania. It excludes important neutrals, such as Turkey and Sweden, Spain and Portugal, Argentina and Chile. Even so, it includes over three-quarters of the population of the world, and all States which will rank as world Powers at the crucial period of peacemaking. The very structure and shape of the group reveals its essential character. It is what Mr. Churchill has sometimes called it—a Grand Alliance—historically the greatest of all Grand Alliances, forged in the heat of battle to resist the domination of the world by two or three aggressive dictatorships. It therefore naturally focuses around the "Big Four", whose leaders have made all the crucial decisions and have consistently taken the initiative at Casablanca, Moscow, Cairo, Teheran, and Quebec.

Membership of it has been determined less by free choice than by necessity. No country except France and the British Commonwealth entered it until it was either directly attacked or so ominously threatened by enemy disruptive tactics that attack seemed imminent. Holland and Belgium, Norway and Denmark, Greece and Yugoslavia, all ostentatiously proclaimed their neutrality until they were invaded by Germany. Soviet Russia

and the United States were assaulted by the enemy before they entered the war, although under the preparedness policy of President Roosevelt the United States had already rendered valuable service to the cause of Britain and France. It is, in origin and mainspring, a battle-fellowship thrown together by the exigencies of fascist aggression and totalitarian war. But much has been built on that foundation, and the "United Nations" as a concept and as a concrete organization has developed far beyond these somewhat negative beginnings.

Four distinct lines of development can be traced—all interlocked and converging into one common purpose: defeat of the enemy and aid to his victims.

First, there has developed a network of bi-lateral treaties and agreements. There is the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942: the Czech-Soviet, Polish-Czech and Greek-Yugoslav agreements already mentioned:¹ the Mutual Aid Agreement between Britain and the United States: even the Canberra pact of January 21st, 1944, between Australia and New Zealand, binding the two Dominions to act together in matters of common interest in the south-western Pacific. Clearly the implementing of these treaties depends on the resolve and good-will of the participants: and they are more akin to agreed statements of policy, such as the Atlantic Charter and the Moscow Declarations, than to existing machinery such as U.N.R.R.A. But all concerned will have a common interest in ensuring the fulfilment of treaty obligations and in ensuring that promises will be treated with more respect than became common in the 1930's. In this sense, these agreements are significant and of permanent value.

Secondly, there have been common statements of general principle and agreed policy, such as the Atlantic Charter and the Big-Power declarations of Moscow, Cairo and Teheran, and—in the economic and social sphere—the Philadelphia Charter issued by the International Labour Office on May 10th, 1944.² All the United Nations, without exception, have signed the Atlantic Charter, and however general and even ambiguous may be its phraseology, it provides a commitment to certain general principles of international behaviour which will prove embarrassing to all who clearly ignore or violate its terms.

Thirdly, and on a more concrete and practical level, there

¹ Above, Chapter V, § 2. The exact significance and durability of these latter agreements vary considerably, in the light of later developments.

² For the texts of the Atlantic and Philadelphia Charters, see Appendix. All are discussed in W. Arnold Foster: *Charters of Peace* (1944).

has grown up an elaborate machinery of military, naval, air and economic collaboration, especially among the "Big Four", which will be at its highest point of development, prestige and success at the moment of victory. This is of supreme importance, for the nature of modern warfare means that military co-ordination and collaboration is as "total" as total war. Since 1793 war between nations has been based on national conscription: since 1870 it has been based on the fullest possible use of heavy industry; since 1914, it has been based on the guidance and mobilization of public opinion through propaganda. It involves not only the whole nation, and strikes at the whole of the enemy nation through the weapons of blockade, bombing and propaganda: but also it involves the whole life of the whole nation, in the economic, social and psychological spheres, no less than in the military and political. This truth is reflected in the organizations which the leading United Nations have been forced to develop in order to carry on the war.

Both chronology and geography have dictated that the fusion of military power between Britain, the Commonwealth, the United States and the occupied countries should be greater than between them and China or Russia. By means of Chiefs of Staffs Committees, the Pacific War Council, United Services Missions, and the rest, supreme direction of war strategy has been co-ordinated with striking effect. Under Supreme Allied Commanders like General MacArthur in the Pacific, and General Eisenhower in Europe, forces of all arms and all nations have been fused into a united weapon of war. As Colonel Llewellyn has put it, "Not only have the plans of campaign been worked out jointly, but their execution in the battle areas has equally been a joint adventure."¹ Through military missions, naval convoys, and bombing shuttle-service, even Russian and western war-efforts have been closely linked in action. The concerted strategy worked out at Moscow and Teheran became vividly effective in the timing of Russian and Allied attacks on Hitler's Europe during 1944 and 1945.

Although much of this purely military collaboration might be expected to weaken and end once the necessity of military action ends, the substance of such "mixing up" of national forces should prove of permanent effect in the security organization universally demanded after the war. In the tasks of disarming and controlling the vanquished countries, first-aid relief

¹ *International Conciliation*, March, 1944.

in the occupied countries, and permanent security measures against aggression, military participation of large and small nations has become a clearer practical possibility in the light of war-time experience. If French soldiers and sailors, Polish airmen and Norwegian merchant-seamen can collaborate so efficiently with British and Americans under a British or American commander, the prospect of a real international security-force considerably brightens. Likewise, if strategic bases and airports can be so welded into a common defence system, regardless of their national ownership, for the purposes of war, they are more likely to remain so planned for purposes of world security.

But of more profound and permanent significance than the purely military fusion and unification is the joint planning of economic resources and supply. The United States and the British Commonwealth have set up five combined boards for these ends: the Combined Munitions Assignments Board, the Combined Production and Resources Board, the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Combined Food Board, and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. These Boards were all given general instructions "to further the co-ordination of the United Nations war effort", and to "confer with the representatives of the U.S.S.R., China, and such other of the United Nations as are necessary to attain common purposes." There is also the very important Middle East Supply Centre, operating on a regional basis.¹ Most of these Boards have been in action since the beginning of 1942, and they have many supporting Boards in Canada, India, Australia, and elsewhere. The probable—and certainly the desirable—rôle of this machinery in peace-making has been thus defined:

At the end of the war, the thing to avoid will be the making of any hurried decisions to scrap. 'Let us keep what is working well until something has been created which will work equally well. The best chance of solving the problems that arise in the change from war to peace will be through such bodies as know what can and cannot be done, based on their experience in dealing with similar problems in time of war.'²

Experience of working together is worth more than many treaty promises and paper obligations: and here, in full working order, is an extensive machinery of real international co-operation which, widened and adapted, perhaps, to meet the fresh needs

¹ See below, Chapter VII, § 2.

² Colonel J. J. Llewellyn, in *International Conciliation*, March, 1944.

and broader possibilities of peace, will play a central part in the process of peacemaking on the social and economic level.¹

Fourthly, and most important of all, there is the existing machinery for relief and reconstruction after the war, on both a national and an international scale. All the exiled governments of the occupied countries which have colonial or financial resources adequate for the task, have plans and machinery of their own for relief and reconstruction in their countries after liberation. Particularly the French, Belgians and Dutch, who control great overseas colonies rich in raw materials, will be able to do much by purely national effort. They could not do enough, however, without the great international machinery devised by the conferences at Hot Springs in May, 1943,² Atlantic City in November, 1943,³ and at Bretton Woods in July, 1944.⁴

The work of the Hot Springs Conference was summarized thus by its Secretary-General :

The work of the Conference emphasized the fundamental interdependence of the consumer and the producer. It recognized that the food policy and the agricultural policy of the nations must be considered together : it recommended that a permanent body should be established to deal with the varied problems of food and agriculture, not in isolation, but together. . . .

"The conference agreed (Resolution XIII) that while shortages lasted there should be co-ordinated action by governments both

¹ Cf. E. Staley : *Wartime and Peacetime Economic Collaboration* (1941), and Report of the Eighth *Fortune* Round Table on "Peace Aims" (Princeton, February, 1941). "At the end of the present war, we believe the task of reconstruction should be entrusted not to a hurriedly convened peace conference, but to the organs already developed by the Democratic Bloc during the present war. What we envisage is a continuing organism . . . to sweep away the debris of the present war and lay economic and political foundations for the future" (quoted J. B. Condliffe : *Agenda for a Post-War World*).

² *Cmd. 6451*. "Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture." The nations represented were Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Commonwealth, Poland, Union of South Africa, U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. See below, Chapter VII.

³ *Cmd. 6497*. "United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Resolutions and report adopted by the Council at its first session." The agreement originally establishing U.N.R.R.A. was signed on November 9th, 1943, by 44 nations—the same 44 listed above, Note 2. See *Cmd. 6491*, and below, Chapter VII.

⁴ *Cmd. 6546*. "Final Act of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference." The same 44 nations again sent delegations, the Conference being under the presidency of Mr. Morgenthau, United States Secretary of the Treasury. Considerable complaint was raised by the confused, misleading and inadequate reporting of the Conference, as well as of the official summary of its proceedings. Cf. *The Economist*, August 12th, 1944. See below, Chapter VII.

to secure increased production and to prevent speculative and violent fluctuations in prices.”¹ It set up an Interim Commission in Washington, to draft a plan for the permanent Food and Agriculture Organization.

The Council of U.N.R.R.A. set up two regional Committees, for Europe and for the Far East, as well as its Committees on Supplies, Financial Control, Agriculture, Health, Welfare, and Displaced Persons. Since the full Council, representing all forty-four member nations, meets only twice yearly, guidance and direction fall to its Central Committee, on which the “Big Four”—Britain, U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and China—have permanent representatives, and on which other countries are represented when their needs are under consideration.² Appearing when it did, the urgent tasks of the Administration were twofold: to dovetail itself and its projected activities into existing organizations covering a similar field, and to prepare immediate plans for relief during war and in the period of liberation in occupied countries. It achieved the first by careful definition of its relations to the Allied military authorities, in whose wake U.N.R.R.A. must work in the liberated lands, and with the various Combined Boards already mentioned, through whose agency it must at present work. As regards relief and the rescue of refugees, it had to define its relations with the countless voluntary societies already engaged in such work. It achieved the second by agreeing on certain general principles: chiefly, that wherever national authorities can pay for and administer relief they should do so; that surplus reserves should be stored and earmarked for relief work; that every step possible should be taken to encourage self-help, with the supply of plant, seeds and all requisites for liberated countries to grow their own food and supply their own needs as soon as possible after liberation. But throughout the discussions and resolutions of the Council, it was apparent that long-term rehabilitation must be an ever-present consideration, in the sense both that immediate action during the formative period would itself help to mould the future, and that the services of an international body such as the

¹ *Cmd. 6451*, pp. 2-5. “Agriculture” is defined as extending to “Fisheries, marine products, forestry, primary forestry products, fibres, and other non-food agricultural products.”

² This arrangement followed naturally and logically from the way in which U.N.R.R.A. inherited all the functions, experience, information and even most of the personnel of the former Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. It involved, however, considerable debate before the arrangement was finally accepted by the Council of U.N.R.R.A.

Administration would prove to have permanent value in the long-term tasks of peacemaking on the social and economic level,¹ if only as a habit and an experiment in international co-operation affecting intimately the lives of millions of men and women.

The achievements of the first session of the Council were thus summed up by Mr. Dean Acheson, its Chairman :

We have reached agreement upon a practicable programme, of defined scope, fully possible of achievement in action. A general purpose has been translated into a definite plan.

We have formulated for submission to the law-making bodies of our countries a workable plan for financing our programme, a plan, the fairness and practicability of which we believe will commend it to those in authority.

We have devised a procedure for ascertaining and meeting needs, which fits into the existing procedures for supplying the materials needed in the prosecution of the war, and which assures fairness and expedition in the supply of liberated areas.

Finally, we have chosen the men to lead us in the continuing co-operation without which this work cannot succeed, and we have provided for an international organization to administer the policies laid down.

The creation of U.N.R.R.A., dealing as it must with social issues hitherto the exclusive province of internal national authorities, is a supremely important event in international organization and in "advance peacemaking". It supplies a pattern of action, and a habit of behaviour, which may well prove fruitful as an example in other fields of international functional administration.

The United Nations' Monetary Agreement reached at the Bretton Woods Conference of July, 1944, set forth its general purposes in Article I of the Agreement.² It proposed the creation of an International Monetary Fund and of an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development : but the Agreement remained a proposal, to be placed before each national authority for consideration. The Fund was designed to provide short-term credit facilities to member countries to enable them to over-

¹ But notice the limitations self-imposed in Resolution 12 (*op. cit.*, p. 15). "The task of rehabilitation must not be considered as the beginning of reconstruction—it is coterminous with relief. No new construction or reconstruction work is contemplated, but only rehabilitation as defined in the preamble of the Agreement. . . . The Administration cannot be called upon to restore continuous employment in the world." This aim, however, is specifically the purpose of the I.L.O. Cf. *The Philadelphia Charter*, Section III, which defines "the solemn obligation of the I.L.O." as being "to further among the nations of the world programmes which will achieve full employment and the raising of standards of living". (See Appendix II, B.)

² See Appendix III, C.

come temporary difficulties in the balance of payments without resorting to restrictive monetary measures which would injure international trade. The World Bank was devised to provide long-term loans so that member countries able to export without demanding the immediate return of real wealth should be able to help others in adjusting their economy ; and to facilitate long-term plans of rehabilitation and industrialization.

The Agreement opened, in the words of *The Times*, " a new phase in the collaboration of the United Nations ". If generally adopted and carried into effect, and adequately reinforced by corresponding agreement on commercial policy, it could clearly provide the framework for a deliberate international control of currency and investment which might replace the control exerted more silently by the financial supremacy of the City of London in the nineteenth century, and at the same time would be an agency for the partial planning and guidance of international trade. Such are its potentialities : but the practical application of the Agreement is still too uncertain and ill-defined to justify more complete judgement.

What, then, can be said in general of the organization of the forty-four " United Nations " after the fifth year of war ? In the realm of agriculture and food, relief and rehabilitation, currency and investment, specific machinery for collaboration has been either created or drafted. In the realm of labour organization and social welfare, the International Labour Organization has been kept in existence, and partially revived. In the sphere of military, naval and air co-operation, a composite international fighting force, operating from commonly held bases under a unified command, and on a concerted plan of strategy and defence, has been in action and is likely to remain in existence, at least for some time, during the post-war years.¹ The pooling of resources, joint planning of production and allocation and transport of goods, has been carried far during the years of totalitarian war, and no general desire is apparent to disintegrate the spirit or machinery of collaboration which has been built up under necessity : indeed, such is the nature of the Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid agreements, that the United Nations must, of material necessity, continue concerted action long after the war. By all these methods, the common purpose of the " United

¹ Such concerted military action is foreshadowed in the report of the British delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, issued on October 9th, 1944, and in the joint declaration issued from the Crimea Conference of February, 1945. See Appendix I, G.

Nations", negative enough in its origins, has been given a solidarity and a more positive, progressive character. The Grand Alliance, forged in totalitarian and global war, is rich in potential good for the world.

It has also, however, an immense potential futility and even immense potential dangers. It has developed in solidarity just far enough to encourage optimism, but not yet far enough to justify optimism. There remains the concrete task of making durable the existing degree of co-operation between States so diverse in character and divergent in interests as China and Chile, Iceland and India, Poland and Peru. Amongst the forty-four nations, there remains the problem of the right relations between the forty and the four: relations which cannot be satisfactorily settled by phrases about "the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States", used at the Moscow Conference and repeated so often since. There remains, perhaps above all, the problem of the right relations between the four themselves—the "Big Four", so overwhelmingly powerful as a united bloc, yet separately so divergent in outlook and make-up, and separately not so immeasurably greater than a France with her overseas colonies, or an India which had found greater unity and opportunity to develop her economic resources. There is a danger in being over-impressed by the number forty-four, when this number is reached by counting Nicaragua, Liberia, Luxembourg and Haiti, and does not include Germany, Italy or Japan, Turkey, Sweden or Argentina. If the United Nations are to make a peace which will last, and which will correspond to the price paid for its winning, their present achievements in collaboration should be looked upon neither with complacency nor over-optimism, but rather as the visible part of an iceberg, important because it betokens a much vaster bulk still hidden from view. What is needed is still more constructive and far-reaching action, through the Combined Boards, the Middle East Supply Centre, the I.L.O., the League of Nations technical bodies, U.N.R.R.A. or kindred organizations, overlapping and complementary, and co-ordinated into an adequate network of active international co-operation: all with the aim of promoting on an international scale the public health, standards of nutrition, housing, sanitation, education and work of men and women in each nation. Here—and here only—is something of common interest to Poland and Peru.

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The last three chapters have outlined what may be called "the framework of peacemaking", as distinct from the technique of conducting and controlling the transition from war to peace on one hand, and from the substantial content and operative principles of long-range, durable peacemaking on the other. Although, for purposes of analysis and discussion, it is logical and necessary to divide up the process of peacemaking into these stages, it will already be clear that each stage merges imperceptibly into the other, and that shortcomings or failures at any one stage have far-reaching repercussions at later stages. Peacemaking is organically one vast process, wherein decisions at one stage or in one sphere have constant interaction on decisions at other stages and in other spheres.

But now, from consideration of past experience, prevalent proposals and the outlook and organizations of the peacemakers, which in combination provide the framework within which peace will be planned, we must move on to consideration of somewhat more speculative problems—the substance of the peace settlement itself. In these matters, the personal opinions of the authors clearly loom larger than in the analysis and collation of known facts. But here, too, in conformity with the general purpose of this book, attempt has been made to estimate the direction and meaning of existing trends of opinion and event, rather than to thrust forward personal views. And therefore the enquiry starts with a fuller analysis of conferences already held and machinery already set up—with the "growing pattern" of the peace settlement as it can already be perceived.

PART III

THE SUBSTANCE OF PEACEMAKING

CHAPTER VII

THE GROWING PATTERN

§ 1. *The pre-war type : the technical bodies of the League of Nations : the Permanent Court of International Justice : the International Labour Office : the Philadelphia Conference : the Philadelphia Declaration and the future of the I.L.O.*

§ 2. *The war-time type : the Middle East Supply Centre : its regional organization and achievements : the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees : its war-time reorganization : its relation to the I.L.O. and U.N.R.R.A.*

§ 3. *The short-range post-war type : the origins of U.N.R.R.A. ; its constitution ; its regional organizations ; its functions : U.N.R.R.A. and former enemy countries : its finances and administration : U.N.R.R.A. and an " International Civil Service " : U.N.R.R.A. as the prototype for other functional organizations.*

§ 4. *The long-range post-war type : the Food and Agriculture Organization : comparison between F.A.O. and the I.L.O. and U.N.R.R.A. : the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development : the background of the Bretton Woods Conference : the Keynes and White Plans : the Joint Statement by Experts : the organization of the Bretton Woods Conference : the structure of the proposed monetary organizations : weighted voting-strength : their limited functions : proposed procedure for their establishment : other plans for shipping, aviation, oil, wheat, education.*

§ 5. *Co-ordinating the functional organizations : proposed means of linking up and co-ordinating these diverse bodies : the suggestion of an " Economic and Social Council " at Dumbarton Oaks.*

Mention has already been made of the various forms of international collaboration which have survived or developed during war, and of their general rôle in the process of peacemaking. From a more close-up view of these forms—of the conferences held to create them, the difficulties encountered and the kinds of machinery set up by them—we can gain some picture of a pattern of peacemaking which is already in existence, and which may well go on growing throughout the post-war years. These conferences and consequent organizations fall broadly into four types :

1. The pre-war type—especially the International Labour Organization created in 1919, and the technical bodies of the League of Nations which have continued to function.

2. The war-time type—especially the Middle East Supply Centre, which operates on a regional basis and springs from the

machinery of the war-effort itself : and the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees.

3. The short-range, post-war type—especially U.N.R.R.A., confined to the United Nations and with specific and limited functions for the immediate post-war period.

4. The long-range, post-war type—especially the machinery proposed at the conferences of Hot Springs and Bretton Woods, much of which is still in the form of proposals and recommendations to national governments. Plans for post-war aviation and shipping, oil and wheat, are also of this type.

In any examination of growing and developing bodies of this kind, there can be no finality, either of description or judgement, But it can already be said with some certainty that from the inter-weaving of these four types will grow at least the broad pattern of the future international system.

§ 1. THE PRE-WAR TYPE : THE I.L.O.

Little need be said about the *technical bodies of the old League of Nations* which have continued to function during the war, and whose experience and facilities can still play a valuable part after the war. After the Atlantic City Conference in November, 1943, which had been attended by representatives of the League's Economic and Financial Mission and the Health Section, a joint session was held of the League's Economic and Financial Committees. They there resolved that "the fullest possible help should be offered by the League's services to U.N.R.R.A., the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, and such other intergovernmental agencies as may be created." They also adopted a programme for promoting the fullest employment of economic resources, rising living standards, prevention of depression, and appropriate monetary and investment policies. The Economic and Financial mission continued its work of collecting information which could be made available for the peace settlement, and conducted research into relevant economic problems.¹ The Fiscal Committee met in Mexico in July, 1943, to study problems of taxation. The Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body met in London in October, 1943. In general, the aim of all branches has been to carry out a sort of holding action, performing such functions as can be of permanent

¹ Notably the study of *The Transition from War to Peace Economy* prepared by the Committee on Economic Depressions. See *International Conciliation*, No. 397, pp. 140-9.

value in making the fund of League experience available for others, and keeping themselves in existence through difficult conditions. League bodies have both the advantage and disadvantage of being neither inclusively nor exclusively "United Nations" in membership and support: and this fact governs also their behaviour.

The Permanent Court of International Justice, also created in 1919 through a development of previous courts, has lived up to its name. Its work has naturally been small and unspectacular amid world war, but it remains in being as an indispensable part of the machinery of international conciliation, with a good record in the past, and with some promise that it can yet, perhaps in modified form, serve a valuable purpose. Mr. Cordell Hull, on September 12th, 1943, referred to consideration being given to "the extent to which the existing court of international justice may or may not need to be remodelled", and President Roosevelt in his preliminary statement on security organization included "an international court to deal primarily with justiciable disputes".¹ The basic principle of the court, as laid down in Article 14 of the Covenant of the League, was that "it shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly." The "Geneva Protocol" of 1920, providing for previous agreement between States to submit to arbitration of the Permanent Court, was rejected in 1925. Thus the functions of the court were always dependent on voluntary submission by States involved in a dispute, and no pronouncement has yet been made as to whether or not the idea of the Geneva Protocol will be revived.²

The International Labour Office was created in 1919 as part of the new machinery of peace, by Article XIII of the Treaty of Versailles.³ Its constitution consists of three main organs. The general basis is the International Labour Conference, on which each member nation is equally represented, and to which each sends four delegates. National delegations consist of two representatives of the Government, and two "Delegates representing

¹ See below, Chapter VII, § 3. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals left it open whether the old Court was to be revised and continued, or a new one created.

² See A. B. Keith: *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs*, Vol. I, pp. xviii, 15, 62. The Statute of the Permanent Court is conveniently available in *Recent General Treaties* (1934). See also above, Chapter II, § 5, and the books there listed.

³ The statute of the I.L.O. may be conveniently found in *Recent General Treaties* (1934).

respectively the employers and the workpeople of each of the Members". Member States undertake "to nominate non-Government Delegates and advisers chosen in agreement with the industrial organizations, if such organizations exist, which are most representative of employers or workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries". The Conference can, by a two-thirds majority, "refuse to admit any Delegate or adviser whom it deems not to have been nominated in accordance with this Article". Each category of Delegates votes separately.

The Governing Body is composed of sixteen Government Delegates, eight Employers' and eight Workers' Delegates. Half the Government Delegates are appointed by "the Members of chief industrial importance", the other half are chosen by the rest of the Government Delegates. Of the sixteen States so represented, six must be non-European States. The Delegations of Employers and Workers each elect their eight representatives on the Governing Body.

The Secretariat, or International Labour Office, is under a Director appointed by the Governing Body, whose meetings he attends. The Organization was originally financed off the budget of the League but is now directly financed by member States. The personality of the Director became of great importance, and M. Albert Thomas converted the office, by the force of his own personality, into a position far more important than Secretary-General of the League. "It was the Director's business to lead," writes Mr. Harold Butler. Whatever the topic of discussion, he was there to represent the international standpoint."¹ During the war, the I.L.O. has worked in Montreal.

The Conference adopts minimum international standards, which it formulates into "Conventions" and "Recommendations", both of which require a two-thirds majority to pass. Between 1919 and 1944, it adopted 67 Conventions and 73 Recommendations. But none of these becomes automatically binding on member States until accepted by the States concerned, and few accepted even a half of them. The I.L.O. is thus, at once, advisory and consultative. Its Secretariat collects, collates and distributes information : and its Conference gives collective advice.

Membership of the I.L.O. was never quite identical with membership of the League. The United States joined the I.L.O.

¹ Harold Butler : *The Lost Peace* (1941), p. 50. Mr. Butler was first Deputy Director under Albert Thomas, and then Thomas's successor as Director.

but never the League. Thus, when the Soviet Union was expelled from the League in 1939, it was left open whether or not she still had membership of the I.L.O. This caused some confusion during its 1944 session.

When the Governing Body of the I.L.O. met in December, 1943, to plan a Conference to meet at Philadelphia in April, 1944, it assumed that the U.S.S.R. was still a member, and an invitation was issued to the Soviet Government to send Delegates. The invitation was not accepted, *Izvestia* giving as the reason that "the I.L.O. should cease to be an appendage of the League, which is now moribund, and should become an organ of the United Nations. In such conditions, the obstacles to U.S.S.R. representation would disappear."¹ This raised a fundamental question of the constitution of the I.L.O. which has yet to be solved. To the Philadelphia Conference (April 20th–May 13th, 1944), forty-one Members sent Delegates, which included neutral States but excluded the U.S.S.R.² The absence of so great a Power—with such immense industrial importance in the world—was considered as a serious handicap to the whole organization.

But participation of Soviet Russia raises again, as it raised in 1934 when she first joined the I.L.O., the equally basic question of the tripartite principle of representation. The nearest approach to Employers' organizations in Russia are government departments, and the nearest approach to workers' organizations are the semi-official trade unions. Neither fits neatly into the tripartite structure of the I.L.O. As more States adopt greater measures of nationalization at home (such, for example, as the French Provisional Government plans for France), the more inappropriate will the tripartite constitution become. At Philadelphia an Australian Government Delegate proposed the formation of an inter-governmental employment committee with executive authority, on the grounds that the tripartite basis was unsuitable for such work as the formulation of full employment policies. The proposal was defeated, and workers' delegates especially were opposed to abandonment of the tripartite basis. But events may well force reconsideration of the whole question.

Absence of the U.S.S.R. was not the only problem of member-

¹ *Izvestia*, April 25th, 1944. Finland, in accordance with the rules, had been invited to attend, in spite of her then being at war with the Soviet Union and Great Britain. This no doubt partly explains the Soviet refusal. Finland eventually did not send delegates to Philadelphia.

² For reports of this Philadelphia Conference (the 26th Session of the I.L.O.), see *International Labour Review*, Vol. L, No. 1, July, 1944, and the *Official Bulletin*, Vol. XXVI, Nos. 1 and 2.

ship and entrance-qualification raised during the Philadelphia Conference. Argentina and the Yugoslav Liberation Committee both caused problems of "recognition", and the Greek workers' delegation withdrew in protest against the Greek Government's policy. The policy of the British Government met with severe criticisms, and the whole conference was more beset with political issues than any of its predecessors. Attempts to formulate policy towards Germany broke down. Indeed the general floundering in which the conference found itself indulging helped to drive it down to more concrete statements of its aims, and of the scope of the I.L.O. in the post-war world.

This task produced a division of opinion over fundamentals. Some wanted great extension of the scope and functions of the I.L.O., until it should become the supreme authority for all matters not only of social, but also of economic policy of international importance. Others opposed such extension, on the grounds that several functional organizations would be more efficient than an excessive centralization of functions in one body, and that anyhow the peculiar constitution of the I.L.O. made it unsuitable to perform such functions. Compromise was reached, and the result was formulated as the Philadelphia Charter.¹

This Charter, intended as the declaration of aims of the I.L.O. in and beyond peacemaking, does result in extending the scope of the organization beyond pre-war limits. Being predominantly concerned with industry, and by its very structure having little purview of agriculture, the I.L.O. was always concerned essentially with industrial conditions, and with social policy as distinct from economic policy. Now it claims "to examine and consider all international, economic and financial policies and measures in the light of the search for social justice". Thus in function it claims *only* to "examine and consider policies", not to formulate them: but in scope it rejects any limitation to *industrial* labour conditions, or to social policy as separate from economic policy. How far this extended claim can be made good, and what relationships to other functional bodies more purely intergovernmental in character can be achieved, remains to be seen.

Perhaps the chief value and significance of this restatement of aims is that the I.L.O. now opposes again to other purely intergovernmental bodies the conception of an international institu-

¹ For full text, see Appendix II. § 4, pledges "full co-operation . . . with such international bodies as may be entrusted with a share of the responsibility for this great task. . . ." Observers from various other bodies attended the meetings in January, 1945.

tion with direct participation of groups other than national governments. In the Philadelphia Charter it has emblazoned the principle of pursuing the tasks of peacemaking beneath the political framework of each national State and even beneath the Grand Alliance of the United Nations. It has affirmed, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter, the universalist ideal that all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.

The Philadelphia Charter is not a programme of action, yet it is more than a pious aspiration. It was adopted unanimously by the representatives (including 74 Government delegates) of 41 nations. It constitutes what has been accurately called "a framework of reference for the achievement of an international code of rights for the common man". It recognizes, with Mr. Henry Wallace, that "this is the social century". And the Conference reduced it to more concrete terms in its specific resolutions. These included recommendation that the Declaration of Philadelphia be reaffirmed as part of the peace settlement and incorporated in any treaties: that the United Nations should formally undertake to maintain a high level of employment: that assuming "the peace" consists of a series of arrangements rather than one formal treaty, specific social provisions be made in each arrangement: in general, that peacemaking should be used for a "concerted advance in the acceptance of binding obligations concerning conditions of labour". They asserted the specific principle that in addition to the aim of full employment there must be the aim of raising living standards, the two being indivisible for social well-being: and that beyond this again, must be the aim of expanding international trade. They were concerned with concrete war-time and post-war problems, such as demobilization, reabsorption of labour and readjustment of industry, minimum standards of social policy in dependent territories, and so on.

The Philadelphia conference showed that the I.L.O. is not only alive but active and resolved to become an integral part of the machinery of peacemaking in social *and* economic life. It is a link between past and future, allies and neutrals, political and social peacemaking. This organization which has been served in the past by men like Albert Thomas, Harold Butler, and J. G. Winant, may yet enlist the services of men who can use it wisely

and well in the manifold labours of peacemaking.¹ It may even serve as an early link between allies and former enemies, as it did between the two wars.² Mr. Ernest Bevin has said, "I look upon the I.L.O. as the body which will be charged with the duty of assisting governments through its advice to give effect to Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter."³ This declares that the governments of the United Nations "desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic adjustment and social security". The I.L.O. has eagerly assumed that duty, and regards it as a right.

§ 2. THE WAR-TIME TYPE : THE M.E.S.C. AND THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

The Middle East Supply Centre may be taken as the prototype of war-time organizations, created by sheer necessity and with the primary aim of military efficiency, yet proving themselves of wider usefulness and more permanent value in planning for peace.

In origin it was even unilateral, for it was created in April, 1941, by the British Government, when shipping difficulties were so acute that imports and exports of the Middle East had to be more scientifically regulated. Its aim was at first purely strategic—economy in shipping and optimum use of available resources and supplies. Since 1942, the United States has co-operated in all its work, and the centre soon became the agency of joint Anglo-American policy. It is controlled by a small joint Executive Committee. Its functions are those of advising and co-ordinating, not of wielding executive or administrative power : but it has become a vital link between the countries of the Middle East on one hand and the various Allied authorities on the other, whether on the spot (the British Minister Resident and the Middle East War Council) or in London (the Ministry of War Transport and the War Cabinet). Its territorial scope has also steadily widened, until it includes Egypt, the Sudan, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Eritrea, Ethiopia, British and French Somaliland, Aden, Pales-

¹ On the work and achievements of the I.L.O., see especially : *The International Labour Organization : The First Decade* (1931) ; E. J. Phelan : *Yes and Albert Thomas* (1936) ; *The International Labour Organization* (Fabian Research Series, No. 82, 1944) ; *The International Labour Review* (monthly publication of I.L.O.).

² Cf. Harold Butler : *The Lost Peace* (1941), p. 48. Germany was admitted to the first I.L.O. Conference in 1919, and Japan retained membership even after leaving the League of Nations.

³ Mr. Bevin to the 91st session of the Governing Body of the I.L.O.

tine, Syria, the Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, the Arab States, Iraq, Persia and Cyprus. It has links with Turkey and East Africa, and for a time included Malta. It has become, within war-time limitations, an agency of certain forms of regional planning.

Imports are controlled through the purchase in bulk, by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, of principal food-stuffs required, at world prices, and the bulk allocation from the regional pool of the required quota to each country concerned. Individual traders may also import certain goods under M.E.S.C. licence. The interchange of surpluses between the countries within the region has likewise been arranged—though under great difficulties, both financial and political. All governments of the region have been encouraged to undertake internal planning and development: pooled information and technical advice have been readily supplied by the Centre, which keeps individual representatives in each country. By wide extension of activities along these lines, the Centre has become a social-service organization, prompting and promoting irrigation, pest-control, the greater use of agricultural machinery and scientific fertilizers, the preservation of food by canning and dehydration, epidemic prevention and control, and better transport facilities.

Many regional conferences have been held, in Cairo, Teheran, Damascus and other capitals, encouraging common policies among the peoples and governments of the region. Two especially important conferences were held at Cairo in February and April, 1944, to discuss agricultural development and financial problems. Further development and ramification are suggested by the resolutions passed at these conferences: the recommendation that the governments concerned should set up a Middle East Council of Agriculture and a Central Institute of Agricultural Development. These would, if created, clearly have links with the Food and Agriculture Organization recommended by the Hot Springs Conference.¹ The logic of such trends would be the creation after the war of a permanent Middle East Economic Council for still more comprehensive regional planning of economic activity and social welfare. The rapid development of the M.E.S.C. illustrates four very significant tendencies in modern peacemaking, and in the process of transition from war to peace:

(a) That modern warfare, affecting "totally" the economic resources and social life of all countries, tends to stimulate a wider

¹ See Chapter VI, above, p. 230, and below, p. 319 f.

measure of international co-operation and planning than during peace.

(b) That even in the Middle East, so long profoundly divided and disrupted by separatist national policies and hatreds, a considerable amount of active international co-operation can be successfully achieved if the problems are approached on a practical specific level ; if policies are concerned with the real material and social well-being of the ordinary people in each country, and are not tackled in terms of " national sovereignty " and " self-determination ".

(c) That such co-operation, once tried and found profitable, tends to expand under its own steam, and seek greater scope and permanence : and the machinery of war-time can, if skilfully handled, lead on naturally to the agencies of constructive peace-making.

(d) That the natural unit of modern planning is not merely nor primarily the nation-State, but the larger territorial region : for none of the problems of the Middle East, with its multitude of small States, could be usefully tackled by one nation alone.

These lessons are of obvious and far-reaching importance for the world-wide tasks of peacemaking.¹

A link between pre-war, war-time and post-war international organizations, is the *Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees*. It originates from pre-war arrangements and patterns of organization, of which the first in this field of relief and humanitarian social service was the appointment under League auspices of a High Commissioner for Refugees.²

The tide of refugees from Fascist terror grew throughout the 1930's. " Refugees " were at first not recognized as that very unfortunate definable category of " people without country and passport ". They were often considered as " scum of the earth ".³ They were driven from one country to another often under abominable conditions, as Elizabethan wandering beggars were whipped from one parish to the other.

In 1938, when thousands of political and racial refugees from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia had to pay for Nazi " bloodless victories " by enforced emigration, the problem

¹ The individuals most concerned with the M.E.S.C. are Sir Edward Grigg, the British Minister Resident ; Mr. R. G. A. Jackson, Director-General ; and Dr. E. E. Bailey, Deputy Director of the M.E.S.C.

² In 1933, cf. Viscount Cecil : *A Great Experiment*, p. 252 f.

³ Cf. Arthur Koestler : *Scum of the Earth* (1941), and see Sir John Hope-Simpson : *The Refugee Problem* (1939).

assumed proportions with which a mere Commissioner of the now discredited and disorganised League could no longer cope. Under British and United States auspices, an international conference at Evian decided to support the High Commissioner by an "intergovernmental committee". The purpose of the Committee was twofold : to influence governments to take a more understanding attitude towards refugees, and to relieve private organizations of a burden which had become too onerous for them to carry efficiently.¹

As a result improvements were made, and a steady stream of emigrants, particularly children, found refuge and new homes outside the Nazi domains which had extended from Germany to Austria, Czechoslovakia and Danzig. But the outbreak of war interrupted these arrangements. Transport difficulties and security problems raised new obstacles. At the Bermudas Conference in 1943 British and United States representatives again took the lead in re-organizing the Intergovernmental Committee. Former members like Switzerland could no longer take an official part in the work, but under the authority of the Executive Committee and the governments of such members as belonged to the United Nations, temporary re-organization took place. In August, 1944, a full session of the Committee was held in London to approve the reconstruction of the organization. Twenty-eight governments were represented.

The constitution, rules of procedure and finance were overhauled, though the Committee's cumbersome title remained. That this re-organization was thought necessary might be reason for either pessimism or optimism. If it meant that the twenty-eight governments concerned had given up hope of a peace without refugees, and foresaw such re-drawing of frontiers that new refugee problems might be created,² then there is reason for pessimism. But if it meant only a resolve to forestall further misery ; to have the most efficient machinery possible in working order to alleviate human suffering ; and to evolve specialized forms of organization to deal with separate aspects of the refugee problem : then there was reason for optimism. In any case, the result was the setting up of a fully finished international

¹ Many private and voluntary bodies had done much valuable work, e.g. the Baldwin Fund, formed after the events of November, 1938, in Germany.

² Enforced migration of more than two million Sudeten Germans from the territory of post-war Czechoslovakia at the time of writing is a considered policy of the Czech Government. The drawing of the new western frontiers of Poland might well result in similar transfers of population.

functional organization to deal with the specific problems of people who even after the war will have no country. The structure of this organization deserves some consideration.

It has a directorate of nine experts, including well-known authorities in relief such as Sir Herbert Emerson who had been the League High Commissioner, Dr. Kullman of Switzerland, and Mr. Makins of the United States. The whole Committee meets in plenary session at least once a year, but also whenever the Executive "deem it necessary" or "one-third of the Members of the Committee demand it". Decisions are taken by a simple majority vote of the Delegates present and voting: though a two-thirds majority is required for changes of the rules or financial regulations. To co-ordinate its work with the many other national and international, governmental and voluntary organizations already in the field of relief, the Committee may "invite public international organizations, non-Member Governments or authorities, voluntary refugee, relief, welfare or other organizations to send observers to attend all or any of its meetings in plenary session and under conditions as the Committee may determine".¹

To avoid rigidity of organization and overlapping or duplicating of functions, there had to be a certain definition and limitation of task. U.N.R.R.A. had undertaken to deal with repatriation in general, as part of its wider field of relief and rehabilitation.² The I.L.O. had assumed special activities in the repatriation of workers—an immense task in itself, in view of the millions of foreign workers deported to Germany for forced labour. At first sight, the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee would seem not to exclude overlap with both these other international bodies. Article II of its new Constitution extends the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee to "all persons, wherever they may be, who as a result of events in Europe have had to leave, or may have to leave their countries of residence because of the danger to their lives or liberties on account of their race, religion or political beliefs." The function of the Committee was defined as the preservation, maintenance and transport of persons within this category. But the practical work of the Committee, as was made abundantly clear in the London meeting, was partly to co-ordinate the work of the many voluntary and national bodies, and partly to deal exclusively with the special category of those who either cannot or do not wish to return to their former homes, and therefore cannot be catered for by either

¹ Article VIII of the Constitution. The I.L.O. was invited by the end of 1944.

² See below, p. 259.

U.N.R.R.A. or I.L.O. These refugees—in a narrow sense—are a special case in two ways : their peculiar political status, and the long-range character of the problem they create. Even when the re-establishment and repatriations to be undertaken by U.N.R.R.A. and the International Labour Office have long been completed, such men and women who cannot or will not be repatriated will need special provision. This they are to get through the assistance of the political body, the Intergovernmental Committee. Already the "Emerson Pass" has been drafted, as a second edition of the "Nansen Pass" issued to refugees, especially from Russia, after the last war.

Here, then, is a certainly useful new functional organization, with a specific rôle. But there cannot be noted in its structure the slightest advance from functional organization to functional authority. Every Member State reserves the right to withdraw from the Committee, and in relation to national Governments the Committee has not much more than a purely advisory character. For the administrative costs of the Committee's work, a financial quota has been fixed to be paid by each Member, whilst the operational expenses are covered by a joint United Kingdom and United States guarantee to foot the bill. Other Member States are left to contribute voluntarily to operational expenses, each "in accordance with its abilities and its interest in the humanitarian work" of the Committee.¹ This arrangement does not suggest governmental expectations of either great permanency or heavy operational outlay.

The Intergovernmental Committee is hardly an example of a radical break with the past. It is an instrument adapted from old forms during war, still further adapted for post-war tasks, with some elements of new organization in it, but retaining all the old pre-war features of deference to national sovereignty, and the impotence to do more than each State will let it do. Even so, it may yet help to alleviate the human sufferings of "men without countries".

§ 3. THE SHORT-RANGE POST-WAR TYPE : U.N.R.R.A.

The main new type of international functional organization, fully developed and already working, is the United Nations Relief

¹ Cf. Annex to the Statute of the I.G.C. While for administrative costs (inevitably small) the U.K. and U.S.A. will pay 108 units each, the U.S.S.R. 94 units, and France 80 units, Sweden will pay only 19 and Switzerland only 17 units. For operational costs (incalculable in scale) the U.K. and U.S.A. have together undertaken to see them covered.

and Rehabilitation Administration (U.N.R.R.A.). It deserves specially close study for these reasons. Although designed to deal with a special, short-term, emergency situation, its establishment, constitution and working are full of lessons and examples, experiments and warnings, for the future of all similar bodies planned or likely to be planned as parts of a new international order.

Broadly speaking, the tasks of liquidating the aftermath of modern war may be undertaken in three ways : by the national efforts of the countries affected (national reconstruction) : by the exaction of wealth or labour from the defeated countries (reparations) : and by concerted international action, either through voluntary societies or through governments. Perhaps the main burden of post-war relief and rehabilitation must always be borne by the nation itself, and final restoration and reconstruction can come only from self-help and self-sacrifice. But a blend of all three methods seems the most effective—and most probable—procedure in modern conditions. Few war-stricken countries can be self-sufficient at first, and reparations, however massive, are only an amelioration and not a mainstay of reconstruction. It was early realized during the war that in face of German destructiveness in Europe and Japanese destructiveness in the Far East, the world would be faced with labours of relief and rehabilitation beyond the power of individual countries to encompass. In accordance with the decisions of a meeting of the allied governments at St. James's Palace in 1941, national committees were set up which proceeded to draw up comprehensive catalogues of post-war requirements of food, raw materials, and other goods. An interallied bureau, under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, co-ordinated these demands, and correlated the total with the stocks and reserves available.

The allied landings in French North Africa at the end of 1942 provided the first practical experience of relief and rehabilitation in territory which had been indirectly controlled by the enemy. The United States had to improvise an emergency organization for the purpose—the " Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations "—whose procedure was sometimes as clumsy as its title. An experienced business man, Mr. Herbert Lehman, a former Governor of the State of New York, was put in charge of it. Early in 1943 Governor Lehman was sent to London by President Roosevelt on a special mission. It was to negotiate, with the British and Allied Governments in London, the formation

of a more comprehensive and systematic organization. On June 10th, 1943, the State Department published a draft agreement prepared by the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China. The draft agreement outlined "the immediate establishment of a central United Nations agency to assume responsibility for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of war", but action was postponed until all other United Nations had discussed the draft and made their views known.

In the exchange of views which followed, the general scheme of the new organization met with general acceptance, but objections were raised to certain details which seemed to tip the balance of power inside the new organization too much in favour of the "Big Four": especially to the proposed Executive composed exclusively and permanently of the "Big Four".

Other objections arose from fears of the "receiving" nations (and also, to some extent, of "giving" nations) lest a new international administration making free gifts should become a rival authority to the national governments in liberated countries. Any tendency or suggestion to make the new machinery an "authority" rather than a co-operative international "administration" met with opposition from all forces which insisted on unlimited national sovereignty.

A second and final draft agreement was prepared during the summer and autumn of 1943. It accepted some and compromised with other requests made on these lines so successfully that on November 9th representatives of all forty-four United Nations signed an agreement setting up the constitution of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.¹ The delegations immediately adjourned from Washington to Atlantic City and got to work converting the paper constitution into a reality. Formally this meeting was the first session of the "Council of U.N.R.R.A."—the first fully completed international functional organization set up in the course of peace-making during war. Its constitution and functions merit closer analysis.

The Constitution of U.N.R.R.A.

The basic pattern of the organization is the old League of Nations. The sovereign body of the organization is an assembly of all member States, called the Council. On it, all States, great or small, have equal voting strength. The smaller executive

¹ The Constitution of U.N.R.R.A. is printed in full in Appendix III, A.

committee, called the Central Committee,¹ is formed exclusively of the four major Powers: the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., United Kingdom and China.

Experience of the League Council, which through haggling for seats increased in size to as much as sixteen, cautioned strict limitation of membership: and the Central Committee was designed, in the first draft,² to consist only of representatives of the "Big Four", with the Director of U.N.R.R.A. permanently in the chair. In face of a barrage of criticism from the smaller States against a Central Committee so exclusively composed, and against the mass of power granted to it, the "Big Four" made concessions. But they did not concede an increase of size: they conceded only a reduction in the powers of the Central Committee. The Committee was now to make policy decisions only of an "emergency nature" between sessions of the Council "when necessary".³ It was agreed that "all such decisions shall be recorded in the minutes of the Central Committee which shall be communicated promptly to each member Government. Such decisions shall be open to reconsideration by the Council at any regular session or at any special session . . ." This insertion into the original draft—and other similar power-reducing insertions in other articles—show clearly enough from where and in what direction the wind had been blowing.⁴ But there was steady resolve to resist such centrifugal tendencies, as far as possible, by centripetal arrangements.

How far are these developments away from the technique of the Covenant towards a more highly integrated organization an indication of the shape of things to come, and how far merely arrangements incidental to a particular technical machine which is admittedly temporary in character and scope?

The technical and temporary nature of U.N.R.R.A. is clear. Herbert Lehman himself has emphasized that U.N.R.R.A. is not intended to become one of those permanent functional organizations which are necessary to implement the fourth point of the Atlantic Charter. He told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American Senate that "The success of U.N.R.R.A. must be measured by the speed with which it is able to liquidate itself:

¹ The choice of the term "Central Committee" seems to have been a borrowing from the vocabulary of the Soviet Constitution.

² Printed in *International Conciliation*, No. 392.

³ Cf. Agreement for United Nations Rehabilitation Administration, *Cmd. 6491*.

⁴ E.g. the proportion needed for calling special sessions of the Council was a majority in the first draft, but only one third in the final constitution.

the sooner it becomes unnecessary, the greater will have been its accomplishments.”¹ Its technical character, as a large-scale relief organization handling human beings (“displaced persons”), and goods in numbers and quantities still difficult to estimate accurately, is equally obvious. But however peculiar and short-lived it is meant to be, U.N.R.R.A., as the only fully completed and actually working new body of its kind, sets precedents and models of behaviour which will doubtless influence the general pattern of organizations functional and international in character.

Two considerations justify this belief. First, other functional organizations yet to be created may well be equally temporary and technical. It is no essential of such bodies that they be permanent or general. They are rather stepping-stones to more permanent and general forms of international organization. Secondly, the deviations from the technique of the Covenant and from pre-war habits and ways of thought were abundantly discussed during the transition from the first to the second draft of the U.N.R.R.A. constitution : and the political issues involved have been therein debated and thrashed out. The idea of a tighter organization was upheld against lively opposition. The results are not haphazard, but establish a certain line of development and a specific internal balance of power which the constitutions of similar bodies can be expected to follow.

One or two details may illustrate these developments. As regards the right of a State to secede—always upheld as the corollary of national sovereignty—the first draft of U.N.R.R.A. kept strict silence. In the final draft, a tenth article was specially added, allowing withdrawal after twelve months’ notice.² This was a triumph for the principle of national sovereignty.

As regards amendment of the constitution—involving the same kind of political issue—the first draft briefly laid down that “the provisions of this agreement may be amended by unanimous vote of the Central Committee and two-thirds vote of the Council”. The final draft returned to even more complicated arrangements than Article 26 of the Covenant. Possible amendments are divided into three categories : Firstly, amendments involving new obligations for member States ; they “require the approval of the Council by a two-thirds vote and shall take effect for each member government on acceptance by it”. This safe-

¹ For further illustrations of the “self-liquidating” character of U.N.R.R.A., see below, p. 257 f.

² The period of notice required by the Covenant was two years (Article 1, para. 3).

guards the individual position of the four great Powers to the same extent as any other member, but only to the same extent. Secondly, amendments involving major changes in the structure of U.N.R.R.A. require approval not only by two-thirds of the Council but of all members of the Central Committee. This ensures that the major Powers have a veto on major amendments. Thirdly, all other amendments require a two-thirds majority in the Council. These final arrangements represent a total diminution in the power of the Central Committee, and therefore of the "Big Four", as compared with its powers in the first draft. Instead of Committee unanimity for all amendments, major Power agreement for matters of essential national rights, and major Power ratification for new obligations, are now required. The original hegemony of the "Big Four" acting together as the Central Committee has been somewhat levelled down in relation to smaller Powers. At the same time, rights of national sovereignty in general have been diminished more than in the League, where unanimity was necessary to vote amendments.¹

The development towards an organization existing in some small sense above member States is also implied in the position accorded to the Director-General of U.N.R.R.A. Given a salary equal to that of a Secretary of State in the United States, and called "the executive authority", he is given "full power and authority for carrying out relief operations . . . within the limits of available resources and the broad policies determined by the Council or its Central Committee". He is appointed by the unanimous nomination of the Central Committee, and removable only by the same procedure. His power of patronage is great, for he is entitled to appoint all staff personnel of the Administration. His position is comparable more to that of the Director of the International Labour Office than to the Secretary-General of the League. As with the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President of the International Bank for

¹ In the proposed amendment of 1932 to Article 26 of the Covenant, a three-fourths majority of the Assembly, including all Members of the Council, was required for voting amendments: and separate ratification was then necessary as well, by all Council Members and a majority of the Assembly. But amendments which had passed both hurdles then involved expulsion for any Member who dissented. U.N.R.R.A. has no provision for expulsion of Members. On the working of the general unanimity rule in the League—which clearly gave a veto to each Member, cf. Viscount Cecil: *A Great Experiment*, pp. 72-3, 93-5.

The requirement in U.N.R.R.A. of "acceptance" by each government before the first category of amendments becomes binding on it cannot be regarded as "introducing the unanimity rule by the back door", since it specifically affects only amendments which impose new obligations on governments, and in no way affects new arrangements of a different character.

Reconstruction and Development proposed by the Bretton Woods meetings,¹ the Director-General of U.N.R.R.A. reflects the American conception of strong executive authority as compared with the British and European conceptions of a "controlled" executive. He is permanent president (without a vote) of the Central Committee itself.

In these ways the constitution of U.N.R.R.A. may be said to break new ground in the political aspects of international organization, and to have moved away, however slightly, from the pure doctrines of national sovereignty embodied in the Covenant of the League. In one other direction, too, new ideas can be traced. Since the beginnings of the debate on post-war reconstruction in 1940, the principle of *regionalism* has raised its head.² U.N.R.R.A. has created special regional committees: the Committee of the Council for Europe, the Committee of the Council for the Far East, and foreshadows "such other standing regional committees" as the Council may consider desirable. These regional committees consist of representatives of all "member governments of territories" within a particular region, and of other member governments directly concerned with problems of relief and rehabilitation within that region. Meeting within their own areas, these committees can "consider and recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies with respect to relief and rehabilitation within their respective areas". They seem destined to become the link between the "receiving countries" and the international body. Rival demands for scarce supplies may be cleared inside these groupings of national governments. In important psychological and political ways, these committees may introduce a regional unity above the unity of the nation-State and below the international body, which may, like the Middle East Supply Centre, serve as a focus of more detailed local arrangements and as a source of international loyalties within the imaginative range of ordinary men and women.

Of the specialized technical and administrative committees, little need be said here. The Committee on Supplies is a stock-providing body, consisting of all "those governments likely to be

¹ Cf. below, p. 288. On the position of the Secretary-General of the League in comparison with the Director of the I.L.O., cf. Harold Butler: *The Lost Peace*, p. 50 f. "It was the Director's business to lead. He spoke on every subject and whenever he liked. Whatever the topic of discussion, he was there to represent the international standpoint." Albert Thomas did much to create this tradition by the force of his own personality. Cf. above, p. 240.

² Cf. above, Chapter V, pp. 166 ff.

the principal suppliers of materials for relief and rehabilitation ". It is a link between the supplying nations and the distributing agencies of the Administration. There are standing technical committees on particular problems of nutrition, health, agriculture, transport, repatriation and finance, with sub-committees attached to the regional committees. But these arrangements belong to the *minutiae* of the organization, and have little general political significance for peacemaking.

The Functions of U.N.R.R.A.

The agreed functions of U.N.R.R.A. are obvious enough, and are defined in the preamble to its constitution.¹ To feed, clothe, shelter and house the victims of war in liberated countries : to re-establish their health, and social and educational services : to help them rebuild their agricultural and industrial production : to organize the repatriation of the twenty-five to thirty million people displaced from their homes : these are the functions.

Certain general principles are laid down for their performance, of which the chief aim is to ensure a fair share-out between all needy countries and all people in need inside those countries. There must be no discrimination because of " race, creed or political belief ". " At no time shall relief and rehabilitation supplies be used as a political weapon. " " All classes of the population, irrespective of their purchasing power, shall receive their equitable share of essential commodities. " " Distribution of relief and rehabilitation supplies should take place under effective rationing and price controls. " " Use should be made to the maximum practicable extent of normal agencies of distribution (governmental, commercial, co-operative) to the particular ends of combating inflation and restoring normal economic activities. "

It may be doubted whether this inclusion of distributive agencies, even if it may help to restore normal economic activity in the pre-war pattern of distribution, would necessarily form a weapon against inflation. In any case the first Sub-committee of the fourth committee of the Council-meeting at Atlantic City found it necessary to add that so far as the distribution of relief and rehabilitation goods is done through private trade, the government or recognized national authority which exercises administrative authority should " take appropriate measures to insure . . . the remuneration earned by private traders for their services is no more than is fair and reasonable. "

¹ See Appendix III, A.

It is not difficult to detect, behind the insistence upon the use "to the maximum practicable extent of normal agencies of distribution", including the "commercial" ones, the same influences which spoke through Director-General Herbert Lehman's voice, when he assured the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, that the resources of U.N.R.R.A. "must be used *only* to meet the most pressing needs". The first Council meeting resolved that the rehabilitation activities of U.N.R.R.A. should be strictly limited firstly, to the repair and restoration of "public utilities and services", like water, power, transportation and communication; secondly, to "essential relief industries, such as those which provide food, shelter, clothing, medical supplies"; and thirdly, to "raw material producing industries such as coal mines, mineral mines, construction material industries". Only in this limited sphere is the Administration expected to render assistance by supplying, from prearranged reserves and pools, the necessary amount of "raw materials, processing materials, machine tools, mobile power units, maintenance equipment, industrial machinery of both standard and special types and spare parts", and even, in certain cases, on request of individual governments, "experienced staff".¹ But definite border-lines are drawn.

The task of rehabilitation must not be considered as the beginning of reconstruction—it is coterminous with relief. No new construction or reconstruction work is contemplated, but only rehabilitation as defined in the preamble of the Agreement. Problems, such as unemployment, are important, but not determining factors. . . .²

These border-lines are self-explanatory and no doubt justifiable. "The Administration cannot be called upon to help restore continuous employment in the world." But whilst, in the case of agriculture, the Hot Springs Conference and its outcome are presumed to make the necessary arrangements for the solution of the "long term problems" (and resolution No. 11, § 3, refers expressly to the "United Nations Organization for Food and Agriculture"), no international organizations for the long term reconstruction of industries, or even for the distribution of raw materials in accordance with point 4 of the Atlantic Charter, have so far been prepared. This makes the "border-lines" somewhat awkward and unsatisfactory.

Furthermore, as already indicated, there were and presumably are still, sections and "pressure groups" more than uneasy

¹ Resolution No. 12, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4.

² Cmd. 6497, p. 15.

of public administration or even "Socialism" making, through U.N.R.R.A.'s activities, further inroads in domains hitherto reserved to private enterprise. The inclusion of the "normal distributive agencies" was one result of their influence. The frontiers drawn to U.N.R.R.A.'s rehabilitation activities seem at least partly to have originated from the same sources.

U.N.R.R.A. and former Enemy Countries

One problem of defining the functions and scope of U.N.R.R.A. has been to decide how far the Administration should operate, if at all, in enemy countries after they are defeated. And here, too, there has been a compromise between original conception and war-time mentality.

To spend goods, services, money and labour on succouring the victims of enemy aggression and misrule was one thing: to extend such help to enemy peoples seemed to be something quite different. But the practical distinction is not so clear as the legal difference would make it appear. Some countries, though not technically allies, were prevented from becoming allies by early Nazi occupation or other circumstances. Denmark and Austria are cases in point. The development of opinion on this issue is of interest and importance.

The preamble of the U.N.R.R.A. Agreement indicates no differentiation between ex-enemy and other territories. It speaks only of "the liberation of any area by the forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of the retreat of the enemy". On principles both of humanitarianism and of enlightened self-interest, it is difficult to distinguish between distressed areas, whether allied or not. Amid the collapse and destruction of defeat, ex-enemy territories would seem to demand even more urgent and extensive relief and rehabilitation, by purely humanitarian and material standards of necessity. But such distinction has been suggested—and actually made—in defining U.N.R.R.A.'s scope.

The Council of U.N.R.R.A., in its first session at Atlantic City, made the *sacrificium intellectus* and bowed to war-time feelings particularly of the delegates of some governments whose countries were suffering deeply under enemy occupation. But in doing so the Council obviously did not feel entirely happy. Hence a compromise inside the compromise, in two directions. Firstly, Subcommittee 4 of the Fourth Committee at Atlantic City, hammering out the policy governing the repatriation of displaced persons,

could not possibly overlook the case of millions of enemy nationals settled during the war in homes whose rightful owners would wish to recover them as soon as possible. Accordingly Resolution 10 prepared by the Sub-committee makes the repatriation of such enemy nationals part of U.N.R.R.A. activities ; but not without inserting in a somewhat apologetic mood the ominous words : " while it is not the object of U.N.R.R.A. to assist enemy subjects. . . ."

The second compromise concerning ex-enemy countries is more general : Committee No. 2 of the first session of the council, under the Chairmanship of the Soviet delegate, Vasili Alexseevich Sergeev, dealt with the General Policy of the Administration and determined as far as possible the geographical areas of potential operations of U.N.R.R.A. It had to take cognizance of the fact that there would be after the war ex-enemy territories to which the activities of U.N.R.R.A. either were, or were not, to be extended. This Committee did not pay so much homage to war-time mentality. In the resolution which this committee successfully submitted to the full council, no such lip service was paid to differentiation as in the resolution and report of the Sub-committee 4 of the fourth Committee quoted above. The line taken by the second committee is much more realistic :

If it appears necessary for the Administration to operate in an enemy or ex-enemy area for the purposes of the agreement, it will do so only from such a time and for such purposes as may be agreed upon between the military command, the established control authority or duly recognized administration of the area on the one hand, and the Administration on the other, and subject to such control as the military command or the established control authority may find necessary ; provided that the Council approve the scale and nature of the operations it is proposed to undertake and the standard of provision, and that all expenses connected with such possible operations in an enemy or ex-enemy area should be carried by the enemy or ex-enemy country concerned.¹

U.N.R.R.A. can operate in enemy or ex-enemy territories, but only under conditions different from those established for its operations elsewhere. That is the sense of the decision of the second Committee approved by the Council. The special conditions attached to operations in such territories, in particular the financial condition that all expenses incurred should be carried by the country concerned, are of such a nature that, if strictly adhered to, they will reduce relief and rehabilitation work

¹ Resolutions and reports adopted by the Council in its first session. *Cmd. 6497*, p. 6.

in such territories to a very minimum. It is hardly feasible that ex-enemy territories or their recognized authorities would be so well off financially that they could fulfil financial requirements which other liberated countries need not. Nor is it likely that the Council of U.N.R.R.A. in its later sessions would use the power put into its hands entirely in favour of the ex-enemy areas, and so squash in this way the remaining differentiation.

There is one other potential source of discrimination : wherever U.N.R.R.A. works it is provided that surplus supplies in any one liberated country should be made available for relief and rehabilitation work in other countries. This transfer is normally a matter of negotiation and collaboration between national governments or authorities on one side and the Administration on the other. In enemy or ex-enemy countries, the arrangement is to be different. "The Director-General will consult with the military command or established control authorities having control of enemy or ex-enemy areas with a view to securing information as to any surpluses of supplies from time to time available in such enemy or ex-enemy areas from which relief and rehabilitation import requirements of liberated areas might be met." Nothing is said about the *terms* of an eventual transfer of such surpluses or on the compensation to be made for ensuing deliveries. As it stands, this special provision might even serve as a back-door for introducing a system of requisitions or reparations in kind. If so, it would lead far away from the original meaning of U.N.R.R.A. U.N.R.R.A. used as a tool for reparations would hardly be fulfilment of the great expectations set upon this first international large-scale enterprise of concerted government action for the *benefit* of suffering mankind.

Financing the Administration

The financial provision for so vast and complex an undertaking, involving so many countries of different size, wealth and disposition, inevitably breaks new ground too. The 44 Governments, with the exception of those whose home territory had been subject to enemy occupation, undertook to put at the disposal of the Administration one per cent. of their national incomes in 1943. These considerable amounts are to be given not as a loan, nor as a *quid pro quo*, but *à fonds perdu*, as contributions which, in spite of their considerable size, are not expected to be recovered. Recovery was not even mentioned.

This represents a psychological no less than a political and

administrative advance, even on international economic arrangements so enlightened as Lend-Lease. It expresses not only general humanitarian sympathies, but the economic outlook developed both in the Atlantic Charter and—even more forcibly—in the Philadelphia Charter, in the words “poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere”. It means a widespread readiness of governments to contribute substantially to the earliest possible restoration of social and economic order in countries with which they hope to resume trade and build friendly relations after the war.

The funds so provided are meant to be the capital of a running concern, not the resources of a charitable organization. They are to be turned over and over again, and the general principle is established that wherever possible, goods and services provided by the Administration should be paid for. On the other hand the governments and peoples of liberated territory are not to be put in financial difficulties or deprived of benefits because of lack of means to pay. The principles of the Mutual Aid Agreement of 1942, of Lend-Lease,¹ are echoed in U.N.R.R.A. Resolution No. 14.

It shall be the policy of the Administration not to deplete its available resources for the relief and rehabilitation of any area whose government is in a position to pay with suitable means of foreign exchange.

But also :

It shall be the policy of the Administration that an applicant government shall not be required to assume the burden of an enduring foreign exchange debt for the procurement of relief and rehabilitation supplies and services.

U.N.R.R.A. and an International Civil Service

Rightly or wrongly, the Secretariat of the League of Nations as defined in Articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, and put on a permanent basis by the Eleventh Assembly in 1930, was hailed as an entirely new departure in international institutions. Each official, in his declaration of loyalty, promised to discharge his functions and to regulate his conduct “with the interests of the League alone in view and not to seek or receive instructions from any government or other authority external”. Here, it was claimed, was the beginning of a real “International Civil Service”.²

¹ Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement is printed in Appendix I, B.

² Cf. Viscount Cecil : *op. cit.*, p. 89.

Extra-territoriality, complete equality between the sexes, non-differentiation with regard to nationality and country of origin, were the guiding principles of the Secretariat. The number of League officials rose from 4 in 1919 to 640 in 1935.¹

Resolutions of the Council of U.N.R.R.A. developed the idea still further.

The status of extra-territoriality is demanded not only for U.N.R.R.A. offices, but also for U.N.R.R.A. staff of all grades. Immunity from suit and legal process (with certain exceptions), inviolability of premises, exemption from taxation and customs duties, "exemptions from or facilities in respect of foreign exchange controls", immunities from immigration restrictions, alien registration and military service obligations, are all specially mentioned (Resolution 32) as privileges which the Director-General is expected to extract from both member and non-member governments.² Further, all usual diplomatic privileges are requested—including priorities for telephone and telegraph communications, diplomatic status for couriers and pouches, exemption from censorship, code facilities and even franking privileges. The obvious aim is to secure U.N.R.R.A. the status of an international *governmental* agency.

As in the League Secretariat, international recruitment is stipulated, and the preamble to Resolution 37 states, "The Council desires to promote the concept of a truly international civil service." Recruitment is to be "without discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, nationality or creed", and on "as wide a geographic basis as is possible, compatible with efficient administration". A link between national and international civil services is made through commendation by member governments of members of their own national civil service for temporary employment by the Administration. As the United States, when the Administration was created, had less pressure on its available man-power of suitable grade than Britain or Soviet Russia, it was found easier to recruit from resources on the spot than from elsewhere, and at first U.S.A. provided a large share of the staff.

In view of the vast numbers of employees likely to be required by the health and welfare services, the agricultural and industrial rehabilitation services, and above all the repatriation services, the development of U.N.R.R.A. may well produce a great new army of public administrators, serving neither municipal nor national

¹ Frederick L. Wheeler : *The Covenant Explained*, p. 34.

² The British Government has already granted most of these demands.

governments, but an international governmental agency of vast dimensions and manifold activities. This introduces a new political factor in itself—a large professional body interested in international administration and its success. But how far this body will develop into a truly international one—as distinct from a United Nations body with a staff recruited mainly from a few leading United Nations—remains to be seen. Enemy nationals and even former enemy nationals are still, at the time of writing, excluded: and for field work, this restriction is perhaps inevitable. But for the immense amount of desk-work required in such an organization, it seems unnecessary. No harm would be done by statistical work in Washington or London being entrusted to a competent statistician whose only deficiency may consist in lack of the right passport. His absolute exclusion cuts across the principle of non-discrimination “on grounds of nationality”, laid down in Resolution 37. The less discrepancy between the rules and Resolutions and the common practice, the more hopeful is the future of this new “international civil service”.

U.N.R.R.A. as the Prototype for other Organizations

Little defence is needed for this detailed examination of the first fully finished and working functional organization which includes all the United Nations. The manner of its establishment, the debates involving principles of national sovereignty which attended its definition of form and functions, its rôle in the treatment of the vanquished countries, its methods of recruitment and procedure, all alike have relevance to the growing pattern of peacemaking which is evolving before our eyes. When further international functional machinery comes to be set up, it is to U.N.R.R.A. experience and example that men will naturally turn. Its success will give impetus to similar experiments: its failure would mean not only vast human suffering in many countries, but might encourage a relapse to national separatism fatal for wise peacemaking. Three similar bodies, more long-range in character, are already projected and require analysis.

§ 4. THE LONG-RANGE POST-WAR TYPE

(a) *The Food and Agriculture Organization*

Historically, both U.N.R.R.A. and the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.) have the same origins. Both originated in the historical, first United Nations conference held at St.

James's Palace in London in the autumn of 1941. The Inter-Allied Committee set up under Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, and the various allied committees created at the same time, paved the way for both international organizations. (It should be noted, however, that neither the word "international" nor the words "United Nations" yet appear in the official title of the F.A.O.)

Equally, the ultimate purpose of both organizations is identical. Both are designed to contribute to realization of the economic and social demands of the Atlantic Charter. "Collaboration in the economic field", "economic advancement", "social security", "freedom from want", are the common aims.

But there the similarity ends. The basic differentiation is between short-term and long-term tasks. U.N.R.R.A. is to concentrate on the short-term requirements of the liberated countries, and particularly, therefore, on relief, rehabilitation and repatriation of displaced persons. The F.A.O. is to be concerned with long-term problems, within the limited but yet vast enough field of nutrition and all the problems of production and distribution connected therewith. There is thus a very different "expectation of life" for the two organizations. U.N.R.R.A. is designedly short in duration: the F.A.O.—not yet born save on paper—is designed to be permanent.

The second difference is a difference in scope: Relief and Rehabilitation in the widest sense are the proposed fields of activity of U.N.R.R.A., as described above. The restoration of industries, even the supply of necessary raw materials, technicians and machinery, are part of its task as far as these are required in individual countries, to help them to overcome quickly the consequences of war. Field work, U.N.R.R.A. officials working on the spot, appeared to be the most promising new departure from the international point of view. Direct intervention of an international organization in national emergencies, without interference with the principle of national sovereignty, had been accepted and arranged.

All this goes far beyond the authorities and powers to be given to the F.A.O. Industry, apart from certain industry connected directly with agriculture and nutrition, is not its concern. Field work and direct actions of F.A.O. officials—with the only exception of experts loaned on request to individual governments—are not taken into consideration. Research, information, and first and foremost "advice", are the main tasks entrusted to

the F.A.O. "Recommendations" and, under certain conditions, "Conventions", are the means by which it is expected to establish, through closer international collaboration, improved conditions of nutrition on the basis of improvements in the technical and economic methods hitherto applied. The guiding principles for the functions of F.A.O., to be worked out by an "Interim Commission", were laid down in Resolutions 6 and 7 of the "Hot Springs Conference", as follows :

(6) That in considering the functions and duties to be assigned to the permanent organization the Interim Commission take into account :

(a) The promotion of scientific, technological, social and economic research ;

(b) The collection and dissemination of information and provision for the exchange of services ;

(c) the submission to member governments and authorities of recommendations for action with regard to the following :

(I) Nutrition ;

(II) Standard of consumption of food and other agricultural products ;

(III) Agricultural production, distribution and conservation ;

(IV) Statistics and economic studies in the field of agriculture and food, including the study of the relations of agriculture to world economy ;

(V) Education and extension work in the field of food and agriculture ;

(VI) Agricultural credit ;

(VII) Problems of agricultural population and farm labour.

(7) That the Interim Commission further consider the desirability of assigning to the permanent organization functions in the field of :

(a) Development of agricultural resources and orientation of production, where necessary ;

(b) Agricultural commodity arrangements ;

(c) Agricultural co-operative arrangements ;

(d) Land tenure ;

(e) Other subjects on which recommendations have been made by the Conference.¹

The largeness of scope is notable. But so is the limitation of real authority granted. The mainly advisory and guiding capacity of the F.A.O. obviously distinguishes it sharply from U.N.R.R.A. If U.N.R.R.A. is a new type of functional organization, perhaps paving the way for real international administration in selected fields, there is projected in the F.A.O.

¹ Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, *Cmd. 6451*,

P. 17.

Cf. Preamble and Articles I and XVI of the draft constitution of F.A.O., issued at Washington, August 1st, 1944. See Appendix III, B, below, and *Cmd. 6590*.

something much more like the old, well-known type of international organization represented particularly by the I.L.O.¹

There are even certain respects in which the legal and moral authority of the F.A.O. might seem to lag behind the I.L.O. The tripartite composition of the latter is one reason for much of its moral prestige. And legally Article 405 of the Versailles Treaty confers upon member governments of the I.L.O. at least the definite *obligation* to submit recommendations or draft conventions within the prescribed period of one year to the national "authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, for the enactment of legislation or other action". No such obligation is envisaged by the constitution of the F.A.O. Its preamble merely binds member governments to report through it to one another on the measures taken and the progress achieved within the field in which the F.A.O. is supposed to help and to work. This difference may to a certain extent reflect the difference between the field of "conditions of labour" on which the I.L.O. works, and the field of "nutrition and agriculture" with which the F.A.O. is supposed to deal. National diversities may be great in both fields. But they are incomparably greater in the production, distribution and consumption of food. To establish a common denominator here is extremely difficult. The prospect of securing parallel or even identical legislation in different countries must therefore be small. With what amount of influence, under these conditions, the F.A.O. will be able to discharge one of its larger functions, the "adoption of international policies with respect to agricultural commodity arrangements"²—on which so much depends for the stability and prosperity of the post-war world—remains to be seen.

This restriction of power is not the only issue on which opinions may differ. The co-existence, side by side, of U.N.R.R.A. and F.A.O., on one hand, and the fact that on the other hand there is so far no plan for any corresponding international organization of industry, is another complaint which may be raised in connection with this issue. The lack of a parallel industrial organization shows how far there is still to go. It is a sign that real and comprehensive international planning

¹ The close connection with the older type of functional international organizations as linked up with the League of Nations is also borne out by the fact that League of Nations officials, namely, Dr. Alexander Loveday, Director of Economic, Financial and Transit Department of the League of Nations, and Mr. Ansgar Rosenberg from the staff of the same department, were members of the Economic Panel of experts appointed by the Interim Commission set up at Hot Springs.

² Proposed Constitution, Article 2(f). See Appendix III, B.

is not yet visualized for the post-war world. Events have moved only as far as men and nations are prepared to go, for the moment.

But even so, the plan of a new, special, long-range functional organization for Nutrition and Agriculture developed during war, is, no doubt, a step forwards. The field of nutrition and agricultural production is large and important enough. Conditions here have obvious and vital connection with the goal of "freedom from want". If worked well, even if only merely advisory in character at the beginning, the F.A.O. may grow into something different and affect substantially the conditions of men everywhere in the general direction of "rising living standards".

(b) *The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*

During the inter-war years, economic instability was the counterpart to political instability. Both drove the world towards war. The relation between the two—how far one was cause and the other effect—is a matter for controversy. But throughout the inter-war years in general, economic and political developments were certainly interdependent. The world political crisis of 1933 is in many ways the counterpart to the world economic crisis of 1931. Just as the creation of an army of six million unemployed in Germany was one pre-condition of Hitler's rise to power and the acceptance of Nazism in Germany, so in Britain and the United States economic problems absorbed much of the attention of government and people, at a time when undistracted attention should have been given to the growing menace of war. It is a fact and not a fable that at one time British newspapers were faced with a request of the advertising clientele to tone down the gloominess of political news, which was still further depressing business. Such incidents, though small, are not insignificant.

In addition to this interplay between economics and politics, there was interplay between national and international economics. Dislocations of international trade caused by the first world war were never brought into order or compensated during the twenty years' crisis. They even increased during the later years. Productive capacity in agriculture and industry could hardly be absorbed anywhere. The result was stagnation, idleness, and the famous follies of burning Brazilian coffee, paying premiums for not growing cotton, and "poverty amidst plenty". The disturbing, short-sighted reaction is equally famous: the

exclusion of foreign goods, protective tariffs, the slogan "Buy British" and its counterparts in other countries, the still further strangling of international trade, the general drift back to pre-Adam Smith practices of "mercantilist economics" in their least helpful form. Trade barriers more insurmountable than ever, depreciated currencies used to support "national economy", became permanent features of international relations. Capital fled from one country to another, to escape the effects of a pending devaluation or to profit from it. Normal, long-term investment was avoided, and there was general economic compression and contraction instead of the expansion which alone could have undermined the problem of mass unemployment.¹

One movement stopped the process, first in Germany and soon in other countries. It was rearmament and war. Realizing that war economics are no lasting solution, people began to discuss increasingly an overhaul of the economic system, thinking of "economics of abundance" instead of scarcity, "service economics" instead of "profit economics", comprehensive planning and control instead of imperfect *laissez-faire*. Hence arose the demand for peacemaking on the economic plane no less than the political.

The Atlantic Charter recognized and embodied this demand. It set forth the aims of "freedom from want" and "economic advancement", however that may be interpreted. But choice of means towards these ends is confronted with an embarrassing number of rival recommendations. Socialists suggest replacing profit as the soulless co-ordinator of national and international economics by a perhaps equally soulless but scientifically elaborated "plan". The "neo-capitalists" are willing to accept much economic guidance and direction by the State. The U.S.S.R. is still the only country willing to work a completely planned economy. Other countries, under the stress of war and defeat as drastic as the condition of Russia in 1917, are tending to move in the same direction. The French Provisional Government, under General de Gaulle, has formulated a plan of reorganization which would result in more than a merely "directed economy". Other liberated countries may follow suit: including ex-enemy countries. For other older govern-

¹ There is a vast literature, in every language, on these matters. The best and most comprehensive factual and analytical work now available is the League of Nations publication, *The Transition from War to Peace Economy* (1943): cf. H. W. Arndt: *The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties* (R.I.I.A., 1944), especially Chapter IX.

ments, and business circles in other countries—above all Wall Street and the City of London—such radical break with the past is more difficult and less probable.

But all agree that steps must be taken to forestall relapse into the pre-war economic chaos. The solution most widely favoured is not a fundamental change in the economic system, but its improvement with the help of a number of new national arrangements and international institutions. These new arrangements and institutions are expected to guarantee expansionist economics "of a stable nature", and "to fulfil the purpose of increasing absorption of existing and developing productive capacity". To what extent such hopes are justified is a crucial question for the pattern of peace and the prospects of peacemaking. As the new arrangements and institutions must come into operation at a time when war-economics are in process of being transferred back into peace-economics, they have to be planned as a part of peacemaking.

A start has been made with tackling two great maladies of the pre-war years, namely, monetary instability and interruption of the free flow of international investment. The procedure started with separate national deliberation. In 1943, after prolonged deliberations between economic experts, white papers were published almost simultaneously in London and Washington, dealing with proposals for monetary stability after the war.¹ These "Keynes" and "White" plans became the basis for a "Joint Statement by Experts on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund", in April, 1944.² This, in turn, paved the way for the United Nations Conference at Bretton Woods in July, 1944, where concrete articles of agreement were drawn up and recommended to each national government.³ The following account analyses these different stages.

Compared with 1918, there has been not only an earlier start but also a difference in method, in approaching economic reconstruction. In 1918 the Board of Trade—a national government department—advised the British delegation at the Peace Conference.⁴ The approach this time was both less governmental and more international. The expert was used from the first: not so extensively as at Hot Springs, and not—at first—through

¹ *U.S. Proposal for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund*, preliminary draft released, April 7th, 1943; and *Proposals for an International Clearing Union* (Cmd. 6437). Canadian experts also prepared draft proposals for an *International Exchange Union* (July 12th, 1943).

² Cmd. 6519.

³ Cmd. 6546.

⁴ Cf. Sir A. Zimmern: *op. cit.*, p. 314.

an international conference. It was wise to leave it to a recognized expert of the stature of Lord Keynes—famous economist of Cambridge University and leader in economic thought all over the world—to embody in a governmental white paper a synthesis between his own far-reaching conceptions and practical realities. Lord Keynes's close connection with governmental policy in recent years ensured a firm grip of the realities. It was equally wise to entrust the preparatory work in the United States to Mr. Harry D. White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury : though the result, powerfully influenced by Mr. Morgenthau, was more exclusively a governmental point of view.

Both proposals agreed on the need for special, permanent international machinery to prevent the currency and exchange difficulties of the inter-war years, by establishing an international order helpful and not harmful to economic stability. This proclaimed for the first time official belief that the age of Adam Smith is dead. It was no longer held officially that some immanent automatism of economics, if undisturbed by interference, would yield the best results. Instead, it was accepted by both proposals that, as no modern State could be expected to apply *laissez-faire* economics in their strict sense, the only alternatives were either disconcerted monetary policies of individual states with consequences well known from pre-war times, or internationally co-ordinated monetary policies, supported by institutions fit to replace, and more than replace, the former automatism. The choice of the latter alternative in white papers of the British, American (and Canadian) governments, makes 1943 a turning point in international economics.

Compared with this consensus, the divergencies between the proposals are of secondary importance. They could be overcome later, without undue difficulties, in the course of negotiations on the expert and governmental plane.

Only one diversity between the British and the American, between the "Keynes" and the "White" proposals, even if also overcome during these negotiations, should be kept on record for both theoretical and practical reasons. The position of gold in the new international monetary order was very different in the two original schemes. In the Keynes scheme gold was given no essential or indispensable place. In this, as in other ways, Keynes was following the most modern and unorthodox theories. His international machinery for the maintenance of currency stability consisted mainly of an international "clearing house"

for international payments. Admittance to the facilities of this clearing house had not to be bought by initial gold payments. The White plan, possibly because of the existing gold abundance in the monetary institutions of the States, took an entirely different line. The "Clearing House" was replaced by a "Stabilization Fund", built upon initial capital contributions of individual countries, of which a certain percentage was to be made in gold. Later, during the actual work of the international stabilization fund, gold was also to have an important place.

Much to the dislike of an increasing number of people no longer prepared to accept the place of gold in national and international finance as inherently necessary and unchangeable,¹ the American scheme eventually carried the day. But it is misinterpreting the situation if this is called with a sneer the "victory" of the American over the British conception. Two things above all have to be kept in mind. Firstly, the British Commonwealth of Nations, embracing in the Union of South Africa one of the main gold-producing countries, could not easily join Keynes on a road which (even if only more quickly than otherwise) might eventually lead to the complete demonetization and devaluation of gold, with all that this implies for the gold-mining industry and its capital and labour. Secondly, it should not be overlooked that the Soviet Union too, as a gold-producing country, had reasons to support the American scheme. It is not such a total and one-sided American success.

The "abolition of gold", then, is not even partly envisaged by the monetary plans for the post-war period. Neither has another, very popular, demand, the "abolition of national currencies" and the "creation of one single world currency" or at least "one single European currency," found any support in these plans.² This is only too understandable, for two reasons. Firstly, experts like Keynes and White, no doubt, were perfectly aware of the fact that national currencies, if closely linked together and maintained in stable relations to one another, would go a long way towards producing the same wholesome effects as a single international currency. Secondly, they would not easily be betrayed into a utopian assumption that the stage

¹ Arguments as to whether the final compromise with the American conception involved Britain in an enforced return to the "Gold-Standard" filled the correspondence columns of the *London Times*.

² "Unitas" and "Bancor" were proposed only as units of international accounting, in the original White and Keynes schemes, but were dropped as superfluous.

had already been reached where national governments would be ready to part with such power as the command of monetary policy means. They were doubtful enough as to whether and to what extent mere *limitations* of national monetary policy (as any sort of effective international organization in monetary matters would of necessity require) would be acceptable to individual states. Happily, almost equal preparedness to accept certain limitations existed on both the American and British side. This, and a carefully thought out balance between the national sacrifices required, and the relative influence on the shaping of an international policy granted to national governments in return by the proposed machinery, seem to have helped considerably a "realistic" as opposed to a "utopian" or "semi-utopian" solution.¹

After the white papers had been submitted to the criticism of public and parliament of each country, the next step was to open up the discussions, in which hitherto Britain and the U.S.A. alone had been officially concerned, to the other United and Associated Nations. In June, 1943, the delegates of no less than eighteen of these nations met in Washington and discussed, more or less informally, the two plans. It emerged that an amalgamation of both plans into one scheme was both necessary and possible. The elaboration of this amalgamated scheme was again left to experts, and took the rest of the year. It was not until April, 1944, that the joint scheme was published, still in the informal shape of a "Joint Statement by Experts on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund". As the title indicates, Lord Keynes's "Clearing Union" conception had given way to the older and more familiar conception of the "Stabilization Fund". But the "aggregate quotas of the member countries", indicating the strength of the fund in terms of capital, had increased from the 5 billion dollars of the White plan to 8 billion dollars during the period in which only United and Associated Nations would be partners, and to 10 billion dollars thereafter, when the fund might comprise membership of the whole world. This strengthening of the fund was a considerable concession to the more lofty and almost unlimited range of the "Clearing Union" in the original Keynes plan. Furthermore, the rigidity of the American plan with regard to the gold

¹ At the moment of writing it would still be somewhat rash to assume that all individual governments will accept the balance, in the end. American bankers have strongly opposed the Monetary Fund, and Mr. Robert Boothby, M.P., leads a campaign against the Bretton Woods proposals.

contribution required from would-be members of the fund, was made more flexible. Members are no longer required to contribute 12.5 per cent., or in certain cases 7.5 per cent. or at least 5 per cent. of their quota in gold. 10 per cent. of their actual gold-holdings are in any case sufficient to fulfil this initial obligation. The way for a redistribution of gold, and a ready market for the surplus long standing in the vaults of American banks, was to be established, but in a more differentiating and mild form.

More flexibility and more detailed arrangements were also introduced into the solution of the vexing problem as to what extent, in the interest of currency stability, changes in the rate of exchange between currencies of different countries should be excluded. Complete exclusion of changes would deprive national governments of a freedom, no doubt too much abused in pre-war times but still perhaps necessary under certain conditions. The problem considered was, therefore, to what extent changes in currency-value relations were to be admitted by consultation with, and by approval of, the Fund. Here the more rigid attitude of the original Keynes and White plans was melted down to a more liberal attitude, which had greater appeal for a number of experts, particularly of the smaller nations.

Most perfect was the amalgamation and the general consensus with regard to the purposes and policies of the Fund. The joint statement expressed them in a six-point formula which, with only small formal alterations, was later entered as Article I in the Final Agreement arrived at on July 22nd, 1944, at Bretton Woods.

There had again, however, been an intermediate stage. The "Joint Statement by Experts" of April, 1944, was the subject of discussion in both Houses of Parliament in London and Washington, and was also considered carefully by the other United and Associated Nations.

In these discussions, and particularly in the debates of the House of Lords where Lord Keynes himself gave the authentic interpretation of both, the negative and the positive ambitions of the joint plan were well brought out. The one ambition was to prevent the pre-war currency chaos for the post-war period, and the second was to define an international monetary policy appropriate to the general economic aims of the future. Lord Keynes untiringly explained highly technical details of this most complicated branch of economics in plain and understandable language. The Joint Scheme did not involve a definite "return

to the Gold-standard " for Britain. It did not interfere with, or destroy, the " Sterling Block ", he assured his fellow Peers and the British public. The advantages of the scheme would be felt in the economics of every country, in creditor and debtor countries alike. One great result of the new international monetary policy would be an opening up of the flow of trade. Trade would be no longer hampered by currency and exchange difficulties, but fructified by additional purchasing-power spread over the world by new international institutions.

This interpretation was readily accepted by the majority, and there was general agreement with the continuation of this part of peace preparations.

It was left to the President of the United States to arrange for the third and final stage of the preparations—the stage which for the first time saw an assembly, not of experts as such, but of government delegations. For three weeks from the 1st of July, 1944, onwards, these delegations met almost daily in the framework of a great international conference skilfully divided into committees and sub-committees. After three weeks the Conference had brought forward the preparations for the post-war international monetary organization—not quite to the stage reached by U.N.R.R.A., but at least as far as the preparations for the F.A.O.

Bretton Woods

Before dealing with the results a word or two may be appropriate on the setting of this conference. The subject of negotiation, intricate, technical matters of money which Disraeli once said had " driven more men mad than matters of love ", made it a matter of course that most of the 44 governments represented had appointed " experts "—Governors and Directors of their Central Banks, high officials of their treasuries, professors of economics—as leaders or members of their delegations. The size of the national delegations—and this too is connected with the complicated, technical character of the subject of negotiations—was considerable. The U.S.A. delegation, led by the Secretary of State for Finance, Mr. Henry Morgenthau, numbered 12 members, among them Miss Mabel Newcomer, Professor of Economics at Vassar College. To compensate this representation of the female element, it included further, four party politicians : Representative Brent Spence and Senator Robert F. Wagner of the Democratic party ; Representative Jesse Wolcott and Senator

Charles W. Tobey, Republicans ; all four serving on the Banking and Currency Committees of Houses of Congress. The United Kingdom Delegation, under the leadership of Lord Keynes, had Professor Lionel Robbins as another of its 7 members, but was without any women or party representatives. It had, instead, a strong leaven of Treasury and Foreign Office Civil Servants. It was numerically weaker than the Canadian Delegation with its 12, and not much stronger than the Indian Delegation with its 5 members. The Chinese Delegation numbered 9, and the Soviet Delegation, led by M. S. Stepanov, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, and P. A. Maletin, Deputy People's Commissar for Finance, included the Assistant Chairman of the State Bank, Mr. Chechulin, Professor Arutiunian and two other experts in monetary matters.

Apart from composition and size of the various national delegations sent, the venue of the Conference deserves some attention. Bretton Woods is a beauty spot, remote from the noise and the grimness of big towns. The meeting-place was a hotel in large grounds, which was bought by the United States government for the purpose of the conference. Has all this something to do with the smoothness and speed which were so significant for the working of this conference of tremendous size ? And if so, are lessons to be drawn from it for other international conferences that will follow ? The whole problem of the setting of Conferences, dealt with in an earlier part of this book,¹ appears again.

At Bretton Woods an extremely clear distinction (reflected in an appropriate apparatus of committees) between policy-forming and technical work, and further between the different types of technical work to be done, was equally a cause for the smooth and efficient working of the conference. The "Steering Committee" consisting of ten members, each of them Chairman of a national delegation, with Henry Morgenthau and Lord Keynes, Stepanov and Hsoang-Hsi K'ung, the chairmen of the delegation from the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R. and China among them, was set up as early as the 3rd of July by the second plenary meeting of the conference. It did "steer" the conference as a whole, and the technical commissions, in the direction of agreed policies. Of the technical commissions there were three. The first, with Harry D. White as Chairman, dealt with the Monetary Fund which was to be shaped more in accordance with the plan bearing his name, than with the Keynes plan. Lord Keynes's great

¹ See above, Chapter II.

experience and skill were put to the best possible use by conferring upon him the Chairmanship of the second technical commission, dealing with the establishment of a Bank for Reconstruction and Development ; the institution which was to take over much of the stimulating and expanding activities which the Monetary Fund as now designed could hardly fulfil to the same extent as the " Clearing Union " originally proposed by Keynes.

Each of the two technical commissions was split up into four sub-committees, dealing with different details of the two new organizations in a parallel way.¹ The sub-committees No. 1 dealt inside both technical committees with the " Purposes, Policies and Quotas " of the respective institutions. The sub-committees No. 2 dealt with their actual operation ; the sub-committees No. 3 with their organization and management ; and the sub-committees No. 4 with their form and legal status.

A third " technical commission " was set up for the purpose of dealing with " other means of International Financial co-operation ". This commission was not subdivided into committees : which may have been one of the reasons why the " problems confronting some nations as a result of the wide fluctuation in the value of silver ", in other words, the Silver-currency problems which had been handed over to the third Commission, could not be discussed in full and up to the point of formulating definite proposals.

There was finally set up, towards the end of the conference, on the 21st of July, a " Co-ordinating Committee ", which received the material worked out by the technical Commissions and their sub-committees and presented the results to the Plenary meeting.

There are three further observations on the general setting of this full-dress international conference. First, the Chairman of the Conference, Henry Morgenthau, and the four Vice-chairmen, among them the Chairman of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Stepanov, the Belgian Minister of Finance, Mr. Gutt, and the Chairmen of the Brazilian and Australian delegations, whilst having been duly elected at the Inaugural Meeting of July 1, wielded practical influence mainly in their capacity as members of the " Steering Committee ". They all belonged to the " Steering Committee " with the only exception of the Australian delegate who was replaced on it by the United Kingdom delegate, Lord Keynes.

¹ The official nomenclature is just " committee " for what, in European fashion, is called " sub-committee " ; and " commission " is the term reserved for what is often called " technical committee ".

Secondly, whilst inside the appointed commissions and even their sub-committees the well-established distinctions of Chairmanship and Reporting Delegate were maintained, a devolution of mere secretarial functions, an increased transfer of work to secretarial staff, is notable. Right into each sub-committee the supply of Secretaries and even Assistant Secretaries was carried forward.¹

Thirdly, collaboration with other international organizations, old and new, was arranged. The Director of the Economic, Financial, and Transit Department of the League of Nations, Alexander Loveday, and his assistant, Ragnar Nurkse, attended. So did Edward Phelan, the Acting Director of the I.L.O., and two of his collaborators. U.N.R.R.A. had two, and the F.A.O. had one, representative on the spot. All these representatives of other international organizations were labelled "Observers". To what extent this practice will in future enable the representatives of one international organization to make active contributions to the work of another, should be a matter of careful consideration. The technique of peacemaking is developing before our eyes.

The Final Act

The results of the Conference of Bretton Woods are laid down in a Final Act² written in the English—and only the English—language. The Act is approved by the Final Plenary Session of the Conference, and signed on the same day on behalf of the 44 Governments represented. The Final Act contains a number of Resolutions partly of formal, partly of material character; partly implying decisions taken by the Conference, and partly recommendations to the individual governments. The statutes of the two new international organizations decided upon are attached as Annex A and Annex B. The former is termed "Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund", and the second: "Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development".

The term "Articles of Agreement" instead of "Statute" is perhaps only introduced for an intermediate period, in order to indicate that the creative act with regard to both institutions is by no means yet completed and may be changed afterwards. The "Agreement" reached between Government Delegations at the

¹ For the Conference as a whole the U.S.A. Government had provided an extremely experienced and skilled Secretariat, led by Warren Kelchner, Chief of the Division of International Conferences, Department of State of the U.S.A., in the capacity of Secretary-General of the Conference, and supplemented among others by the Professor of International Law at Columbia University, Philip C. Jessup.

² *Cmd. 6546.*

Conference will, in any case, receive full validity only through subsequent actions of their Governments. These actions go beyond normal ratification. As indicated in identical terms in the articles of both Annexes, they require the special signature of each government, and the deposition of a special instrument of acceptance with the Government of the United States. Only if and when this has been done by Governments, having amongst themselves 65 per cent. of the total of Quotas, will the Articles of Agreement enter into force, and the creative act reach completion. Until then the "Final Act" would seem to be legally hardly more, and is rather less, than a *pactum de contrahendo*.

The whole situation is vastly different from the conditions under which U.N.R.R.A. was born. There was rapid progress from the signature of the U.N.R.R.A. Agreement on one day, and the beginning of the first Council Meeting at Atlantic City on the very next day. Here the situation corresponds more with the rhythm of progress shown by the different moves towards the formation of the F.A.O. The difference is that of a mere "Interim Commission" there performing the task which, at Bretton Woods, was performed by an accomplished Conference of Government Delegations. This may be, if not legally, at least politically significant.

It is not difficult to find explanation for the difference in speed between the perfection of U.N.R.R.A. and the final establishment of the monetary organizations. The urgency for immediate post-war relief and rehabilitation was, and is, much greater than the urgency of arrangements for the re-establishment of normal international finance relations in the post-war world. It is significant that the decisions of the Bretton Woods Conference go so far as to exclude definitely the entry into force of either the Agreement concerning the Monetary Fund or the agreement concerning the International Bank before May 1, 1945.¹ Furthermore, U.N.R.R.A. as a "United Nations Organization" is strong enough to develop its prescribed activities. An international monetary organization, in order to fulfil expectations, must be as comprehensive and universal as possible.²

The Substance of Agreement

With regard to the substance of the decisions, recommendations and plans embodied in the "Final Act" of Bretton Woods,

¹ Cf. Annex A, Article XX, Final Act, and Annex B, Article XI, Final Act, in both cases, § 1.

² The immediate post-war currency rearrangements in liberated countries was rightly or wrongly left outside the scope of Bretton Woods.

anything like a comprehensive discussion would transcend the ambitions and scope of this book. Suffice to select from the numerous aspects those which are of greatest relevance for either the existing tendencies and trends of peacemaking, or for the pattern of peace appearing on the horizon, or for both.

Under such limitations, it has to be stated first that the delegations of 44 national governments have in the name of their governments expressed their readiness to forego in future certain liberties and powers in currency matters. They have agreed that monetary policy, as far as concerned with the external value of national currency, with the internal value of foreign currencies, and so with the exchange-relations between national and foreign currencies, shall no longer be an exclusive national but rather a joint national and international concern. The sacrifice, from the point of view of national governments, is considerable, in view of the extent to which they formerly made use of devaluation and revaluation of national currency, disregarding any interests but their own and prepared to fight by every means foreign interference in such matters of "national" concern. France revaluating and devaluating at different times; Britain returning to and leaving again the Gold-standard; depreciation of the American dollar in terms of its gold value, and reappreciation of the American dollar in terms of the Sterling shortly before the outbreak of war: these are only a few examples, leaving out completely measures going beyond mere unilateral changes in currency values and in exchange relations, as applied in its most ostentatious form by Germany and certain other countries. That is to go. The period of "sacred egoism", when monetary policy was an essential and unlimited component of national sovereignty, is to be followed by a period of accepted limitations on freedom of action. The necessary social restrictions of liberty are accepted in an important field by national governments.

And the restrictions are far-reaching, despite certain exceptions which will be mentioned later. They begin with an obligation of each member of the monetary organization to establish a "par value" of its national currency in terms of gold: or—what amounts to the same—of the U.S.A. Dollar "of the weight and fineness on July 1, 1944".¹ The second, main obligation, consists in the obligation to maintain this "par value" by all

¹ Annex A, Article IV, § 1; Article XX, § 4. The existing par value is normally to be taken as basis. But during an initial period rectification by mutual agreement between Fund and member State is possible.

Non-founder members have—according to Article XX, § 4 (j)—to accept the par

technical means and to "avoid competitive exchange alterations". Any alterations required by a member must have other than merely competitive reasons, and are to depend on previous consultation with, and agreement by, the Fund. Agreement cannot be denied by the Fund to alterations (in one or different stages) as long as the total change remains below 10 per cent. increase or decrease in the value of the member's currency. But beyond this relatively small margin the Fund has the right to object; and in this case the member has only the alternatives either to abandon the intended monetary policy, or to become automatically "ineligible to use the resources of the Fund". In case of persistence in a unilateral attitude the member concerned can become the object of a decision of the Fund that it must withdraw (*i.e.* expulsion).¹ To what extent these two sanctions will be sufficient to secure fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by members, remains to be seen. It should largely depend on the advantages of membership of the Fund and on the general atmosphere. The possibility of a Fund depopulated, as was the League of Nations at certain times, cannot be excluded.

There are numerous other obligations of member States, apart from their contribution of their "Quota"—partly in gold and partly in local currency or securities—to the Fund. One obligation, again limiting former absolute independence in these matters, is the obligation to abstain from any "restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions", and from any "discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices" except under authorization by the Fund.²

Questions as to the structure and composition of the new international body in whose favour national governments are expected to part with authority, are therefore extremely relevant. What is its composition? What is the balance of power inside? What arrangements have been made to assure governments that their views and interests can adequately be expressed, and ensure the successful commutation of their individual wills into a "common will", more wholesome in the end for their own countries?

The problems raised here are different from those raised in the creation of U.N.R.R.A. and F.A.O., and still more different

value as part of the terms of admission "prescribed" to them by the Fund: an arrangement which may befit ex-enemy countries, but hardly facilitates entry of neutral countries like Sweden or Switzerland.

¹ Article IV, § 6, in conjunction with Article XV, § 2 (b).

² Annex A, Article VIII, §§ 2 and 3.

from the problems of older international bodies such as the League of Nations and the I.L.O. They have also found a totally different solution. The equality of constituent member States in terms of voting power in an assembly is missing here completely. It is replaced by a system meting out influence in various degrees and in proportion to "responsibilities". The technique applied is simple ; perhaps too simple, because it makes use of differentiations which originally and primarily were—and still are—not concerned with political influence inside the organization. They are based on economic differences between countries linked up with the organization, and contributing to and drawing from the organization in varying degrees according to their different economic structure. These differences, from the first drafts of the Keynes and White plans onwards, were stressed and led to the proposal of different "Quotas" for different countries. The Keynes plan went so far as to suggest that "the initial quota might be fixed by reference to the sum of each country's exports and imports on the average of (say) the three pre-war years, and might be (say) 75 per cent. of this amount".¹ The American plan was more general in its terms.

The quota for each member country shall be determined by an agreed formula. The formula should give due weight to the important factors relevant to the determination of quotas ; e.g. to a country's holdings of gold and foreign exchange, the magnitude of the fluctuations in its balance of international payments, and its national income.²

This American definition already introduces elements which, even if economic in character, are (like the figure of national income) at the same time criteria of something more. They are criteria of what may be described as the general momentum of a particular country, deserving a higher quota with correspondingly more influence than less important countries. The acceptance of such a general political differentiation had gone considerably further when the "Joint Statement of Experts" said no more about Quotas and their differentiation than, "The Quotas may be revised from time to time", and added significantly, "but changes shall require a four-fifths vote, and no member's quota shall be changed without its assent".³ It is difficult to avoid the impression that in the meantime the emphasis had changed, and

¹ *Cmd. 6437*, p. 7.

² United States Proposals for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund, p. 5, II, 1.

³ *Cmd. 6519*, p. 6, II, 2.

that the "Quota" had been recognized as a measure of influence inside the organization.

Thus the structure of both the International Fund and the International Bank, as outlined in Bretton Woods, is built upon a formal equality of member States which, however, is *weighted* according to their Quotas and Shares. This, of course, could not but affect the distribution of Quotas and Shares made at Bretton Woods. It is neither an accident, nor hardly the result of exclusively economic and financial deliberations, that in the Schedules of the Final Act showing the allotments, we find that U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., China and France—in short, the "Big Five"—are, in that order, the biggest individual holders with an aggregate of more than two-thirds of the total capital. This distribution, no doubt, provides the desired distribution of influence inside the new international organizations, and corresponds to the distribution of power in U.N.R.R.A., where the Central Committee consists of the "Big Four".

This becomes still more visible: in each of the two organizations a "Board of Governors" is the lowest tier of command. Each member State has the right to appoint one Governor. The figure of Governor is thus made synonymous with the delegate of a member government to the League of Nations, and the Board of Governors as a whole corresponds with the Assembly of the League (or the Council of U.N.R.R.A.). The very great difference, however, is that the Governors' voting strength inside the Board is not equal, but in strict proportion to the Quota or number of Shares of the States they individually represent. The U.S.A. Governor in the Board of the Monetary Fund, for instance, has more than double the votes of his colleague representing the U.K., or his colleague representing the U.S.S.R. All three, together with their Chinese and French colleagues, have a voting-power which no combination of the remaining 39 colleagues (even assuming that all signatories of the Final Act of Bretton Woods have become members and appointed their Governors) could possibly match. From the standpoint of the "Big Five", of course, this is something preferable to the "unanimity rule" of the League.

In a very subtle way, the principle is carried forward to the second tier of command, here called "The Executive Directors", which for purposes of practical comparison in the structural plane, can be paralleled with the "Council" of the League of Nations, or the "Central Committee" of U.N.R.R.A. Here also the principle "one man one vote" is abandoned in favour of the

principle of "men with weighted votes". The subtlety of the technique applied is amazing, and much too intricate to be developed here in full. Of the twelve Executive Directors, five are "appointed" by the "five members having the largest quota", whilst seven are to be elected by the remaining members (i.e. by the Governors representing them). The ballot system to be used is something so far completely unknown in the formation of international bodies.¹

No wonder, then, that the "Quota" as the root of the differentiation in power is fortified against changes in a tremendous way. It can only be changed by a four-fifths majority of the total voting power—and only with the consent of the Power concerned.² Quota changes, which might be utterly desirable for economic reasons, will obviously become difficult in case they would not agree with the careful, mathematically worked out balance of power inside the organization. The nexus between the economic and political functions of the Quota is surely dangerous. Furthermore, with the existence of the present Quota system and of the present Quota distribution, it is difficult to imagine how neutral and ex-enemy countries shall be accommodated in the two organizations.³ Finally, a general increase in the total of quotas would obviously require complete renewal of all the power-mathematics involved.

For such reasons these arrangements worked out and approved by the Bretton Woods Conference will doubtless not be the last word in the matter. On the other hand, the system of weighted votes inside a body of "Governors"—replacing the "Assembly" of more familiar international organizations—and inside an inner body of "Executive Directors"—corresponding to either the "Council" of the League of Nations or the "Central Committee" of U.N.R.R.A.—must certainly be judged a remarkable effort to overcome the difficulties of either simple majority rule or unanimity rule in the framework of international organization.

* * *

The rest of the structure of the two new international organizations proposed, keeps in line with all the old requirements con-

¹ Schedule C, Final Act, *Cmd. 6546*, p. 41.

² Article III, § 2, Annex A.

³ Hardly more than 10 per cent. of the total Quota, and less than 10 per cent. of the Shares, are at present reserved for the two categories of "neutrals" and "ex-enemies". It is not easy to believe that countries like Switzerland, Sweden or post-war Germany, Italy and Japan, will be happy with what little can be parcelled out to them: when this decides the amount of influence inside the organization and the degree to which the facilities of the institutions can be used.

sidered necessary from the point of view of unlimited sovereignty of member States. There is an unqualified right of each member State to leave the organization whenever it chooses. There are not even periods of notice as in the F.A.O., U.N.R.R.A. and other functional organizations.¹ There are safeguards for members against alterations in the organizations and changes in the statutes which might affect their individual position. There are also the more progressive and hopeful claims for extra-territorial and semi-diplomatic status of the organizations as such, and of their officials.² But in the nature of these two organizations, and in view of the centralized and technical work they are expected to carry out, the "international civil service" created here can hardly influence the international atmosphere to the same extent as thousands of field-workers of U.N.R.R.A.

Proposed Functions

Of the functions of the two organizations and of their technical work, a few indications are sufficient. The "Monetary Fund" is a body entitled to authorize, or alternatively to veto, alterations in the value relations between national currencies of member States. This is, no doubt, an important but still a negative function. But it is accompanied by a positive function of the Monetary Fund, supposed to make changes in the exchange relations of national currencies less necessary. The Monetary Fund is conceived as a "Stabilizing Fund". Under conditions laid down in the "Articles of Agreement", members of the Fund are entitled to receive from the Fund foreign currencies normally up to a maximum of 200 per cent. of their quota, in exchange for their national currency at par value. This is supposed to save them from the need to rely on open markets, where otherwise they would have to buy foreign currency possibly at a price higher than the established par value of their own currency. But the extent to which the "Fund" can in this way support members is limited. In recognition of this limitation, the supporting actions of the Fund are, firstly, confined to "current international payments" of member States, and secondly, supplemented by the functions of the twin institution, the International Bank.³

¹ Annex A, Article XV, Annex B, Article VI.

² Annex A, Article IX, Annex B, Article VII.

³ It would seem justified to describe the International Bank as a twin institution of the Fund because, even if both institutions are kept strictly separate with regard to administration, etc., members of one organization are expected to be members of the other also. In principle, membership of the Fund is a condition of membership of the Bank. Cf. Annex B, Article II, § 1, but also Article VI, § 3, for possible exceptions.

The International Bank is supposed to look more after "long-term" requirements of member States, as opposed to "short-term requirements" at any particular juncture, which the Monetary Fund would have to fulfil. The long-term requirements are adequately described in Article I, which brings all forms of long-term capital investment into the range of either the direct or indirect activities of the Bank. Assistance in the "restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by the war", "the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs", and the "encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in the less developed countries", are specifically mentioned. The assistance itself is to be given either indirectly through the promotion of "private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations in loans and other investments made by private investors", or, when private capital is not available on reasonable terms, "by providing, on suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes out of its own capital, funds raised by it and its other resources". The priority given to private investment is notable. But it is made clear that the Bank, where necessary, can and shall act as an "International Investment Board". To a certain extent even "planning" is made part of the policy prescribed for the new institution. It has "to promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade, and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments, by encouraging international investment for the *development of the productive resources of members*, thereby assisting in *raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labour in their territories*". It has, further, "to arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it . . . so that the more useful and urgent projects, large and small alike, will be dealt with first".¹

The connection with the present central idea of peacemaking in the economic plane, aiming at all-round development and setting free of resources in the interest of raising living standards, and postulating a general policy of expansion securing full employment, is evident enough.

These general purposes of the new International Bank for Reconstruction and Development may be contrasted with the tasks of its predecessor, the Bank of International Settlement established to settle the reparation and inter-allied debt problems of the first world war.² The fundamental difference is that the

¹ Annex B, Article I (i-iv), *italics* are ours.

² The Bank of International Settlement which is still working at Basle (and has been working there all through the second world war, it is said, much under German influence) is to be liquidated according to the recommendation of Resolution V of the Final Act of the Bretton Woods Conference.

older institution was built on the recommendations of the Young committee for dealing with one of the most unsatisfactory and discouraging remnants of the past war. There has now grown up the conception of an institution of universal character (which the Bank of International Settlements never had or aspired to), looking far into the future with prospects and policies worked out and accepted during the second world war.

The structure and constitution of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were conceived by the Bretton Woods Conference on lines almost parallel to the Monetary Fund. Again a "Board of Governors" represents the member States, and forms what the League of Nations termed the "Assembly" and what the U.N.R.R.A. agreement calls the "Council".

A "Board of Executive Directors", as in the Monetary Fund, is the inner nucleus, and comprises twelve Directors. Five are appointed by each of the five members having the largest number of shares: and "shares" in the Bank correspond to "Quotas" in the Monetary Fund. Seven are elected by the other members on the same weighted vote and complicated ballot as in the Fund. And again, the balance of power between member States is carefully worked out. The total capital of the Bank is fixed at 10,000,000,000 American dollars "of the weight and fineness on July 1st, 1944". It is divided into 100,000 shares of a par value of 100,000 dollars each. Shares have been allotted to member States in roughly the same proportions as the Quotas of the Fund.¹ Each share gives to the member State (i.e. to its representatives on the Boards) one additional vote. Of the "Big Five", the U.S.A. holds 31,750 shares, the United Kingdom 13,000, U.S.S.R. 12,000, China 6,000 and France 4,500. Between them they thus hold a block vote securing decisive influence. The principle of "one State one vote", as in the League of Nations or the I.L.O., is replaced by the principle of "voting strength—in accordance with the amount of responsibility undertaken". This new principle in the setting of international organizations here, as in the Monetary Fund, is carried to the length that even in the inner nucleus of the Board of Executive Directors, in spite of the fact that the "Big Five" have already the prerogative of appointing one Executive Director each, no "counting of heads" is

¹ According to Schedule A, Annex B to Articles of Agreement, only 9,100 million dollars in shares have so far been allocated (July, 1944). Therefore, 900 million dollars are available for non-founder members (e.g. neutrals and ex-enemy countries). The position for them may, therefore, be no more satisfactory than in the Fund. Alternatively, of course, the total capital of the Fund and Bank could be adjusted.

admitted. Instead, each Executive Director's position is based on the strength of the vote which either appointed or elected him.¹ And again, as in the case of the Monetary Fund, this new set-up is firmly fortified against any possible changes in principle. Section 3 of Article II provides that in the event of an increase of the total share capital of the bank, each member is entitled to an allotment of new shares in exact proportion to its original stock. Such allotment therefore cannot change the original distribution of power, provided all members can take up the increase in their shares.

Furthermore, amendments are made extremely difficult. Not technically : in that respect both the Bank and the Monetary Fund are very progressive. They admit circular letters and even telegrams as means of communicating with member governments on their acceptance. But this progressive attitude is confined to the technical side. The unanimity rule is applied where two or three most fundamental interests of member States, such as any proposed abolition of the right to withdraw, are in question. But also in other instances amendments of the rules are made extremely difficult. They depend quite generally on acceptance by "three-fifths of the members having four-fifths of the total voting power".² This would seem to be even less "democratic" than the old unanimity rule which gives a "veto" to each member State. The distribution of "Quotas" in the Monetary Fund and of "shares" in the International Bank would enable the U.S.A. with its overwhelming voting power to reject successfully any amendment, even if it were supported by all other members of the organization. But neither the United Kingdom nor any other of the "Big Five" would enjoy such a privileged position. Even support of the United Kingdom by all the Dominions would not create one-fifth of the total votes required to block an amendment when the total capital of the Bank is allocated on the present schedule.³ Only the U.S.A. is able to do it without the support of any other member. Is it the new pattern of power which, it may be asked, has brought about and insisted upon these arrangements?

With regard to the status of the Bank and its staff, the same demands as regard extra-territoriality and governmental privileges are made as in the Monetary Fund.⁴ It is not quite clear why

¹ Annex B, Article V, § 4 (g), cf. with Annex A, Article XII, § 3 (i).

² Annex B, Article VIII, (a) and (b) : Annex A, Article XVII, (a) and (b).

³ U.K. together with all Dominions and *India*, which has been allotted the relatively high amount of 400 million dollars' worth of shares, would have the qualifying minority of one-fifth of the votes.

⁴ Annex B, Article VII.

the President of the Bank is called "President", whilst his colleague on the Monetary Fund has to be satisfied with the less pompous title of "Managing Director". He too presides without voting power (apart from a casting vote) over meetings of the "Board of Executive Directors", but not of the "Board of Governors" who elect their own chairman. He is, like his colleague leading the administration of the Fund, expected to build up a body of expert civil servants, to be picked from the point of view of their ability and disregarding their nationality.

The principal office of the Bank—like the principal office of the Fund—is to be located in the territory of the member holding the greatest number of shares. That means in both cases the U.S.A. Regional offices may be established, and will have to be established elsewhere.¹

Gold has to be part of the initial payments of each member State on similar lines to the Monetary Fund. Two per cent. of the price of each share is payable in gold or in U.S.A. dollars, and there is no such mollifying as the possible reduction to 10 per cent. of the actual gold holdings of the individual member State. The 2 per cent. gold payment—quite a substantial amount—has to be made within sixty days of the date on which the Bank begins operations.² Members whose metropolitan territory has suffered from enemy occupation or hostilities during the present war, however, have the right to postpone payment of one half per cent. until five years later.³ For members whose gold reserves are still "seized or immobilized as a result of the war", further postponement of the gold payment can be granted by the Bank. Considering that the total amount of shares is fixed at 10,000,000,000 dollars, the amount of gold to be moved in connection with the initial payments to the Bank, even if perhaps less than the amount of gold required by the Monetary Fund, is nevertheless quite substantial. In other words, here again care has been taken to "return gold to its place and to create channels for its redistribution". This does not mean, however, that large amounts of gold will necessarily be physically moved. On the contrary: as in the Monetary Fund so in the Bank, it is foreseen that, initially at least, one half of the gold holdings shall be held in the "depository designated by the member in whose territory the Fund and

¹ Annex B, Article V, §§ 9 and 10 (a), to compare with Annex A, Article XIII, § 1.

² Annex B, Article II, § 8 (a).

³ Britain having suffered in its metropolitan territory from "hostilities", would presumably enjoy this privilege.

the Bank have their principal offices", i.e. the U.S.A. It is further arranged that, of the remaining half of the gold assets, at least 40 per cent. shall be kept in the "depositories designated by the other four members of the Fund and the Bank with the largest quotas and shares."¹ All this will tend to reduce transports of gold from one country to another, or perhaps even from one depository to another inside one country, to the very minimum. A change of ownership, a transfer of the losses and devaluation risks connected with gold holdings, and particularly a deliverance of the U.S.A. from its specially embarrassing position in this regard, would seem to be some of the effects of what has been planned.

A few more details of the Bank may deserve brief mention. The Bank, apart from its board of Governors, its body of Executive Directors, and its staff headed by the President, is to have some further supplementary organs. One of them is the "*Advisory Council*", consisting of not less than seven persons selected by the Board of Governors and including "representatives of banking, commercial, industrial, labour, and agricultural interests, and with as wide a national representation as possible".² The Advisory Council is supposed to advise the Bank on matters of general policy, and shall meet once a year and in addition as often as the Bank requests. It is foreseen that the members of the Council shall be selected in consultation with other functional international organizations. In other words, the I.L.O. and F.A.O. and any similar organizations in the industrial section of economic life, will be brought in closer touch with the general policy of the Bank through members on the Advisory Council serving as some sort of liaison.

Smaller semi-national committees are to be permanently formed as the work of the Bank goes on, namely, the so-called "*Loan Committees*".³ Whenever the Bank, in the course of its activities, guarantees a private loan or makes a loan out of its own resources to a member government, to a political subdivision of a member government, or to any business, industrial or agricultural enterprise inside the territory of a member State, one of the pre-conditions is that a "written report recommending the project after a careful study of the merits of the proposal" be submitted by a "Loan Committee". The Loan Committees are to be

¹ Annex B, Article V, § 11, and Annex A, Article XIII, § 2.

² Annex B, Article V, § 6.

³ Annex B, Article V, § 7, and Article III, § 4 (4).

appointed by the Bank and are composed of one expert selected by the Governor representing the member in whose territory the project is located, and one or more members of the technical staff of the Bank.

The stage at which the Bank is expected to start normal work is fixed on lines similar to the Monetary Fund.¹ The Articles of Agreement must have been signed by members whose subscription comprises at least 65 per cent. of the total subscriptions allotted during the Bretton Woods Conference (and laid down in Schedule A of Annex B of the Final Act of the Conference), and these members must have deposited with the Government of the U.S.A. instruments "setting forth" that the agreement was accepted "in accordance with the law", and that all steps necessary to carry out the obligations it entails have been undertaken. With these actions the creative act is completed. Signing members have simultaneously to transmit to the Government of the U.S.A. $\frac{1}{100}$ per cent. of their shares in gold or American dollars as their contribution towards the administrative expenses of the Bank. They also have to appoint their Governors who will be convened by the U.S.A. to their first meeting. In their first meeting the Governors select provisional Executive Directors, and then the Bank can notify its members that it is ready to begin operations. In sixty days after that the initial gold payments have to come in.² It is not expected that all this can be done before late summer or autumn 1945, at the very earliest. Article XI of the Agreement states that in no event shall it come into force before May 1st, 1945, which means that with the other formalities and material obligations still to follow, several months would still have to pass before real work could be started. But, on the other hand, the Agreement established something like a "dies ad quem" by laying down that the Agreement shall remain open for signature by founder members only until the end of 1945 :³ and that if by then the necessary quorum of signatures (signature by members representing 65 per cent. of the allotted shares) have not arrived, the contributions towards the Administrative Fund made by those who have signed are to be returned by the Government of the U.S.A.

After the creation of the Bank non-founder members (i.e. countries not belonging to the United and Associated Nations) can be admitted to membership in the same way as to the Fund. But the Bank "prescribes" the terms, and whilst there is no differ-

¹ Cf. p. 278.

² Cf. p. 288.

³ Annex B, Article XI, § 2 (e).

entiation or disqualification of ex-enemy countries, a favourable majority vote inside the Board of Governors is a condition of admission.

The “*right to withdraw*”, this supreme test of “national sovereignty”, here too is safeguarded in a most pronounced form. Notice of withdrawal can be given at any time by a simple letter to the head office of the Bank, and it becomes effective on the day of arrival. There are no such limitations as the two-year period of notice in Article I, § 3 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, or similar restrictions in the U.N.R.R.A. Agreement or the draft constitution of the F.A.O.¹

Suspension and enforced withdrawal are, as in the Fund, sanctions to be taken against members defaulting in their obligations. Both depend on a simple majority of the votes inside the Board of Governors. This gives to the “Big Five” an almost absolute control of the conduct of members. Suspension automatically results in the loss of membership to the Bank, if after one year the member has not been returned into “good standing” by a vote of the Board of Governors to be taken on the same lines.² Final loss of membership, or expulsion, does not as in the Fund require a special vote.³ Nor, as in the Agreement concerning the Fund, has the member a specific right to be given adequate opportunity for oral and written defence. The difference in method would seem to reflect the complicated nature of contraventions of currency obligations: defaults in connection with the more limited obligations in the Bank would be more easily discernible.

The Fund and the Bank, whilst obviously meant to be part and parcel of one comprehensive post-war organization in the field of currency, credit, and finance, are in other ways separate entities. The Bank can suspend, or even stop altogether, its activities and can dissolve itself without forcing the Fund to follow suit. This is a consequence of the Bank as a whole having more of a *co-operative* character, and very little, if anything at all, of the *policing* functions which the Monetary Fund has to fulfil in currency matters. It is the Fund which binds its members to maintain the once established “par values” of their national currency, and to resort to depreciations or appreciations, in other words, to changes in the value relations between their national currency and the currency of other countries, only in consultation with and on approval by the Fund. It is one of the main tasks of the Bank to make fulfil-

¹ Annex B, Article VI, § 1.

² Annex B, Article VI, § 2.

³ Annex A, Article XVI, § 2.

ment of that obligation easier. It is the co-operative principle which is expected to supplement the policing principle.

Looking at the institutions as a whole, as designed by the Annexes to the Final Act of Bretton Woods, one cannot help feeling that great as their possible services may be, and much as their mere existence may distinguish the scene after this war from the scene after the first world war, or before the beginning of this war, the institutions alone will not yet mean salvation.

Of this the Conference of Bretton Woods was also naturally aware. It therefore inserted into the Final Act two more general resolutions. The first, with the title "Enemy Assets and Looted Property", takes solemn note that the United Nations have pledged themselves repeatedly and firmly to undo as much as possible of the robberies and other methods of dispossession practised by the enemy governments and their nationals, particularly in occupied countries. It recommends as an important and essential step towards the fulfilment of the pledge, early negotiations with neutral countries to forestall efforts to use their territory and their institutions for the purpose of disposing of or concealing the loot.¹ This recommendation would seem to have two main implications. First, it tries to widen the circle of governments represented at Bretton Woods by an early approach to those governments who, owing to their neutrality, had been unrepresented. But secondly, and more important, by concentrating upon the loot and on measures for restoration without mentioning anything going beyond that, like indemnities or reparations, it would seem that the Conference had not favoured a return to the more unhappy side of "peacemaking" after the first world war.

More definite and more positive is the second general resolution, entitled "International Economic Problems".² This Resolution, beginning with a quotation from Article I of the Agreement of the Monetary Fund,³ makes it clear that all the work done by the Conference and all the plans made in the field of specifically monetary and financial measures would require, in order to come to fruition, many more co-operative efforts of individual governments, and agreement between them on much more general problems of economic policy. The resolution therefore urges the governments to seek, as soon as possible, agreement on the ways and means whereby they might best—

(1) Reduce obstacles to international trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous commercial relations.

¹ Resolution VI of the Final Act.

² Resolution VII of the Final Act.

³ Cf. Appendix III, C.

(2) Bring about the orderly marketing of staple commodities at prices fair to producer and consumer alike.

(3) Deal with the special problems of international concern which will arise from the cessation of production for war purposes.

(4) Facilitate by co-operative effort the harmonization of national policies of Member States designed to promote and maintain high levels of employment and progressively rising standards of living.

The fourth point of this recommendation strikes at the core of the whole problem of peacemaking in the economic plane, and therefore of peacemaking as a whole after this war. If the essential basis of constructive peacemaking, the establishment of "progressively rising living standards" as both a condition and a result of "maintained high levels of employment", has to be secured, it can only be secured through "harmonization of national policies" into one, great *international* policy. Such national policies are already being accepted in Britain, France and many other countries: and agreement that international harmonizing should march with national planning has been reached.

An international Stabilization Fund and an International Bank can substantially contribute to this result.

(c) *Other International Functional Organizations*

In addition to the large-scale undertakings described above, several other specialized organizations have been set up or projected, to afford some degree of international planning of vital services or raw materials: most conspicuously shipping and aviation, oil and wheat.¹ These constitute an "emergent pattern" of the kind already described—a growing network of international machinery, which is capable of still further extension and application to other goods and services.

The agreement about control of merchant shipping is one of the most striking examples of speedy and effective organization. Representatives of the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium, Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and France, signed an agreement on "Principles having reference to the Continuance of Co-ordinated Control of Merchant Shipping" on August 5th, 1944.² The agreement was largely a war-time measure, to maintain "common responsibility" for the provision of shipping for the war and for relief:

¹ Cf. *Building Peace out of War* (P.E.P., 1944).

² Cmd. 6556.

and it notably includes most of the Atlantic seaboard States, along with Greece and Poland whose supplies for relief will depend upon such shipping. It was destined to end not more than six months after the end of hostilities in Europe or the Far East. But it has value and interest as a piece of international co-operation which took positive, centralized form. A central authority was set up, consisting of a "United Maritime Council"—open to representatives of all signatories and of all other United Nations or neutrals wishing to join: and a "United Maritime Executive Board", including representatives only of the United Kingdom, United States, the Netherlands and Norway. One significant arrangement was division of the Executive Board into two Branches in Washington and London, "under War Shipping Administration and Ministry of War Transport chairmanship respectively". Another was that the Board and its Branches "shall proceed by agreement among the members. There shall be no voting." A "Planning Committee" was set up in London to prepare the necessary machinery for the Board to exercise the functions attributed to it—planning the "efficient overall use of shipping".

The organization of civil aviation after the war, because it concerned a new and undeveloped method of transport, and post-war rather than war-time plans, proved more difficult and complex. Private interests hastened to stake out their claims in good time, and to identify them with national interests. The President of American Airlines Inc. had urged immediate expansion of America's aviation "to protect our nation at the peace conference". Mr. Walter Runciman in Britain had urged timely steps to prevent "the Americans overrunning the whole of the European routes". This was in 1943. By 1944, the governments of the "Big Three" began to show more lively interest in the subject, and during June and July, 1944, American and Russian groups in Washington exchanged preliminary views, and agreed that experts of both countries should explore the needs for future technical co-ordination. The idea of setting up an international authority for international air services began to be mooted. In Britain an independent group of experts under the chairmanship of Captain A. G. Lamplugh, set up in 1942, issued two reports in which they, too, proposed the setting up of "an international controlling body of operators to regulate traffic on a regional basis", and an international government authority to ensure a uniform standard of efficiency and safety

in pilots, machines and airport facilities.¹ Detailed discussions between Britain, the British Dominions and the United States were also planned, and the course was set for the setting up of some sort of functional body to handle this problem, which the *Manchester Guardian* described as "one of the most far-reaching of all the tests of our capacity for co-operation". Eventually a conference of over fifty nations was arranged to meet at Chicago in November, 1944.

It is noteworthy that where, as in this instance, international action becomes desirable, there is inevitably imposed on private interests a greater degree of national control than before : which is one reason for their opposition. The Lamplugh Committee, while urging a return to private competition on a commercial basis in Britain, also urged control by either the Minister of Transport or a new Minister of Civil Aviation.² The State has the threefold task of reconciling and regulating private enterprise internally, safeguarding general national interests, and participating in concerted international arrangements. The work of the State is increased and not diminished by such developments.

Similar development took place in the kindred business of oil. With the heavy drain on American oil-supplies during war, considerable anxiety had been felt in America over British control of Middle East supplies. With the principle of the Atlantic Charter in mind—equal access for all nations to the trade and raw materials of the world needed for their economic prosperity—Britain and America reached agreement in August, 1944.³ They created an International Petroleum Commission, consisting at first of themselves, to estimate the world demand for petroleum and to determine how world needs could be met on a basis equitable for all concerned. Again, the agreement involved greater control over the private oil companies, but American fears were dispelled, and the way was left open for the participation of other oil-producing countries—most obviously Russia and the Netherlands. Here again is the beginning of a functional organization, and a model which might well be copied for other essential raw materials such as rubber and cotton. But the kind of business interests concerned in each commodity vary greatly, and some are likely to prove less amenable to national control and international co-ordination than aviation and petroleum.

¹ *The Times*, August 14th, 1944.

² Such a new Ministry was created in October, 1944 : and cf. Postscript, below.

³ *The Times*, August 10th, 1944.

New methods of agreement, new devices of organization, would doubtless have to be evolved for each main commodity.

As regards wheat—a raw material of obvious concern to bodies already in existence such as the Middle East Supply Centre and U.N.R.R.A. and of bodies already projected, such as the F.A.O.—an interim arrangement has been made, pending the setting up of the F.A.O. The supply bodies already set up by the United Nations are maintained by agreement during the transition period, to prevent any break in continuity of planning or control. But international planning of wheat production and supply would clearly fall within the province of the Food and Agriculture Organization eventually.

In these diverse, piecemeal ways, sometimes for purely war-time needs and sometimes to forestall or diminish international and commercial rivalry, the habit of international co-operation through established machinery is growing. It is one of the main roads to peace.

In a very different sphere—that of education—there has been some advance and much more discussion of advance—towards greater international co-operation. The League Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, apart from its Institute in Paris, had no outstanding achievements to its credit. In the winter of 1942-3, Mr. R. A. Butler, then President of the Board of Education, called a meeting of Allied Ministers of Education. It became an established Conference, with an executive committee meeting fortnightly, and this Committee set up three commissions for dealing with books and periodicals, scientific equipment, and films. As a result, preparations have been made for stocks of British and American books to be kept available for national and university libraries in the liberated countries: an Inter-Allied Book Centre has been set up in London: and books have been specially written for use in European schools after the war. The organization has tended to turn into a sort of intellectual and cultural U.N.R.R.A., or what Sir Ernest Barker has called an "I.E.O."—an International Education Office.¹ The tasks of reconstruction of universities, technical institutes and educational systems in liberated countries: of encouraging the right kind of re-education in Germany: of reviving the old tradition of truly international learning and study: all these tasks, ranging from the immediate to the ultimate, will certainly need machinery. Whether an "Inter-Allied Committee" is appropriate in this

¹ Sir Ernest Barker: "Books for the Allies" in *The Spectator*, September 29th, 1944.

sphere for more than the immediate post-war tasks, is doubtful. Organizations such as International Student Service and the Universities themselves must play as large a share as official and inter-governmental bodies, if obvious dangers are to be avoided. And "international education"—whatever its substance—needs time to grow and cannot be unduly rushed.¹ Here is a task which can perhaps only be properly tackled at a later stage, when the early labours of peacemaking are already sweetening international relations, stabilizing national life, and making possible that serenity and objectivity in which true learning has always thrived. Present achievements are but an approach and an indicator of direction: it is well they should not hasten to be more.

§ 5. CO-ORDINATING THE FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

One final and very important question remains: how far can and should these diverse technical and functional organizations be themselves planned and organized, to prevent wasteful overlapping, and co-ordinate their activities? It has already been seen, in the borderlines between the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and U.N.R.R.A., between U.N.R.R.A. and the I.L.O., that great care has had to be taken to partition functions and interlock organizations. Should this task be undertaken more systematically? If so, does this involve some superior organization? Or, since the mainspring of action in each body lies within each member State, will there be sufficient automatic harmonizing, through the simple interplay of national policies which are themselves consistent enough to interact similarly within each functional body?

This last thesis is doubtful. National policies are so complex, and national interests which dictate them are so varied, that it is rash to assume a high logical consistency in each national policy. A State may take one line about labour conditions in the I.L.O. and a line which, to other States, seems inconsistent in its financial or currency policy. On the other hand, it is in the very nature of functional administration to be realistic and practical, *ad hoc* and adjustable, and any high degree of superior control and co-ordination would partly cramp and frustrate the

¹ The attempt to write history books for general use in each country is surely unwise in war-time, and over-sanguine hopes (as held out by Sir Ernest Barker) seem rash. Cf. also J. Slávik in *The London Quarterly of World Affairs*, October, 1944.

free development of each organization within its own province of action.¹

Yet each body so far set up has its own central directing authority, and these authorities are differently constituted in each, and the balance of power between members is not identical in each. Perhaps for these general reasons, and also to link up the economic and social labours of peacemaking with the political and military, the first official proposals issued from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of the "Big Four" on October 9th, 1944, included a special Chapter (IX) on "International Economic and Social Co-operation". It was declared that the proposed organization as a whole ("The United Nations") "should facilitate solutions of international economic, social, and other humanitarian problems, and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". The General Assembly should be responsible for discharge of this function, but under its authority, a special "Economic and Social Council" should also be set up. This was designed as a link between the existing functional bodies and the general organization.

The various specialized economic, social, and other organizations and agencies would have responsibilities in their respective fields as defined in their statutes. Each such organization or agency should be brought into relationship with the Organization on terms to be determined by agreement between the Economic and Social Council and the appropriate authorities of the specialized organization or agency, subject to approval by the General Assembly.

Among the proposed duties of the Economic and Social Council is the duty

to receive and consider reports from the economic, social, and other organizations or agencies brought into relationship with the Organization, *and to co-ordinate* their activities through consultations with, and recommendations to, such organizations or agencies.

It is even empowered, in the draft proposal, to examine the administrative budgets of functional agencies, and make recommendations to them or to the General Assembly on its own initiative, as well as carrying out the recommendations of the General Assembly.²

Here, then, is a general international economic authority, small enough to reach clear decisions, since it would have only

¹ See further below, Chapter VIII, § 4, and *Cmd. 6560*.

² By Chapter IX, paragraph D2, of the proposal, representatives of the functional agencies could attend the deliberations of the Council, but without a vote.

eighteen members ; representative in character, since it would be elected by the General Assembly of " The United Nations " ; and untrammelled in action since a simple majority vote is sufficient. In its proposed form, it could effectively co-ordinate the various special agencies, supervise their general behaviour, and keep a watching brief, as it were, for overlaps, gaps, frictions and inefficiencies. Although it would have, in relation to the General Assembly and the Security Council, only advisory powers, it could exert over functional bodies a healthy, flexible and yet unifying influence. If duly set up, the Economic and Social Council might become the central agency for economic and social peacemaking. The prospect raises two fundamental questions, which lie at the very heart of peacemaking.

How loosely jointed must international organization be to allow scope enough for free growth and healthy development, and so promote a durable settlement ?

How loosely jointed can international organization afford to be, without imperilling balanced growth and harmonious development ?

To answer both questions satisfactorily is the central clue to successful peacemaking in the economic and social spheres : and perhaps in the political sphere as well. One approach to the problem—the problem of how highly integrated peace-planning should be—is to disentangle the main patterns of settlement, each consistent within itself, which may be superimposed one on the other in the final peace settlement. This attempt is made in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

FOUR POSSIBLE PATTERNS OF PEACE

§ 1. *Local domination of each of the "Big Four": the tendency to regional organization, and to regional influence of big powers: "constellar politics".*

§ 2. *Regional Groupings or Federations of States: geographical unity of regions: geological units: economic units.*

§ 3. *A revised League of Nations: present trends favouring a general League "with teeth in it": proposals for revision: Dumbarton Oaks proposals: probable developments.*

§ 4. *International Functional Organizations: the relation between security organization and functional "social service" bodies: interaction of forces of nationalism and desire for economic welfare and security: how post-war conditions will influence such developments: dangers and difficulties.*

From the foregoing survey of previous patterns of peace settlement, of strongly-backed proposals for an international order which have made their appearance in recent years, of the various factors which will certainly exist together during the next experiment in peacemaking, it may be useful to select four broad types of settlement, each of which might predominate in the future. The first three would be settlements based essentially on a fixed territorial arrangement, paying as much homage to geography as to history, to politics as to economics. The fourth would be a more universal settlement, demanding more sustained conscious effort and planning, and depending more directly on the will of men: but more elastic in territorial basis, more comprehensive in purpose. It must from the first be clear that these four types are not mutually exclusive: that a peace settlement is conceivable—and perhaps even desirable and probable—which combined two or more of these patterns, and sought permanence through its very reconciliation of diverse principles. Organizing the world is a complex and variable undertaking, and no one principle of settlement may be found capable of universal application. Indeed, the wise peacemakers will not sacrifice effectiveness for tidiness, and their only requirement of any arrangement will be that it does not violate too many of the pre-requisites of peacemaking, some of which have been suggested above.¹

§ 1. LOCAL DOMINATION OF EACH OF THE "BIG FOUR"

The first pattern of settlement—requiring little concerted

¹ Introduction, pp. 17-18.

action between the "Big Four" and most likely to happen if they should fail to agree on a common and concerted policy—is a virtual partition of the world into "spheres" or regions of influence, in each of which one great Power would predominate over its smaller neighbours. This, indeed, is the pattern of Germany's "New Order" in Europe and of Japan's "Co-Prosperity Sphere" in Eastern Asia. It is the pattern inherent in Nazi racial theories of the *Herrenvolk* and geo-political theories of *Lebensraum*. A settlement deliberately based on this pattern would have certain affinities, at least in territorial matters, with the settlement of Westphalia in 1648, when the struggle between the dynastic powers of the Bourbons in France and the Habsburgs in Austria, and between the religious forces of Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany, found temporary compromise solution in regional domination and the principle of *cuius regio eius religio*.¹ France asserted her influence over the southern Rhineland through control of the large bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun, and over the southern Netherlands. The quarrelsome collection of weak German States after 1648 became for her, in the words of one historian, "a prime factor in French security, a reservoir of political allies, a sphere of influence, a buffer against Austria, a prime condition of European equilibrium".² In the western Danube valley, the Austrian Habsburgs consolidated their power and laid the basis for their later remarkable domination of the whole Balkan region. As yet, however, they divided it with the Ottoman Turks, whose regional domination of the Balkan peninsula up to the very gates of Vienna was then at its zenith. Austrian influence in Germany was exercised through the nebulous office of Holy Roman Emperor, a Habsburg family monopoly for many centuries.

A modern world which fell into zones of influence centring on the "Big Four" would, of course, have many differences from this old dynastic pattern, woven of conquest, marriage and diplomacy. But it would operate upon the same principles of equilibrium, and since it can be conceived existing only as the consequence of the failure of the "Big Four" to agree upon and achieve more organic unity, it would carry within itself the same seeds of future conflict and instability. Nor have technical and political tendencies in the twentieth century diminished the possibility of such regional groupings. Mr. Walter Lippmann

¹ See Chapter IV above, p. 124.

² H. A. L. Fisher: *A History of Europe*, p. 632.

has coined the phrase "nuclear politics" to describe the adhesion of smaller States around the core of the "Big Four" world Powers. It is for similar reasons that a system of nuclear politics can be conceived, wherein each Power separately has its constellation of planets and its zone of attraction.¹

Even during the fighting of the war, it has been found natural and convenient to organize battle-zones of operations, as separate as possible one from the other: eastern Europe, the "Atlantic system", the Mediterranean region, the South-east Asia Command, and so on. The factors of strategy, national traditions and political ideology act as strong centrifugal forces, making the democratic-capitalist United States, Soviet Russia, republican China and the widely scattered British Commonwealth cores of very distinctive political systems and regional areas, overlapping and interlocking indeed, yet exerting a divergent pull on intermediate States such as France, Poland, and the South American republics. Just as the solidarity of the British Commonwealth has shown and strengthened itself in war, so has the advance of Russia into eastern Europe brought new areas within her orbit, the Pan-American organization and "good neighbour" policy of the United States has fostered the idea of transatlantic solidarity, and China will undoubtedly be reinforced to offset and overshadow a defeated Japan. The nations of Europe, the most complex storm-centre in the world, may find themselves drawn in different directions and subject to a conflict of affinities and allegiances. Many will tend, after liberation, to gravitate much more closely to one focus than to another.

Such a prospect, terrifying in its potential strife, perhaps serves only to underline the central necessity for the big Powers to reach solid and reliable agreement among themselves.² That these natural tendencies to "constellar" policies should be strengthened by a deliberate and premeditated policy of regional dominion by any one great Power would spell the doom of the United Nations and of world peace. Experience of German economic penetration into the Balkans even before Hitler launched his campaign of military conquests shows how such domination could be effected by subterfuge, commerce, technical assistance,

¹ *United States Foreign Policy*, Chapter X. Indeed, the arguments used by Mr. Lippmann in favour of the "Big Four" acting as one nucleus apply with equal, if not greater force, to their development as four separate and often rival "nuclei".

² The first real test of such agreement may well concern the policy adopted towards Germany—the area in which Russian and Anglo-American interests most completely overlap. Cf. Carl L. Becker: *How New will the Better World Be?* (1944), pp. 192–5, and below, pp. 352 ff.

and even investment. The strategic necessities of modern defence, too, make possible a programme of systematic domination disguised as simple demands for effective self-defence, and control of a screen of advance outposts in the laudable cause of general security. Lacking sincerity and goodwill in any one big Power, the whole spirit and structure of international order can be destroyed.

Yet it will be essential, at every point, to distinguish between the regional influence and even control which must, by the drift of natural tendencies inherent in modern conditions, fall to a big Power surrounded by smaller or weaker States, and efforts to exert such influence and control which are dictated by more ambitious separatist interests and policies. The simple fact of regional influence is no cause for lament and suspicion: it is how it is used, and whether it is artificially augmented to the detriment of the national interests and sentiments of the small States concerned, that must be the test. It is no more wrong that Russia should safeguard her Baltic coastline by key outposts than that Britain should hold Mediterranean garrisons at Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus, or that the United States should want strategic bases in Iceland and West Africa and Panama. Indeed, the changing geography of the modern world implies a new approach to the problem of world bases.¹ It is whether or not these bases are welded into a common international defence system and used to establish law and order in the world of a kind that all nations can equally enjoy, which makes them good or ill. Doubts of the intentions of the American sponsors of world bases² can only be quelled by a policy of integrated and unified action.

No government of a modern "social-service" State, charged with protecting the welfare of its people, can be expected to jeopardize that trust in the interest of some vaguer international "general good". But all can be expected to pursue the well-being of its people in such a way as not to violate the corresponding well-being of neighbouring nations. It cannot usefully be asked to give up positive national assets from simple altruism: it can

¹ See above, Chapter IV, Part VI. See further, Y. M. Goblet, *The Twilight of Treaties* (1936); V. Stefansson, "Arctic Supply Line" (*Fortune Magazine*, July, 1942); cf. W. Sievert, "Crisis of British Sea-Power," *Journal of Geopolitics* (1941).

² N. J. Spykman: *America's Strategy in World Politics* (1940). Cf. also Walter Lippmann's conception of the "Atlantic Community", comprising all countries bordering the Atlantic and controlling strategic bases within it. *Op. cit.*, Chapter VII, and *U.S. War Aims* (1944), where the organization of such a community is more fully discussed (Part II, "The Great Communities").

be asked to use those assets in a wider common purpose,¹ which will increase and not diminish their purely national value.

In this sense, a limited system of "constellar" politics can be with value combined with any other of the three types of possible peace-pattern now to be discussed: and it may be laid down as a general principle that the clearer such groupings crystallize out after the war, the stronger should be the fabric of the general co-ordinating organizations, whatever their form. They will have stronger centrifugal forces to control and offset.

§ 2. REGIONAL GROUPINGS OR FEDERATIONS OF STATES

A second possible type of settlement, with some affinities of pattern to the first already discussed, is the more purely geographical settlement, fostering the grouping of States into smaller blocs or federations. Some of the war-time proposals for this type of pattern have been already mentioned.² The usual purpose of such proposals is exactly the opposite of "constellar" politics, in that they are intended to produce greater equality of size and power between a larger number of units of international organization. They propose the union of groups of smaller States, geographically contiguous, so that each group may be more on a par with each of the big Powers. A Balkan federation of the Danubian basin; a union of the "eastern marchland States", from the Baltic to the Balkans³; the "Oslo group", which existed for certain purposes before the war, or a "Scandinavian bloc"; a federation of the western seaboard States, with or without the United Kingdom⁴; a "Latin bloc" of the western Mediterranean States; a Far Eastern bloc; ingenious combinations of these and other groupings⁵: all have had their advocates, and some have their historical and traditional justifications as workable schemes.⁶

¹ Which is precisely why this "wider common purpose" must be stated in terms of universal applicability—such as individual human freedom, conditions of work and living-standards—and not in exclusive and limited terms of national sovereignty, the "freedom of States", and "sovereign equality of all States". See above, Chapter VII, p. 243f., and below, pp. 337-9.

² See above, Chapter V, on "Contemporary Proposals", especially pp. 166-72.

³ F.g. *Central Union*, by George Harrison and Peter Jordan (1943), encouraged for obvious enough reasons by certain Polish circles.

⁴ E.g. W. I. Jennings: *A Federation for Western Europe* (1940).

⁵ E.g. Ely Culbertson: *Summary of World Federation Plan* (1944); Harold J. Laski: *Reflections on the Revolution of our Times* (1943), Chapters 6 and 8; J. B. Condliffe, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-7.

⁶ Thus a union of the Balkan countries would have some historical parallel in the Habsburg settlement of 1815: just as local domination of big Powers would be akin to 1648.

This pattern of settlement would have one great weakness : that it would exaggerate the power and significance of geography as against that of history, of economics as against politics. In recent years, geographers have stressed more and more the importance of the region as a unity.¹ They have divided regions into two kinds—*natural regions*, homogeneous in terms of relief, climate, drainage, etc., and *human regions*, homogeneous in culture and economy. The need to secure some correlation of the two is plain. Unfortunately, German geo-politicians,² by stressing the rôle of the State as the “ master of space ”, and using geographical data to expand the frontiers of the Reich, perverted the whole study of political geography. Their work has not contradicted, rather has it indirectly strengthened, the case for geo-political regions, developing to the full the resources of their own areas, and realizing that homogeneity which can only come from a balancing of all the factors involved. Unfortunately, there is little likelihood of the redrawing of the map of the world to satisfy such criteria.

There is every economic and material argument in favour of a federation of the Balkan or the eastern marchland States : there is also, unfortunately, every political and racial and nationalistic reason why a rational, tidy union of these States is little likely to be achieved at the next peace settlement. Even in Scandinavia or western Europe, where traditional hatreds and recent squabbles are far less prevalent than in eastern Europe, Denmark and Sweden, France and Spain, show little evidence of any desire or intention of entering into close union one with the other. In so far as the policy of Hitler has been “ divide and rule ”, and war tends to breed xenophobia, it has to be confessed that regional federation on a scale big enough and general enough to serve as a basis for this pattern of settlement is highly improbable.

Nevertheless, even partial achievement of such groupings would have some value, and might well—like regional domination by separate big Powers—be one consequence of failure by the “ Big Four ” to concert their policy and behaviour on a world-

¹ Especially from the time of F. Ratzel (1844–1904). For a recent regional study by a Cambridge geographer, see H. G. Wanklyn, *The Eastern Marchlands of Europe* (1941). This should be read in conjunction with R. E. Dickinson, *The German Lebensraum* (1943). See also Y. M. Goblet, *op. cit.*

² The work of the German geo-politicians should be studied not only for its impact on German strategy in time of war, but for its directives on German policy in a long-range settlement, assuming victory in war. The geographical bases of a German settlement would have been fairly plain. See H. W. Weigert : *Generals and Geographers* (1942) ; R. Strauss-Hupe, *Geopolitics : The Struggle for Space and Power* (1942).

wide scale. Any tendency to form larger units from smaller States by voluntary agreement, and to create bigger free-trade areas than the area covered by small States, would be in the interests of all parties and of wider international co-operation and peace. Regional unification will be better than separatist isolation or neutrality.¹ The case against it is on grounds of probability, not of desirability.

It is significant that advocacy of this sort of grouping is normally not the policy of small States themselves, but of the larger States—the nearly-great Powers, such as Italy, Spain, Poland and—in her periods of greatest weakness—France. It is the obvious device of the nearly-great for augmenting their power by the adhesion of smaller allies, not of the small and weak, who fear over-intimate attachment to a State large enough to dominate them yet not large enough to guarantee their security in time of crisis. The instinctive policy of small States is either to seek the “certain” protection of a big Power, as Hungary sought German, or more often to hug neutrality even in relation to other small States, as did Belgium, Greece and Switzerland. They gain little, in security at least, from merger with other Powers as small as themselves. Given conditions of greater international security, the economic and other benefits of fusion between small States may, indeed, find freer scope and higher priority in the scale of attractive propositions. But even then, the attractions of close connection with the really big Powers will also be correspondingly greater. And whatever the rôle of the nearly-great States in international alignments and groupings, it is unlikely to be that of a “bridge” between big and small. It can only be that of appropriate partnership, with big and small alike, in wider tasks of organizing an international system of law and order, and in an international network of “social-service” administrations for improving the standard of living and conditions of welfare for their citizens. Functional organization permits of leadership and partnership, but scarcely of a finely graded hierarchy of power.

Organization of regional areas—often of overlapping areas—may well be the inevitable basis of international administration. For any one functional purpose, the most convenient area is often

¹ Although the economic interests of a group of States, such as Scandinavia, are essentially bound up with States outside the bloc—e.g. trade relations with England—to a higher degree than with some States inside the bloc—e.g. trade between Sweden and Denmark. Exportable goods may be too much alike to find markets within the region.

dictated by material conditions of geography, climate, economic conditions, transport facilities, and so on. This regionalism of purely administrative convenience is different in kind from the many political proposals to create federations of States on regional foundations, and the divisions of convenience seldom coincide with political and national frontiers. The area best suited for the administration of relief would probably be different in size and limits from the area best suited to be the unit of organization in transport and communications, or of agricultural reconstruction and planning. Likewise the vast coalfield covering Belgium, Luxemburg, the Ruhr and northern France is geologically one unit, and there would be immense technical and economic advantages in its being worked by a unified organization. The fact that this coalfield happens to coincide with one of the political storm-centres of Europe has hitherto overruled all considerations of economic advantage, and has impoverished all countries concerned. Just as there has been a Danube Commission to control the navigation of the Danube which is of so much commercial interest to the States of the river-valley, so the reasonable arrangement would be a Ruhr Commission to supervise the working of the great coalfield, whose development and control affects the welfare of towns as far apart as Hamburg and Marseilles. But such an international organization is possible and conceivable only in terms of individual human well-being, and not of national sovereignty and security.

A Ruhr Coal Commission, with administrative and planning powers over the whole area would, of course, be perfectly possible without any formal political federation between France, Belgium, Luxembourg and western Germany. If linked with a still wider International Fuel and Power Administration, it would have facilities for marketing and a security and stability greater than it could have within a limited regional federation of States. The coal would be mined and sold not in terms of private company-profits nor in terms of separate national security, but in terms of world needs for coal in relation to other sources of fuel and power. Similarly, the proposed establishment of a "Tennessee Valley Authority" for the Danube Valley¹—attractive as it seems and as it might be in operation—is less likely to come, in Balkan conditions, through the immediate establishment of a high-

¹ Cf. P. Lamartine Yates and D. Warriner : *Food and Farming in Post-War Europe* (1943), p. 53 f.; Herman Finer ; *The T.V.A. Lessons for International Application* (International Labour Office, 1944) ; T. Balogh et al. : *The Economics of Full Employment* (1944), p. 165 f., on "Full Employment within a Region."

powered regional authority set up by a regional federation of these States, than as one part of wider international administrations concerned with navigation, water-power, commerce, employment, and so on. The most hopeful approach in modern conditions is not so much a frontal attack on the principles and theory of national State-sovereignty, but rather a changed priority of purpose, ranking human well-being higher in the scale than separatist interests of business-corporations, nations or even regions.

§ 3. A REVISED LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Mention has already been made of the tendency, during the years of war, to move from general disillusionment and despair in the League of Nations, as it worked or failed to work between the two wars, through violent flirtation with the ideas of Federal Union, towards a return to the League conception with certain radical revisions and adjustments.¹ The first clear and official encouragement of the idea, other than personal *obiter dicta* of leading statesmen already quoted, came from President Roosevelt when he issued his general statement of opinion after consultation with members of both Houses of Congress and officials of the State Department, and after consideration of the many plans put forward by groups and individuals.² The President stated :

The maintenance of peace and security must be the joint task of all peace-loving nations. We have, therefore, sought to develop plans for an international organization comprising all such nations. . . . Accordingly, it is our thought that the organization would be a fully representative body with broad responsibilities for promoting and facilitating international co-operation, through such agencies as may be found necessary, to consider and deal with the problems of world relations. It is our further thought that the organization would provide for a council, elected annually by the fully representative body of all nations, which would include the four major nations and a suitable number of other nations. The council would concern itself with peaceful settlement of international disputes and with the prevention of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace. There would also be an international court to deal primarily with justiciable disputes.

Here, clearly, is the outline of a revised League of Nations "with teeth in it" : a general assembly representing all States (though the President did not specify equal representation) : an executive council, based on the "Big Four" but increased by

¹ See above, Chapter VI, pp. 182 f. ² Cf. *The Times*, June 17th, 1944.

"a suitable number" of other nations, responsible for ensuring international security: a court of international justice. That it should involve no attack on principles of national sovereignty was made abundantly clear in the rest of the statement.

We are not thinking of a super-State with its own police forces and other paraphernalia of coercive power. We are seeking effective agreement and arrangements through which the nations would maintain, according to their capacities, adequate forces to meet the needs of preventing war and of making impossible deliberate preparation for war, and to have such forces available for joint action when necessary.

Other stages in the crystallizing of American opinion are marked by the Mackinac Island Conference of the Republican Party Post-War Advisory Council, the Fulbright resolution in the House of Representatives, and the Connally resolution in the Senate. On September 17, 1943, the Republican Party's Council called for "responsible participation by the United States in a post-war organization among sovereign states to prevent military aggression and to obtain permanent peace with organized justice in the world". This call, coming from the Party hitherto associated with forces of isolationism, marked the beginning of the process of taking this issue out of party conflicts—a process which was soon to be continued by the support given to similar statements in Congress. On September 21st, the Fulbright resolution was carried by 360 votes to 29. It called for "the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favouring participation by the United States therein through its constitutional processes". During the Senate discussions of an amended text of the same resolution, there appeared the Moscow Declaration, with its reference to "an international organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States".¹ With the phrases of the Moscow Declaration included, the resolution passed through the Senate by 85 votes to 5. An influential group of Senators even spoke in favour of the United States signing the Covenant of the League in 1943, Senator Taft explaining that in his view "the only practical line on which we can succeed is one based substantially on the same principles as represented by the League of Nations of 1920".

To the Atlantic City conference, which established U.N.R.R.A.

¹ For full text, see Appendix I, D.

two months later, both the technical services of the League of Nations and the I.L.O. sent representatives. In other ways the activities of the League's surviving technical bodies (the Economic and Financial Mission at Princeton, the Health Section, the Fiscal Committee, the Anti-Drug Boards and the Supervisory Commission acting as holding-authority for the Assembly) assumed some prominence in American affairs during 1943.¹ The League was again much in men's minds by the end of 1943.

In Britain, the League of Nations Union had prepared a draft pact for the future international authority, which foreshadowed a revised League preserving the familiar form but with a "Defence Committee" of the "Big Four" to take immediate and drastic action against an aggressor.² At the same time, in a report on "social and economic reconstruction in the post-war settlement", the association had shown its realization of the immense importance of peacemaking in the social and economic spheres, no less than in the purely political.³ These publications are important only as evidence of the trend of opinion among people who had previously been the most ardent supporters of the Covenant of the League and of the principles on which the old League of Nations had been based. Mr. Eden had said in 1941 that "social security will be our policy abroad no less than at home".⁴ And for the pursuit of this new objective it came to be widely realized that "some measure of abandonment of national economic sovereignty and some degree of international government in the economic sphere has become an inevitable necessity".⁵

Among the many forceful expositions of a realistic approach to the problems of international security organization, Walter Lippmann's book on *U.S. Foreign Policy* was particularly widely read and quoted on both sides of the Atlantic, and by reason both of its timely appearance and its incisive comments it helped to crystallize thought on the main questions.⁶ Attacking the world problem from the point of view of a national foreign policy,

¹ For further details, see Arthur Sweetser in *International Conciliation*, February, 1944, and above, Chapter VII, § 1.

² *Draft Pact for the Future International Authority* (1943).

³ *Draft Report on Social and Economic Reconstruction in the Post-War Settlement* (1941).

⁴ *Cmd. 6289*, p. 6. In the House of Commons on December 2nd, 1942, Mr. Eden also made the significant statement: "To my mind, there are three indispensable attributes . . . for any international organization. . . . First, it must be fully representative of the Powers that mean to keep the peace. The old League was not. Second, the Powers themselves must have the unity and the determination to arrive at agreed and positive decisions. And the third, and perhaps the most important of all, is that they should have the force behind them to give effect to their decision."

⁵ L.N.U. Report, p. 7. ⁶ Walter Lippmann: *U.S. Foreign Policy* (1943).

and insisting that enlightened self-interest is the only basis of national policy, Mr. Lippmann argued the case for a "solvent" policy—that is, one in which the commitments undertaken did not exceed the power of the nation undertaking them. In this sense, he contended, the United States had never had a solvent foreign policy of its own, for the policy it followed was based on the existence of the British Navy. The true end of foreign policy is "to provide for the security of the nation in peace *and* in war", so that definite alliances and adequate armaments are necessary. The mistake of President Wilson, in drafting the Covenant of the League, was to identify "collective security with antipathy to alliances, rather than with the constructive development of alliances". The League became impotent "because the nuclear alliance of Britain, France and America had been dissolved". This alliance, and that with Russia, had to be reconstructed in order to conduct the war. The future organization of international security must therefore be built around such a "nuclear alliance", consisting of at least America, Britain and Russia. "The will of the most powerful states to remain allied is the only possible creator of a general international order." But such will to remain allied can only be perpetuated if they act "so as to gain and to hold the goodwill of the other peoples". Here, indeed, was effective underlining of the Moscow Declarations.

The prospect of a revised League of Nations had thus, by the end of 1943, clarified into three general propositions which appeared to win widespread general agreement from the most ardent supporters of the old League, from influential political writers, and above all from the governments of the big Powers. These three propositions were :

1. That the core and hinge of the new League must be a close alliance of at least America, Britain and Russia.
2. That the terms of this alliance, and of its power to provide international security, were that it should win the goodwill and co-operation of most other nations. This involved wider international organization around the powerful core.
3. That beyond the machinery for providing security and order, there must be a network of other international organizations, directly or even remotely linked with the political organization, for co-operation in social and economic matters.

When the first problem, of security organization pure and simple, was tackled at the conferences at Dumbarton Oaks, near

Washington, in August and September, 1944, it was tackled by meetings between the "Big Three" mentioned, and between Britain, America and China : and these three propositions were re-stated officially at the start.¹

One fundamental issue between the three Powers soon became clear. It was the relative emphasis which should be placed on the rôle of the Big Powers as leaders and as guarantors of order, and on the general participation of "all peace-loving nations" in the provision of security. Mr. Cordell Hull, United States Secretary of State, declared that "the future maintenance of peace and security—the supreme object of international co-operation, must be a joint task and a joint responsibility of all peace-loving nations, large and small". He expressed the American view that : "It cannot be emphasized too often that the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, irrespective of size and strength, as partners in a system or order under law, must constitute the foundation of any future international organization for the maintenance of peace and security". The leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Sir Alexander Cadogan, endorsed these sentiments and added that "No one wishes to impose some great Power dictatorship on the rest of the world ; but it is obvious that unless the great Powers are united in aim and ready to assume and fulfil loyally their obligations, no machine for maintaining peace, however perfectly constructed, will in practice work". He further emphasized that "we must arrange for at least a measure of co-ordination between the various functional organizations now created or to be created, and in some way gear them to our international machine. . . . Freedom from fear and freedom from want must, so far as human agency can contrive it, move forward simultaneously." ² Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet representative, emphasized that "freedom and independence can be preserved only if the future international security organization uses effectively all the resources in the possession of its members, and, first of all, the resources of such great nations as the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. The organization will be

¹ See above, Chapter VII, § 5. During the meetings Mr. Churchill, in a letter to Viscount Cecil on his eightieth birthday, spoke significantly of creating "an armed grand alliance under the ægis of the League."

² *The Times*, August 22nd, 1944. The British statement amounted almost to a restatement of British traditional policy in modern terms ; e.g. in its insistence on traditional British alignment with small Powers and the dangers of international machinery becoming too rigid. Cf. Castlereagh in 1818 ; in H. Temperley and L. Penson : *Foundations of British Foreign Policy, 1792-1902* (1938), p. 39.

based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all freedom-loving countries." The Soviet spokesmen later pressed that functional organizations should be formed outside the security organization to deal with everything not directly connected with the settlements of disputes or the preservation of order.¹

The final issue which emerged from the first discussions at Dumbarton Oaks was just this question—whether the aim should be to build up an omnibus international machine, as the League had set out to be, for the handling of problems of order, security, international disputes, economic welfare and social and intellectual co-operation : or whether separate, if loosely co-ordinated, agencies should be created, without overmuch attention to tidiness and unification of machinery. Lord Halifax, in a broadcast to the United States during the meetings at Dumbarton Oaks, took the second view. His words are so relevant to the central theme of this book, that they are worth quoting :

It is becoming more and more clear that the peaceful order we hope to set up is not something that will spring quite suddenly out of a large conference. It will depend on the thought and work put into it before the war is over. The meeting at Dumbarton Oaks should therefore be seen as part of a pattern for peace. The work was begun at Hot Springs and went on to Atlantic City and Bretton Woods. More meetings of the kind will be necessary as the pattern grows. But this is the right way to go to work.²

The interim statement issued from Dumbarton Oaks on August 29th revealed agreement on the three main points : a general Assembly of all peace-loving nations, a Council of the "greater Powers" along with others elected periodically, and "effective means for the peaceful settlement of disputes" which would include an International Court. It thus reflected faithfully the design outlined by President Roosevelt in June, 1944.³

On October 9th, 1944, the draft proposals of the Conference for a general international organization to be called "The United Nations" was at last issued.⁴ Although French representatives had at that point taken no part in the discussions, the draft bore striking similarities to the Bourgeois Draft of the Covenant prepared by the French in 1918. The two most striking differences between the new scheme and the League are that "plans for the application of armed force should be made by the Security Council (of eleven members only) with the

¹ *The Times*, August 26th, 1944.

² See above, p. 308.

³ *The Times*, August 28th, 1944.

⁴ *Cmd. 6560.*

assistance of the military staff committee": and that "in order to enable urgent military measures to be taken by the organization, there should be held immediately available by the members of the organization, national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action". In 1918-19, Léon Bourgeois pleaded for a permanent international staff with military power at its disposal for prompt action against an aggressor. He also pleaded that decisions be reached by majority vote and not unanimity. In the "United Nations" project, important decisions of the General Assembly are to be taken by a two-thirds majority and lesser decisions by a simple majority: but the use of unanimity rule in the much more important Security Council proved an issue of such profound controversy that it was left undecided in the first draft proposal. In basic essentials, then, if the new organization is to be regarded as a "revised version" of the League, it is of the League as conceived by France in 1919, rather than of the Covenant as it was finally drafted and adopted.¹

The four purposes of the general organization are defined as follows:

To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means the adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace.

To develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

To achieve international co-operation in the solution of international economic, social, and other humanitarian problems; and

To afford a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends.

The sequence of aims is significant: security—friendliness—co-operation—harmony. The "organs of the organization" have this same priority of importance: the Security Council—the General Assembly and International Court of Justice—the Economic and Social Council—the permanent Secretariat. Although the functions are not, of course, strictly or exclusively allocated to the organs in this sequence, yet the hierarchy of authority within the whole does correspond to the priority of aims and functions.

¹ On the contrasting conceptions of the League in 1919 and the process by which the final draft was achieved, see especially D. Hunter Miller: *The Drafting of the Covenant*; Sir A. Zimmermann: *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law*, Part II; W. E. Rappard: *The Quest for Peace* (1940), Chapter II.

The tightness of organization, the degree of integration attempted within each organ, varies in a similar ratio. The Security Council consists of only eleven members, of which the "Big Five" are permanent and the other six elected in turn by the General Assembly. It has much more initiative and power (including direct control of air power) than the Council of the League. The General Assembly, on which every member has equal representation and voting-strength, exists chiefly to provide a forum or clearing-house for the ventilation and interplay of separate national policies, and to voice world opinion. Its functions in relation to the Security Council, once it has elected six of its members, are advisory and persuasive, not imperative. Its most important offshoot—directly elected by it—is the Economic and Social Council for co-ordinating the activities of the various functional organizations and agencies.¹ But the majorities required for important decision in each body are some index of their tightness of organization: as regards the Security Council, there was deadlock over the demand that unanimity be required: in the General Assembly, a two-thirds majority is needed for all major decisions: in the Economic and Social Council, a simple majority is sufficient for all purposes. The powers of the organs are thus in inverse ratio to the narrowness of the majority required for decision.²

There is, about the whole draft, a certain camouflage which obscures its divergence from the old League. As in the Covenant, peace and security are stated as the general aims: as before, there is lip-service to principles of universality and national sovereignty. "The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States," and "membership of the organization should be open to all peace-loving States." But these principles are little endorsed in the structure itself, and it has been aptly said that "the organization will exist rather for security as such than for justice as such, and will, it seems, leave less doubt on this point than did its Geneva precursor".³

What is left unsaid is important. The Charter of the organization is not to be attached to or even connected with the Peace Treaties, as in 1919. No longer does each State guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of each. There is no specific reference to "treaties which have become inapplic-

¹ See above, Chapter VII, § 5.

² Cf. the various majorities required in each functional organization, described above, Chapter VII.

³ *The Times*, October 12th, 1944.

able". There is no mention of procedure for withdrawal, but the General Assembly has power of expulsion for persistent violation of the terms of the Charter. What is said very categorically is equally important, for it precludes all the old debate about formal and legal definition of an "aggressor". There is to be preventive action of a kind never entrusted to the League.

The Security Council should be empowered to investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Security Council is thus a sort of watch-committee, holding a watching brief to intervene decisively at an early stage of any international problem which *it* decides may prove dangerous. On that new and basic power, the whole of the rest of the structure, and its hierarchy of organs, is built up. The most comparable historical event is not the inclusion of sanctions articles in the Covenant, but the famous Article 61 of Magna Carta which set up a watch-committee of twenty-five powerful barons—including a selected "Big Four"—to take decisive action and to enforce by military action the terms of the Charter.¹ The unruly nations of the world which may sign the proposed Charter will say, as King John said in signing Magna Carta, that "if we shall not have corrected the transgression" after due protest, then the Security Council may "distrain and distress us in all possible ways, by seizing our castles, lands, possessions and in any other way they can". The analogous circumstances of emergency which called for such action need little emphasis.

The relation of smaller States to the major Powers, which would hold so preponderant a place in the central authority wielding military force, is utterly different from their relationship in the former Council and Assembly of the League. True, they may take turns of sitting on the Security Council, and all have an equal vote in the General Assembly. But with the abandonment of the unanimity rule in the Assembly (the "Right of deadlock") and the diminished power of the Assembly itself, the smaller States have a new function. Each, knowing it cannot by itself veto any important decision under a unanimity rule, must concentrate more on real persuasion and affiliation with other States. Each has to "undertake to make available to the Security Council . . . armed forces, facilities, and assistance

¹ Cf. W. S. McKechnie: *Magna Carta* (Second Edition, 1914), Chapter 61.

necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security". In the Economic and Social Council, and all the functional agencies which it seeks to co-ordinate, they have a larger share still ; and economic and social matters are likely to prove of increasing importance in general peacemaking, once military security is assured. They may, in substance, surrender a greater degree of their "national sovereignty" than the great Powers, if "national sovereignty" means freedom to wage war (or to be warred against). They gain in freedom to plan their national economy and internal social development by membership of a vast network of international co-operative agencies, and to seek freedom from want because they already have freedom from fear. The older distinction between Powers with general interests and Powers with limited interests has still much real substance : and this substance is recognized in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

But the way in which the first draft was prepared—by the "Big Four" with the later addition of France—served as a challenge to the smaller States, despite their opportunities to discuss it fully later in general conference. Some of the neutral countries, such as Switzerland, showed clear resentment against a proposal for Big Power leadership so exclusively drawn up by the "Big Four" themselves. The balance of organs, functions and powers within the new organization may be modified by discussion and agreement at the San Francisco Conference in April, 1945. Extension of the regional arrangements specifically encouraged by the proposal and of the activities of the Economic and Social Council—both somewhat sketchily treated in the proposal—might go far to meet the demands and interests of the smaller States. But at every stage the inflaming of national feeling inseparable from modern war will doubtless prove an obstacle to smooth development.

For the final truth about the new security organization, as of all machinery for international co-operation, is that what will come out of it will be no more than what is put into it. Perfection and elegance of structure, fine balance of constitutional arrangements and obligations, are less important than the will to make them effective and a general resolve to make them work for the general good. There is a clear resolve that whatever mistakes be made, they will not be the same set of mistakes as before. With the chastening reminder that they may be mistakes as great as before, this learning from experience is all to the good.

In view of these developments, a general security organization with formal similarity to the League of Nations is indeed the most probable pattern of peace. It does not preclude local spheres of "Big Power" influence or regional groupings of States of the kind already described. Still less does it preclude—it positively favours—the creation of functional agencies of peacemaking of the kind described in the previous chapter. Rather does it seek to provide the structure of security and the political framework for the effective operation of such functional bodies: the roof of orderliness and security, under which shelter can be given to many other varieties of international co-operation at many different levels.

The acceptance of this pattern of organizations raises—as it raised at Dumbarton Oaks—the basic question of what should be the exact relation between the security organization and the other agencies of co-operation: whether the "revised League" should wield a general, political, supervisory and co-ordinating power over all other machinery, or whether it should confine its activities to providing security and general political facilities for collaboration, leaving the functional bodies free and separate. In short, how loosely jointed can, and should, the structure be? Experience of the I.L.O. in relation to the former League argues against too close a link between general and functional organizations: and in so far as tidiness is much less important than effectiveness, the extent to which the general organization should attempt to be an omnibus organization might well be left for practical experiment and experience to determine. There would be undesirable restriction and rigidity if the League were to try to confine all the vigorous fronds and ramifications of internationalism within its own walls: and failure anywhere would have immediate repercussions in every other part of the structure.

But the issue must be decided on a balance of considerations. If an international authority is needed to co-ordinate the activities of at least most of the functional organizations, it would clearly have to be the political authority, the General Assembly, or its offshoots. Such co-ordination may be found necessary and desirable to prevent or eliminate wasteful overlapping, and to prompt the formation of new agencies to cover fields not already covered. To withhold co-ordinating authority would be to leave to each national government the task of reaching agreement within each functional organization, and so would import political and national conflicts of policy into the heart of each

organization. Yet such conflicts of policy there will be in any case, and it may be that each set of conflicts can be more easily and smoothly resolved in one limited sphere and over one specific issue at a time, than if all were bundled together into a general clash of principles on the political level within the organization primarily concerned with security. It would seem wisest for the League to be accredited with a general supervisory power, but for such power to be called into action only in the last resort, when deadlock had been reached at the level of functional co-operation. The problem can be further illuminated by considering what would be the pattern of peace if the security organization were restricted to its minimum functions—leaving all other tasks to linked but substantially distinct organizations.

§ 4. INTERNATIONAL FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

From the interaction of tendencies already described, the final possible pattern of peace which requires more close-up examination is the pattern woven of functional organizations, built up piecemeal for each separate category of international problems. If revision of the League of Nations were carried far enough on the lines suggested, it might amount to little more than one agency among many, concerned with the particular political and military problem of "keeping the peace". It would not, in itself, necessarily have the function of co-ordinating or supervising other functional bodies: it would be, so to speak, *primus inter pares*. It is unlikely that this development would take place at first. But given the smooth and efficient working of the security patrols, and given a solid basis of agreement among the bigger Powers which alone would provide smooth working machinery, it is conceivable that international relations might move forward to a new stage of more widely varied activities and more constructive voluntary co-operation on a scale far exceeding any already achieved. The security organization would then take its place alongside many others, linked with them only by the common agreement and leadership of the bigger Powers and by a substantially common membership of nations. There would be, in short, more international administration than international government: if it were to amount to a super-State it would be a super-State of the "social-service" order, not a super-State with political sovereignty, transcending and replacing "national sovereignties". Its roots would still lie in the distinct

—but interdependent—policies of each nation. Such is the basis, already examined, of U.N.R.R.A., and the proposed basis of the Food and Agriculture Organization and the financial organizations recommended at Bretton Woods.

What is the “possibility” of such a development—or even of a trend of events leading in this direction? The answer would seem to depend on a balance of two great forces. It is a problem of creating systematic co-operation between nation-States: and the answer lies in the result of the conflict between the nature of modern nationalism and the nature of the modern State.

On the one hand, nationalism remains still the strongest popular enthusiasm and the most powerful political force in the modern world. It has triumphed over every great international movement with which it has come into conflict. It won its first triumph over international Catholicism during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when it produced from the unity of medieval Christendom the patchwork of modern nation-States in Europe and America. It overcame and superseded the forces of international democracy which, with their roots in the universal rationalism of the eighteenth century, first manifested themselves in France during the French Revolution. The French revolutionaries calling on all peoples to overthrow their outworn régimes and enter into the new era of democratic freedom, of “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity”: the liberals of 1830 and 1848, seeking in the solidarity of oppressed peoples a common cause against despotism: both alike went down before the forces of dynamic nationalism. These turned the edge of French democracy by exalting the principle of “sovereignty of the people”, and of European liberalism by the principle of “national self-determination”. Napoleon replaced Robespierre just as Robespierre had ousted the Girondins and the *Feuillants*: Cavour replaced Mazzini: Bismarck replaced the Frankfurt Parliament: Napoleon III killed the Second Republic. And in the wake of these nationalist leaders, international democracy withered before militant nationalism. International Socialism, fostered by the first two Internationals and by men like Jaurès and Keir Hardie, wilted before the power of separatist nationalism in 1914. International Communism, adhering to Marx’s slogan “Workers of the world unite” and operating in modern times through the Third International, has been defeated in one country after another: and in the home of communism, Soviet Russia, its last relics, Trotskyism, have been eliminated by that eminent Russian nationalist

Marshal Stalin. Internationalism pure and simple, as formulated by President Wilson, was from the first doomed because of its own insistence on the principles of "national self-determination" and the sovereign equality of all nations: and the story of its decay is the international history of the last twenty-five years. The death of modern internationalism was due to national selfishness and indolence in face of Hitler's "bloodless victories".

After a five-years war, in which countries have been ravaged infinitely more brutally and thoroughly than by Napoleon or Kaiser Wilhelm II, and in which patriotism has been the cement of organized resistance to fascism, it is unlikely that these turbulent energies of nationalism will have weakened or subsided. Rather must they be expected to flourish and surge as never before, as they have already infused the resistance movements in occupied countries. That is one side of the picture.

But, on the other hand, the whole character of the modern State has undergone fundamental transformation during the last two generations. A hundred years ago, the State as it existed in western Europe and in the U.S.A. was little more than a "police-State", whose prime *raison d'être* was to keep law and order, protect rights of person and property, and conduct foreign relations. In Prussia, it is true, and for a short time in France under her revolutionary governments, the State assumed a wider measure of control and interference in social and economic life. But no State had a large civil service or administrative organization, and few governments had either the apparatus, technique or will to make themselves responsible for the welfare and economic prosperity of their subjects. The "sovereign State"—even the sovereign nation-State—whose functions were so negative and limited, had no need whatever for international functional organizations. International affairs were merely "foreign affairs"—a matter of diplomacy, war, treaty-making and trade. In the nature of things they could be nothing more, and "State sovereignty" had a certain root in reality (of a purely legal and military kind) which made the implications of the principle reasonable and applicable to actual conditions.

During the last seventy years or so, all this has changed. Every State in the modern world has, in greater or less degree, made itself responsible for protecting and actively promoting the social and economic well-being of the mass of its citizens. The Benthamite principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number", which at first served as the destructive, reforming

organizations planned at Bretton Woods are intended to form a link between separate national policies. There is widespread realization that

one of the chief reasons for the failure of the League was that it was given a formal authority and promissory tasks for the future, while the immediate, urgent, and most welcome tasks of social reconstruction and reform were left to be attended to by national agencies ; later efforts to retrieve that mistake only led to a series of barren economic conferences, as by that time the policy of each country was set hard in its own mould.¹

There is hope in 1945 that, with more countries in the melting-pot economically and with the bitter lessons of the pre-war years, more will be done than in 1919 to attempt peacemaking in the social and economic spheres on a more integrated international pattern.

But there are reasons, too, for avoiding undue optimism. The most important organization, the proposal of the Hot Springs Interim Commission to set up a Food and Agriculture Organization, has met with much obstruction and makes very slow progress towards timely realization. The even more important task of creating corresponding functional organizations for industry had made hardly any headway whatever by the end of the fifth year of war.² There was still, in many influential quarters in Britain and the United States at least, the firm belief that social and economic reconstruction has nothing to do with peacemaking. Thus Leopold Schwarzschild, in his much discussed book *World in Trance* (1943), expounded the thesis that "The preservation of peace consists in securing our house from external attacks. Social progress consists in improving its internal organization. There is no relation between the two tasks."³ Inside each country, plans for social security met with stubborn and concerted opposition from powerful business interests⁴ : interests which would clearly, for the same reason, obstruct every effort to project such plans into the international sphere. In addition, intransigent nationalism and the xenophobia induced by war act as a barrier to any movement which can be interpreted as adjusting national economy to international needs : and a "social-service" State whose concern is to safeguard the standard of living of its

¹ David Mitrany : *A Working Peace System*, p. 24.

² For two partial exceptions, see above, p. 295 ; and the I.L.O. itself (see above, Chapter VII, § 1).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 277.

⁴ E.g. the campaign of the insurance companies against the Beveridge proposals.

members can plausibly interpret its tasks in either a protective and exclusive manner, or in terms of enlightened self-interest which may mean sacrificing short-term advantages to long-term well-being.

With this balance of forces and considerations, there is a certain danger that the establishment of functional organizations will be encouraged by national governments and economic pressure-groups more as a sop to public opinion and popular demand than as a real and effective contribution to international action. There is nothing inherently good or constructive about international organizations as such : all depends on the spirit that infuses them and the purposes they are made to serve. Utopian enthusiasts are too apt to assume that every move towards more concerted action is good : but it is not good if it masks a determination to obstruct solid progress in co-operation, or if the organization be used merely as a sounding-board for selfish nationalist policies which have no intention of promoting joint action. The way in which membership of the League of Nations—and even of the I.L.O.—was used by some States in this way should serve as sufficient warning against this delusion.

The arguments in favour of the fullest possible development of functional organizations internationally have been so ably and convincingly expressed by Professor David Mitrany¹ that they need only be briefly summarized here.

1. "Peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it." The political-constitutional approach of Federal Unionists and all who seek political union as prior in time and importance to economic co-operation, gets bogged in formalist arguments and questions of national sovereignty, political rights and constitutional arrangements. The functional approach does not preclude or hamper political arrangements : but it is concerned with needs which are common and ends which are specific, not with political differences and constitutional principles.

2. "Society will develop by our living it, not by policing it !" Emphasis and concentration on social-service organizations and economic administration is in harmony with the historical development of the nation-State itself, from the early, negative "police-State" towards the modern, positive "social-service" State : it is a logical development of the most constructive and

¹ *A Working Peace System* (1943). The quotations which head these four summaries of the argument are from this work.

successful aspects of the work of the League of Nations and the I.L.O. : it meets the present material needs of a dislocated post-war world. By their practical elasticity and adaptability, functional organizations can serve the ever-changing needs of the modern world with a minimum of nationalist friction. They can serve as agencies of "peaceful change" such as a purely police organization for keeping order would fail to be.

3. "The task that is facing us is how to build up the reality of a common interest in peace : not a peace that would keep the nations quietly apart, but a peace that would bring them actively together."

The most hopeful organization in modern conditions is one which actively serves the highest common measure of interests among peoples : and such interests cannot be stated in terms of national sovereignty and political authority alone—nor even in terms of national independence and freedom. They can be stated only in terms of human welfare, individual well-being, the social security and happiness of men and women. Only organizations effectively serving such ends can win a loyalty strong enough to transcend modern nationalism : only they *can* effectively satisfy these needs.

4. "Every activity organized in this way would be a layer of peaceful life : and a sufficient addition to them would create increasingly deep and wide strata of peace . . . the elements of an active international society."

To seek peace through working functional organizations is the opposite of Utopian : it is to approach the mighty tasks of peacemaking with due humiliation and deference, to work from the concrete and material to the more general and spiritual. It is to regard peacemaking as a process and not an event, a living human activity, not the drafting of a Treaty or the multiplication of promissory notes. It is to act on the assumption that peace is not merely the absence of war, but the healthy condition natural to a developing "international society".

The practical scope of functional administrations is vast, and the form and precise shape which each of them might take is, by their very nature, unpredictable. Form would have to be devised, adapted and developed to suit changing needs and the increasing co-operation of other nations. Essential raw materials such as coal, wheat, cotton, timber, the rarer minerals, could be planned in this way for the general welfare. Transport facilities by land, sea and air could likewise be co-ordinated and developed.

Schemes for public health, sanitation, housing, the prevention of epidemics and drug addiction, could be built on foundations already existing in the technical committees of the old League. National standards of nutrition, work and social security could be promoted and reinforced by economic "mutual aid" already started for war-time and already foreshadowed by Bretton Woods and Hot Springs. The arts and sciences and public education have infinite needs which can only be met by international effort, though here the forces of nationalism may prove even more tough and unyielding than in more material matters of food and health.¹

There is one important proviso about this most complex of all "possible patterns of peacemaking". It is that by its very fluidity and elasticity, its effects are ultimate and its influence long-range. The authors are convinced, from their analysis of all the factors, that on this pattern can be built the most hopeful and durable kind of peacemaking. But in existing conditions, its speed of materializing and its power for good will be determined by the form of peacemaking at the political level.² It will have different capacities and effectiveness if the world falls into zones of Big Power influence from those which it will have if States form regional groupings or federations: and different effectiveness again if a more universal League be created around a nucleus of Big Powers guaranteeing order in the world. This will be true not merely because the form of political and security organization will itself help to mould the conditions favouring or obstructing functional administration, but also because both will be determined by the interaction of historical, national, material and psychological forces which earlier chapters have attempted to analyse and assess. Functionalism is no panacea for peace, no slogan which by even universal acceptance will save nations or men the effort and anxiety of constant inventiveness, unremitting clear thinking, and patient compromise in a spirit of helpful co-operation and good will. Given these things, peace can be built up painfully in the face of disappointments and setbacks. Without these things, no device of organization and administration can give birth to peace.

¹ Though the Universities have a tradition of internationalism which still lives in certain forms: e.g. International Student Service, the frequent interchange of students and teachers, etc., cf. G. W. Keeton: *The Case for an International University* (1941).

² For this reason, the measure of political agreement about such thorny problems as the Polish frontiers, the treatment of Germany, and the treatment of liberated countries, which the three major Powers reached at the Crimea Conference in 1945, is a most hopeful omen. See Postscript, below.

CHAPTER IX

PROBLEMS OF A PLANNED SETTLEMENT

§ 1. *Requirements of the planners : the terms of the equation to be solved : freedom and organization : the desirable qualities of a sense of perspective, a sense of direction, a sense of purpose : the experience of war planning : national policy and international planning : choosing the planners.*

§ 2. *The aim of planning : the "Four Freedoms" : individual and national security, prosperity and welfare : towards an "international society".*

§ 3. *Can planning be democratic ? : the "road to serfdom" : criticisms and counter-criticisms : laissez-faire not necessarily "democratic".*

§ 4. *The dangers of planning : impersonality and inhumanity : dangers of limitless planning : obtrusiveness : the prospects for greater rational control of events and more "scientific peacemaking".*

§ 1. REQUIREMENTS OF THE PLANNERS

Implicit in the arguments of this book are certain general problems of planning social life : problems of deliberate and effective control by men and women over the course of those events and the growth of those organizations which are of prime significance in the making of peace. It has been argued that if we conform to certain conditions, "we can get what we want", and do not merely have to wait for "what is coming to us".¹ Despite much criticism and resistance from the forces of individualism and private enterprise—and the natural antipathy of ordinary men and women to being regulated and "administered" by government departments according to certain blueprints—most modern States have come to accept and adopt a high degree of planning of social and economic life. It is clear that a large part of the wealth and well-being of the common man depends on functional planning and organization and comes to him in the form of "social services" such as transport, health-insurance, old-age pensions, unemployment benefit, free education, and so on. The Utopian visions of a clinical civilization often put forward by planning enthusiasts have rightly made the word "planning" a term of abuse for some people and a term of suspicion for many. But it is as probable as anything can be that each nation and all nations collectively will see more and not less planning of social life in the present century. A "brave new world" may be a visionary's nightmare : it is made no less remote and no less of a nightmare if we are shy of planning, or if we fail

¹ See Introduction.

to approach the realities of the post-war world in a spirit of fresh inventiveness and with the courage of conviction that a minimum of order can be brought out of the chaos.

For "planning", of course, is in itself a neutral process, good or ill in its effects on human liberty and welfare according to its purposes and its technique. Prodigies of planning—"combined operations" on a fantastic scale of elaboration and thoroughness—have been successfully accomplished in war. The Nazi preparations for the systematic conquest of Europe, the Russian organization of recovery and counter-offensive, Anglo-American combined operations for invasion, have meant planning on a scale hitherto unknown in the world. They are rightly judged good or bad by the purpose which they have served. But their accomplishment shows that, given the energy and will, technical difficulties can be successfully overcome and the desired end can be achieved. It will be an argument frequently heard in the post-war years that if these miracles of organization can be performed in war for the end of destruction, they can equally be performed in peace for the ends of human well-being and constructive civilization. It will be an argument refutable only on grounds of lack of will, and not on grounds of technical impossibility. And there is no recipe for creating the will, save accumulating conviction that there is no alternative but disorder, helpless acquiescence, and a "cowardly old world".

Many advocacies of national and international planning are attacked—and indeed condemn themselves—because they omit from the terms of the technical problem values which are rightly felt to be menaced by the regimentation and controls involved in planning. The greatest of these values is individual freedom, and the place of individual freedom in social planning involves the question of how far planning can be democratic. This will be considered below. It is tempting and all too easy to draft blue-prints of national and world order in purely material and economic terms: blue-prints which owe their very simplicity and precision to their having left out from the equation the one value which by its existence created the problem. *If* people could all be persuaded that federal union is preferable to national separatism—of course there is no problem of world federation and no obstacle to its achievement: but people from China to Peru, being free to think differently, are not likely all to be converted by Clarence Streit or Dr. Joad. *If* everyone believed that peace between nations is a higher good than national advantage or

personal gain, and that pacifism is a moral imperative, then, of course, wars would automatically cease : but people, being free to hold contrary beliefs and ideas, are not all likely to become converted members of the Peace Pledge Union in time to prevent the next ten wars. *If* everyone could have been persuaded that the Germans really are a master-race, predestined to dominate the world of lesser tribes without the law, then, of course, the Nazi New Order could have ended wars : but people in every other nation being strangely perverse about this belief, the attempt to set up the Nazi New Order in Europe has produced the greatest of all wars so far. Despite their diametrically opposed methods of procedure, the Utopian planner and the Nazi New-Orderer start from the same root-fallacy : that human freedom and diversity of opinion can be ignored or overcome in the process of planning a new order.

The first and most fundamental of all assumptions in democratic planning, on an either national or international scale, is that the values of personal freedom and diversity—freedom of conscience, thought, speech and private life—are hard and irremovable terms in the problem which confronts planners and peacemakers : and no “solution” to the problem will be worth anything unless it reconciles these values with political order and social organization. The dilemma of reconciling freedom and organization is as old as human society itself, and it cannot be met by ignoring freedom. But neither can it be met, as the extreme individualists and anti-planners would have us believe, by ignoring organization. Many have drawn up blue-prints for machines of perpetual motion which ignored the laws of mechanics : but their machines have never been known to work.

Assuming, then, the need for organization and therefore for planning on an international scale after the war, what are the pre-requisites for the planners? Be they politicians, civil servants, experts, generals, business-men, or ordinary citizens—and they can include all these¹—the qualities most to be valued in peacemakers would seem to be three : a sense of historical perspective, a sense of direction, and a sense of purpose. In so far as these qualities are present and in well-balanced proportions amongst the peacemakers, the harvest of their labours will be rich and rewarding, nourishing generations to come not with the bitter seeds of war but with the ripe corn of human welfare. Let us examine each of these qualities in turn.

¹ “Peacemakers” is here used in the widest sense, described above in Chapter VI.

A sense of historical perspective : here and here only is the storehouse of wisdom based on experience. The gibe may be levied against historians that they can never predict anything—they are always wise after the event : and this is true. The study of history is based on the belief that it is better to be wise after the event than never to be wise at all. The day is past when political leaders could pride themselves in their elegant ignorance of the affairs which they handled—when a British Chancellor of the Exchequer could lament of decimal points that he never had known what “ those dammed dots meant ” : unless, indeed, the story be true that Laval, after the failure of the Hoare-Laval Pact, was surprised to learn that Abyssinia is not an island. Politicians may still suffer from ignorance : they can scarcely pride themselves in it. If the whole of the present is indeed the product of the whole of the past (and it is difficult to see in what sense it is not)—then a working appreciation of the broad trends of historical development, of past errors and failures, of deep-rooted tendencies and traditions still operative in the modern world, is indispensable to the wise planner and peacemaker. Attempt has been made in the previous chapters to indicate some of the broad trends and lessons of history as the authors see them : to describe some of the more hopeful and hopeless experiments of the past, in their relation to present needs.

A sense of direction : for it is not enough to know where we have come from. We must also have some awareness of where we are going to. Not of where we want to go to—but of whither the tide of events, the swirling of great forces and powerful currents is tending to carry us. Successful planners must steam more with the tide than against it. They may—like a skilful pilot—steer their way to the harbour they desire : but only if the waters are well charted, if they are familiar with the treacherous currents and the dangerous rocks, and if their skill in navigation enables them to survive the squalls and storms that rage about them. They must, by careful study and preparation, by *expertise* and well-tested instruments, have adequate appreciation of the main forces at work in our time and of their relative strengths, be these forces political, such as the force of nationalism, or economic, such as the desire for “ freedom from want ”, or social, such as the desire for “ social security ”. Attempt has been made also, in the previous chapters, to analyse and assess these forces as the authors see them and to indicate the main directions in which they are moving. Whatever disagreement there may be about the answer

given, there can be none about the importance of studying these forces.

A sense of purpose : for we must also know where we want to go. The qualities of vision and foresight in planners and peacemakers need little emphasis. The most skilful of pilots, the most expert of navigators, cannot bring his ship to port if there is no port—or if he does not know of it—or if his crew all insist on trying to reach different ports at the same time. Yet such is the common condition of helmsmen of State. There are so many “drifters”, prepared to take the often admirable advice of “wait and see” to the extreme of waiting until it is too dark to see anything, except the futility of having waited. Between the two wars, many political and business leaders of Britain, France and America “waited to see” and drifted with the tide in a “world in trance”. We have seen where they led us. Prudence, cautious progress, willing compromise are often virtues in government : hesitation, muddled-thinking, indolence are seldom virtues in anything. There are occasions truly called “a time for greatness”.¹ And one of them is immediately after a war. But, as has been often emphasized in the previous pages, the port we make for must be a port within reach. Attempt has therefore been made to suggest some usable ports and useful moorings, even if they be only ports of call rather than the final destination : and the authors have tried to separate the possible from the ideal, the achievable aims from the more remote and more desirable havens of peace.

These, then, are the three qualities most desirable in the planners of peace. Are they too much to expect ? That each, or even most, of the planners should combine all three is indeed improbable. But that these qualities should be demanded and found in adequate proportions during the formative years of the peace settlement is not inconceivable. They are the very qualities which have been most needed for the planning of war, and the United Nations which will mould the peace have shown their capacity to throw up leaders in every sphere with some at least of these virtues. They are not super-human requirements—they are qualities common enough, and the practical need is only to mobilize and harness them in the cause of peacemaking. Blessed, indeed, are the peacemakers, if they consistently manifest these

¹ “Change is constant and inevitable. . . . But improvement is rare, and instead of being inevitable it is the hard-won product of human will.”—Herbert Agar : *A Time for Greatness* (1943), p. 143.

virtues : and if we do not demand of them the impossible—a rounded, cut-and-dried world plan right at the start. All technical problems have to be split into various lesser constituent problems before they can be solved. In the making of peace, the vastest and most complex of all technical problems, it would be unreasonable to demand total solution within a fixed time, as was demanded of the Conference of Versailles. To burden one gathering of men, however large, or one group of nations, however powerful, with so superhuman a task is courting failure : and men who would claim to perform the task would suffer the fate of all tragic *hubris*. Humility is better than humiliation. That is why emphasis has been thrown throughout these pages on the pragmatic, empirical approach, and on the rôle of functional organizations in the making of peace.

One sign of hope is that the most diverse thinkers find themselves in agreement on the value of this type of approach. Mr. Leopold Schwarzschild, whose outlook is not always commendable, writes that “ The happenings of a few months cannot determine the course of history, nor can a text of a peace treaty determine the character of a peace. Both are a perpetual creation, with new situations arising daily and the need of constantly new decisions.”¹ Professor Hayek, whose case against planning is so ably formulated, writes :

There will probably exist a strong tendency to make any new international organization all-comprehensive and world-wide. . . . The great danger is that, if in the attempt to rely exclusively on this world organization it is charged with all the tasks which it seems desirable to place in the hands of an international organization, they will not in fact be adequately performed : . . . a smaller and at the same time more powerful League might have been a better instrument to preserve peace.²

Professor E. H. Carr writes, in similar vein :

After the present war it will be wise to recognize that peacemaking is not an event, but a continuous process which must be pursued in many places, under varying conditions, by many different methods and over a prolonged period of time ; and anyone who supposes that it will be complete within six years should be regarded with the utmost suspicion.³

In this respect, too, the strategy of peacemaking can learn much from the experience of war-planning. It was very early

¹ *World in Trance*, p. 27.

² *The Road to Serfdom*, p. 176.

³ *Conditions of Peace*, p. 240.

decided by the "Big Four" not to attempt anything in the nature of a permanent General Allied Council, sitting continuously to run the war as a whole. Mr. Churchill stated :

The physical and geographical difficulties of finding a common working centre for the leaders of nations and the great staffs of nations which cover the whole globe are insuperable. . . . There is no solution that can be found where the war can be discussed from day to day fully by all the leading military and political authorities concerned.

Instead they evolved a network of Chiefs of Staffs Committees, each in its own capital but including high officials representing the other ally : of military missions and ministers-resident : of single unified commands on the spot, such as that of General MacArthur in the South-east Pacific zone, General Chiang Kai-Shek in China, General Alexander in Italy, General Eisenhower in North Africa and then in western Europe : of combined resources and production boards, already described.¹ The political unification of policy, as distinct from military and naval strategy, has been decided by periodic meetings between the heads of States, and larger conferences of political leaders and technical experts as at Casablanca, Moscow, and Teheran.

The planning of economic and social affairs has been attempted not by joint meetings of politicians and technicians so much as by preliminary meetings of experts which then formulate agreed proposals to be simultaneously placed before each national government for approval and endorsement. This was the procedure at Hot Springs and Atlantic City. At Bretton Woods, the experts came in the rôle both of financial experts and of government delegates, presumably already primed with directives of national policy by their governments. But the procedure was then followed of referring back the proposals to the separate governments. At Dumbarton Oaks, the representatives attending were more clearly still the spokesmen of national policies : but the limited number of States concerned, the high nature of the decisions and the need to win the general agreement of other States led again to a process of referring back, and later wider consultations with other national governments.

The precise relationships of politicians and experts in the planning of international organizations will thus tend to vary according to the nature of the organization. The point and the manner in which national policy enters into functional planning

¹ Above, Chapter VI.

is of supreme importance. Enter it must. If it enters too early or too exclusively into the planning, it is apt to lead to the over-assertion of separatist interests. If it enters too late, it may lead to obstruction of the experts' agreed proposals. It is comparable to the relation between tactics and strategy. When Ludendorff declared that "tactics must always govern strategy", he was overstating the truth that the technical means available condition the kind of result which can be achieved. But he was expressing the truth that the two are inseparable. There must be constant interplay between the strategist and the tactician, the policy-maker and the expert, at every stage if the best results are to be achieved.

How, then, shall the planners be chosen? How are the right people to be found? This obvious question begs itself, for the truth is that most of the planners will find themselves. The existing national leaders, the political parties in power at the time, the senior civil servants and trusted advisers of these parties will normally be charged with the key positions of planning for peace. But underlying this truism is the question of what steps can be taken by parliaments and democratically responsible bodies to exert some choice that desirable appointments be made and unsuccessful appointments cancelled. It is doubtful whether professional diplomats will make the best organizers of international machinery. However out of date may be the conception of the diplomatist as a man sent abroad to lie for his country, his responsibilities and talents lie essentially on the political plane of bi-lateral negotiation in terms of reaching agreement between independent "sovereign States". In technical matters of transport, nutrition, health, there is more hopefulness in technical experts jointly urging a common policy for all nations, than in national agents negotiating a compromise between conflicting national policies on these matters. The virtues and qualities of the good diplomatist may still be abundantly needed even when "foreign affairs" become "international affairs":¹ but the professional diplomatist as such, who belongs to the world of the "sovereign State", is already largely displaced by national leaders and politicians on the one hand, and by the technical experts on the other.² Speedy decisions seem best achieved either when the

¹ See the charming essays of Jules Cambon: *The Diplomatist* (1931), and Harold Nicolson: *Diplomacy* (1939).

² E.g. the personal rôle assumed by national leaders in all important international agreements since 1918—a tendency not lessened by the advent of great dictatorships in Europe. It is admitted, in the British "Proposals for the Reform of the Foreign

great men themselves get together, or when expert advice is directly referred to them for decision.

For the establishment and routine working of international organizations, vast staffs of administrators will, of course, be required. The experience of the League and the I.L.O. Secretariats is valuable, particularly in that they were recruited internationally and were encouraged to develop an independent *esprit de corps*, an international loyalty and a professional pride, which created a large and valuable vested interest in making the organizations work. The experiment of U.N.R.R.A. in forming various sub-committees of men from different nations according to suitability and "special competence", and a general administrative staff "recruited upon as wide a geographic basis as is possible, compatible with efficient administration", will provide further experience of how to choose personnel.¹

If it be assumed that international planning will synchronize with—and will further encourage—a greater degree of national planning internally, there will be a great and universal demand for specially trained people. Here again the amount of planning in war-time will partly pave the way, for the vast administrative staff which all old and new government departments tend to build up during war will have valuable experience. They will have to be wisely sifted with close scrutiny and discrimination, and the men of administrative experience in the armed services will have equal claim to consideration. Even so, special provision for a steady supply of suitably trained and competent servants of functional organizations will probably have to be made by most countries: and a rivalry and competition in providing servants and service will do no harm to international relationships if wisely directed.² Britain and the United States have extensively loaned administrative staff to U.N.R.R.A. As

Service" (*Cmd. 6420*, 1943), that "conditions which the Diplomatic Service originally grew up to meet no longer exist unchanged in modern international affairs. Economics and finance have become inextricably interwoven with politics: an understanding of social problems and labour movements is indispensable. . . ." (p. 2). As a consequence of proposed changes, a new kind of national diplomatist may appear.

¹ *Cmd. 6497*, p. 33. The Council of U.N.R.R.A. formally recognized "that the success of the Administration will in large part depend upon the vision, competence, integrity and loyalty of the men and women who will be its administrative officers, and comprise its technical staff": and resolved "that the staff of the Administration should be of an international character, selected upon the basis of individual competence, character and integrity, without discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, nationality or creed". Cf. Chapter VII, above, § 3.

² For suggestions as to selection and training of "the planners", see Harold J. Laski in *Plan for Britain* (1943) and G. D. H. Cole in *Can Planning be Democratic?* (1944). Both volumes are Fabian Society lectures, published by Routledge.

organization grows in size and scope, "the managers" inevitably assume greater importance and greater power.¹ International organization is no exception to the present tendency: a fact which may be either deplored or welcomed, but which must anyhow be faced.

§ 2. THE AIM OF PLANNING

The weakness of all previous peace settlements has been not only that they treated peacemaking as an event, circumscribed in time and place, but also that they treated it as an event having only one overriding aim—the restoration of a condition of peace after a state of war. Peace settlements marked only the transition from a state of war to a state of peace, just as the cessation of hostilities marked the transition from a state of war to a state of armistice. They were mainly political in character: a redressing of conditions which left each State concerned free to start its own independent plans for post-war reconstruction and to frame its separate national policy. The conviction in which this book has been written, and in which some preparations for peacemaking have already been made, is that the aim of peacemaking is something more positive, demanding concerted national policies and co-operative national plans. This new kind of peacemaking depends, therefore, on its having certain definite agreed aims. What are these aims?

President Roosevelt has immortalized them in his statement of "the Four Freedoms", and the aims have been elaborated in the Atlantic Charter which all the United Nations have sponsored. It was in his address to Congress in January, 1941, after his election for a third term, that the President restated the democratic ideal in these words:

In the future days that we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

¹ Cf. James Burnham: *The Managerial Revolution* (1942); T. N. Whitehead: *Leadership in a Free Society*; F. J. Roethlisberger: *Management and Morale*; William Temple: *The Church Looks Forward* (1944), Chapter XXII; Austen Albu: *Management in Transition* (1942). Mr. Albu defines the function of "management" as "the translation into action of policy decisions whether those taking these decisions be partners or directors of private firms, governors of a public corporation, directors of a co-operative society, ministers of a state department directly controlling an industry or service, or a local government committee controlling a municipal enterprise" (p. 5). Or, one might add, the policy-forming bodies of an international functional organization.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peace-time life for its inhabitants everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour anywhere in the world.

These general aims of peacemaking and post-war planning were given greater definition in the Atlantic Charter : the " third freedom " in points four and five, the " fourth freedom " in points six and eight.¹ Aims stated thus in terms of individual freedom and security of men everywhere must logically involve concerted international action, organization and planning as a scale and of a penetrating character unthought of in previous peace settlements. Either these aims are pious aspirations, thrown off airily in the rhetoric of war, and equally lightly forgotten and betrayed in the reality of peacemaking : or they are solemn pledges and considered undertakings, involving peace planning of an entirely new kind. It may be that so sweeping a vision arouses hopes which will be difficult to fulfil in the rough-and-tumble of post-war : events are seldom controllable enough to be moulded perfectly to this vision. But the first and unavoidable condition for its fulfilment is integrated and correlated planning on a world-wide scale for the benefit of each individual and of each nation.

To the individual, it aims at giving security from war and violence as a threat to his freedom and happiness. To the nation it gives security from invasion, aggression, occupation and domination. Social and national security are at root identical : freedom from fear of violence.

To the individual it aims at giving security from starvation, malnutrition, avoidable sickness and economic distress. To the nation it gives security from economic exploitation by other nations, and scope for economic development in harmony with world economy. Individual and national prosperity are at bottom inseparable : both depend upon international trade and freedom from economic dislocation and maladjustment.

To the individual it aims at giving social security, freedom from not merely distress but from an unduly depressed standard

¹ See text of Atlantic Charter in Appendix A. The sixth point refers specifically to " freedom from fear and want ".

of living, from prolonged unemployment and the worst hardships of sickness, poverty and old age. To nations, likewise, it aims at giving the benefits of mutual aid, of pooled information and assistance through the agencies of international co-operation, of a medium for peaceful change through arbitration and conciliation. Individual and national welfare are at root inseparable : both must spring from concerted effort to utilize world resources and international facilities for the well-being of men and women.

Clearly, in pursuit of these three interwoven aims of individual and national security, prosperity and welfare, there must be co-operation in the political, economic and social spheres. To be fully effective, such co-operation must be systematic and constant, not haphazard and intermittent. Just as in the provision of international security from aggression, action must be predictable and certain if it is to prevent aggression,¹ so in the provision of international prosperity and welfare action must be no less predictable and certain. There can be no sense of "freedom from want" if the citizen is told that he must "wait and see", that no promises can be made until he is actually sick, or unemployed, or old, before definite terms of social security can be stated. The whole benefit of provision comes in the foreknowledge that regular, working machinery is in operation for meeting such contingencies as they arise, and that welfare will not depend—as it did so much between the two wars—on last-moment improvisation, unscientific and hand-to-mouth methods. The hand will not reach the mouth if it is not raised until the last possible moment. Just as in international political relations the policy of keeping "a free hand" means usually that it is an empty hand when the need arises, so the policy of not meeting the slump until it is upon us, or of not building the machinery of mutual aid until some are so distressed that the aid cannot be mutual, should have been thoroughly discredited by the helpless drifting of the inter-war years.

And prevision and preparedness means organization, and organization means planning. National plans must themselves be to some extent integrated and correlated, if they are to work. There may be—and there will be—many plans, for each nation and for each functional purpose : but they must ultimately have a place in one plan, if they are to work smoothly and well. When it is recalled how vast and how successful have been the world-plans of the United Nations during war, it is nonsense to pretend

¹ See above, Introduction, p. 14.

that such an aim is impossible or undesirable. Yet clearly it is not an aim which can be lightly undertaken, or attempted with undue optimism and lack of strenuous, all-out effort. It is a task requiring not only immense inventiveness, strenuous effort and the utmost intelligence, but also a fund of goodwill, of sustained idealism, of moral purpose. If it should fail, it will be a failure of human intelligence and goodwill, rather than of technical aptitude and mechanical means. The pattern of peacemaking must derive its coherence from human resolve and moral purpose if it is to create the harmony that is real peace.

The evidence and the achievement of this purpose will be the emergence of a genuine international society : a community *of* nations and yet transcending nations, wherein the loyalty of the citizen to his own nation and to other nations is less of a conflict of loyalties than it is at present. The fallacy and failure of utopianism was its assumption that to speak of the "community of nations", and to contend that it existed because the world is made one and interdependent by the development of science, transport, communications and trade, was somehow to make such a community exist. The hope of the practical development of many working functional organizations on an international scale is that it will give substance and reality to the "community of nations". It will go some way towards creating a real international society, and of making men feel, in their everyday life, the existence of such a society. International society will not exist until it exists in the minds of men : and it will not exist in the minds of men until it can be perceived in action, and judged by its results. It will not be implanted in the minds of men by the persuasive arguments of utopian writers, and by rational demonstration on paper that it exists in embryo. "Society will develop by our living it, not by policing it" : nor by our keeping on saying that it really exists already.

The meaning which can be given to "international society" will be judged in terms of human benefit and welfare. It should therefore be built up and devised in terms of human benefit and welfare. It should be infused at every stage with awareness that even the best and most complete of plans exists for the benefit of men, and that man does not exist for the sake of the plan. The best available assurance that this will happen is that planning should be done by democratic societies through democratic methods : which raises the general question "can planning be democratic ?"

§ 3. CAN PLANNING BE DEMOCRATIC?

To this vital question, many give a negative answer. Sir Ernest Benn and his individualist followers would say no. The full-dress and most persuasive negative answer has come recently from Professor F. A. Hayek, who has described planning on the scale here suggested as *The Road to Serfdom*.¹ He states the case against extended planning so forcibly and ably, that his arguments deserve close attention.

Professor Hayek would agree that the ultimate value is human freedom. But he contends that the idea of freedom has been perverted from its original meaning "freedom from coercion, freedom from the arbitrary power of other men, release from the ties which left the individual no choice but obedience to the orders of a superior to which he was attached". It has come to mean "freedom from necessity, release from the compulsion of the circumstances which inevitably limit the range of choice of all of us". The change of meaning has been aptly put by John Dewey: "liberty is the effective power to do specific things", so that the present demand for freedom is really "demand for power".² Professor Hayek argues, in brief, that these two forms of freedom cannot be combined: that freedom and organization on the scale urged by modern planners are incompatible,³ or, in other words, that the first two freedoms are irreconcilable with the second two, in President Roosevelt's enumeration.

His chief argument in favour of this belief is that planning must have a definite social aim, a common purpose which is made a unitary end in itself. But "the welfare of a people, like the happiness of a man, depends on a great many things that can be provided in an infinite variety of combinations. It cannot be adequately expressed as a single end, but only as a hierarchy of ends, a comprehensive scale of values in which every need of every person is given its place". This scale of values implies a complete ethical code, which does not exist, and it is impossible for any mind to comprehend the infinite variety of different needs of different people. The more complete the planning which is attempted, therefore, the more coercion has to be used, and the more freedom in the original sense is destroyed. The machinery

¹ F. A. Hayek: *The Road to Serfdom* (Routledge, 1944). For a similar argument from a slightly different angle, cf. Gustav Stolper: *This Age of Fable* (1943).

² Cf. the symposium on *Freedom: Its Meaning*, edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen (1942), especially the contributions of John Dewey and Henry A. Wallace.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 19, Chapter IX, etc.

of collectivism can be used only for common ends, and democratically elected assemblies such as parliaments are unlikely to be able to agree on these common ends. "They are not asked to act where they can agree, but to produce agreement on everything—the whole direction of the resources of the nation. . . . A complex whole where all the parts must be most carefully adjusted to each other, cannot be achieved through a compromise between conflicting views."¹ The logic of planning is not democracy but totalitarianism, whether called communism, fascism, national socialism or democratic socialism. "It is the price of democracy that the possibilities of conscious control are restricted to the fields where true agreement exists, and that in some fields things must be left to chance."

These objections to national planning apply still more to international planning.

The conflict between planning and freedom cannot but become more serious as the similarity of standards and values among those submitted to a unitary plan diminishes. . . . Planning on an international scale, even more than is true on a national scale, cannot be anything but a naked rule of force, an imposition by a small group on all the rest of that sort of standard and employment which the planners think suitable for the rest.²

Economic planning carried out by special functional organizations on an international scale would be the greatest encroachment on freedom. "Any international economic authority, not subject to a superior political power, even if strictly confined to a particular field, could easily exercise the most tyrannical and irresponsible power imaginable." Such organizations would, in practice, become the agencies by which big Powers would impose their will on smaller nations within their sphere of hegemony. Federation of States would be the best procedure for preserving freedom while making desirable and agreed planning possible. "A community of nations of free men must be our goal."³

To the forceful argument of Professor Hayek, to which this bald summary does the barest justice, three main arguments may be adduced in answer.

First, Professor Hayek himself accepts the necessity and even desirability for extensive planning of certain kinds. He insists, for instance, that "the planning against which all our criticism

¹ *Op. cit.*, Chapter V, "Planning and Democracy".

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 164-5, and Chapter XV, *passim*, "The Prospects of International Order".

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 169-78.

is directed is solely the planning against competition—the planning which is to be substituted for competition”.¹ Planning and competition can be combined only by “planning for competition”. The virtue of competition is that in the price system it affords an impersonal and automatic way of adjusting complex economic relationships which no conscious control or deliberate plan could achieve without coercion.² But it is worth asking whether the kind of coercion felt by the unsuccessful “competitor” in the form of being ousted from business is any greater “freedom” than that coercion endured by the producer or distributor directed, in a planned economy, to produce one thing or to produce it in one way, rather than another. The choice between competition and planning is not the clear-cut alternative between freedom and coercion, but between different kinds of coercion. It is also difficult to see where planning to prevent such hardship ends and planning to “prevent competition” begins. United States experience of such half-way measures to “hold the ring” and preserve “free enterprise and competition” do not inspire much confidence in the notion that there is a clear borderline with freedom on one side and “serfdom” on the other. Freedom cannot be identified with a sort of economic Darwinism.

Secondly, the present economic conditions of the world are in no sense a merely perverted form of private enterprise which can be restored to health by “planning for competition”, and the forswearing of all positive planning which might result in less competition. Before the war, completely free enterprise existed in no country. The war has been itself a revolution, bringing the economic collapse of most occupied countries, just as defeat will bring a similar collapse to enemy countries. It is true that in the reconstruction of national economies after the war, the fullest attention must be given to the values of human freedom and economic enterprise. But that the vast labours of basic rehabilitation and reconstruction can be undertaken without extensive planning and conscious control over economic resources and processes seems out of the question. Even if peace need not be so elaborately planned as many suppose, peacemaking at least must spring from a conscious effort and concerted action on agreed plans. Competition there will inevitably be—between nations as between business corporations and individual entrepreneurs. But the interplay of competition will take place at an earlier stage, in the stage of formulating the plan and setting up the organiza-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

² *Op. cit.*, Chapter IV, *passim*.

tion or international agency. This interplay will continue, to some extent, in each stage of the application of the plan and the operation of the agency. But between the jostling of competitors and the recipient of the social services or welfare provided will be the medium of a composite organization, serving ultimately indeed "one unitary aim", but an aim which is conditioned by many interacting forces. In post-war conditions, the only choice will be between social services and public welfare provided by these means, and their not being provided at all. Naked competition between British enterprises, or between British and United States enterprises, to provide rehabilitation services in Europe, would lead either to chaos or to such friction that political co-operation would be jeopardized.

Thirdly—and most fundamentally of all—it is not true that "freedom of" is so different from "freedom from" as Professor Hayek contends: "freedom of worship" and "freedom of thought" are not different in kind from "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". It is true that the first two of the four freedoms mean protection against the violence of men, and the second two more generally protection against the violence of material conditions. From the point of view of the individual deprived of such freedom they are fundamentally alike—and are resented equally because they entail coercion by other men. The demand for "freedom from want" has arisen first, not in China and India, where masses suffer want, but in the western highly industrialized countries, where there is the spectacle of "poverty amid plenty", and where want means being deprived of enjoyment of an average standard of living because "someone" has suffered cut-throat competition, or "someone" has given you the sack. The demand for "freedom from fear" has arisen in "peace-loving countries" which have been subjected to the violent aggressions of other men or nations: not in countries habitually subject to the violence of earthquake or volcanic eruption. All four freedoms are equally assertions about the right kind of relations between men, not between men and brute nature. They are social conceptions, which demand social action for their accomplishment. All are in a similar sense the demand for "effective power to do specific things", in John Dewey's phrase which Professor Hayek attacks: a power whose effectiveness is negated by the will of other men, not by the incapacities of man.

The relation between freedom and planning is expressed

wisely and cautiously by Mrs. Barbara Wootton in *The Problem of Freedom under Planning*.¹ "Where there is no frustration, there, there is freedom." Mrs. Wootton points out that planning is not synonymous with socialism : it does not necessarily involve public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange. It means, rather, "the socialization of demand", the determination by public authority of what is to be produced, when and where. The effects of planning *as such* on freedom are not restrictive of civil liberties, though they are of economic liberties. But such restriction of economic liberties which planning necessarily involves can be ameliorated by the use of inducements rather than coercion. The choice of the consumer, the rewards and conditions of producing certain goods rather than certain others, can be so arranged as not to limit freedom more than it is limited under a free economy. Nevertheless, the right of collective bargaining needs both prudent exercise and adequate safeguards in a planned economy : the working of the party-system in parliamentary politics as we have known it will have to be modified, if parties are in fundamental disagreement about the broad objectives of planning. Mrs. Wootton believes that "we shall eventually have to make the choice of our rulers less in terms of programmes, and more in terms of people and principles" : and that "the individual elector should be less concerned with major decisions of policy than with the constructive criticism of the day-to-day operation of policies that have already been adopted".² In short, the traditional forms and procedures of parliamentary politics will have to be adjusted to new needs. But there is nothing eternal or sacrosanct about traditional forms and procedures, which have themselves evolved from different forms and in various directions. It is the human needs they serve and the moral values they implement which are sacrosanct : and the urgent need is not total opposition to new needs or to moral values restated in contemporary terms, but political inventiveness and persistence in adjusting habits and institutions to the more apt service of living men and women.

The arguments of Professor Hayek and others who think like him must be frankly accepted as valuable warnings. "Plan-

¹ To be published by Allen & Unwin. The gist of the argument appears in "Freedom under Planning", by Mrs. Wootton in *Can Planning be Democratic?* (Routledge, 1944) ; and cf. E. R. Walker : *From Economic Theory to Policy* (1942).

² *Op. cit.*, p. 52. The working of the Soviet system in U.S.S.R. provides valuable experience in this connection. Cf. S. and B. Webb : *Soviet Communism : A New Civilization?* (2 vols., 1935), Vol. I—a description of the electoral organization of men as citizens, producers and consumers.

ning " as a panacea can become a vicious and monolithic policy in the hands of reckless enthusiasts, who subordinate the end to the means. It is healthy to have the dangers and difficulties fully stated, for planning is a dangerous and difficult undertaking, putting a tremendous strain on human resources of intelligence, energy and goodwill. The conscious control of economic life is a task not to be lightly undertaken, and not to be carried out without the fullest possible attention to other values and ends of equal validity to the aims of economic security and material welfare. Some of the greatest dangers and difficulties will be discussed below. The ultimate connection between economic planning and democratic values can perhaps best be stated in terms suggested by Professor John Macmurray.¹

Historically, the roots of democratic ideals lie in the claim to freedom of conscience and thought. The rejection of religious uniformity carried with it, as an implication and a consequence, the assertion of political and civic liberties—freedom of speech and public meeting, of the press and of association.² The exclusion of the State from individual matters of religious belief, intellectual and cultural activities, led in the nineteenth century to the attempted exclusion of the State from economic activities as well. It was denied the right to interfere beyond a basic minimum in social and economic life. But this attempted separation of politics from economics was in fact short-lived, and due to special historical circumstances. As Dr. A. D. Lindsay has said :

We have to recognize that the connexion between democracy and *laissez-faire*, or what is sometimes called a negative conception of the State, is accidental, and arises from historical circumstances. The purpose of the State in a democratic society is to maintain the democratic nature of that society, to remove the disharmonies and dangers which threaten its democratic life. If that democratic life is strong and healthy, the State need do little ; but if that democratic life is threatened not just by plain disorder and crime within or hostile attack from without, but by more subtle and insidious forces, whether social or economic, the State is called to assume a much more positive function.³

¹ John Macmurray : *Constructive Democracy* (1943).

² Cf. William George Addison : *Religious Equality in Modern England, 1714-1914* (1944) : an able and detailed analysis of how the drive for religious freedom and equality interwove with the achievement of wider civic and political liberties in England. " Full freedom of worship is, in fact, the one necessary freedom, the warranty of all other freedoms, personal and associational. It is ' the thermometer for freedom of thought in general ' " (p. 3). Cf. also A. D. Lindsay : *The Essentials of Democracy* (1939) and *Tolerance and Democracy* (1942).

³ *Tolerance and Democracy*, p. 8.

Whether the State makes itself responsible for control of parts of the economic life of society is, after all, a question of expediency and convenience—of organization appropriate to material conditions. So long as it is excluded from control of spiritual, intellectual and cultural life, it is not only not totalitarian, but the fountainhead of freedom and democratic life is left intact. Control of production and distribution in no way necessitates or presupposes collectivism in culture.

But the greater the power of the State in general, the greater the need for watchfulness, for the vigorous assertion of civic liberties and cultural freedom. Bad planning and tyrannical planning may indeed be worse than no planning. That is a truth which must never be forgotten.

§ 4. THE DANGERS OF PLANNING

In addition to the general dangers to personal freedom and democratic rights inherent in large-scale planning of economic life, which have been already outlined, there are two more specific dangers which need special mention. There is the danger of overmuch planning from above—by governments and bureaucrats alone, or by sections of a nation such as a party representing only sectional interests, or by an *élite* such as the compact Bolshevik Party in Soviet Russia. Democratic planning involves the fullest possible participation, in a real and active way, of the ordinary citizen in the operation of the plans. The principle of democratic politics that only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches has equal validity in democratic economics. The dangers of impersonality and even inhumanity in plans made and enforced from above, with passive acquiescence from below, can be overcome only by new opportunities for popular participation. The share of organized labour in the running of factories,¹ of consumers in the systematic criticism and even control of the choice offered by planned production and distribution, of advisory and executive committees popularly constituted in the working of a planned economy, should be given every encouragement in a democratic order.² Freedom of every kind is only maintained by

¹ Cf. Peter Drucker : *The Future of Industrial Man* (1943), especially Chapter 9, for suggestions for "the organization of industry on the basis of local and decentralized self-government", and turning the factory as a social unit into a "self-governing community".

² Cf. the demands of the T.U.C. in Britain, which have been extensively met during the war by direct T.U.C. participation in many important advisory bodies, e.g. the National Production Advisory Council, Joint Consultative Committee of the Ministry

use. It is essential—though not enough—that opportunity be given for the free ventilation of every maladjustment, every harsh incidence of planning. This necessity—even for the efficient working of the plan itself—of combining political liberties with economic planning is a lesson which Soviet Russia has increasingly learnt and applied in bitter experience. But the degree to which the ordinary citizen can participate in administration, and in detailed decisions which have to be made by administrators, has yet to be much more fully explored and experimented with.¹

Secondly, there is the danger of limitless planning. It has been argued above that there must be integrated and correlated planning, and quite extensive planning of economic activities and social services, and preferably planning on a world-wide scale. But this in no way means that planning has no limits. Philosophically, limits are imposed by the central fact that all plans exist for the sake and for the benefit of men, and that the fountain-head of freedom springs from spiritual, intellectual and cultural freedom from interference. It has been well said that the only problem of leisure is to prevent other people from using it. After the war, men will be ready to pay a high price for peace: they will be ready to submit, even, to much regimentation and control if they are convinced it is necessary for a more orderly world. But they will revolt against restrictions and controls which are not clearly parts of essential planning and peacemaking: and they will follow sound instincts when they do.

There would seem to be three cardinal sins of excessive interference. One is obtrusiveness—the poking of official noses into the ordinary lives and liberties of the citizen. One need only recall how bitterly the means test was resented by the working classes of Britain during the slump years: how “Cooper’s snoopers” were laughed out of countenance during the silly season of the Ministry of Information: how the French peasant

of Labour, the T.U.C. Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Food, the National Advisory Council for Fire Prevention, and several others. See *T.U.C. Interim Report on Post-War Reconstruction* (1944).

¹ During war, Local Information Committees, Food Committees, Hardship Committees, etc., have done much to keep administration in systematic contact with public opinion, and given citizens a share in administration. Other steps have been taken in the right direction. One example is the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders set up in September, 1944, by Mr. Herbert Morrison as Home Secretary, to advise and assist the officials of his department in preparing and carrying out penal reforms. It includes barristers, civil servants, experts on penal reform, M.P.’s, a Bishop, and a dozen other individuals knowledgeable in social and economic problems. Other departments might well avoid the dangers of working in isolation by even wider use of similar bodies.

has always resented the taxgatherer even more than taxation itself, because he associated direct taxation with official busyness and obtrusive interference. The more of this spirit—even if it sometimes has unfortunate results—the healthier the body politic and the wiser will be the planning. The second is inhumanity in planning—the spirit of over-tidiness, impatience, schematic thinking—which leaves too small a place for human impulses and spontaneous, voluntary action, in the general design of planning. The enthusiast for planning is apt to set too much store on neatness : and though this desire for orderliness springs from healthy revulsion against the muddle, chaos and drifting of the inter-war years, it can easily drive too fast and too far in the opposite direction. The fullest scope should be allowed, in both national and international affairs, for the voluntary association, even at some cost of overlapping, slowness in co-ordination, and exhaustion of the patience of government officials.¹ The third is encouragement of an implicit faith in “ the plan ” as a panacea for all ills—a “ Morrison’s pill ”, as Carlyle would call it—bringing a new heaven as well as a new earth. The more highly geared and high-powered the machinery of planning, the more fatal becomes the slightest mistake.²

Yet mistakes, miscalculations, errors of judgement and imagination there will certainly be. It is all too easy to breed unnecessary despondency and reaction by promoting exalted hopes and irresponsible optimism. Not least important in the technique of wise peacemaking is the avoidance of omnibus promises and exaggerated hopes. The last war slogans of “ homes fit for heroes ” and “ a world safe for democracy ” were modest hopes compared with the aspirations for social security, freedom from fear and want, full employment and world peace, which have been generated by this war. It may be that the peoples of the occupied countries are less convinced that such perfections are round the corner : it may be that ordinary folk everywhere are less infected with superficial optimism than our most ardent planners of a new world. If so, it is all to the good.

¹ Admirable efforts in the direction of such “ elastic ” arrangements are foreshadowed by collaboration in the work of U.N.R.R.A. and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, of voluntary societies such as International Student Service, Salvation Army, Friends’ Ambulance Unit, and so on. Organized under the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad, these associations have a joint channel of contact with official organizations, and have been given a regular place in the plans for post-war relief work.

² This point has been eloquently and amusingly elaborated by Dr. Esmé Wingfield Stratford in *The Price of Liberty* (1944).

Certainly there is greater awareness than in 1919 that efforts to control man's destiny by reason and will require more prolonged and strenuous exertion than peoples were prepared to undertake during the inter-war years. One of the present writers, while in France soon after her liberation, was impressed by four trends in French opinion which may be indicative of opinion in other liberated lands. The planning and control, instituted by the Germans while in occupation, had left people more ready to consider the need to undertake systematic and deliberate planning of economic life. Opposition to free enterprise, which was felt to have collaborated too readily with the Germans, had grown even in the most traditionally individualistic of countries, and had led to a resolve to limit large-scale private enterprise by national direction and control. (This resolve has been borne out by the plans and actual measures of the Provisional Government to establish a more highly integrated national economy.) Thirdly, viewed quite objectively, free enterprise impressed Frenchmen with its incapacity to accomplish the labours of reconstruction after prolonged devastation with which France is faced : nothing short of highly directed production, transport and distribution could tackle the problem. Finally, the achievements of Soviet Russia, which seemed more close at hand than the democratic planning of Britain and the United States, had greatly impressed many Frenchmen : it was the greatest credential of the active Communist Party, otherwise so much feared and disliked by the middle classes and peasants. In all these ways, post-war public opinion in Europe may well be more realistic and resolute than ever before about economic and social problems. Economic and social planning undertaken reluctantly and of necessity, may be more apt, more cautious, and more aware of careless optimism, than planning undertaken only by ardent enthusiasts and doctrinaire opponents of all free enterprise.

This climate of opinion—of which the general features were sketched at the beginning of this book—bodes well for more scientific peacemaking. Despite the violent emotions stirred by war and the social and individual dislocations produced by war, there are other forces making for a more rational peace settlement. Peacemaking has come to be regarded more as a matter of brain than of emotion. That is an advance. That it should be regarded as a more long-range, continuous process, involving the sustained will and good will of men and nations, and affecting

their behaviour in social and economic life and not merely in politics, is a further advance. If the study made in this book serves only to indicate the complex and laborious path which the peacemakers must tread, and so to give warning against impatience or over-optimism, it may not have been written in vain.

POSTSCRIPT

UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS

The leaders of the "Big Three" and their advisers met at the Crimea Conference in February, 1945. It was announced that their purpose was "to concert plans for completing the defeat of the common enemy and for building, with their allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace".¹ The joint statement issued from the Conference is printed in the Appendices below, and was the most significant declaration hitherto issued by the major Powers. It marked the decisive step from warmaking to peacemaking on the political level. It gave new definition to United Nations policy towards Germany : towards the liberated countries of Europe ; and towards one another in their relations with European countries. It tackled the Polish and Yugoslav problems in particular. And it provided for regular consultations in future between the Foreign Secretaries of the three Powers, as well as for a general United Nations Conference to meet at San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to prepare the Charter for a security organization on the lines of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.²

The Crimean declaration referred to unity of purpose and action between the United Nations, and especially between the three major Powers, as "a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to the people of the world". Yet the Conference took place against an immediate background of incidents which had revealed many points of real divergence between the policies of the major Powers, and of incompleteness in the structure of United Nations co-operation. The absence of French representatives from the Crimean Conference, as well as from all the previous meetings of the major Powers, was only the most conspicuous hint of such disharmony. The invitation to France to take part in future discussions and in the occupation and control of Germany, which the Crimean declaration included, did little to remove French fears and apprehensions. The signature of a truce in Athens during the Crimean meeting ended the worst phase of the Greek conflict. Acceptance of the Curzon Line as the substantial limit of Russia's western

¹ *The Times*, February 8, 1945.

² For press comments, etc., see the press of February 13, 1945, and after.

frontiers with Poland removed an old source of friction. But a brief survey of the background of events against which the conference met may help to show some of the obstacles to international harmony, and may serve as some indication of the "climate of peacemaking" this time.

The winter of 1944-5 had brought many disappointments. In Greece, liberation from German rule meant not national unity but civil war, in which British forces unhappily found themselves fighting Greeks, and relations between Britain and her major allies were partially implicated. In Poland, M. Mikolajczyk had failed to bridge the gulf between the Polish Government in London and the Polish National Committee in Lublin, and the complexities of Polish politics also threatened to embroil Anglo-Soviet and American-Soviet relations. In Yugoslavia, discord between King Peter and Marshal Tito was prevented from creating similar difficulties only because of careful previous co-ordination of allied policy.¹ In Italy, the status of Count Sforza in particular brought Anglo-American disagreements into the open, when the recently appointed Secretary of State, Mr. Stettinius, aired these discords in public. In all these and other incidents, the fragility of unity among the major Powers was demonstrated forcibly. Unresolved discords as to the new order in Europe jangled ominously: and those concerning the Pacific had not yet been raised at all. How far these frictions were overcome by real goodwill, how far by the pressure of sheer necessity to remain united in war, is a most important question which remains obscure.

Moreover, efforts of the major Powers to reach agreement in matters concerning not other nations but their own future co-operation in world planning had not always met with success. The Chicago Conference on civil aviation after the war was not attended by the Soviet Union, and ended in political (though not technical) deadlock between Britain and the United States. U.N.R.R.A. worked unsuccessfully, partly because of delays due to military developments and requirements, and partly because it proved less acceptable to the provisional governments of liberated countries than had been hoped. The contraction of Lend-Lease facilities between the United States and Great Britain, and the stricter stipulations concerning re-export of Lend-Lease goods by Britain, buried hopes that Lend-Lease

¹ Cf. Mr. Churchill's speech of January 18, 1945, *Hansard*, Vol. 407, col. 398-9.

would mean indefinite Mutual Aid. Judicial experts were divided over the possibility and wisdom of including Hitler and the other Nazi leaders in the list of "war criminals".

Popular and parliamentary attacks on the formula of "unconditional surrender" led Mr. Churchill to re-define the term and elaborate its meaning for allied policy towards Germany.

In his parliamentary statement of January 18, 1945, he said :

. . . we may now say to our foes, "We demand unconditional surrender, but you well know how strict are the moral limits within which our action is confined. We are no extirpators of nations, or butchers of peoples. We make no bargain with you. We accord you nothing as a right. Abandon your resistance unconditionally. We remain bound by our customs and our nature." . . . This, at least, I can say on behalf of the United Nations to Germany : "If you surrender now, nothing that you will have to endure after the war will be comparable to what you are otherwise going to suffer during the year 1945." Peace, though based on unconditional surrender, will bring to Germany and Japan an immense, immediate amelioration of the suffering and agony which now lies before them. We, the Allies, are no monsters, but faithful men trying to carry forward the light of the world, trying to raise from the bloody welter and confusion in which mankind is now plunged, a structure of peace, of freedom, of justice and of law, which system shall be an abiding and lasting shelter for all.¹

This tendency to supersede allied discords in more long-range plans by solidifying allied agreement over the more immediate tasks of dealing with Germany, found a parallel in the United States. Mutual criticisms between Britain and America reached its climax in the article entitled "Noble Negatives", which appeared in the *Economist* of December 30, 1944.² Widely quoted and discussed in both countries, the article did much to clear the air by outspoken comment not only on American foreign policy but on the irresponsible habits of some sections of American public opinion. There followed the proposal of the Republican, Senator Vandenberg, that an immediate treaty should be made by the major allies to ensure the disarming of Germany and permanent security. It received considerable support in the Senate and the country, as a step likely to create feelings of security for continued co-operation among the major Powers in their more long-range tasks of peacemaking. Public opinion had awakened to the dangers of divergent policies : and out of such indication of frictions had come this dying isolationism.

¹ Hansard, January 18, 1945, *loc. cit.* The Crimean declaration re-echoed these views.

² Reprinted in the *Daily Telegraph*, January 8, 1945.

assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or virtue." Defining "power politics" as "the misuse of power", he argued that "power must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good".¹ The President reaffirmed the objectives of the Atlantic Charter as comprising this general good, adding that "International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, require constant alertness, continuing co-operation, and organized effort, and can only be secured through institutions capable of life and growth". The President was clearly concerned to fix the eyes of the United Nations on general agreed aims and constructive labours for peace, rather than on the cracks of conflicting interest and outlook which were appearing between them. But would he succeed?

More chastening, even, than the evidence of unresolved political issues were the signs of equally unresolved conflicts in economic affairs. The contest between the supporters and opponents of Sir William Beveridge in British opinion (including the Liberal Party itself) was matched by the contest, already mentioned, between supporters and opponents of Mr. Henry Wallace in America, and by the refusal of the American Federation of Labour to participate, along with the Soviet Trade Unions, in the World Trade Union Congress in London in February, 1945. The degree of unregulated private competition and free enterprise which each country should preserve after the war remained, as described above, the horizontal division of opinion within each country, no less profound and far-reaching than the vertical division between nations over the preservation of unrestricted national sovereignty. The twin conceptions of the sovereign individual and the sovereign State have haunted all modern history from the time of the Renaissance until the present day—and would seem destined to haunt it still further in the future.

And one issue tends to cut across the other. Nineteenth-century Liberals, of the kind of Mazzini, combined a faith in individualism and in national sovereignty with a readiness to limit both by the claims of universal humanity and religion. Twentieth-century Liberals, of the kind of Beveridge, align with Socialists to demand the abandonment of both extreme individ-

¹ Compare, too, the British Government's official "Commentary" on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals (*Cmd. 6571*), which speaks of "the governing principle that responsibility should march with power".

ualism and extreme nationalism for the greater good of a more rationally organized and controlled community at home and all over the world. Tory Reformers, of the Quintin Hogg kind, move in the same direction. But at the ends of the scale are the champions of individualism in Britain and America, tending to be nationalists in foreign policy: and the Soviet Union, though the greatest example of State planning and collectivist economics internally, tending also to be nationalistic in foreign policy. By these criss-cross divisions the issues of domestic planning are partially projected on to the screen of international relations; attempts to achieve greater international planning are apt to be used to further individualist and nationalist interests, as at the Bretton Woods and Chicago Conferences; and the "total" nature of modern peacemaking is infringed, neglected and obscured at many points.

As already shown,¹ more international planning implies more domestic planning: and domestic planning makes possible more complete international planning. But nations are apt to seek international planning only so far as it seems likely to cover their own particular deficiencies or needs. Thus the United States seeks a planning of civil aviation, monetary and relief organizations, as far as such machinery will supplement and satisfy her own needs for expansion of aviation and exports, and will help to establish an international system of investment and trade based on gold. Soviet Russia is little interested in international civil aviation, but is willing to participate in monetary organizations which may aid her programmes of national reconstruction and development and allow export of her gold. Unless all the major Powers are ready to co-operate not only here and there, as their needs dictate, but all-round and all-in, the balanced and systematic organization of peace is impossible. Similarly, the exclusion of an eager and co-operative Power such as France from the earlier stages of peace organization is a serious breach in the framework.²

Such, then, was the general situation when the leaders of Great Britain, Soviet Russia and the United States met, in February, 1945, to take decisive steps in agreeing the political

¹ Chapter IX above, p. 336.

² Cf. the significant speech of General de Gaulle repudiating arrangements agreed without France's participation, and expressing desire for an Anglo-French Treaty comparable with the Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-French Treaties: in *Daily Telegraph*, February 6, 1945.

settlement of Europe. It was with the future Security Organization still in draft form, and undiscussed by a general conference of all the United Nations ; with all the functional organizations except the I.L.O., U.N.R.R.A. and the purely war-time agencies still mere projects on paper, unratified by national governments ; with much recent evidence of abundant divisions, frictions and misunderstandings between even the major Powers. But they met, too, with many express and reaffirmed declarations of agreed principles ; with the experience of highly successful military, naval and air co-operation during the war ; with great reserves of personal understanding and goodwill, and a diffused yet very real popular yearning for a more cohesive and coherent international order. The penalties of failure to make a durable peace were being forced upon all by the rapid development of new methods of warfare—by the German use of V1 and V2 weapons not only against civilian populations but in the line of battle itself, and by Allied demonstration of how amphibious operations and strategic bombing can change the meaning of geography. Such was the climate of peacemaking when the Crimean Conference took place. Distrustful of over-optimism and of a prematurely prefabricated peace, but mindful of the penalties of failure, the peacemakers began their task. Never before has the problem of “getting what we want” presented itself on a more immense scale : and never before have the stakes been so high.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I : UNITED NATIONS AGREEMENTS

- A. *The Atlantic Charter*
August 14th, 1941.
- B. *The Mutual-Aid Agreement*
February 23rd, 1942.
- C. *The Anglo-Soviet Treaty*
May 26th, 1942.
- D. *The Moscow Three-Power Conference*
October 30th, 1943.
- E. *The Cairo Declaration*
December 1st, 1943.
- F. *The Teheran Declaration*
December 1st, 1943.
- G. *The Crimean Declaration*
February 12th, 1945.

APPENDIX II : THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

- A. *Membership at March, 1944.*
- B. *The Declaration of Philadelphia*
May 10th, 1944.

APPENDIX III : NEW ORGANIZATIONS

- A. *The Constitution of U.N.R.R.A.*
November 9th, 1943.
- B. *The Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization proposed by the Interim Commission, August 1st, 1944.*
- C. *Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as accepted by the Government Delegations at Bretton Woods, July 22nd, 1944.*

APPENDIX I

UNITED NATIONS AGREEMENTS

A. THE ATLANTIC CHARTER, AUGUST 14TH, 1941

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

FIRST, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.

SECOND, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

THIRD, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they live ; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

FOURTH, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

FIFTH, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security.

SIXTH, after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

SEVENTH, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

EIGHTH, they believe all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armament.

ENDORSEMENT OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

The following resolution, moved by Mr. Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, was adopted at a meeting of representatives of the Allied Governments at a Conference held at St. James's Palace, London, on September 24th, 1941 :

The Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia, and representatives of General de Gaulle, leader of Free Frenchmen, having taken note of the Declaration recently drawn up by the President of the United States and by the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, on behalf of H.M. Government in the United Kingdom, now make known their adherence to the common principles of policy set forth in that Declaration and their intention to co-operate to the best of their ability in giving effect to them.

B. THE MUTUAL-AID AGREEMENT

This Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America was published in Washington on February 23rd, 1942, and governs the conditions under which the two Allies exchange "defence articles, defence services and defence information". The significant feature of the Agreement is that it defers final settlement of the bargain and speaks in

terms of "benefits" as the criterion of repayment. The operative article is Article VII, reproduced below, of which every word is relevant to the thesis of this book.

Article VII. In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11th, 1941 (*i.e. the Lend-Lease Act*), the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the joint declaration (Cmd. 6321) made on August 12th, 1941, by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (*i.e. the Atlantic Charter*). At an early convenient date conversations shall be begun between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded Governments.

"*Master Lend-Lease Agreements*", in identical terms, have been concluded by the United States with the Soviet Union (June 11th, 1942): China, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, Liberia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia, Australia, New Zealand and Canada have accepted the principles embodied in Article VII. Cf. E. R. Stettinius: "Lend-Lease" (1944).

C. THE ANGLO-SOVIET TREATY

Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Soviet Russia signed in London on May 26th, 1942:

Treaty of alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and of collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the Agreement between his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for joint action in the war against Germany, signed at Moscow on July 12th, 1941, and to replace them by a formal treaty;

Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace

and to the prevention of further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe ;

Desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the basis of the principles enunciated in the declaration made on August 14th, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has adhered ;

Desiring, finally, to provide for mutual assistance in the event of an attack upon either High Contracting Party by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Have decided to conclude a treaty for that purpose and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries . . . (who) have agreed as follows :

PART I

ARTICLE I

In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other Government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

PART II

ARTICLE III

(1) The High Contracting Parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period.

(2) Pending the adoption of such proposals, they will after the termination of hostilities take all the measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

ARTICLE IV

Should one of the High Contracting Parties during the post-war period become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III (2) in consequence of an attack by that State against that Party, the other High Contracting Party will at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance in his power.

This Article shall remain in force until the High Contracting Parties, by mutual agreement, shall recognize that it is superseded by the adoption of the proposals contemplated in Article III (1). In default of the adoption of such proposals, it shall remain in force for a period of twenty years, and thereafter until terminated by either High Contracting Party, as provided in Article VIII.

ARTICLE V

The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of the security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects, and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

ARTICLE VI

The High Contracting Parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

ARTICLE VII

Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE VIII

The present treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of the instruments of ratification, and shall thereupon replace the agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, signed at Moscow on July 12th, 1941.

Part I of the present treaty shall remain in force until the re-establishment of peace between the High Contracting Parties and Germany and the Powers associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part II of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of 20 years. Thereafter, unless 12 months' notice has been given by either party to terminate the treaty at the end of the said period of 20 years, it shall continue in force until 12 months after either High Contracting Party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

D. THE MOSCOW THREE-POWER CONFERENCE

The Conference of Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull ; of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden ; and of the Soviet Union, Mr. V. M. Molotov, took place at Moscow from October 19th

to 30th, 1943. *At the end of the Conference there was issued a joint communique explaining the achievements of the Conference and announcing the decisions to set up in London a European Advisory Commission representing the three Governments and an Advisory Council for matters relating to Italy in which the three Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation and eventually the Governments of Greece and Yugoslavia were to be represented. There were also issued four declarations.*

JOINT FOUR-NATIONS DECLARATION

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China :

United in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1st, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender ;

Conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression ;

Recognizing the necessity of insuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments ;

Jointly declare :

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other States except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union have established that their three governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States and United Kingdom declare that the action of their governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect :

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed fascism.

2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist régime shall be suppressed.

4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from institutions and organizations of a public character.

5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded full amnesty.

6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and Army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles stated above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The three governments, parties to this declaration, will, at the request of any one of them, consult on this matter. It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on

March 15th, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighbouring States which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

STATEMENT ON ATROCITIES

Declaration by President Roosevelt, Mr. Winston Churchill, and Marshal Stalin

The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that in their desperation the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from Hitlerites and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-three United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows :

At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres, and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands ; to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Italy.

Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know they will

be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals whose offences have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the governments of the Allies.

E. THE CAIRO DECLARATION

President Roosevelt, General Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Winston Churchill having met in Conference at Cairo from November 22nd to 26th, 1943, issued from their meeting the following declaration :

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan.

The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.

They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

F. THE TEHERAN DECLARATION

THREE-POWER AGREEMENT

Signed at Teheran December 1st, 1943.

We, the President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met in these four days past in this the capital of our ally, Teheran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in the war and in the peace that will follow.

As to the war, our military staffs have joined in our round-table discussions and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of operations which will be undertaken from the east, west and south. The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to the peace, we are sure that our concord will make it an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the co-operation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and in mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them as they may choose to come into the world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air. Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these friendly conferences we look with confidence to the day when all the peoples of the world may live free lives untouched by tyranny and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose.

G. THE CRIMEAN DECLARATION

The following statement was made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the result of the Crimea Conference, on February 12th, 1945.

1.—DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three allied Powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The Military Staffs of the three allied Powers have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three allies than ever before.

The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope, and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from east, west, north, and south have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three Staffs attained at this Conference will result in

shortening the war. Meetings of the three Staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

2.—OCCUPATION AND CONTROL

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany is accomplished.

Under the agreed plans the forces of the three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a Central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the three Powers with headquarters in Berlin.

It has been agreed that France should be invited by the three Powers, if she should so desire, to take a zone of occupation, and to participate as fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces : break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism ; remove or destroy all German military equipment ; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production ; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by Germans ; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions ; remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public offices and from the cultural and economic life of the German people ; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world.

It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations.

3.—REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to Allied Nations in this war, and recognize it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for the damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.

4.—UNITED NATIONS' CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic, and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving people. The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks.

On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve the difficulty.

We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco, in the United States, on April 25, 1945, to prepare the Charter of such an organization along the lines proposed in the informal conversation at Dumbarton Oaks. The Government of China and Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

5.—DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on Liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting the policies of the three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of Liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows—

The Premier of the U.S.S.R., the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of Liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in Liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples of Europe liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany, and the people of the former Axis satellite States to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice.

This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated State or former Axis satellite State in Europe where, in their judgement, conditions require :—

- (a) to establish conditions of peace ;
- (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people ;
- (c) to form interim Governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people ; and
- (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authority or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to themselves are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated State or any former Axis satellite State in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this Declaration.

By this Declaration we re-affirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build, in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this Declaration the three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with themselves in the procedure suggested.

6.—POLAND

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We re-affirmed our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent, and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussion we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major Powers. The agreement reached is as follows :—

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army.

This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should, therefore, be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines.

This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions, and that the final delimitations of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

7.—YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasitch that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that agreement. We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare that :—

(1) The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (*Avnoj*) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (*Skupshchina*) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament, and

(2) Legislative Acts passed by the Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

8.—MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value, and the Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in

the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London after the United Nations Conference on World Organizations.

9.—UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to the people of the world.

Only with continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, “afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”

It is considered that victory in this war and the establishment of the proposed international Organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

APPENDIX II

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

(See especially Chapter VII)

A. MEMBERSHIP

In March, 1944, fifty-one States were members of the I.L.O. These were :

Abyssinia	Hungary
Afghanistan	India
Albania	Iran
United States of America	Iraq
Argentine Republic	Ireland
Australia	Latvia
Belgium	Liberia
Bolivia	Lithuania
Brazil	Luxemburg
British Empire	Mexico
Bulgaria	Netherlands
Canada	New Zealand
Chile	Norway
China	Panama
Colombia	Peru
Cuba	Poland
Czechoslovakia	Portugal
Denmark	Sweden
Dominican Republic	Switzerland
Ecuador	Thailand
Egypt	Turkey
Estonia	Union of South Africa
Finland	Uruguay
France	Venezuela
Greece	Yugoslavia
Haiti	

The nominal membership of most neutral States, some enemy States (Hungary, Thailand), some States with no exiled government (Denmark), some which had been incorporated into the U.S.S.R. (the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), combined with the absence of the U.S.S.R. as a whole, reflects the basic difficulties encountered by the Organization in war-time.

B. THE DECLARATION OF PHILADELPHIA, MAY 10TH, 1944

The twenty-sixth Session of the I.L.O. met in Philadelphia from April 20th to May 12th, 1944. Delegations attended from forty-one member countries and included seventy-four Government delegates, twenty-eight Employers' and thirty Workers' delegates ; thus only twenty-eight were fully tripartite. In addition, observers were

present from Iceland, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Denmark. The conference published the following "Philadelphia Charter", whose principles were described by President Roosevelt as "the essential bulwarks of any permanent peace". It was adopted unanimously by the conference.

The International Labour Conference in Philadelphia, attended by delegates from forty-one countries and composed of representatives of governments, employers and workers, unanimously adopted the following "*Declaration concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organization*" :

The General Conference of the International Labour Organization, meeting in its Twenty-sixth Session in Philadelphia, hereby adopts this 10th day of May, in the year nineteen hundred and forty-four, the present Declaration of the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organization and of the principles which should inspire the policy of its Members.

I

The Conference reaffirms the fundamental principles on which the Organization is based, and, in particular, that :

- (a) labour is not a commodity ;
- (b) freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress ;
- (c) poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere ;
- (d) the war against want requires to be carried on with unremitting vigour within each nation, and by continuous and concerted international effort in which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of Governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic decision with a view to promotion of the common welfare.

II

Believing that experience has fully demonstrated the truth of the statement in the Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organization, that lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice, the Conference affirms that :

- (a) all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity ;
- (b) the attainment of the conditions in which this shall be possible must constitute the central aim of national and international policy ;
- (c) all national and international policies and measures, in particular those of an economic and financial character, should be judged in this light and accepted only in so far as they may be held to promote and not to hinder the achievement of this fundamental objective ;

- (d) it is a responsibility of the International Labour Organization to examine and consider all international economic and financial policies and measures in the light of this fundamental objective ;
- (e) in discharging the tasks entrusted to it the International Labour Organization, having considered all relevant economic and financial factors, may include in its decisions and recommendations any provisions which it considers appropriate.

III

The Conference recognizes the solemn obligation of the International Labour Organization to further among the nations of the world programmes which will achieve :

- (a) full employment and the raising of standards of living ;
- (b) the employment of workers in the occupations in which they can have the satisfaction of giving the fullest measure of their skill and attainments and make their greatest contribution to the common well-being ;
- (c) the provision, as a means to the attainment of this end and under adequate guarantees for all concerned, of facilities for training and the transfer of labour, including migration for employment and settlement ;
- (d) policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work calculated to ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all, and a minimum living wage to all employed and in need of such protection ;
- (e) the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the co-operation of management and labour in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency, and the collaboration of workers and employers in the preparation and application of social and economic measures ;
- (f) the extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to all in need of such protection and comprehensive medical care ;
- (g) adequate protection for the life and health of workers in all occupations ;
- (h) provision for child welfare and maternity protection ;
- (i) the provision of adequate nutrition, housing and facilities for recreation and culture ;
- (j) the assurance of equality of educational and vocational opportunity.

IV

Confident that the fuller and broader utilization of the world's productive resources necessary for the achievement of the objectives set forth in this Declaration can be secured by effective international and national action, including measures to expand production and consumption, to avoid severe economic fluctuations, to promote the economic and social advancement of the less developed regions of the

world, to assure greater stability in world prices of primary products, and to promote a high and steady volume of international trade, the Conference pledges the full co-operation of the International Labour Organization with such international bodies as may be entrusted with a share of the responsibility for this great task and for the promotion of the health, education and well-being of all peoples.

V

The Conference affirms that the principles set forth in this Declaration are fully applicable to all peoples everywhere and that, while the manner of their application must be determined with due regard to the stage of social and economic development reached by each people, their progressive application to peoples who are still dependent, as well as to those who have already achieved self-government, is a matter of concern to the whole civilized world.

APPENDIX III

NEW ORGANIZATIONS

A. THE UNITED NATIONS' RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

U.N.R.R.A. was formally established on November 9th, 1943, when representatives of forty-four countries, either United Nations or closely associated with them, signed at Washington the "Constitution" of U.N.R.R.A. of which the text is given below. The first session of the Council of U.N.R.R.A. so constituted was held at Atlantic City from November 10th to December 1st, 1943. (Its resolutions and reports are published as a White Paper, Cmd. 6497.)

THE CONSTITUTION OF U.N.R.R.A.

The Governments or Authorities whose duly authorized representatives have subscribed hereto,

Being United Nations or being associated with the United Nations in this war,

Being determined that immediately upon the liberation of any area by the armed forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of retreat of the enemy, the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and that preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed ¹ agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services,

Have agreed as follows :

ARTICLE I

There is hereby established the United Nations' Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

1. The Administration shall have power to acquire, hold and convey property, to enter into contracts and undertake obligations, to designate or create agencies and to review the activities of agencies so created, to manage undertakings and in general to perform any legal act appropriate to its objects and purposes.

2. Subject to the provisions of Article VII, the purposes and functions of the Administration shall be as follows :

(a) To plan, co-ordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical and other essential services ; and to facilitate in such areas, so far as necessary to the adequate provision of

¹ These words "urgently needed" were inserted after considerable debate, and are designed to limit the functions of U.N.R.R.A. in both scope and time.

relief, the production and transportation of these articles and the furnishing of these services. The form of activities of the Administration within the territory of a member government wherein that government exercises administrative authority and the responsibility to be assumed by the member government for carrying out measures planned by the Administration therein shall be determined after consultation with and with the consent of the member government.

- (b) To formulate and recommend measures for individual or joint action by any or all of the member governments for the co-ordination of purchasing, the use of ships and other procurement activities in the period following the cessation of hostilities, with a view to integrating the plans and activities of the Administration with the total movement of supplies, and for the purpose of achieving an equitable distribution of available supplies. The Administration may administer such co-ordination measures as may be authorized by the member governments concerned.
- (c) To study, formulate and recommend for individual or joint action by any or all of the member governments measures with respect to such related matters, arising out of its experience in planning and performing the work of relief and rehabilitation, as may be proposed by any of the member governments. Such proposal shall be studied and recommendations formulated if the proposals are supported by a vote of the Council, and the recommendations shall be referred to any or all of the member governments for individual or joint action if approved by unanimous vote of the Central Committee and by vote of the Council.

ARTICLE II

Membership

The members of the United Nations' Relief and Rehabilitation Administration shall be the governments or authorities signatory hereto and such other governments or authorities as may upon application for membership be admitted thereto by action of the Council. The Council may, if it desires, authorize the Central Committee to accept new members between sessions of the Council.

Wherever the term "member government" is used in this Agreement it shall be construed to mean a member of the Administration, whether a government or an authority.

ARTICLE III

The Council

1. Each member government shall have one representative, and such alternates as may be necessary, upon the Council of the United Nations' Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which shall be the policy-making body of the Administration. The Council shall, for each of its sessions, select one of its members to preside at the session. The Council shall determine its own rules of procedure.

Unless otherwise provided by the Agreement or by action of the Council, the Council shall vote by simple majority.

2. The Council shall be convened in regular session not less than twice a year by the Central Committee. It may be convened in special session whenever the Central Committee shall deem necessary, and shall be convened within thirty days after request therefor by one-third of the members of the Council.

3. The Central Committee of the Council shall consist of the representatives of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, with the Director-General presiding without vote. Between sessions of the Council it shall when necessary make policy decisions of an emergency nature. All such decisions shall be recorded in the minutes of the Central Committee which shall be communicated promptly to each member government. Such decisions shall be open to reconsideration by the Council at any regular session or at any special session called in accordance with Article III, paragraph 2. The Central Committee shall invite the participation of the representatives of any member government at those of its meetings at which action of special interest to such government is discussed. It shall invite the participation of the representative serving as Chairman of the Committee on Supplies of the Council at those of its meetings at which policies affecting the provision of supplies are discussed.

4. The Committee on Supplies of the Council shall consist of the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing those member governments likely to be principal suppliers of materials for relief and rehabilitation. The members shall be appointed by the Council, and the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make emergency appointments between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. The Committee on Supplies shall consider, formulate and recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies designed to assure the provision of required supplies. The Central Committee shall from time to time meet with the Committee on Supplies to review policy matters affecting supplies.

5. The Committee of the Council for Europe shall consist of all the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing member governments of territories within the European area, and such other members of the Council, representing other governments directly concerned with the problems of relief and rehabilitation in the European area, as shall be appointed by the Council; the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make these appointments in cases of emergency between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. The Committee of the Council for the Far East shall consist of all the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing member governments of territories within the Far Eastern area, and such other members of the Council representing other governments directly concerned with the problems of relief and rehabilitation in the Far Eastern area as shall be appointed by the Council; the Council may authorize

the Central Committee to make those appointments in cases of emergency between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. The regional committees shall normally meet within their respective areas. They shall consider and recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies with respect to relief and rehabilitation within their respective areas. The Committee of the Council for Europe shall replace the Inter-Allied Committee on European post-war relief established in London on September 24th, 1941, and the records of the latter shall be made available to the Committee for Europe.

6. The Council shall establish such other standing regional committees as it shall consider desirable, the functions of such committees and the method of appointing their members being identical to that provided in paragraph 5 of this Article with respect to the Committees of the Council for Europe and for the Far East. The Council shall also establish such other standing committees as it considers desirable to advise it, and, in intervals between sessions of the Council, to advise the Central Committee. For such technical standing committees as may be established, in respect of particular problems such as nutrition, health, agriculture, transport, repatriation, and finance, the members may be members of the Council or their alternates nominated by them because of special competence in their respective fields of work. The members shall be appointed by the Council, and the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make emergency appointments between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. Should a regional committee so desire, sub-committees of the technical standing committees shall be established by the technical committees in consultation with the regional committees, to advise the regional committees.

7. The travel and other expenses of members of the Council and of members of its committees shall be borne by the governments which they represent.

8. All reports and recommendations of committees of the Council shall be transmitted to the Director-General for distribution to the Council and the Central Committee by the secretariat of the Council established under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 4.

ARTICLE IV

The Director-General

1. The executive authority of the United Nations' Relief and Rehabilitation Administration shall be in the Director-General, who shall be appointed by the Council on the nomination by unanimous vote of the Central Committee. The Director-General may be removed by the Council on recommendation, by unanimous vote, of the Central Committee.

2. The Director-General shall have full power and authority for carrying out relief operations contemplated by Article I, paragraph 2 (a), within the limits of available resources and the broad policies determined by the Council or its Central Committee. Immediately

upon taking office he shall in conjunction with the military and other appropriate authorities of the United Nations prepare plans for the emergency relief of the civilian population in any area occupied by the armed forces of any of the United Nations, arrange for the procurement and assembly of the necessary supplies and create or select the emergency organization required for this purpose. In arranging for the procurement, transportation, and distribution of supplies and services, he and his representatives shall consult and collaborate with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations and shall, wherever practicable, use the facilities made available by such authorities. Foreign voluntary relief agencies may not engage in activity in any area receiving relief from the Administration without the consent and unless subject to the regulation of the Director-General. The powers and duties of the Director-General are subject to the limitations of Article VII.

3. The Director-General shall also be responsible for the organization and direction of the functions contemplated by Article I, paragraph 2 (b) and 2 (c).

4. The Director-General shall appoint such Deputy Directors-General, officers, expert personnel, and staff at his headquarters and elsewhere, including field missions, as he shall find necessary, and he may delegate to them such of his powers as he may deem appropriate. The Director-General, or upon his authorization the Deputy Directors-General, shall supply such secretariat and other staff and facilities as shall be required by the Council and its committees, including the regional committees and sub-committees. Such Deputy Directors-General as shall be assigned special functions within a region shall attend meetings of the regional standing committee whenever possible and shall keep it advised on the progress of the relief and rehabilitation programme within the region.

5. The Director-General shall make periodic reports to the Central Committee and to the Council covering the progress of the Administration's activities. The reports shall be made public except for such portions as the Central Committee may consider it necessary, in the interest of the United Nations, to keep confidential; if a report affects the interests of a member government in such a way as to render it questionable whether it should be published, such government shall have an opportunity of expressing its views on the question of publication. The Director-General shall also arrange to have prepared periodic reports covering the activities of the Administration within each region and he shall transmit such reports with his comments thereon to the Council, the Central Committee and the respective regional committees.

ARTICLE V

Supplies and Resources

1. In so far as its appropriate constitutional bodies shall authorize, each member government will contribute to the support of the Administration in order to accomplish the purposes of Article I, paragraph 2 (a). The amount and character of the contributions

of each member government under this provision will be determined from time to time by its appropriate constitutional bodies. All such contributions received by the Administration shall be accounted for.

2. The supplies and resources made available by the member governments shall be kept in review in relation to prospective requirements by the Director-General, who shall initiate action with the member governments with a view to assuring such additional supplies and resources as may be required.

3. All purchases by any of the member governments, to be made outside their own territories during the war for relief or rehabilitation purposes, shall be made only after consultation with the Director-General, and shall, so far as practicable, be carried out through the appropriate United Nations' agency.

ARTICLE VI

Administrative Expenses

The Director-General shall submit to the Council an annual budget, and from time to time such supplementary budgets as may be required, covering the necessary administrative expenses of the Administration. Upon approval of a budget by the Council the total amount approved shall be allocated to the member governments in proportions to be determined by the Council. Each member government undertakes, subject to the requirements of its constitutional procedure, to contribute to the Administration promptly its share of the Administrative expenses so determined.

ARTICLE VII

Notwithstanding any other provision herein contained, while hostilities or other military necessities exist in any area, the Administration and its Director-General shall not undertake activities therein without the consent of the military command of that area, and unless subject to such control as the command may find necessary. The determination that such hostilities or military necessities exist in any area shall be made by its military commander.

ARTICLE VIII

Amendment

The provisions of this Agreement may be amended as follows :

(a) Amendments involving new obligations for member governments shall require the approval of the Council by a two-thirds vote and shall take effect for each member government on acceptance by it ;

(b) Amendments involving modification of Article III or Article IV shall take effect on adoption by the Council by a two-thirds vote, including the votes of all the members of the Central Committee ;

(c) Other amendments shall take effect on adoption by the Council by a two-thirds vote.

ARTICLE IX

Entry into Force

This Agreement shall enter into force with respect to each signatory on the date when the Agreement is signed by that signatory, unless otherwise specified by such signatory.

ARTICLE X

Withdrawal

Any member government may give notice of withdrawal from the Administration at any time after the expiration of six months from the entry into force of the Agreement for that government. Such notice shall take effect twelve months after the date of its communication to the Director-General subject to the member government having met by that time all financial, supply or other material obligations accepted or undertaken by it.

B. PROPOSED CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS' FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION

The Conference of representatives of the forty-four United Nations which met at Hot Springs from May 18th to June 3rd, 1943, set up an Interim Commission which in due course proposed to the national Governments the setting up of a Food and Agriculture Organization.

The salient points of the proposed Constitution for such an Organization are as follows (Cmd. 6590, p. 2).

PREAMBLE

The Nations accepting this Constitution, being determined to promote the common welfare by furthering separate and collective action on their part for the purposes of—

Raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of the peoples under their respective jurisdictions ;

Securing improvements in the efficiency of production and distribution of all food and agricultural products ;

Bettering the conditions of rural populations ;

And thus contributing towards an expanding world economy, hereby establish the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, hereinafter referred to as the "Organization", through which the Members will report to one another on the measures taken and the progress achieved in the fields of action set forth above.

ARTICLE I (Functions of the Organization)

1. The Organization shall collect, analyse, interpret, and disseminate information relating to nutrition, food and agriculture.

2. The Organization shall promote and, where appropriate, shall recommend national and international action with respect to

(a) scientific, technological, social, and economic research relating to nutrition, food and agriculture ;

(b) the improvement of education and administration relating to nutrition, food and agriculture, and the spread of public knowledge of nutritional and agricultural science and practice ;

- (c) the conservation of natural resources and the adoption of improved methods of agricultural production ;
 - (d) the improvement of the processing, marketing, and distribution of food and agricultural products ;
 - (e) the adoption of policies for the provision of adequate agricultural credit, national and international ;
 - (f) the adoption of international policies with respect to agricultural commodity arrangements.
3. It shall also be the function of the Organization
- (a) to furnish such technical assistance as governments may request ;
 - (b) to organize, in cooperation with the governments concerned, such missions as may be needed to assist them to fulfil the obligations arising from their acceptance of the recommendations of the United Nations' Conference on Food and Agriculture ; and
 - (c) generally to take all necessary and appropriate action to implement the purposes of the Organization as set forth in the Preamble

[There is to be a Conference of the Organization, in which each Member nation is represented by one member, and has one vote : it is to meet at least once every year. For all ordinary purposes, a simple majority vote is sufficient, but for the admission of new Member nations, making recommendations to Member nations, submitting, conventions to Member nations, and undertaking new functions, a two-thirds majority is required (Articles II-IV).

There is to be an Executive Committee of the Conference, consisting of between nine and fifteen members, whose terms of office are left for the Conference to determine : as are the establishment and definition of other technical or regional committees (Articles V-VI).

There is to be a Director-General, to appoint and run the Staff and direct the work of the Organization (Articles VII-VIII).

The Organization is financed by States according to an agreed percentage each—the highest being the United States (25 per cent.) and the United Kingdom (15 per cent.) (Article XVIII and Annex II).]

C. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

The Governments on whose behalf the present Agreement is signed agree as follows :

INTRODUCTORY ARTICLE

The International Monetary Fund is established and shall operate in accordance with the following provisions :

ARTICLE I

Purposes

The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are :

- (i) To promote international monetary co-operation through

a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems.

(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.

(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.

(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.

(v) To give confidence to members by making the Fund's resources available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.

(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.

The Fund shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth in this Article.

ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

The Governments on whose behalf the present Agreement is signed agree as follows :

INTRODUCTORY ARTICLE

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is established and shall operate in accordance with the following provisions :

ARTICLE I

Purposes

The purposes of the Bank are :

(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peace-time needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries.

(ii) To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations in loans and other investments made by private investors ; and when private capital is not available on reasonable terms, to supplement private investment by providing, on suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes out of its own capital, funds raised by it and its other resources.

(iii) To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment for the development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labour in their territories.

(iv) To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international loans through other channels so that the more useful and urgent projects, large and small alike, will be dealt with first.

(v) To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international investment on business conditions in the territories of members and, in the immediate post-war years, to assist in bringing about a smooth transition from a war-time to a peace-time economy.

The Bank shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth above.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

A full bibliography on all aspects of peacemaking would be itself another book. It would also be quite out of date before publication. Most of the main books used by the authors have already been quoted in footnotes, where author, title and date of publication have invariably been given in the first reference to each book. The list now added is, therefore, neither a catalogue of sources, nor a reading-list for the specialist student. It is intended merely as a highly selective—and therefore somewhat arbitrary—indication of writings which seem to the authors to have immediate importance for the study of some of the major aspects of peacemaking, such as the interested reader might find useful.

A. PAMPHLETS AND PERIODICALS

The study of problems of peacemaking has become more highly organized in the twentieth century. In 1907, the American Association for International Conciliation was set up, and in 1910 a wider body was founded by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This foundation has done much to foster "a thorough and scientific investigation of the causes and results of war": and its monumental *Economic and Social History of the World War* is indispensable. Its monthly publication, *International Conciliation*, which has continued to appear throughout the war, is a most valuable source of documents, speeches and reports of study-groups.

The League of Nations publications and the International Labour Office publications are equally valuable sources: especially the *Handbook of International Organizations*, the *Quarterly Bulletin of Information on the Work of International Organizations*, and the *International Labour Review* (published in English, French and Spanish). The I.L.O. *Legislative Series*, consisting of translations and reprints of the texts of the most important laws and regulations affecting labour adopted in each country, provides further basic material.

The *Foreign Office Handbooks* published in the last war have collected much material in handy form for the historian: and during this war, the many *Ministry of Information* and *Department of War Information* publications have given up-to-date information about the British and United Nations' preparations for peace. But private associations have produced even more. The *American Council on Foreign Relations* and the *Royal Institute of International Affairs* (R.I.I.A.) have prepared special reports by experts on problems of peace. Most of these have been referred to in the footnotes. The *National Peace Council* and the *Fabian Society* have done much to make original sources popularly available. The N.P.C. "Peace-Aims Documents" and the Fabian "Research Series" have kept the public well supplied with handy and inexpensive material of first-rate importance. On even more popular level, the *Oxford Pamphlets* published by the Oxford University Press and the A.B.C.A. pamphlets published by the British Army Bureau of Current Affairs for H.M. Forces, have carried popular and accurate study of war and peace much further than in the last war. The *Current Problems Series* published by the Cambridge University Press has helped in the same direction. All have helped to mould the "atmosphere" and "climate" of peacemaking in Britain and the United States.

B. BOOKS

Among books which have evolved a more scientific approach to international relations, and which have exerted special influence on contemporary thought about peacemaking, are especially :

E. H. CARR : *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939).

— : *Conditions of Peace* (1942).

F. A. HAYEK : *The Road to Serfdom* (1944).

KARL MANNHEIM : *Ideology and Utopia* (1936).

— : *Man and Society* (1940).

DAVID MITRANY : *A Working Peace System* (1943).

LEONARD WOOLF : *International Government* (1916).

— : *The War for Peace* (1940).

The general conflict between the "realist" approach and the reaction against it can be studied in the above works.

Among accounts of peacemaking last time and the experiment of the League of Nations, the following are authoritative :

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VISCOUNT CECIL : *A Great Experiment* (1941).

F. S. MARSTON : *The Peace Conference of 1919* (1944).

D. HUNTER MILLER : *The Drafting of the Covenant* (2 Vols., 1928).

HAROLD NICOLSON : *Peacemaking, 1919* (1933).

WILLIAM E. RAPPARD : *The Quest for Peace* (1940).

SIR A. ZIMMERN : *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-35* (1936).

More specialized studies of the relations between the Powers before and during this war include the following :

P. E. CORBETT : *Post-War Worlds* (1942).

G. M. GATHORNE-HARDY : *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-38* (1938).

ANDRÉ GROS : *Les Problèmes Politiques de l'Europe* (1942).

W. M. JORDAN : *Great Britain, France and the German Problem, 1918-39* (1943).

WALTER LIPPMANN : *U.S. Foreign Policy* (1943) and *U.S. War Aims* (1944).

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN : *Europe on the Eve : the Crises of Diplomacy, 1933-39* (1939).

ARNOLD WOLFERS : *Britain and France Between Two Wars* (1940).

The great controversy over "the German Problem" can be followed in these writings, among many others :

LORD VANSITTART : *Black Record* (1941) and *Roots of the Trouble* (1942).

H. FRANKEL : *Lord Vansittart's Gift to Goebbels* (1942).

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The first two formulate the argument of "Vansittartism", the second two the contrary arguments. The controversy is discussed more fully in :

F. W. FOERSTER : *Europe and the German Question* (1941).

T. H. MINSHALL : *Future Germany* (1943).

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The more long-range, social and economic tasks of modern peacemaking have nowhere been systematically explored, but of immediate relevance to study of them are the following :

SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE : *Full Employment in a Free Society* (1944).

HERMAN FINER : *The T.V.A. : Lessons for International Application* (1944).

DAVID E. LILIENTHAL : *T.V.A. : Democracy on the March* (1944).

LIONEL ROBBINS : *Economic Planning and International Order* (1937).

— : *The Economic Causes of War* (1939).

GUSTAV STOLPER : *This Age of Fable* (1943).

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HENRY A. WALLACE : *The Century of the Common Man* (1944).

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P. L. YATES and D. WARRINER : *Food and Farming in Post-War Europe* (1943).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS : *The Transition from War to Peace Economy* (1943).

R.I.I.A. REPORT : *Occupied Europe* (1944).

Finally, the historical aspects of peacemaking—mainly of political and diplomatic treaty-making and of ideas about peacemaking—may be studied in the following :

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